I assure you all I've read the cases, but I don't have time to read them again and I'm having a dispute with someone over the following issue:
How is the ruling in B that a deception as to the HIV status of D will not vitiate consent reconcilable with the ruling in Assange that failure to heed a condition of V that she will only have sex if a condom is used will vitiate consent?
My friend thinks that they are reconcilable on the basis that in Assange the condition was explicit, but that seems to me an odd ground of distinction. I thought the finding in B was because, notwithstanding that the particular aspect of the act, i.e. the risk of disease, wasn't consented to, the nature of the act was consented to, such that there could be no complaint of rape.
Is it simply a judgment that protection goes more towards the nature of the act that risk of disease?
Thanks in advance.
Last edited by TimmonaPortella; 26-05-2012 at 21:02.
I'll have a look when I get the next couple of exams out of the way
(Original post by Forum User)
Ah no worries, although would have been interesting to know what you concluded about the distinction.
edit: that might let you know that I didn't really get to a solid conclusion, I ran out of time in a massive way and was basically going to write down what you said if it came up. I'll have a look at what I actually think with time to reflect though, I'm sure I won't disagree anyway
Last edited by TimmonaPortella; 29-05-2012 at 15:54.