[gethsemane342]

(Original post by jjarvis)
Mangold was almost certainly a test case! I think increasing direct effect is good, or at least arguably good, actually (parties would at least know where they stand, and it would make the law clearer/more certain), but Mangold is a crap decision.

I mean horizontal effect Consider the implications given that most people barely know English law (and don't even know how our system works) let alone another flipping system and set of laws.

(And sadly Mangold was affirmed by Kucukdeveci. I only recall this case because everyone thought I knew how to pronounce it. Why? When was I *ever* proficient at languages?)

[Legal Eagle]

(Original post by nulli tertius)
Where are you studying? What class of degree are you hoping to get?

Applications for most of the large London firms for 2013 closed some time ago (though my provincial firm is still accepting applications).

This is the thread for 2013 training contracts.

http://www.thestudentroom.co.uk/show...441488&page=52


You should probably look at the 2014 training contact thread as well.

http://www.thestudentroom.co.uk/show....php?t=1779007


Did you do a vacation scheme during the long vacation between your 2nd and 3rd year?

I do not think you have any prospect of a funded LPC place for 2012 so the question is do you fund yourself (with or without a training contract) or try for a training contract in 2014 with a funded LPC place in 2013. Alternatively do you try and get a job and do a part-time LPC?

What legal (and other) work experience do you have? What legal extra curricular activities have you undertaken?

Frankly, the place you do your LPC doesn't matter very much.

At the moment I suspect you are at base camp for a legal career and choosing your LPC provider is a bit like deciding which way round to put the flag on the ice pick!

Hi,

Thanks for the advice.

I'm at University of Westminster and am aiming for at least a 2:1.

I have just completed in this summer holidays 10 weeks of work experience in a local high street firm and have done 2 weeks in my a level years.

To be honest I never actually was aiming for the major firms. I was always more inclined towards the medium to small firms. I was told by careers that smaller firms also take applications only 1 year in advance. Is this true?

Thanks again!

[jjarvis]

(Original post by gethsemane342)
I mean horizontal effect Consider the implications given that most people barely know English law (and don't even know how our system works) let alone another flipping system and set of laws.

I'm not sure--while not all parties have legal advice, at the moment it's not always clear whether a body is a public body, whether national legislation can be interpreted to be compatible (and how that interpretation will work), whether the ECJ will "find" another general principle, and whether a provision of national law will be disapplied as incompatible. Given the Court's proclivity for doing all of these things, even well-advised parties can find it difficult to ascertain the law. Sure, not everyone will know what the European law on a position is--but at the moment advising a party properly requires understanding BOTH sets of laws, and a certain amount of guesswork about interpretation/general principles/etc. I think in some ways we'd be better off returning to Faccini Dori, abandoning Mangold, and using Francovich damages to compensate private parties who get shafted out of a remedy through non-implementation. Since that seems unlikely, however, giving horizontal direct effect would provide clarity and certainty.

In any case, I'm not sure the objection that people don't understand English law and therefore we should not add a layer of European law holds up. Parties' relationships are already subject to a tremendous amount of European law. Unless we leave the Union, the Court will continue to effect relations between private parties in uncertain ways. Admitting that EU law does and will alter private relations at a horizontal level would be intellectually honest. It is slightly more complicated than having domestic law only, of course, but substantially less complicated than the current position.

[gethsemane342]

(Original post by jjarvis)
I'm not sure--while not all parties have legal advice, at the moment it's not always clear whether a body is a public body, whether national legislation can be interpreted to be compatible (and how that interpretation will work), whether the ECJ will "find" another general principle, and whether a provision of national law will be disapplied as incompatible. Given the Court's proclivity for doing all of these things, even well-advised parties can find it difficult to ascertain the law. Sure, not everyone will know what the European law on a position is--but at the moment advising a party properly requires understanding BOTH sets of laws, and a certain amount of guesswork about interpretation/general principles/etc. I think in some ways we'd be better off returning to Faccini Dori, abandoning Mangold, and using Francovich damages to compensate private parties who get shafted out of a remedy through non-implementation. Since that seems unlikely, however, giving horizontal direct effect would provide clarity and certainty.

In any case, I'm not sure the objection that people don't understand English law and therefore we should not add a layer of European law holds up. Parties' relationships are already subject to a tremendous amount of European law. Unless we leave the Union, the Court will continue to effect relations between private parties in uncertain ways. Admitting that EU law does and will alter private relations at a horizontal level would be intellectually honest. It is slightly more complicated than having domestic law only, of course, but substantially less complicated than the current position.

Your first argument misses my point - when you get to court, it is different. But the thing is, people need to go about their life knowing what the law is. Not all of it but the relevant parts. Take an area like agriculture for example. The law on quota etc will change on a weekly basis. In fact, regulations etc get discussed very quickly (please just trust me on this. My mother threatened to send me every discussion before the European Parliament which gets sent to the legal department where she works. Ministers in government get this information. Lay people don't unless they have mothers who get sent it who think they might want it). It's very harsh to inform someone that they're breaching a law they don't know about because of a technicality they weren't sent. If the whole system were to change, that's one thing. But simply increasing horizontal effect doesn't help. They say ignorance of the law is no excuse and in some cases this is clearly right. But in some cases, good faith counts for something and this must be right as well. I'd say it's the same principle.

Also consider that while a Member State can use certain defences, these are not open to a private party and in many cases, would go on to subvert the Member State's national system if they were so applied. For example, I am an employer and I refuse to let you work for me because you haven't got a Welsh GCSE. There is horizontal effect there (Angonese applied) but unlike a Member State, I cannot say "I have this Welsh GCSE requirement for public policy reasons". What public policy? I'm some random person, I can't create a public policy! So clearly this defence should not be extended to me anyway. In effect, you apply the same law to two separate groups but you'll create arbitrary confusion as some attempt to defend themselves and some can't. If we have horizontal effect in such a way, it should be somewhat equal. Considering the massive differences between the two potential groups, this can't be so.

[jjarvis]

(Original post by gethsemane342)
Your first argument misses my point - when you get to court, it is different. But the thing is, people need to go about their life knowing what the law is. Not all of it but the relevant parts. Take an area like agriculture for example. The law on quota etc will change on a weekly basis. In fact, regulations etc get discussed very quickly (please just trust me on this. My mother threatened to send me every discussion before the European Parliament which gets sent to the legal department where she works. Ministers in government get this information. Lay people don't unless they have mothers who get sent it who think they might want it). It's very harsh to inform someone that they're breaching a law they don't know about because of a technicality they weren't sent. If the whole system were to change, that's one thing. But simply increasing horizontal effect doesn't help. They say ignorance of the law is no excuse and in some cases this is clearly right. But in some cases, good faith counts for something and this must be right as well. I'd say it's the same principle.

I agree with you in principle--there's a lot to be said for the ability of people to rely on the law. At the moment, though, the cases applying exceptions to the "no horizontal direct effect" rule are instances where, often, the body acted on an assumption that domestic legislation applied. The comments Signalson et al made *would* have been legal and fair--CIA Security's security system didn't comply with Belgian law. Unless we require Signalson to figure out that the Belgian law as incompatible, and would therefore be disapplied, Signalson is in a disadvantageous position. The same is true of the grocer in Unilever Italia. Both defendants relied on national law. They ought to have been able to so rely on national law. Yet the Court overturned their (I would argue reasonable) reliance, and deprived both of a defence. The same is true in Pfeiffer. The employment contracts were, to all intents and purposes, legal under German law. It was only when the rescue workers discovered a different position in Community law that everything was upset.

The system we have doesn't work--though it's possible you're right and more horizontal direct effect isn't the answer.

(Original post by gethsemane342)
Also consider that while a Member State can use certain defences, these are not open to a private party and in many cases, would go on to subvert the Member State's national system if they were so applied. For example, I am an employer and I refuse to let you work for me because you haven't got a Welsh GCSE. There is horizontal effect there (Angonese applied) but unlike a Member State, I cannot say "I have this Welsh GCSE requirement for public policy reasons". What public policy? I'm some random person, I can't create a public policy! So clearly this defence should not be extended to me anyway. In effect, you apply the same law to two separate groups but you'll create arbitrary confusion as some attempt to defend themselves and some can't. If we have horizontal effect in such a way, it should be somewhat equal. Considering the massive differences between the two potential groups, this can't be so.

I take your point here. There's actually a further problem with horizontal direct effect. British Gas, for example, couldn't really raise public policy either--it's not self-evident that a corporation of its sort can implement public policy. Nonetheless, it was treated as a public body against which direct effect could be claimed. The employees of a nationalised corporation are treated differently from the employees of a private corporation, and I think the court's reasoning justifying this is pretty shoddy. There are arguably more differences between a nationalised corporation qua employer and a central government body (the Home Office in Van Duyn, for example) than between a nationalised corporation qua employer and a private body qua employer. The present system also has arbitrary distinctions and leads to confusion--just in a different place. I'm not sure the present confusion is more principled than the confusion that giving directives horizontal direct effect would produce.

Long story short, I think there just isn't a simple answer here.

[nulli tertius]

(Original post by Legal Eagle)
Hi,

Thanks for the advice.

I'm at University of Westminster and am aiming for at least a 2:1.

I have just completed in this summer holidays 10 weeks of work experience in a local high street firm and have done 2 weeks in my a level years.

To be honest I never actually was aiming for the major firms. I was always more inclined towards the medium to small firms. I was told by careers that smaller firms also take applications only 1 year in advance. Is this true?

Thanks again!

Smaller firms are variable in when they recruit from at the one end running to the same timetable as the largest firms to "can you start next Tuesday"

I certainly think you ought to be looking at applications from now onwards.

Most smaller firms generally do not fund the LPC; therefore you need to think about funding but you do not need to commit to the LPC until very late, at least not with the College of Law. I don't know if Westminster has an alumni discount. Avoid BPP if you are wanting to go to a smaller firm. They are not really geared up to that market.

You have a good level of experience. Do you have any mooting, advice agency etc experience.

Do look for a TC in areas of the country with which you have, or can argue you have a connection. Smaller firms are looking for people who want to make a career in that area, not people who will run away at the first opportunity. They take few trainees and hope that all will be successes and stay.

[The West Wing]

(Original post by jjarvis)
I agree with you in principle--there's a lot to be said for the ability of people to rely on the law. At the moment, though, the cases applying exceptions to the "no horizontal direct effect" rule are instances where, often, the body acted on an assumption that domestic legislation applied. The comments Signalson et al made *would* have been legal and fair--CIA Security's security system didn't comply with Belgian law. Unless we require Signalson to figure out that the Belgian law as incompatible, and would therefore be disapplied, Signalson is in a disadvantageous position. The same is true of the grocer in Unilever Italia. Both defendants relied on national law. They ought to have been able to so rely on national law. Yet the Court overturned their (I would argue reasonable) reliance, and deprived both of a defence. The same is true in Pfeiffer. The employment contracts were, to all intents and purposes, legal under German law. It was only when the rescue workers discovered a different position in Community law that everything was upset.

The system we have doesn't work--though it's possible you're right and more horizontal direct effect isn't the answer.


I take your point here. There's actually a further problem with horizontal direct effect. British Gas, for example, couldn't really raise public policy either--it's not self-evident that a corporation of its sort can implement public policy. Nonetheless, it was treated as a public body against which direct effect could be claimed. The employees of a nationalised corporation are treated differently from the employees of a private corporation, and I think the court's reasoning justifying this is pretty shoddy. There are arguably more differences between a nationalised corporation qua employer and a central government body (the Home Office in Van Duyn, for example) than between a nationalised corporation qua employer and a private body qua employer. The present system also has arbitrary distinctions and leads to confusion--just in a different place. I'm not sure the present confusion is more principled than the confusion that giving directives horizontal direct effect would produce.

Long story short, I think there just isn't a simple answer here.

It's all a bit of a mess really. Originally directives weren't supposed to have direct effect and would only become law once they were implemented but then all these rules were created (Van Duyn, Ratti, CIA, Foster, Marleasing, Mangold to name a few) and the stage we are now is such that you can never really tell if a directive is directly effective, leading to this horrible uncertainty in application. There's definitely a strong case for abandoning the distinction between directives and regulations altogether. The main problem I have is the Mangold case, because it hasn't yet been limited. General principles of law are expansive and vague and there's nothing stopping the judges making them up as they go along, and they have done so. Until there's some proper clarification of Mangold and the setting of limits what we have is the worst situation, where the distinction between directives and regulations has been crippled to such a great extent but it's still being maintained.

The argument I would make in favour of having a narrow interpretation of the direct effect of directives relies on the principle of conferral. The treaties confer the EU certain powers and the way it applies them is in the form of regulations, directives, decisions etc. - if it's going to make a directive then the point is to limit the 'direct' effects it has and give the national government some discretion as to how to implement it. In this sense although it doesn't give the government a choice as to content it doesn't encroach on the procedural autonomy. If the CJEU values procedural autonomy (which I don't think they do) then there should be a clear difference between regulations and directives, and the latter should have less potency, even if it means there is an uneven application of EU law.

[hmaus]

Just wondering if anyone can recommend any employment law textbooks they have found particularly useful on the topic of discrimination? Thanks.

[G8D]

Any of you know of any articles/big cases that discuss/shed light on the effect that judicial review has had on bureaucratic decision making.

Efficiency, procedureal effects, restrictions. That kind of stuff.


Would be really helpful

[jjarvis]

That awkward moment when you download Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co (No 6) and discover it's 240 pp long...



Just to clarify: don't have to read remotely near all of it. Only the parts dealing with conversion...

I do, on the other hand, have to read all of OBG v Allan and Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL.

[gethsemane342]

(Original post by jjarvis)
That awkward moment when you download Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co (No 6) and discover it's 240 pp long...



Just to clarify: don't have to read remotely near all of it. Only the parts dealing with conversion...

I do, on the other hand, have to read all of OBG v Allan and Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL.

I skimmed OBG ... possibly I shouldn't have...

[jjarvis]

(Original post by gethsemane342)
I skimmed OBG ... possibly I shouldn't have...

Crap thing about old conversion cases: they're really badly written/unclear. Thinking I might go to bed early tonight as I feel pretty crap and none of this is going in.

[gethsemane342]

(Original post by jjarvis)
Crap thing about old conversion cases: they're really badly written/unclear. Thinking I might go to bed early tonight as I feel pretty crap and none of this is going in.

Aaaw, get well soon

I've just looked at my plan for my conflicts essay again. The fact that I've written, in all seriousness, "Is there a branch or agency argument here? Look into it, Batman!" is somewhat worrying and possibly an indication of my inevitable decline into insanity...

[jjarvis]

(Original post by gethsemane342)
Aaaw, get well soon

I've just looked at my plan for my conflicts essay again. The fact that I've written, in all seriousness, "Is there a branch or agency argument here? Look into it, Batman!" is somewhat worrying and possibly an indication of my inevitable decline into insanity...

Thanks dude. I was talking with a friend last night about how Cambridge seems to make everyone go nuts--and possibly studying law as well, in which case we're doubly screwed. Hang in there!

I've not *read* the conflicts problem, or any of the cases/textbook reading, so your position could be worse!

(Original post by Celtic_Anthony)
Feel better soon!

There's a 3 page article in the Edinburgh Law Review about OBG! Might help... I discovered this after reading the whole thing...

Ah, cheers, I'll look into that. Our lecturer wrote a CLJ case note, but I somehow think cribbing that might be a bit obvious.

[AmiB]

Lord Denning is a rebel

[G8D]

Met Lord Bonomy at the James Wood annual lecture.

He's sound.

[mirin?]

Reading the first Vandervell case for Equity/Trusts. I don't really understand this because its all over the plaace. But i want formalities to be something i'm especially prepared for because it looks bad tbh.

2nd year is a bitch, but i've actually been working hard all throughout so far.

[jjarvis]

(Original post by mirin?)
Reading the first Vandervell case for Equity/Trusts. I don't really understand this because its all over the plaace. But i want formalities to be something i'm especially prepared for because it looks bad tbh.

2nd year is a bitch, but i've actually been working hard all throughout so far.

As in Vandervell v IRC? There's a (reasonably) good précis in Webb and Akkouh, provided you understand that intention is quite important in the decision.

Or, have a nutshell explanation here:

Spoiler:

Show

National Provincial Bank holds shares in Vandervell's company on a bare trust for V (meaning V is absolutely entitled under the beneficial interest, and could make an order to transfer the legal title to him under the rule in Saunders v Vautier).

V told the trustees to transfer the shares to the Royal College of Surgeons. The RCS was intended to get any dividends paid on the shares and use them to endow a share. The order to transfer is oral for tax reasons: a deed of transfer would incur stamp duty.

Thus, the question which arises before the House of Lords is whether an order to transfer the shares will transfer the legal title and beneficial interest, or the legal title only. Their lordships held that the purpose of LPA 1925 s 53 was to prevent frauds being committed on a beneficiary. When a person has the sole interest under a bare trust, however, an order by one beneficiary *couldn't* defraud him. His own disposition of the only equitable interest won't inadvertently deprive him of his interest. Thus, they skirted the formality requirement by holding that where the beneficiary's intention was clear the full legal and beneficial interest passed to the transferee. It's principally a decision based on policy. In some respects it seems difficult to square with Grey, though the situations are distinguishable.

Webb and Akkouh criticise the decision because it seems to gut the purpose of formalities--sometimes formality rules go against the obvious intent of the parties, but if they can easily be evaded that reduces their use in protecting against fraud. Parker and Mellows also criticise the decision on the basis that the "mischief rule" their lordships invoked should not be used *except* when a statute is ambiguous. Here, the statute seems pretty clear on its face.

Hope this helps a bit!

I'm buried in crim and conflicts work. Two supervisions tomorrow. Bleurgh...

[TurboCretin]

Are there other universities where students study equity & trusts in first year?

I've been studying law for all of one month and, yeah, it's doing my head in slightly.

[jjarvis]

(Original post by TurboCretin)
Are there other universities where students study equity & trusts in first year?

I've been studying law for all of one month and, yeah, it's doing my head in slightly.

It's a final year paper for us--they used to allow a (tiny) handful of second years to do it, but they tended to do poorly. Equity's conceptually difficult, especially if you haven't done land and contract and aren't used to private law reasoning.