hey guys, hows revision going?
had a unit4 mock today and just realised how little time we have! (it was the 2016 paper scenario1). I've just finished my model answer on the evaluation of general defences and could you take a look at it (bt my teacher gave it 19/25). thanks a lot and feel free to ask me anything (personally think im better at the scenario q's)
Write a critical evaluation of two of the general defences in criminal law, and suggest what reforms may improve one of your chosen defences.
The defence of intoxication- where the D argues that his intoxicated state caused him to commit a crime, therefore lacks the necessary MR, has been heavily criticised.
A criticism of the defence of intoxication refers to the distinction made between specific and basic intent crimes, the Law Commission (LC) report in 2009 states that the terms basic and specific are confusing and misleading and stated that the defence of intoxication is “patchy in its coverage of offences, because the split between basic and specific intent crimes is not based on a coherent policy”. Although Majewski stated the distinction between specific intent crimes (like murder) and basic intent crimes (like assault) was the former required a MR of intent and the latter could be committed recklessly, however judges failed to agree on a definition of basic and specific intent. This issue was raised in the case of Heard, where the court had to decide if the offence of sexual assault s.3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 was one of specific/basic intent. In Heard the CA noted that not all offences could be categorised as specific or basic and some had elements of both, thus leaving the distinction unclear.
Another criticism of this defence is that regarding basic intent crimes and voluntary intoxication, the law is based upon public policy rather than balancing the proof of fault on behalf of D. The decision of Majewski was that the D could not rely on the defence of voluntary intoxication for committing an assault (a basic intent crime), because voluntary intoxication is a reckless course of conduct and recklessness is sufficient for the MR of assault (and other basic intent crimes). However, this undermines the subjective nature of recklessness, Cunningham stated that a D is reckless if he foresaw the risk of actual consequences (the AR) and proceeded anyway. However, at the time of getting intoxicated the D wouldn’t have foreseen the risk of committing an offence, i.e. Majewski wouldn’t have foreseen the risk of assaulting police officers when getting intoxicated. Furthermore, this also conflicts with rule of contemporaneity- that the AR and MR must coincide. As seen in Majewski where the offence was committed (AR) after the D got intoxicated (MR).
Furthermore, in relation to, where a D’s inhibitions are broken down by being made intoxicated involuntarily, the law seems a little unfair. The decision in Kingston, that a drugged intent is still an intent, ignored the fact that the intoxication had weakened D’s self-control, nevertheless was involuntary and that D was not to blame for his intoxication. Without the actions of another the crime would not have happened, the CA also felt that D should have acquitted.
Another defence which has also received criticism is the defence of insanity- this is where the D claims he was suffering from a defect of reason, caused by an internal disease of the mind, that caused him to not know the nature and quality of his act or that it was legally wrong.
One criticism with the law of insanity is that that the label insanity itself is stigmatising. The LC 2012 paper “Insanity and Automatism” states that people who should rely on this defence don’t and instead plead guilty to avoid stigma, further shown by the fact there are only 30 pleas of insanity a year, yet a large proportion of prisoners still have mental health problems. A successful defence will lead to a person being not guilty by reason of insanity, thus bring with it the stigmatising label of insane and misleadingly thought to be medically insane.
To tackle the issue of the law being stigmatising and inaccurate, it was proposed in the Draft Criminal Code of 1989 that the term “insanity” should be replaced with “mental disorder”. Also, another proposed reform was that there should be new defence without an insulting verdict (in the IA 2012 paper): ‘Not criminally responsible by reason of recognised medical condition’. This eradicates the word “insanity” and perhaps creates less of a stigmatising effect, should the defendant plead this successfully.
Another criticism of the law on insanity is regarding the use of internal and external tests as causes of disease of the mind. As stated above disease of the mind is a legal term, and since this must be caused by an internal condition this has led D’s with common medical conditions such as sleepwalking (Burgess), epilepsy (Sullivan) and arteriosclerosis (Kemp), being classed as insane, who are not recognised as such by the public and the medical profession. For diabetics, the situation is further complicated, if the D was hypoglycaemic (too much insulin), this is classed as external and thus the D would use the defence of automatism (Quick). However, if D was hyperglycaemic (not enough insulin), this is classed as an internal cause, thus D would use the defence of insanity as seen in Hennessy. The diabetic who was hyperglycaemic would have the social stigma of being classed as legally insane, yet the one who was hypoglycaemic can get a total acquittal if successful. Clearly this is an injustice since diabetes can easily be controlled by drugs, yet depending on whether your hypoglycaemic/ hyperglycaemic you can be classed insane. Perhaps therefore Lord Justice Davis calls it “illogical and little short of a disgrace” and even goes so far to say that the differentiation between “external” and “internal” cause should be abolished.
One proposed reform that could help the above issue according to Criminal Liability: insanity and automatism [2013] is that clearer distinctions could be made between insanity and automatism. Firstly, the accused would not be held criminally responsible only where he lacked the capacity to conform to the law and had a recognised medical condition which caused a total lack of capacity to reason, understand wrongfulness or an inability to control his physical actions. The main difference between the insanity and automatism would be that for insanity, incapacity must arise from a qualifying recognised medical condition. This prevents conditions like diabetes resulting in unfair and bogus sentences.
Furthermore, another criticism of insanity comes from the decision found in Windle, that the D must not know that his act was legally wrong to use the defence of insanity, regardless of whether he didn’t know that the act was morally wrong. This has led to the defence of insanity being too narrow as it excludes some of the very cases it originally seeks to protect society from. For example, cases such as Byrne where the D was suffering from irresistible impulses, yet knew it was legally wrong to kill but just couldn’t help himself due to his mental condition, wouldn’t be able to use the defence. As the Butler Committee pointed out in 1975, “this is too narrow an interpretation for even people who are grossly disturbed generally know that murder and arson, for instance are crimes”.
One suggestion for reform regarding this issue was made by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, they suggested that M’Naughten rules should be extended so a D would be considered insane if he was incapable of preventing himself from committing a crime (regardless of whether he knew it was legally wrong). However, the government introduced the defence of Diminished Responsibility, this gives a special defence to those charged with murder and would allow D’s like Byrne to use this defence since they wouldn’t meet the requirements for the defence of insanity. However, a key point to note is that Diminished Responsibility is a special defence only for murder this means people who commit crimes other than murder and knew their act was legally wrong cannot rely on the defence of insanity.