Edexcel: From kaiser to fuhrer 1900-1945, his03/d exam friday 10th june 2016

There's an essay on page 3 on the final solution but I can't get on it could someone please be an absolute hero and copy and paste it for me pleaseeee 😬
Thanks in advance

Reply 182

jodie1012

1

Original post by Annie.humair

There's an essay on page 3 on the final solution but I can't get on it could someone please be an absolute hero and copy and paste it for me pleaseeee 😬
Thanks in advance

The origin and motive of the Nazi decision,reached at the Wannsee Conference in 1942, to adopt the ‘Final Solution’ forthe systematic extermination of the Jewish population is a highly debatedtopic. Dawidowicz and other intentionalist historians argue that it was thedistinct desire of Hitler and long—term anti-Semitism in Germany which hadculminated in a planned escalation of policy to the point of extermination. Onthe other hand, Functionalist historians such as Schleunes and Mommsen suggestthat the primary cause of the decision lies in the chaos of the the SecondWorld War and the disorder of the government at the time, which shaped policyand forced the Nazi’s to seek a short-term solution to the increasing number ofJews under German control. This essay will argue a synthesis of both views, andthat while it is important to consider the role of long-term aspirations ofHitler in directing policy, the chaos of WW2 was, to a great extent, pivotal indetermining when and how the Final Solution evolved as it did. Intentionalist historians such as Flemingand Dawidowicz both see Hitler, and his long-term drive for the ‘elimination ofworld Jewery’, as the crucial cause of the Holocaust, and to an extent, thereis a level of evidence to suggest the role of this desire, instead of theimmediacy of war, to the development of the Final Solution. Hitler’santi-semitic belief, documented in ‘Mein Kampf’ in which he argued that WW1could have been won if 100,000 Jews had been killed, was a fundamental elementof Nazi policy. Dawidowicz comments that the Final Solution was caused as aresult of a planned ‘gradual escalation’ of this policy, from the conception ofideas in the 1920’s, shown in Mein Kampf and the Nazi’s 25-point program, toimplementation in the 1930’s, with incidents such as Kristallnacht, to theclimatic extermination of Jews in the 1940’s. Hitler’s 1939 ‘prophecy’ speechto the Reichstag, in which he declared that in the event of war the‘annihilation of Jews’ would be a ‘necessary consequence’ adds weight to intentionalist’sview that Hitler foresaw a Holocaust in some form. However, some have pointedout the comparison between the moderate anti-Semitism during the 1920’s andparts of the 1930’s, such as during the Berlin Olympics, as indicative ofHitler not being fully committed or able to pursue Jewish exterminationthroughout the period, instead demonstrating the decisive role of WW2 in providingthe opportunity to transform anti-Semitic sentiment from weak policy to one of extermination.While Dulger maintains that the Holocuast was inconceivable with Hitler’s willand authority driving the escalating policy, Goldhagen argues that the prevalenceof anti-Semitism amongst the German people and their complicity as Hitler’s‘willing executioners’ was, instead, a crucial trigger and driver in thedevelopment of the Final Solution, and thus the cause lay not only with Hitlerbut with the German population as a whole. The Orpo police, for example, playeda pivotal role in the administration of the early mass murder of Jews, withover 2,000 members in Warsaw, highlighting the willing role and ambition of thepublic in the implementation and development of the Final Solution. The increasein Nazi support to 37% of the electorate in July 1932, in the wake of itsideological developments such as the 25-point program’s ‘Point 4’ thatdenounced all Jews as non- Germans, could be seen to indicate this nation-wideanti-Semitic intention which was responsible for the Final Solution. However,as identified by Muhlberger, Nazi appeal was heterogeneous and was not only linkedto anti-Semitism, suggesting to an extent that this link is weak. Moreover, theearlier opposition towards the intensifying policies of exclusion and murderwithin Germany, such as the Catholic opposition to the 1939 Euthanasia program,which was subsequently stopped by the Nazis in response, indicate that generalextermination and anti-Semitism was not a fully entrenched part of societalopinion prior to the war. Lending weight, therefore, to the view, as argued byGotz Aly, that the chaos of war was crucial in ‘destroying all German ties totradition’, and providing a situation of disorder which enabled the extrememethods of the ‘Final Solution’ to become a possible option. Indicating that, whileintentioinalist’s argument of the role of long-term anti-Semitism and desiresfor a solution to the ‘Jewish question’ certainty played a part in facilitatingthe growth of an anti-Jewish policy, the need for a short-term resolution as aresult of the pressures of war was key to determining when and in what way the‘Final Solution’ developed. Conversely, functionalist historians suchas Mommsen argue that the Final Solution was ‘not based on a long-termprogram’, and arose instead purely out of the chaos of Nazi government administrationin the face of war and the failure of previous solutions. The invasion ofPoland in 1939, which increased the number of Jews under German control by 3million, and the USSR in 1941, significantly increased the pressure andresponsibility of the Jewish race in Germany, leading to an escalation inpolicy and requirement for solution. Schleunes had argued that the road towardsthe Final Solution was a ‘twisted one’ and did not follow a direct path fromintentional anti-Semitism, but evolved out of the changing circumstances anddifficulties of war. Originally, it was deportation, not extermination that wasthe preferred solution, with Madagascar and then later Siberia that wereproposed as relocation territory for the Jewish population, lending weight toSchleunes’s assertion that the Final Solution did not follow a planned andstraightforward escalation. It was the chaos of war that rendered these optionsvoid. Firstly, Madagascar wasruled out due to the nature and practicalities of ‘total war’, and the laterSiberia initiative in the face of renewed Russian resistance at Stalingrad in1942, the same year as the Wannsee Conference at which it is argued the ‘FinalSolution’ was devised. As Lee has pointed out, it was as a result of‘inadequacies instead of efficiencies’ in German policy that led to the FinalSolution, as evidenced in the Nazi attempt and failure to utilise the SS deathsquad, the Einsaztrgruppen, as the initial way to remove the Jewish populationin response to the unsuccessful outcome of relocation plans. It was the failure of these solutions due tothe constraints of war, and increasing number of Jews that were brought underGerman control through war that escalated Nazi policy to form the Final Solutionto resolve these pressures. Given thatthe Final Solution and method of extermination was only devised in 1942, thereis significant evidence to suggest it was the impediments and demands of warthat caused the Nazis to resort the Final Solution. The disorder of war alsofacilitated an increasingly chaotic Nazi government and the overlappinginstitutions led to the emergence of numerous groups in government vying forthe creation of a preferred solution to the Jewish question. Emerging on topwas the Himmler led SS, who expanded their influence and position of terror inGermany during the turmoil of war, and the well documented role they played inorchestrating the Final Solution lends further weight to the structuralist viewthat it was the emergence of competing extreme Nazi groups during the war, andnot before, that caused the frantic escalation towards the extermination of theJewish population in the form of the Final Solution. Structualists andIntentionalist are not mutually exclusive, however, and it appears that whilstthe Holocaust may have had the process of Functionalists, which includes thecrucial developments of the Second World War, it was inspired by the motive ofintentionalists. Most significantly,the synthesis lens of historiography has fused the notion of long-termanti-Semitism with the impact of WWII. While the motive for the ‘FinalSolution’ lies in the long-term anti-Semitism and desires of Hitler and theGerman people, the chaos of WW1 undoubtedly was the crucial trigger for theNazi government to want, and to be able to, seek an efficient and immediateresolution to the growing burden of the Jewish population. Although there isevidence, in Hitler’s earlier policies of exclusion, of the existence of adesire to remove the Jewish population, it is hard to envisage the FinalSolution taking place outside the realms of war, despite Hitler’s drive to‘eliminate world Jewry’. Unlike Fleming, who argues the path to the Finalsolution in Germany was a ‘direct one’, Tim Snyder has argued WWI was pivotalin that it exposed to Germany that Jews could be eradicated through murder,with no concern of the need to appease Allied Powers, as had been the casepreviously, such as the Berlin Olympics. Thus, World War One provided thecontext in which the anti-Semitic desire could be expressed in the form of theFinal Solution. This suggests that whilst the impetus of the Holocaust lieswith Hitler, the means in which it was carried out lies with a plethora ofpeople, organisations and factors in the chaos ensuing after 1939. In conclusion, thechaos of World War One was undoubtedly a significant element in the developmentof the Final Solution, due to the increasing pressure and changingcircumstances that provided a background for the possibility of Jewishextermination. While the long-term anti-Semitism, and a desire to remove Jews,of Hitler and the Jewish population suggest that, to an extent, the responsibilitylies with Hitler, the chaos of War was crucial to the Solution developing asand when it did. In the wake of the growing number of Jews and failure ofprevious methods during the War, the catastrophic method of extermination ofthe ‘Final Solution’ was facilitated as an immediate solution. Thus, to a greatextent, it was neither the clear intentions of Hitler, nor the chaos of War,that exclusively caused the Final Solution, but an amalgamation of both. Whilstthe Second World War crucially shaped the fate of Europe’s Jews, it did notdetermine it, as it was the pre-existing aim of Hitler that initiated itsescalation.

Think this was the one you were talking about!! x

Reply 183

The Germans fought to the end out of loyalty to the Fuhrer.docx118.0KB

Original post by jodie1012

The origin and motive of the Nazi decision,reached at the Wannsee Conference in 1942, to adopt the ‘Final Solution’ forthe systematic extermination of the Jewish population is a highly debatedtopic. Dawidowicz and other intentionalist historians argue that it was thedistinct desire of Hitler and long—term anti-Semitism in Germany which hadculminated in a planned escalation of policy to the point of extermination. Onthe other hand, Functionalist historians such as Schleunes and Mommsen suggestthat the primary cause of the decision lies in the chaos of the the SecondWorld War and the disorder of the government at the time, which shaped policyand forced the Nazi’s to seek a short-term solution to the increasing number ofJews under German control. This essay will argue a synthesis of both views, andthat while it is important to consider the role of long-term aspirations ofHitler in directing policy, the chaos of WW2 was, to a great extent, pivotal indetermining when and how the Final Solution evolved as it did. Intentionalist historians such as Flemingand Dawidowicz both see Hitler, and his long-term drive for the ‘elimination ofworld Jewery’, as the crucial cause of the Holocaust, and to an extent, thereis a level of evidence to suggest the role of this desire, instead of theimmediacy of war, to the development of the Final Solution. Hitler’santi-semitic belief, documented in ‘Mein Kampf’ in which he argued that WW1could have been won if 100,000 Jews had been killed, was a fundamental elementof Nazi policy. Dawidowicz comments that the Final Solution was caused as aresult of a planned ‘gradual escalation’ of this policy, from the conception ofideas in the 1920’s, shown in Mein Kampf and the Nazi’s 25-point program, toimplementation in the 1930’s, with incidents such as Kristallnacht, to theclimatic extermination of Jews in the 1940’s. Hitler’s 1939 ‘prophecy’ speechto the Reichstag, in which he declared that in the event of war the‘annihilation of Jews’ would be a ‘necessary consequence’ adds weight to intentionalist’sview that Hitler foresaw a Holocaust in some form. However, some have pointedout the comparison between the moderate anti-Semitism during the 1920’s andparts of the 1930’s, such as during the Berlin Olympics, as indicative ofHitler not being fully committed or able to pursue Jewish exterminationthroughout the period, instead demonstrating the decisive role of WW2 in providingthe opportunity to transform anti-Semitic sentiment from weak policy to one of extermination.While Dulger maintains that the Holocuast was inconceivable with Hitler’s willand authority driving the escalating policy, Goldhagen argues that the prevalenceof anti-Semitism amongst the German people and their complicity as Hitler’s‘willing executioners’ was, instead, a crucial trigger and driver in thedevelopment of the Final Solution, and thus the cause lay not only with Hitlerbut with the German population as a whole. The Orpo police, for example, playeda pivotal role in the administration of the early mass murder of Jews, withover 2,000 members in Warsaw, highlighting the willing role and ambition of thepublic in the implementation and development of the Final Solution. The increasein Nazi support to 37% of the electorate in July 1932, in the wake of itsideological developments such as the 25-point program’s ‘Point 4’ thatdenounced all Jews as non- Germans, could be seen to indicate this nation-wideanti-Semitic intention which was responsible for the Final Solution. However,as identified by Muhlberger, Nazi appeal was heterogeneous and was not only linkedto anti-Semitism, suggesting to an extent that this link is weak. Moreover, theearlier opposition towards the intensifying policies of exclusion and murderwithin Germany, such as the Catholic opposition to the 1939 Euthanasia program,which was subsequently stopped by the Nazis in response, indicate that generalextermination and anti-Semitism was not a fully entrenched part of societalopinion prior to the war. Lending weight, therefore, to the view, as argued byGotz Aly, that the chaos of war was crucial in ‘destroying all German ties totradition’, and providing a situation of disorder which enabled the extrememethods of the ‘Final Solution’ to become a possible option. Indicating that, whileintentioinalist’s argument of the role of long-term anti-Semitism and desiresfor a solution to the ‘Jewish question’ certainty played a part in facilitatingthe growth of an anti-Jewish policy, the need for a short-term resolution as aresult of the pressures of war was key to determining when and in what way the‘Final Solution’ developed. Conversely, functionalist historians suchas Mommsen argue that the Final Solution was ‘not based on a long-termprogram’, and arose instead purely out of the chaos of Nazi government administrationin the face of war and the failure of previous solutions. The invasion ofPoland in 1939, which increased the number of Jews under German control by 3million, and the USSR in 1941, significantly increased the pressure andresponsibility of the Jewish race in Germany, leading to an escalation inpolicy and requirement for solution. Schleunes had argued that the road towardsthe Final Solution was a ‘twisted one’ and did not follow a direct path fromintentional anti-Semitism, but evolved out of the changing circumstances anddifficulties of war. Originally, it was deportation, not extermination that wasthe preferred solution, with Madagascar and then later Siberia that wereproposed as relocation territory for the Jewish population, lending weight toSchleunes’s assertion that the Final Solution did not follow a planned andstraightforward escalation. It was the chaos of war that rendered these optionsvoid. Firstly, Madagascar wasruled out due to the nature and practicalities of ‘total war’, and the laterSiberia initiative in the face of renewed Russian resistance at Stalingrad in1942, the same year as the Wannsee Conference at which it is argued the ‘FinalSolution’ was devised. As Lee has pointed out, it was as a result of‘inadequacies instead of efficiencies’ in German policy that led to the FinalSolution, as evidenced in the Nazi attempt and failure to utilise the SS deathsquad, the Einsaztrgruppen, as the initial way to remove the Jewish populationin response to the unsuccessful outcome of relocation plans. It was the failure of these solutions due tothe constraints of war, and increasing number of Jews that were brought underGerman control through war that escalated Nazi policy to form the Final Solutionto resolve these pressures. Given thatthe Final Solution and method of extermination was only devised in 1942, thereis significant evidence to suggest it was the impediments and demands of warthat caused the Nazis to resort the Final Solution. The disorder of war alsofacilitated an increasingly chaotic Nazi government and the overlappinginstitutions led to the emergence of numerous groups in government vying forthe creation of a preferred solution to the Jewish question. Emerging on topwas the Himmler led SS, who expanded their influence and position of terror inGermany during the turmoil of war, and the well documented role they played inorchestrating the Final Solution lends further weight to the structuralist viewthat it was the emergence of competing extreme Nazi groups during the war, andnot before, that caused the frantic escalation towards the extermination of theJewish population in the form of the Final Solution. Structualists andIntentionalist are not mutually exclusive, however, and it appears that whilstthe Holocaust may have had the process of Functionalists, which includes thecrucial developments of the Second World War, it was inspired by the motive ofintentionalists. Most significantly,the synthesis lens of historiography has fused the notion of long-termanti-Semitism with the impact of WWII. While the motive for the ‘FinalSolution’ lies in the long-term anti-Semitism and desires of Hitler and theGerman people, the chaos of WW1 undoubtedly was the crucial trigger for theNazi government to want, and to be able to, seek an efficient and immediateresolution to the growing burden of the Jewish population. Although there isevidence, in Hitler’s earlier policies of exclusion, of the existence of adesire to remove the Jewish population, it is hard to envisage the FinalSolution taking place outside the realms of war, despite Hitler’s drive to‘eliminate world Jewry’. Unlike Fleming, who argues the path to the Finalsolution in Germany was a ‘direct one’, Tim Snyder has argued WWI was pivotalin that it exposed to Germany that Jews could be eradicated through murder,with no concern of the need to appease Allied Powers, as had been the casepreviously, such as the Berlin Olympics. Thus, World War One provided thecontext in which the anti-Semitic desire could be expressed in the form of theFinal Solution. This suggests that whilst the impetus of the Holocaust lieswith Hitler, the means in which it was carried out lies with a plethora ofpeople, organisations and factors in the chaos ensuing after 1939. In conclusion, thechaos of World War One was undoubtedly a significant element in the developmentof the Final Solution, due to the increasing pressure and changingcircumstances that provided a background for the possibility of Jewishextermination. While the long-term anti-Semitism, and a desire to remove Jews,of Hitler and the Jewish population suggest that, to an extent, the responsibilitylies with Hitler, the chaos of War was crucial to the Solution developing asand when it did. In the wake of the growing number of Jews and failure ofprevious methods during the War, the catastrophic method of extermination ofthe ‘Final Solution’ was facilitated as an immediate solution. Thus, to a greatextent, it was neither the clear intentions of Hitler, nor the chaos of War,that exclusively caused the Final Solution, but an amalgamation of both. Whilstthe Second World War crucially shaped the fate of Europe’s Jews, it did notdetermine it, as it was the pre-existing aim of Hitler that initiated itsescalation.

Think this was the one you were talking about!! x

Omg thanks!!! 😘

Reply 184

stateofminds

1

Original post by Kattkin

That would be ace if you could but if it's too time consuming don't worry about it! If would be super helpful even if you just outlined your main points/arguments, thank you so much! ^_^

Here is how I planned it (as this one was based on why Germany fought to the end)

I separated the paragraphs into
Loyalty to Hitler
Fear of enemies
Fear of regime/ terror

I have attached the word document with my plan, sorry I haven't typed the essay but the plan is quite long and detailed

I got comments back from my teacher to say include a greater information on the role of propaganda, here is what I would include on propaganda that is not included in my plan

Propaganda:
- Goebbels took the job of rallying public opinion behind the war effort - he called for total war in 1943. Warning of the horrors that could follow a soviet invasion and claimed Germany was developing miracle weapons (the V1 and V2)

- He failed to stop the decline in morale - the propaganda was shown to be hollow. The Hitler Myth largely collapsed following the 1942 defeat at Stalingrad, made it difficult to see Hitler as a miracle worker when Germany was suffering these defeats

- propaganda had more effect when it was built upon pre-existing beliefs - helped to reinforce the fear of the enemy, the Jewish conspiracy etc.

I hope this helps!! Good Luck!

Reply 185

chloe5555

1

For consolidation i would focus on any of the following;

- Fear/failure of communism
- Propaganda and support of the Nazi Party (and what this allowed Hitler to achieve)
- The failure of the WR politicians to stop Hitler, most notably Hindenburg
- Nazi terror and violence
- Mention 'Gleichschaltung'

You can link all of these with each other quite easily i think - hope that helps!

Reply 186

grassntai

14

so what are everyone's predictions for what will come up?

Reply 187

OP

Original post by grassntai

so what are everyone's predictions for what will come up?

Strongly think golden years

Possibly if not golden years, the successes of Nazism between 1920 and 1929

And WW2 I think final solution

Reply 188

OP

Original post by stateofminds

Here is how I planned it (as this one was based on why Germany fought to the end)

I separated the paragraphs into
Loyalty to Hitler
Fear of enemies
Fear of regime/ terror

I have attached the word document with my plan, sorry I haven't typed the essay but the plan is quite long and detailed

I got comments back from my teacher to say include a greater information on the role of propaganda, here is what I would include on propaganda that is not included in my plan

Propaganda:
- Goebbels took the job of rallying public opinion behind the war effort - he called for total war in 1943. Warning of the horrors that could follow a soviet invasion and claimed Germany was developing miracle weapons (the V1 and V2)

- He failed to stop the decline in morale - the propaganda was shown to be hollow. The Hitler Myth largely collapsed following the 1942 defeat at Stalingrad, made it difficult to see Hitler as a miracle worker when Germany was suffering these defeats

- propaganda had more effect when it was built upon pre-existing beliefs - helped to reinforce the fear of the enemy, the Jewish conspiracy etc.

I hope this helps!! Good Luck!

Interestinr and helpful stuff :smile:

Reply 189

Original post by eddso

Strongly think golden years

Possibly if not golden years, the successes of Nazism between 1920 and 1929

And WW2 I think final solution

Wouldn't mind if the golden years or the final solution came up tbh
Don't want anything in the second reich though at all

Reply 190

OP

Original post by Annie.humair

Wouldn't mind if the golden years or the final solution came up tbh
Don't want anything in the second reich though at all

I hate the second Reich passionately

Reply 191

grassntai

14

Original post by eddso

Strongly think golden years

Possibly if not golden years, the successes of Nazism between 1920 and 1929

And WW2 I think final solution

if unit 4 comes up do you reckon it'll be on nazi consolidation of power? im really only revising unit 2,3 and 6.

Reply 192

Original post by grassntai

if unit 4 comes up do you reckon it'll be on nazi consolidation of power? im really only revising unit 2,3 and 6.

Could also be on the rise of the nazis.
Hitler becoming a chancellor came up last year so less chance of that but there's no guarantee

Reply 193

OP

Have just written an essay on morale in WW2 - will get in marked and if it is good will upload :smile:

Reply 194

Kattkin