Original post by AJC1997How far do you agree with the view that the period 1924 - 1929 was one of both political stability and genuine recovery?
Grade A* answer:
The period of 1924 to 1929 did see a recovery in Germany to some extent, certainly when compared with the turmoil that came after. However, the extent to which this was genuine and stable is questionable. While in economic terms there was an overall recovery and no significant negative events, such as were seen before of afterwards with hyperinflation and the onset of the depression from 1929 onwards, this was both artificial and vulnerable in the sense it relied on overseas loans. Similarly, while the political system appeared more stable, with fewer elections being required and less of a threat from extremism, it is hard to consider this stable, with shifting coalitions and little sign that parties were maturing beyond interest groups to be capable of sustaining a successful democracy over the longer term.
In political terms there was a sense of stability, at least relative to the periods before and after. The lack of significant extra-parliamentary threat after the defeat of the Beer Hall Putsch and a dramatic reduction in political murders since 1922 must be seen to be a success. While combat leagues did develop on both sides of the political spectrum, these were marginal and of little threat to stability, with clashes between these only starting to grow from 1928 onwards. However, the absence of such negatives was not in itself a sign of real political stability, rather what Kolb described as 'relative stability'; it gave the Weimar Republic the chance to concentrate on establishing genuine democratic roots, but can only be seen as a qualified success in that it had recovered from the traumatic year of 1923.
When viewed from the perspective of the time, the experience of parliamentary democracy in the Reichstag appeared to offer a cautious optimism for the stability and potential long-term success of democracy. Extreme parties on both sides lost their share of the votes, with the KPD down 9% by 1928 from a combined communist peak of 20% in 1920 while, on the extreme right, the Nazis vote over halved in the two elections of 1924, from 6.5% in May and were not significant again until the 1930 election. However, while there was support for democratic parties, this did not translate to stable government. Proportional representation was never likely to produce single-party rule, but the deeper problem was the failure of the parties to mature to create stability within the system. Most parties still acted as interest groups, partly a legacy of the Second Reich, and were unable to act with a sufficient 'spirit of compromise' necessary to make coalitions work. Even in these relatively peaceful years, there were seven different governments in the period 1924-1930, the longest of which lasted 21 months. These issues significantly undermined political stability as the predominantly minority coalitions failed to command effective government, agreeing more on foreign policy than domestic issues, and were easily collapsed by changed in party leadership or when faced with difficult issues. While the problems they had to content with were by no means on the scale of later issues, they were by no means stable, and even before 1930, political legitimacy was being lost, particularly in the eyes of the crucial middle class.
The period did also see a recovery in economic terms, although the extent of this is questionable as it was vulnerable to external shocks and ultimately brought down with the depression. Alongside the stabilisation of the currency with the Rentenmark, the Dawes Plan of 1924 brought a more realistic settlement on the reparations and a loan of 800 million gold marks. The recovery as a result of this appeared remarkable; Stolper saw this as 'unparalleled in recent German history'. Output levels for heavy industries and coal, iron and steel equaled and in cases surpassed pre-WW1 levels. In one sense the recovery was genuine, productivity increased through improved technology and efficiency. However, although the higher wages and the generous social welfare benefits supported by the Weimar coalitions gave a sense of recovery and certainly benefited ordinary Germans, these were unsustainable - a burden on the fragile recovery struggled to bear even with the US loans it was dependent upon. Production actually declined in 1926, with declining exports and unemployment never falling below 1.3 million. Industrial disputes such as the huge lockout at the Ruhr ironworks in 1928 disrupted production and limited the competitiveness of German producers. Such problems were merely masked by the high level of foreign investment. Thus, while there were elements of a genuine recovery, the reliance upon US loans left the economy vulnerable. The weaknesses were evident before 1929 and, with US investment being withdrawn from 1928, in economic terms the recovery should not be overstated.
Increased political stability, due to the impact of Germany's rehabilitation in foreign relations, was also evident. However, as with the increased foreign investment that brought economic recovery, the permanence of this is questionable. Along with the Dawes Plan, the signing of the Locarno Treaty in 1925 saw Germany's relations with other nations rehabilitated to a considerable degree, leading to Germany joining the League of Nations in 1926. While this measures provoked anger among nationalists, Stresemann's efforts were welcomed by most, seeing the DNVP move to supporting coalition government, and produced real gains for Germany, such as financial support of the Dawes Plan and a reduction in the Rhineland occupation forces in 1927, with full withdrawal in 1929. The recovery this investment brought was undoubted, with over 25 billion marks stimulating economic output and higher wages. In cultural terms, Weimar Germany increasingly gained a reputation as a place of toleration and creativity, from Bauhaus architecture to the modernity of Neue Sachlichkeit in literature and theatre. The extent to which either of these developments constitutes a genuine recovery is a different matter. The latter was somewhat a departure of the more conservative culture of the Second Reich, but these cultural developments really highlight the division in Germany. There was a reaction against the cultural freedom among more conservative elements of German society and, while this didn't stop this being a recovery of sort, it emphasises the more fundamental divisions that were not healing during this period. Perhaps more significantly, while the domestic benefits resulting from foreign policy, both in terms of real economic gains, as well as the improved public optimism towards Germany's prospects under democratic government shown by the reduced attraction of extreme parties, was one of the greatest successes of this period, Stresemann's methods of revision through fulfilment were a work in progress. He himself felt that by 1929 this was beginning to disappoint, and certainly was not successfully embedded enough to survive more testing circumstances that came after, and thus the implications of this for Germany cannot be seen as a recovery with long-term prospects.
Thus the period of 1924-29 cannot be seen as one of political stability and genuine recovery. While a recovery of sorts did take place, with significant economic growth, this was reliant upon external support, and while this hadn't failed by 1929, the gains made were already being eroded. As far as political stability was concerned, in relative terms the period was a success. However, this was in part dependent upon a recovery in areas such as the economy and foreign policy, which were themselves fragile. Thus, while the Weimar Republic was under less threat and the functioning of government was broadly smooth, this had failed to mature in a way that would have prepared it to deal with the problems that came later, and was increasingly losing legitimacy even before 1929 and so cannot be see as a genuine recovery.