The Student Room Group

OCR AS History Britain 1930-1997 Wednesday 18th May

Any predictions for tomorrow afternoon's paper?
Bumping this back to the top of the threads ... am I the only one? :afraid:
yh i have no clue aswell:argh:
(edited 7 years ago)
British Modern History 1930 (Churchill) --> 1997, right?
Original post by idfk_alex
British Modern History 1930 (Churchill) --> 1997, right?


yeah probably, i wonder what the 20 marker would be for section B- something about international crisis would be nice
Does anyone have a "perfect"/ model answer to the essay? I asked my teacher if she could do a demo of a perfect answer to a 20 marker and she said 'no' each time LOOOL, so yeah, no idea what im doing tomorrow
(edited 7 years ago)
Original post by idfk_alex
British Modern History 1930 (Churchill) --> 1997, right?


Yep thats the one ... any tips from teachers about what to expect?
Point, Evidence, Explanation, Evaluation

To what extent was Thatcher’s resignation in 1990 a result of Conservative divisions over Europe? (20 marks)

Margaret Thatcher was Britain’s first female Prime Minister, ushering in an unprecedented era of Conservative domination between 1979-97, and overturning the Keynesian ‘post-war consensus’ of the welfare state with her radical new-right economic policies. Whilst Conservative divisions over greater political and financial integration with Europe were certainly an important cause of the acrimonious crisis that led to her resignation in 1990, one must also consider the short-term impact of her misjudged poll tax, and disillusionment with her leadership amongst high-ranking Conservatives in 1990s. Ultimately, all of these problems can be traced back to the underlying economic malaise in Britain that developed over the years of Thatcher’s monetarist rule. Therefore, long-term financial problems were the fundamental cause of Thatcher’s resignation, and the view expressed in the question is valid only to a limited extent.

The divisions over Europe which damaged Conservative unity and Thatcher’s position certainly contributed to her resignation. Since the late 1960s, the EEC (of which Britain had been a member since 1973) had begun to move closer to a monetary union. Whilst Thatcher had supported the Single European Act (1986), under the belief that it would lead to the emergence of a pure capitalist free market economy, she was opposed to monetary union, as it contradicted her deeply-held beliefs in ‘small government’ and ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’ she was reluctant to cede British sovereignty to a centralised European location. The tensions came to a head when Thatcher opposed Britain’s joining of the European Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM), against advice from her key allies, Geoffrey Howe (Foreign Secretary) and Nigel Lawson (Chancellor). Their disagreements with Thatcher led to a demotion and resignation respectively, the public fallout of which greatly weakened Thatcher’s position of leadership within the Conservative Party and led many to question whether she was still fit to command the party and rule the country. The European debate exposed deep rifts in the Conservatives and contributed to Thatcher’s resignation, as she could no longer rely on the loyalty of a large section of her party (who had kept her in power for the previous 11 years). However, Conservative divisions over Europe only became so severe because of the underlying economic difficulties in Britain if Britain’s economy had not been so tumultuous, Howe would not have advocated joining the ERM as a means to stabilise the country’s finances, and the entire disagreement that led to the two high-profile resignations would have been averted. In addition, disagreements over Europe had existed in the party for decades, but were successfully avoided in times of economic prosperity. Therefore, although divisions over Europe were important in causing Thatcher’s downfall, the fundamental cause was the economic decline of Britain between 1979-1990.

The primary cause of Thatcher’s resignation was the country’s steady economic decline throughout Thatcher’s rule. Whilst her monetarist, free-market policies of privatisation and deregulation had led to a boom in modern sectors of the economy (finance, services, etc.), traditional industries had suffered greatly (coal, steel, etc.), leading to serious problems with unemployment amongst the working classes (at times, surmounting 3 million nationwide). In addition, her deregulation of the financial markets and the rampant speculation that followed led to a stock market crash in 1987 that wiped 24% off share prices. A subsequent series of misguided income tax and interest rate policies by Lawson to avoid recession had the unintended effect of triggering mass inflation, which raised the cost of living, and raising interest rates to 15%. The latter effect was particularly important, as it financially struck mortgage-paying middle classes, the demographic that Thatcher had traditionally relied on at elections and whom she had encouraged to borrow to buy houses. Thatcher’s economic miracle began to look increasingly unconvincing, and the stark realities of financial desperation exposed by her misguided fiscal policy meant that she could no longer rely on an image of ‘economic competence’ to maintain support within her Cabinet, party, Parliament and amongst the country at large. Whilst this did not directly cause her resignation, as she attempted to stubbornly continue her strict monetarism, it massively weakened her electability and led to the resignations and leadership challenges within her Cabinet which ultimately forced her to realise her position was untenable.

The poll tax served to tip Thatcher’s precarious position over the edge and force her resignation, although it only triggered the considerable problems that had built up in the preceding years. The poll tax was Thatcher’s ill-judged attempt in 1998 to replace ‘the rates’ (a tax on the owners of property) with the Community Charge, which would serve as a flat tax charged equally on all individuals thereby proportionally disadvantaging the less well-off in society. Whilst Thatcher’s party had supported her up to this point, the poll tax was seen by many as a moral step too far into the ruthlessness of free market neo-con capitalism; and more pragmatically, as the issue on which the next election would be decided against the Conservatives. This opposition threatened the security of her premiership. Their concerns were well-founded; in its introductory phase in Scotland, millions of Scots (encouraged by the SNP) refused to pay, and in March 1990, the day before it was due to be imposed in England, a massive demonstration in Trafalgar Square turned into a riot which led to 300 arrests and 400 police injuries. The poll tax was evidently unpopular; yet Thatcher chose to press ahead despite the warnings of the electorate and her Cabinet. This increasingly dictatorial style alienated her previously close supporters, and led to resignations, leadership challenges and her subsequent resignation. However, one must note that the immense political backlash against the poll tax did not exist in isolation, but as a representative culmination of dissatisfaction at her extreme economic policies, which were disproportionately punitive against the less wealthy. Had Britain been in a more holistic state of economic prosperity, it is unlikely that the poll tax would have caused such anger amongst the electorate however, coming hot on the heels of inflation, rising indirect taxes and unemployment, the poll tax was a fatal blow to her credibility. Her party had been coming to the gradual realisation that they would be unable to win a future election after alienating large swathes of the electorate due to Thatcher’s questionable economics the negativity surrounding the poll tax was merely the final straw.

Therefore, it is clear that the underlying and most important reason for Thatcher’s resignation in 1990 was her poor economic policy in her three terms in office. Her far-right monetarist economics damaged the country, financially and socially, and led to the belief amongst high-ranking Conservatives, e.g. Howe and Lawson, that it would be impossible for the party to win the next election under Thatcher. Combined with the twin pressures of considering European integration (inflamed by economic difficulties) and the misjudgement of the poll tax. Thatcher was forced from office by Conservative ministers fearful of their party’s future. Thatcher’s resignation, then, was only a result of Conservative divisions over Europe to a partial extent.


A very long answer but this is like a high level answer
Senpai thats great! Do you mind specifying where the marks are earned? i.e is there a max of 4-6 marks for knowledge, 7-8 marks for evaluation or something? Thank you
Original post by SenpaiHelp
Point, Evidence, Explanation, Evaluation

To what extent was Thatcher’s resignation in 1990 a result of Conservative divisions over Europe? (20 marks)

Margaret Thatcher was Britain’s first female Prime Minister, ushering in an unprecedented era of Conservative domination between 1979-97, and overturning the Keynesian ‘post-war consensus’ of the welfare state with her radical new-right economic policies. Whilst Conservative divisions over greater political and financial integration with Europe were certainly an important cause of the acrimonious crisis that led to her resignation in 1990, one must also consider the short-term impact of her misjudged poll tax, and disillusionment with her leadership amongst high-ranking Conservatives in 1990s. Ultimately, all of these problems can be traced back to the underlying economic malaise in Britain that developed over the years of Thatcher’s monetarist rule. Therefore, long-term financial problems were the fundamental cause of Thatcher’s resignation, and the view expressed in the question is valid only to a limited extent.

The divisions over Europe which damaged Conservative unity and Thatcher’s position certainly contributed to her resignation. Since the late 1960s, the EEC (of which Britain had been a member since 1973) had begun to move closer to a monetary union. Whilst Thatcher had supported the Single European Act (1986), under the belief that it would lead to the emergence of a pure capitalist free market economy, she was opposed to monetary union, as it contradicted her deeply-held beliefs in ‘small government’ and ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’ she was reluctant to cede British sovereignty to a centralised European location. The tensions came to a head when Thatcher opposed Britain’s joining of the European Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM), against advice from her key allies, Geoffrey Howe (Foreign Secretary) and Nigel Lawson (Chancellor). Their disagreements with Thatcher led to a demotion and resignation respectively, the public fallout of which greatly weakened Thatcher’s position of leadership within the Conservative Party and led many to question whether she was still fit to command the party and rule the country. The European debate exposed deep rifts in the Conservatives and contributed to Thatcher’s resignation, as she could no longer rely on the loyalty of a large section of her party (who had kept her in power for the previous 11 years). However, Conservative divisions over Europe only became so severe because of the underlying economic difficulties in Britain if Britain’s economy had not been so tumultuous, Howe would not have advocated joining the ERM as a means to stabilise the country’s finances, and the entire disagreement that led to the two high-profile resignations would have been averted. In addition, disagreements over Europe had existed in the party for decades, but were successfully avoided in times of economic prosperity. Therefore, although divisions over Europe were important in causing Thatcher’s downfall, the fundamental cause was the economic decline of Britain between 1979-1990.

The primary cause of Thatcher’s resignation was the country’s steady economic decline throughout Thatcher’s rule. Whilst her monetarist, free-market policies of privatisation and deregulation had led to a boom in modern sectors of the economy (finance, services, etc.), traditional industries had suffered greatly (coal, steel, etc.), leading to serious problems with unemployment amongst the working classes (at times, surmounting 3 million nationwide). In addition, her deregulation of the financial markets and the rampant speculation that followed led to a stock market crash in 1987 that wiped 24% off share prices. A subsequent series of misguided income tax and interest rate policies by Lawson to avoid recession had the unintended effect of triggering mass inflation, which raised the cost of living, and raising interest rates to 15%. The latter effect was particularly important, as it financially struck mortgage-paying middle classes, the demographic that Thatcher had traditionally relied on at elections and whom she had encouraged to borrow to buy houses. Thatcher’s economic miracle began to look increasingly unconvincing, and the stark realities of financial desperation exposed by her misguided fiscal policy meant that she could no longer rely on an image of ‘economic competence’ to maintain support within her Cabinet, party, Parliament and amongst the country at large. Whilst this did not directly cause her resignation, as she attempted to stubbornly continue her strict monetarism, it massively weakened her electability and led to the resignations and leadership challenges within her Cabinet which ultimately forced her to realise her position was untenable.

The poll tax served to tip Thatcher’s precarious position over the edge and force her resignation, although it only triggered the considerable problems that had built up in the preceding years. The poll tax was Thatcher’s ill-judged attempt in 1998 to replace ‘the rates’ (a tax on the owners of property) with the Community Charge, which would serve as a flat tax charged equally on all individuals thereby proportionally disadvantaging the less well-off in society. Whilst Thatcher’s party had supported her up to this point, the poll tax was seen by many as a moral step too far into the ruthlessness of free market neo-con capitalism; and more pragmatically, as the issue on which the next election would be decided against the Conservatives. This opposition threatened the security of her premiership. Their concerns were well-founded; in its introductory phase in Scotland, millions of Scots (encouraged by the SNP) refused to pay, and in March 1990, the day before it was due to be imposed in England, a massive demonstration in Trafalgar Square turned into a riot which led to 300 arrests and 400 police injuries. The poll tax was evidently unpopular; yet Thatcher chose to press ahead despite the warnings of the electorate and her Cabinet. This increasingly dictatorial style alienated her previously close supporters, and led to resignations, leadership challenges and her subsequent resignation. However, one must note that the immense political backlash against the poll tax did not exist in isolation, but as a representative culmination of dissatisfaction at her extreme economic policies, which were disproportionately punitive against the less wealthy. Had Britain been in a more holistic state of economic prosperity, it is unlikely that the poll tax would have caused such anger amongst the electorate however, coming hot on the heels of inflation, rising indirect taxes and unemployment, the poll tax was a fatal blow to her credibility. Her party had been coming to the gradual realisation that they would be unable to win a future election after alienating large swathes of the electorate due to Thatcher’s questionable economics the negativity surrounding the poll tax was merely the final straw.

Therefore, it is clear that the underlying and most important reason for Thatcher’s resignation in 1990 was her poor economic policy in her three terms in office. Her far-right monetarist economics damaged the country, financially and socially, and led to the belief amongst high-ranking Conservatives, e.g. Howe and Lawson, that it would be impossible for the party to win the next election under Thatcher. Combined with the twin pressures of considering European integration (inflamed by economic difficulties) and the misjudgement of the poll tax. Thatcher was forced from office by Conservative ministers fearful of their party’s future. Thatcher’s resignation, then, was only a result of Conservative divisions over Europe to a partial extent.


A very long answer but this is like a high level answer


Blimey! Thanks so much!
Reply 10
Original post by SenpaiHelp
Point, Evidence, Explanation, Evaluation

To what extent was Thatcher’s resignation in 1990 a result of Conservative divisions over Europe? (20 marks)

Margaret Thatcher was Britain’s first female Prime Minister, ushering in an unprecedented era of Conservative domination between 1979-97, and overturning the Keynesian ‘post-war consensus’ of the welfare state with her radical new-right economic policies. Whilst Conservative divisions over greater political and financial integration with Europe were certainly an important cause of the acrimonious crisis that led to her resignation in 1990, one must also consider the short-term impact of her misjudged poll tax, and disillusionment with her leadership amongst high-ranking Conservatives in 1990s. Ultimately, all of these problems can be traced back to the underlying economic malaise in Britain that developed over the years of Thatcher’s monetarist rule. Therefore, long-term financial problems were the fundamental cause of Thatcher’s resignation, and the view expressed in the question is valid only to a limited extent.

The divisions over Europe which damaged Conservative unity and Thatcher’s position certainly contributed to her resignation. Since the late 1960s, the EEC (of which Britain had been a member since 1973) had begun to move closer to a monetary union. Whilst Thatcher had supported the Single European Act (1986), under the belief that it would lead to the emergence of a pure capitalist free market economy, she was opposed to monetary union, as it contradicted her deeply-held beliefs in ‘small government’ and ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’ she was reluctant to cede British sovereignty to a centralised European location. The tensions came to a head when Thatcher opposed Britain’s joining of the European Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM), against advice from her key allies, Geoffrey Howe (Foreign Secretary) and Nigel Lawson (Chancellor). Their disagreements with Thatcher led to a demotion and resignation respectively, the public fallout of which greatly weakened Thatcher’s position of leadership within the Conservative Party and led many to question whether she was still fit to command the party and rule the country. The European debate exposed deep rifts in the Conservatives and contributed to Thatcher’s resignation, as she could no longer rely on the loyalty of a large section of her party (who had kept her in power for the previous 11 years). However, Conservative divisions over Europe only became so severe because of the underlying economic difficulties in Britain if Britain’s economy had not been so tumultuous, Howe would not have advocated joining the ERM as a means to stabilise the country’s finances, and the entire disagreement that led to the two high-profile resignations would have been averted. In addition, disagreements over Europe had existed in the party for decades, but were successfully avoided in times of economic prosperity. Therefore, although divisions over Europe were important in causing Thatcher’s downfall, the fundamental cause was the economic decline of Britain between 1979-1990.

The primary cause of Thatcher’s resignation was the country’s steady economic decline throughout Thatcher’s rule. Whilst her monetarist, free-market policies of privatisation and deregulation had led to a boom in modern sectors of the economy (finance, services, etc.), traditional industries had suffered greatly (coal, steel, etc.), leading to serious problems with unemployment amongst the working classes (at times, surmounting 3 million nationwide). In addition, her deregulation of the financial markets and the rampant speculation that followed led to a stock market crash in 1987 that wiped 24% off share prices. A subsequent series of misguided income tax and interest rate policies by Lawson to avoid recession had the unintended effect of triggering mass inflation, which raised the cost of living, and raising interest rates to 15%. The latter effect was particularly important, as it financially struck mortgage-paying middle classes, the demographic that Thatcher had traditionally relied on at elections and whom she had encouraged to borrow to buy houses. Thatcher’s economic miracle began to look increasingly unconvincing, and the stark realities of financial desperation exposed by her misguided fiscal policy meant that she could no longer rely on an image of ‘economic competence’ to maintain support within her Cabinet, party, Parliament and amongst the country at large. Whilst this did not directly cause her resignation, as she attempted to stubbornly continue her strict monetarism, it massively weakened her electability and led to the resignations and leadership challenges within her Cabinet which ultimately forced her to realise her position was untenable.

The poll tax served to tip Thatcher’s precarious position over the edge and force her resignation, although it only triggered the considerable problems that had built up in the preceding years. The poll tax was Thatcher’s ill-judged attempt in 1998 to replace ‘the rates’ (a tax on the owners of property) with the Community Charge, which would serve as a flat tax charged equally on all individuals thereby proportionally disadvantaging the less well-off in society. Whilst Thatcher’s party had supported her up to this point, the poll tax was seen by many as a moral step too far into the ruthlessness of free market neo-con capitalism; and more pragmatically, as the issue on which the next election would be decided against the Conservatives. This opposition threatened the security of her premiership. Their concerns were well-founded; in its introductory phase in Scotland, millions of Scots (encouraged by the SNP) refused to pay, and in March 1990, the day before it was due to be imposed in England, a massive demonstration in Trafalgar Square turned into a riot which led to 300 arrests and 400 police injuries. The poll tax was evidently unpopular; yet Thatcher chose to press ahead despite the warnings of the electorate and her Cabinet. This increasingly dictatorial style alienated her previously close supporters, and led to resignations, leadership challenges and her subsequent resignation. However, one must note that the immense political backlash against the poll tax did not exist in isolation, but as a representative culmination of dissatisfaction at her extreme economic policies, which were disproportionately punitive against the less wealthy. Had Britain been in a more holistic state of economic prosperity, it is unlikely that the poll tax would have caused such anger amongst the electorate however, coming hot on the heels of inflation, rising indirect taxes and unemployment, the poll tax was a fatal blow to her credibility. Her party had been coming to the gradual realisation that they would be unable to win a future election after alienating large swathes of the electorate due to Thatcher’s questionable economics the negativity surrounding the poll tax was merely the final straw.

Therefore, it is clear that the underlying and most important reason for Thatcher’s resignation in 1990 was her poor economic policy in her three terms in office. Her far-right monetarist economics damaged the country, financially and socially, and led to the belief amongst high-ranking Conservatives, e.g. Howe and Lawson, that it would be impossible for the party to win the next election under Thatcher. Combined with the twin pressures of considering European integration (inflamed by economic difficulties) and the misjudgement of the poll tax. Thatcher was forced from office by Conservative ministers fearful of their party’s future. Thatcher’s resignation, then, was only a result of Conservative divisions over Europe to a partial extent.


A very long answer but this is like a high level answer


hmmm this looks familiar 🤔 ... I really don't appreciate people using my work without permission.
How did everyone find the exam?
I personally HATED the source questions, I think I messed those up because I lacked Norway knowledge unfortunately :frown:
Original post by Spaghetti_Oh
How did everyone find the exam?
I personally HATED the source questions, I think I messed those up because I lacked Norway knowledge unfortunately :frown:


Q2 was really difficult, none of the sources were that relevant to the view stated(?). Only did half of Q2,,, didn't have enough time to go back to it
Reply 13
Couldn't agree more felt like the sources didn't really help answe question 2, unfair if you didn't know about Norway. Questions 3 and 4 were good i thought
Reply 14
I didn't finish question 2 fully so just went on to do question 3. Annoying thing with history exams is you could be writing for 30 mins and only have done half your question.

For question 2, I just tried to talk about how Source B pointed out Churchill's flaws after a "drive against Chamberlain" meaning he would not have been in power if Chamberlain was not opposed. It mentioned something about a "strain with the admiralty" which I said highlighted the fact that someone who had worked at the head of the navy prior to becoming a wartime PM makes it seem as though Churchill was not fit to rule but only had the opportunity to due to Chamberlain being opposed. Then I just mentioned some other stuff about his flaws and why that would hinder his chances of becoming PM but because of the situation he was the only one they could rely on.
For source C, I just talked about the provenance and the obvious discord between Chamberlain and his cabinet. Because of this, they needed someone to lead and Churchill seemed the only choice. Therefore, it was only due to Chamberlain's unpopularity that Churchill was able to lead. I included some own knowledge stuff about why Chamberlain was opposed like failure of appeasement and allowing Hitler to "play" him but I should have mentioned that Churchill had opposed appeasement and strongly supported rearmament which is what the country had to resort to. Since Churchill was right about actions needed to be taken against Hitler, despite being in the minority, he stood out as a canditate.
I wrote nothing about source C because I would have spent too long thinking about it so just started question 3.

For question 3 I don't think I stuck to the mark scheme too well but I just mentioned a lot of things;
- Labour split was main reason for Conservative domination: NHS, Bevan vs Gaitskell, nuclear policy, Bevan being expelled from parliamentary party, Europe and trade unions. I basically kept saying that because Labour were so divided they did not really pose a threat to Conservative domination; stagflation, 'stop-go', Suez Crisis. Fairly limited number of weakenesses due to time and the fact my main argument on this side was Labour weakness.
- Then I talked about how the Conservatives were able to dominate despite some huge weaknesses which showed the extent of Labour divide but I didn't explain too well.
- My other side of the argument was basically saying that the Conseratives did have strengths which helped them dominate; policies (such as housing boom and 'more read meat' promise), reducing tax on income before elections, increased living standards, wages rising quicker than prices, greater availability of credit etc.

Honestly I think that I got a high C/low B because I wasn't very good at analysing and I couldn't explain things as well as I would have liked due to rushing. 10 minutes more could have increased my marks massively I feel.
(edited 7 years ago)

Quick Reply

Latest

Trending

Trending