Mind / Body Problem

pedy1986

I'm just currently doing some basic preparation for university - and i've been reading up, once again, on the whole problem of consciouness etc.

As I understand it, the contrasting views are that of dualism and monism - both present problems (either interaction problems, or how an objective brain can create subjective experience).

I've been thinking that since we can create a conscious visual experience by stiumalting the brain with electrodes, it seems to indicate, at least cartesian dualism is false and that if anything, it must be some form of dual aspect theory? Is this a correct way of thinking?

I wondered if any of you philosophy people could pass your own comment on it, perhaps with reasoning to help me look at the defences of either form. Or, link me to some more introductory articles on it - its very hard to find a book that isn't too technical or way too basic!

Reply 1

organised_chaos

I recommend Maslin- Philosophy of mind; it's A lvel/undergrad and altho a bit wordy at times, it's a good introduction. Covers all key topics; dualism, mind/brain identity, monism, behaviourism, functionalism etc etc

Reply 2

Calvin

Your example with electrodes isn't a direct objection to Dualism. The interaction problem you mentioned is the very problem of explaining how interaction between mind and brain are possible. Electrodes creating conscious experience only demonstrate that it is possible. So the best I can see that it will give you is to help force home the interaction problem with an example. But seeing as you have loads of simple examples- this one is probably unecessarily contentious (creating conscious experiences with electrodes isn't easy whereas say, seeing a picture is).
So I think electrodes creating conscious experience isn't really going to cause the dualist much trouble as they will want to claim there is a link between mind and body anyway, the real difficulty is going to be saying what that link is.

For me the interaction problem puts the dampner on Dualism. If you want to be dualistic you are going to have to be either an epiphenomenalist (body effects body and in the process throws out a mental experience, but the mind doesn't causally effect anything) or a psycho-physico-parallelist (Body effects body, mind effects mind, just coincidence/convention tha the two are linked).

The latter looks completely implausible I think. The former- epiphenomenalism has more to say for it, but may run into problems (for example) when we want to claim that our mental experience has caused something- how can we have knowledge of mental states if those mental states don't directly cause us to believe in them or know about them?

I think to be honest dualism is one of those things that starts of attractive and the more we understand about it the less attractive it becomes. Monism on the other hand is the opposite, seems initally unattractive but for me at least improves the more I look at it.
Monism usually breaks into Behaviourism and Functionalism. Functionalism seems the most plausible to me, indeed I think some form of functionalism may be the ultimate explanation though we need a lot more complexity than we currently get in terms of the systems that need to be involved- the complexity of function.

As for books: For mind/body stuff I usually end up going to: P. Carruthers- Introducing Persons and P. Smith & O. R. Jones- The Philosophy of mind both cover all the bases well though neither are particularly inspiring- but that might just be me not loving philosophy of mind too much.

Edit: It occurs to me that Epiphenomenalism/pscyho-physico-parallelwhatsi bit doesn't make much sense as an answer to the interaction problem as it's stated. The interaction problem runs two ways: How does the body effect the mind is one way and that's a problem. But a bigger problem is how the mind effects the body. ules of thermodynamics says energy can't be created yet if something immaterial is going to effect the material isn't it going to have to create energy out of somewhere? So can't we disprove dualism by doing some neuroscience?
The two subversions of dualism mentioned are mainly responses to that more dangerous part.

Reply 3

pedy1986

Calvin

Thanks for that, has cleared some things up for me. I'll try and look for those books in the library at somepoint.

In regard to monism, i've read the basic outline of the theories like functionalism and behaviorism - but they for me, at least, don't seem to give an adequete account of our experience - for instance what it is like for me to be in pain. If we reduce everything to a physical level, then I don't see how this squares against our actual experiences :/

Reply 4

Calvin

Basically I agree with you. But functionalism particularly seems to me useful for at least some questions. It helpfully explains belief, thought, understanding, knowledge and things like that for example. The standard objection to functionalism is the Qualia Objection, essentially the one you've just raised and it seems pretty difficult to overcome. But i think it's important to distinguish those aspects of the mind which don't involve qualia and thus which functionalism can more obviously help us (things like those I gave above). The Qualia Objection only seems to limit functionalism to particular areas, it doesn't refute it completely.

Reply 5

Bloomsbury

Qualia, what qualia? It'd be well worth reading about Dennett's views on qualia, or even better read Dennett himself. You'll realise Qualia is no objection at all to fuctionalism.

"far from being directly or immediately apprehensible properties of our experience, they are properties whose changes or constancies are either entirely beyond our ken, or inferrable (at best) from "third-person" examinations of our behavioral and physiological reaction patterns" (Dennett 1988)

Reply 6

Calvin

Ah yes... Dennett. I had a lecture from him last year... very big beard.
Surely what you are quoting though (and I'm not entirely sure of the context so I apologise) is concerned with the supposed epistemological virtues of qualia? But that's not the objection to functionalism. We aren't concerned with whether they are immediatly perceivable but that they don't appear reducible to functional statements, they appear to have a feeling to them which functionalism may struggle with.

Reply 7

Bloomsbury

oh I do apologise for the lack of context therein. However, what I think Dennett is trying to say is that they only appear irreducible if you consider them to be, as many do; ineffable, intrinsic, private and directly apprensible to us. But through various thought experiments Dennett shows that these properties can't belong to 'qualia' at all. Furthermore he offers a theoretical functionalist account of how the illusion of qualia come about, based on the multiple drafts model.

(from what I understand, he's bloody tall too.)

btw: Calvin, are you at Cambridge?

Reply 8

Calvin

Yeah, Clare College. He came and lectured to the Ahiests and Agnostics guys. I went along because I'd read Freedom Evolves and Consciousness Explained and a couple of others. Wasn't how I expected him. But the lecture wasn't bad.

Sounds intriguing. Mostly because I don't see at all how he can shw qualia aren't private or experiential. Could you point me towards something he's written on the topic that I could go find, leave by my bed for 6 weeks whilst I try to get through all the other reading I have and then finally forget why I wanted to read it? :smile:

Much obliged.

Reply 9

Bloomsbury

Ah yes, the Atheist and Agnostic society. I saw a bit about them when trying to find out about my interviewer, Prof. Lipton. Sound like a bunch I'd get on with. :wink:

I'm applying to Kings btw.

Sure thing! Here you go

Reply 10

Calvin

Thanks I'll get onto it when I can. I can't say I go the A&A meetings often. I'm an athiest, but religion doesn't grip me enough to go meet, debate and essentially campaign about it. Little to much like a group bitching session about all things religous for my liking.

Lipton's awesome. Astoundingly clear, really knows his stuff and a really nice fellow (pun unitended) I think probably one of the people I would pick to interview me if I had a choice. So you've come out well there I think, good luck with your interview.