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Why do people believe in free will?

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Original post by StarvingAutist
Well, good for you I suppose. But how do you argue free will's existence?


There's lots of evidence for it and not much against it. I know I can make a decision to do something and then change my mind. I can communicate ideas to other people who would go ahead and decide whether they want to carry out my advice or not.

The only reason for me to think that free will doesn't exist is if all of my perceptions of the world are wrong. This is too unlikely for me to logically accept.
Reply 21
Original post by StarvingAutist
Well, from birth you have been exposed to an environment which has influenced the development of your personality, and you have a genetic factor in how your brain works too. Your brain responds to the environment due to its structure & biases so in that respect you have no choice over your actions, since you had no choice about how your personality was formed.


Ok, but do all decisions from a formed personality? Regardless, independent of whether you formed that personality, that personality is still 'you. Therefore if you make a decision using that personality, it is really you making that decision.
Original post by StarvingAutist

Also, you don't choose which chemical process should happen in your body at a particular incident, and you don't choose how your body responds to that.


That's sort of begging the question, no? To claim we have no free will is essentially the same as saying we don't control which chemical processes occur.

Besides, I'm not sure that I agree entirely. To someone not all that familiar with neuroscience, it seems like for many major functions we control 'what happens' at least on a macro level. Sure we don't engineer chemical processes, but if I think 'move arm', my arm moves.
If it feels like we have a choice, in our own minds, if it feels like we are choosing one path of life over another, then we do have free will. Yes we may be biased from previous life experiences, but that does not mean we are rigid - although we are mechanical, and we limit our own free will by our own accord (free will) through close mindedness.
Original post by Dragonfly07
There's lots of evidence for it and not much against it. I know I can make a decision to do something and then change my mind. I can communicate ideas to other people who would go ahead and decide whether they want to carry out my advice or not.

The only reason for me to think that free will doesn't exist is if all of my perceptions of the world are wrong. This is too unlikely for me to logically accept.


There are lots of things we perceive wrongly. "You Are Not So Smart" is a good read; I found it quite enlightening.
Perceptions aren't always a good reason to believe something, especially if it's to do with our brain. Brains are full of tricks, and though we own them, we aren't always wise to them.

Yes, you can make decisions. Yes, you can change your mind. But if you get down to the basics, these 'decisions' are really caused by environmental factors and not by any 'freedom of will' - which is a quite poorly defined concept anyway. The structure of a brain informs how it responds to stimuli, and there is no choice about that, so it follows that there was never really a conscious decision process for anything anyway. There is evidence to show that we make decisions even before we are consciously aware of it, which highlights that there is at least a deterministic part in the process. Don't believe in free will just because it seems apparent from your conscious thought processes; there is a lot more going on behind the scenes. Our consciousness is just the tip of the iceberg.

I'll give an example of someone who certainly doesn't have a choice about things: a psychopath. Psychopaths have physically different brains which work in a totally different way to those of an empath. Compassion is simply not on the agenda - so what other way would they act but in self-interest? You could hardly blame them for being 'immoral'.


Original post by pjm600
Ok, but do all decisions from a formed personality? Regardless, independent of whether you formed that personality, that personality is still 'you. Therefore if you make a decision using that personality, it is really you making that decision.


That's sort of begging the question, no? To claim we have no free will is essentially the same as saying we don't control which chemical processes occur.

Besides, I'm not sure that I agree entirely. To someone not all that familiar with neuroscience, it seems like for many major functions we control 'what happens' at least on a macro level. Sure we don't engineer chemical processes, but if I think 'move arm', my arm moves.


That's not really the point though; of course you move your arm. The question is, were you in control of that decision?
I believe in free will.
Reply 25
there are different layers to the human consciencness.

underneath the culture, the current trends and the base instincts is a little voice telling you what you should actually be doing in any given situation.
Reply 26
Free will doesnt necessarily mean that you can choose a different outcome, it just means you can choose how and when to reach to that outcome.
Original post by imtelling
there are different layers to the human consciencness.

underneath the culture, the current trends and the base instincts is a little voice telling you what you should actually be doing in any given situation.


As scary as it may sound, this is not the case for every one.
Reply 28
Original post by silvershadows
They really are, I wasn't particularly sober when I made that point, no idea what I was thinking (usually I argue against that assumption). :blushing: But when you decide to pursue a course of action, don't you subjectively feel as though you've made a decision?

Drunken debating can be highly rewarding. :yy: Yes, of course, but I'd mention that decision-making would occur in both scenarios, so it wouldn't be an appropriate indicator of whether we had free will.

Original post by silvershadows
Obviously if you were to look back on it you might be able to understand that really it was just a result of x, y and z (and many more things), but at the moment when one makes a decision, one feels as though one has a choice to do otherwise.

You're right, it does feel like you could choose to do something else, but this could well be accurate: In a deterministic model, it would just be that the reason you changed your mind was because of those factors x, y and z.

Original post by silvershadows
I think one's view rests on one's definition of free will. I don't think there's much point even discussing the religious idea of free will, it doesn't make the least bit of sense, and personally I don't know what people are actually arguing when they talk about it in that manner. It's meaning seems to disprove itself. However, if you define a free decision as one made without (much) hindrance from external influences, rather (mostly) through our predetermined motives, is there really still a problem? I suppose you could argue that it's hard to draw a line between internal and external factors? Sorry if I don't make much sense, I'm fairly useless at arguing, and may have just repeated what I've already said. :rolleyes:

I don't think this would make an adequate enough definition of free decision-making, since it doesn't well-capture the 'free' element of it. For example, suppose that randomness exerted a large influence on our behaviour (which it seems to me that it may well): In such a scenario, our decisions would not be fully determined by prior causes, but randomness also. It would not be particularly meaningful to describe our decision-making as 'free', however, since we wouldn't be in any position of greater control over it than had it been determined wholly by the prior causes. If my actions are controlled by a roll of the dice, I'm not free - I'm just a random actor. One of the major problems with free will, for me, is that nobody appears able to adequately explain the origin or nature of the supposed freedom that we are purported to have.
Original post by miser
Drunken debating can be highly rewarding. :yy: Yes, of course, but I'd mention that decision-making would occur in both scenarios, so it wouldn't be an appropriate indicator of whether we had free will.
That wasn't actually an argument for it, it was a response to you saying that you thought as though you didn't have free will. I meant that I didn't understand how one could think that way, as one regrets not making certain 'choices' over other ones, or feels relieved at having done so. Isn't that a result of thinking as though one had free will?

You're right, it does feel like you could choose to do something else, but this could well be accurate: In a deterministic model, it would just be that the reason you changed your mind was because of those factors x, y and z.
I understand that, but those factors are a result of one's mind- which is the definition of freedom I prescribe to.


I don't think this would make an adequate enough definition of free decision-making, since it doesn't well-capture the 'free' element of it. For example, suppose that randomness exerted a large influence on our behavior (which it seems to me that it may well): In such a scenario, our decisions would not be fully determined by prior causes, but randomness also. It would not be particularly meaningful to describe our decision-making as 'free', however, since we wouldn't be in any position of greater control over it than had it been determined wholly by the prior causes. If my actions are controlled by a roll of the dice, I'm not free - I'm just a random actor. One of the major problems with free will, for me, is that nobody appears able to adequately explain the origin or nature of the supposed freedom that we are purported to have.
It may be more of an emotional definition of 'free' than a one based in logic, it's more down to whether something feels free, in my view. What would your definition of free will actually be? I think that's the part which doesn't quite make sense to me. There seems to only be determinism and chance- does free will actually have a coherent logic-based definition? I use the other definition in part because I don't understand what any other one could mean.

Depending on how good you are with dice :wink:
I've heard some argue that randomness only works on a microscopic scale. I'm not informed enough to have much of an idea, though that view seems unlikely (the butterfly effect etc.? Again, uninformed). Could you explain it to me in any more depth, or is it too complex?
(edited 10 years ago)
Reply 30
Original post by StarvingAutist
Well, from birth you have been exposed to an environment which has influenced the development of your personality, and you have a genetic factor in how your brain works too. Your brain responds to the environment due to its structure & biases so in that respect you have no choice over your actions, since you had no choice about how your personality was formed.
Also, you don't choose which chemical process should happen in your body at a particular incident, and you don't choose how your body responds to that.


That's quite interesting, If our brains are all programmed to respond in a certain way given a certain stimuli and then the code gets altered depending on which stimuli we get exposed to thus potentially changing our future response to other stimuli, and this keeps getting repeated every time we make any action/decision, then we will think we have free will ( I.E you prefer to watch show A over show B) but actually, that preference has been predetermined by your previous actions/decisions which were in turn predetermined by the actions/decisions before that and so you never actually had free will in the first place.

I'm talking jibberish?
Reply 31
Original post by silvershadows
That wasn't actually an argument for it, it was a response to you saying that you thought as though you didn't have free will. I meant that I didn't understand how one could think that way, as one regrets not making certain 'choices' over other ones, or feels relieved at having done so. Isn't that a result of thinking as though one had free will?

Ah, I see. When I say that I think as though I don't have free will, I mean that I acknowledge to myself that I believe that my decision was entirely the result of physical processes for which I am not meaningfully responsible.

Original post by silvershadows
I understand that, but those factors are a result of one's mind- which is the definition of freedom I prescribe to.

Then that is very well and you could use it to argue that we have 'free will' - I just don't think it'd be the same kind of free will that the layman believes in, whom I think generally accepts there to be some means through which he can legitimately author his own actions, and not have them authored for him by impersonal physical laws.

Original post by silvershadows
It may be more of an emotional definition of 'free' than a one based in logic, it's more down to whether something feels free, in my view. What would your definition of free will actually be? I think that's the part which doesn't quite make sense to me. There seems to only be determinism and chance- does free will actually have a coherent logic-based definition? I use the other definition in part because I don't understand what any other one could mean.

I would say that a fair definition of 'free' would be 'unconfined'. Certainly we are not wholly free, but most people believe there to at least be some degree of freedom. The way I see it, we are wholly confined, given that we cannot exert a modicum of control over the forces that account for our neurochemistry, which would appear to govern our decision-making. Whether we feel free I think is neither here nor there; after all, any slave who believes himself to be free is the most comprehensively imprisoned, and we can note that his belief in his freedom does not affect his actual condition as a slave.

Original post by silvershadows
Well, if you're rolling a dice it isn't actually random (I know it's only an example- I have studied a tiny bit of physics though). I've heard some argue that randomness only works on a microscopic scale. I'm not informed enough to have much of an idea, though that view seems unlikely (the butterfly effect etc.? Again, uninformed). Could you explain it to me in any more depth, or is it too complex?

I'm just using dice as an example of something considered to be random. There may not be any true randomness in the universe, but the closest example I could give would be based on quantum indeterminacy, if you're willing to entertain a contrived example.

Suppose that we took a small piece of radioactive material and placed it in a Geiger counter. The radioactive material was measured so that over the course of a given period of time, there was a fifty percent likelihood that one of the atoms decayed; equally probable would be that none of the atoms would decay. If the Geiger counter was then hooked up to some apparatus capable of controlling a person, and that person's decision to make a cup of tea or not was to be determined by this Geiger counter, then if the person went to make a cup of tea, we would probably not describe their decision as having been 'free'.

We could say that they could have not made a cup of tea, since the atoms could equally have not decayed (but this feels not entirely accurate - at least to me - which is the same way I feel when anyone says that a person 'could' have acted differently than they did). But saying that they 'could' have acted differently isn't sufficient justification to say that the decision was a free one, since it was merely random. There was a 50% chance that they would put the kettle on, and a 50% chance that they would not.

I can't see that it would matter what the source of the randomness is, or the apparatus leading to its effect on the decision of the person considering having a hot beverage; if the decision is some parts determined by prior causes, and some parts determined by random forces, there is still no room for freedom, just unpredictability. The people would still be confined to the outcome of the metaphorical dice (or in this case, the random decay of radioactive matter).

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