To whom does the 21st century belong?
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Original post by St. Brynjar
Fair point. It's impossible to speculate that far ahead but I'll suggest that without serious demographic changes China won't ever surpass the USA as a power. I think the 21st century will see the rise of regional blocs acting as states - an Eastern European bloc led by Poland, an Asia-Pacific bloc led by Japan, an Arabic bloc led by Turkey. America will still be the dominant power but with a much weaker hegemony.
After all the hard work to form the EU, I can't see the Union splitting into West/East. Japan, isn't powerful to go it alone, and its neighbours, which it colonised in the previous century won't be too happy with it becoming top dog: they'll remain under the U.S. umbrella. Turkey isn't Arabic, and is hell-bent on joining the EU - why would it join the Arab League?
Can I press you for an argument favouring the Indian Ocean over the Pacific? Bearing in mind the only major difference would see India replacing the USA.
Most of the world's shipping goes through the Indian Ocean, as such the Chinese have been building ports in Burma, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh in order to secure their trade routes. It also has strategic chokepoints like the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden/Suez Canal, and the Strait of Malacca.
Although the power is certainly in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, due to the strategic interests, will play a far more prominent role than the Pacific Ocean, in my opinion.
I put the west. For all it's faults, the United States, as fifty individual states stitched together by the fabric of Federalism, is still well better placed than any nation to thrive far into this century and next. Despite 50 different states, there is no significant signs of any states willing to succeed from the Union.
In Asia, the situation is somewhat different. China's currently in the process of rebalancing its economy.
Rapid changes bring further changes, and instability. There is reason to suggest that Chinese communism cannot continue. There are significant challenges of separatist movements, especially Xinjiang (though you could add Tibet), as well as the challenge of personal liberty to the Communist ideology. China has opened up its market, but personal liberties is not something that has been done. We live in an information age. With India undertaking similar challenges of moving to a developed nation, political unrest and instability could hinder its progress in undertaking that monumental task. Similar situation with Brazil, although it does have more natural resources, Personally, the 21st century will be the Americas' century, with United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina at the forefront. Europe will take a back seat, but will have historical clout for a while...and that would be to the advantage of Asia in foreign policy.
In Asia, the situation is somewhat different. China's currently in the process of rebalancing its economy.
Rapid changes bring further changes, and instability. There is reason to suggest that Chinese communism cannot continue. There are significant challenges of separatist movements, especially Xinjiang (though you could add Tibet), as well as the challenge of personal liberty to the Communist ideology. China has opened up its market, but personal liberties is not something that has been done. We live in an information age. With India undertaking similar challenges of moving to a developed nation, political unrest and instability could hinder its progress in undertaking that monumental task. Similar situation with Brazil, although it does have more natural resources, Personally, the 21st century will be the Americas' century, with United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina at the forefront. Europe will take a back seat, but will have historical clout for a while...and that would be to the advantage of Asia in foreign policy.
(edited 9 years ago)
Original post by posthumus
Why not West vs East.... does China dominate the East?
Does it dominate Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, et cetera?
Original post by Stalin
Does it dominate Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, et cetera?
I would't say it dominates those nations now but the potential is there. The Philippines seem to be getting pretty well dominated by China. Taiwan I can't help but feel will be a matter of time until China attempts to test the US's security guarantees. Sure they might be safe today, but in ten or twenty years?
Japan and South Korea are the regional powers that could certainly stop Chinese domination in the region, but for that they need to be more willing to work together. Given the historical tensions of the region South Korea likely views Japan as a potential rival rather than an ally
I doubt we'll see the sort of hegemony the US had in the pacific after 1898 but at least a few of those nations are likely to come under immense Chinese pressure to ally behind it.
Original post by Aj12
I would't say it dominates those nations now but the potential is there. The Philippines seem to be getting pretty well dominated by China. Taiwan I can't help but feel will be a matter of time until China attempts to test the US's security guarantees. Sure they might be safe today, but in ten or twenty years?
The Pacific Rim will remain under U.S. control as long as the U.S. is a superpower.
Even in ten, twenty, thirty and/or forty years time from now, the U.S. will be technologically superior to China.
Japan and South Korea are the regional powers that could certainly stop Chinese domination in the region, but for that they need to be more willing to work together. Given the historical tensions of the region South Korea likely views Japan as a potential rival rather than an ally
Japan and South Korea share some common traits: both are capitalist democracies, both host U.S. troops, and both are fearful of China's not-so-peaceful rise.
South Korea, for example, faces an existential threat in North Korea: China's thug.
With the backing of the U.S., I don't see any reason for either nation to consider the other a rival. Both are well aware that they are stronger united in a coalition against China, than divided because of historical grievances.
I doubt we'll see the sort of hegemony the US had in the pacific after 1898 but at least a few of those nations are likely to come under immense Chinese pressure to ally behind it.
The only countries I believe will succumb to China are Cambodia, and possibly Burma (although it can go either way really).
The rest all swing in favour of America.
Original post by Stalin
Does it dominate Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, et cetera?
No it doesn't, not unless it manages to dominate the South China Sea first, the world is not open to China for it to be a "superpower" or it's century.
With US & India countering China in East Asia, I doubt it will happen anytime soon.
Original post by posthumus
No it doesn't, not unless it manages to dominate the South China Sea first, the world is not open to China for it to be a "superpower" or it's century.
With US & India countering China in East Asia, I doubt it will happen anytime soon.
With US & India countering China in East Asia, I doubt it will happen anytime soon.
India continues to sit firmly on the fence - it's non-alignment policy is its way of appeasing both sides, but it's only a matter of time before it is left with no choice but to align with the West.
China already has a number of ports dotted across the Indian Ocean.
The Pacific rim seems quite interesting. Japan is rearming (Abe now has the majority to change the constitution at will) and many smaller nations are looking to it for help, the Philippines just signed a Nato like agreement with Japan. South Korea and Japan seem great friends now although South Korea seems to be doing its best to balance its relationships.
Original post by Stalin
India continues to sit firmly on the fence - it's non-alignment policy is its way of appeasing both sides, but it's only a matter of time before it is left with no choice but to align with the West.
China already has a number of ports dotted across the Indian Ocean.
China already has a number of ports dotted across the Indian Ocean.
I don't agree, India-China trade is estimated to touch $100bn in the next 3 years. Its about $76bn currently (not exactly sure). China has got the industrial acumen, India has the innovative entrepreneurs and frugal engineering. Cooperation is the key. Being an Indian citizen, I know that most of my pals are more enthusiastic about China than the west. But then China, being an export-based economy rather than a market economy, its soon gonna run out of steam. So is India, with its horrible infrastructure. So if you consider only China, I would say, the west, but if China and Japan get their act together, then in the face of a China-Japan-India-Russia driven east, no contest
China and India.
The 21st century on the West is declining.
China and India - growing superpowers.
And no India's policy is that it will remain tolerant with its neighbors. However should there be any incursions, India will reply back. Pakistan have made recent fires on the Indian border. The Indian army replied and Pakistan is constantly being beaten back. Narenda Modi has established India back onto the world stage, establishing well made alliances with countries that India had a negative past with, most certainly Australia and the US.
Modi's friendship with Abe proves one thing: Both are opposed to Chinese influence in its growing power. Why did Modi make so many trips to all the east Asian countries? Because he wanted to break the string of pearls that China had created. Nepal, Vietnam, and other countries now have more Indian influence.
In-fact I'd say that India and Japan co-operate more than China does. Despite the border incursions that Chinese troops make into India, especially when Xi Jinping visited India, the Indian troops drove them back. China is however, a vital part of India's trade and economy. One thing India cannot do is let China dominate all of its trade so that it becomes dependent on them. Which is why Modi is looking forward to other investors from other countries, especially from Japan and other states. Mostly I'd prefer an Australia-Japan-India coalition against the growing influence of China.
If India is to progress forward - it needs to bring about economic/infrastructure reforms. The Modi Government is adopting excellent schemes and is able to pass its laws despite fierce opposition from a party of 60 years of ruling the country that thoroughly destroyed it. Give the Government time and you will see a far stronger India than you saw in the past 10 years of Congress rule.
It is true that China have been building their ' posts' out in the Indian ocean. But the Indian military/navy is quite opposed to this (very opposed to this). Modi spread Indian influence to most of the states which would have two effects:
A) Modi visiting the East Asian countries boosted his and India's prestige on the world stage
B) Indian students, Indian engineers and an Indian workforce will be invited to work in those East Asian countries.
C) India will get foreign investment to invest and rebuild economy/infrastructure.
If China can build its outposts in strategic regions, then India can do the same, in effect India is smartly playing a economic game. If it cannot establish its strategic outposts yet due to negligent influence, it can however visit those countries, and pursue a economic drive. Its a far efficient policy I have ever seen - and it is smart. What you are then doing is driving Chinese influence quite far off - this is something the Chinese have been very careful about since Modi came to power. Their influence is being eroded by the presence of a Strong Government in India. While Chinese influence remains - it is slowly being eroded off.
Here are some good articles:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_Narendra_Modi
http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/10408-AusIndIns-Aii%20FearlessNadia%20Vol3-WEB%5B1%5D.pdf
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/23/decoding-modi-s-foreign-policy
Decoding Modi’s Foreign Policy
Niranjan Sahoo
ARTICLE SEPTEMBER 23, 2014
SUMMARYIndia’s new prime minister wants to expand the country’s global role. Economics will take center stage in the effort, but Modi may also emphasize democracy promotion.
Ever since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won India’s 2014 parliamentary elections in a landslide, debate has intensified over the likely direction of the country’s foreign policy. The BJP and the new prime minister, Narendra Modi, have received the strongest mandate ever for an Indian political party other than the dominant Indian National Congress. Given that, there are unprecedented expectations that the new government will finally unburden the country’s foreign policy from the ideological fixation of the Nehruvian era,1 reorienting to meet the demands of new geopolitical realities. While it is too early to know precisely what the new foreign policy will be, a few signposts—the BJP’s vision statement, Modi’s own political beliefs, and some of his recent statements—offer clues.
Modi’s foreign policy is likely to be a mix of nationalist-led geopolitics and expedient geoeconomics. These twin foci mean that democracy and human rights issues will become second-order issues. However, Modi may push international democracy more than the previous Congress-led government as part of his geopolitical agenda to extend Indian global power.
Building Brand India
The nationalist in Modi would like to revive India’s “civilizational role” and restore its ancient glory. To that end, India must assume a larger role in the shift of global power toward Asia. This can only be achieved on the basis of domestic strength. Modi’s pre-election statements suggested he would eschew any exaggerated portrayal of India’s power. As he said, “we have to put our own house in order so that the world is attracted to us.”2 For him, membership in international clubs or regional groupings does not in and of itself make India a serious contender for a seat at the high table of global power. Its path there begins with real changes in the economy, governance, and national power. “India first,”oft repeated during the election, is his clarion call.
Modi’s push to strengthen India’s domestic core is not merely governed by his own beliefs but also the country’s recent economic deceleration. Following the global economic downturn and prolonged domestic policy paralysis, India’s “tiger economy” has been stuttering below 5 percent growth (although recent figures suggest a slight upturn). India barely survived a major credit rating downgrade by Standard & Poor’s in 2013,3 which claimed its budget deficit was too high. These economic woes have greatly diminished Brand India, the campaign to bring business to the country.This has combined with significant domestic political change and an accumulated drift in foreign policy to reduce India to a local player that even the tiny Maldives can afford to snub, as it did during its 2013 election by rejecting the pro-India candidate.4
At its current pace, the Indian economy lacks the dynamism and depth to absorb the 12 million youth who join the labor market every year.5 Given the enormity of the economic challenges, the new government will necessarily emphasize trade and commercial relations. It will prioritize economic diplomacy to facilitate India’s economic revival. Modi stated recently that “I believe a strong economy is the driver of an effective foreign policy.”
To achieve this Modi will have to ensure peaceful external conditions in India’s immediate neighborhood. He is aware that an unsettled neighborhood with various failed and failing states puts considerable strain on the economy. And he has signaled his aim to reset India’s relationship with its neighborhood by taking strong action, such as imaginatively securing the participation of most South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation leaders, including Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, at his swearing-in ceremony and by choosing Bhutan as his first foreign destination after becoming prime minister.
Yet Modi’s regional engagement cannot just be based on visits; it will require efforts to harness the trade and economic potential of the neighborhood. As the long-serving chief minister of Gujarat, a state bordering Pakistan, Modi knows the transformative potential of international trade in goods and services. More than once, Modi has made clear his intention of turning border regions into porous business hubs by easing restrictions, strengthening infrastructure connectivity, and genuinely integrating common markets. Trade could fundamentally alter the region’s conflict-ridden history.
Geoeconomics Is the Key
When it comes to dealing with big powers, geoeconomics (or neomercantilism as some analysts would describe it) will likely guide Modi’s foreign policy. The prime minister is an unabashed pioneer of trade and economic diplomacy. As chief minister of Gujarat, he made several trips to China, Japan, and South Korea, cultivating a personal rapport with leaders like Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Modi plans to expand his Gujarat template to all of India. He will seek trade routes to deepen relations with big powers that matter to India’s economic revival and geopolitical rise.
For instance, geoeconomics will play a central part in driving Sino-Indian relations. Modi is well aware that China needs the big Indian market, while India desperately seeks large Chinese investments to build transit and other infrastructure critical to its economic revival. Acrimony over borders and geopolitical rivalry in the region notwithstanding, trade will be the centerpiece of India’s policy toward China.
Geoeconomics will also set many of Modi’s policy choices vis-à-vis the rest of East Asia and Southeast Asia, especially concerning India’s growing relationship with Japan. Japanese firms that are facing growing hostility in China increasingly see India as a better destination for investments. Given his rapport with Abe, this could be fertile ground for Modi.6
And the Modi government will deploy geoeconomics to strengthen India’s most critical relationship: with the United States. The Indo-U.S. relationship has suffered in recent years from stagnation on trade negotiations, disputes over intellectual property, sluggish economies, and the Obama administration’s preoccupation with Afghanistan and Syria. The once-blossoming relationship recently fell to a new low after the arrest of an Indian diplomat in New York.7 Aware of this, Modi has already taken important steps to facilitate a turnaround. The bold announcement to open India’s $250 billion defense sector to private participation,8 which of course will include U.S. firms, could revitalize Indo-U.S. economic relations.
Trade will also be the cornerstone of Modi’s foreign policy with the EU, much of the Middle East, and Eurasia. With Modi eager to make India a manufacturing hub (he called for a “Made in India” campaign in his Independence Day speech in August 2014),9 trade with Germany, India’s biggest partner in Europe, assumes greater importance.
In all likelihood, Modi will highlight issues relating to trade, investment, infrastructure, and the other economic and development inputs necessary to revive economic growth. In short, his government’s priority is to bridge the gap between the country’s development goals and its foreign policy.
Democracy Promotion: The IBSA Moment Again
Democracy is likely to be a second-order issue in Modi’s foreign policy. But it still offers opportunities for the new government, and Modi’s nationalist perspective on geopolitics and national power could mesh well with democracy promotion.
Even as the BRICS forum builds momentum, what sets India apart from those countries are its long-standing democratic credentials. For many countries striving to be democracies, India remains an inspiration. As Modi said in his first speechafter assuming office, the world should understand the strength of India’s democracy so the country gets the respect and status it deserves.10 The prime minister reiterated this during his Independence Day address when he referenced the power of democracy in his own rise from a boy selling tea to the office of prime minister.11 This is not out of character for a leader from Modi’s party—it was a previous BJP prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who took an unprecedented departure in 1999 from the tradition of nonalignment and nonintervention to dedicate funds to the Community of Democracies, former U.S. president Bill Clinton’s initiative to encourage democratic norms and institutions.
The India-West rapprochement on democracy issues has taken a beating during the last ten years of the United Progressive Alliance government, a coalition led by the Congress party. This has been largely due to the government’s ambivalence toward democracy support, which it considered interventionist in nature,12 and a series of high-profile scams and scandals that overwhelmed the government in its second term and left little time for external engagement with democracy promotion and human rights protection. This may change under Modi.
While the prime minister will personally push the BRICS through geoeconomics, Modi will also push for the democracy club IBSA—India, Brazil, and South Africa—to get its due. On the margins of the BRICS summit in Brasilia this July, Modi secured hosting the next IBSA meeting in 2015. He is keen to build on India’s soft power.
However, his natural playfield for democracy promotion will be in South Asia. With Nepal, Myanmar, Pakistan, Bhutan, the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan experiencing political upheavals and needing support to secure or achieve democracy, India’s democratic experience can be of considerable help. Modi did well in this regard during his recent visit to Kathmandu. Not only did he praise the Nepalese population for shunning violence and embracing democracy, he applauded their efforts to prepare a constitution and promised to provide the interim government all possible help in its journey toward democracy. Modi’s conviction that the “democracy glue” will eventually bind South Asia together serves the cause of democracy promotion well.
Other than its normative importance, democracy offers Modi the opportunity to consolidate and expand India’s power in the rapidly changing geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific. China’s swift rise and the uncertainties over its ambitions have generated considerable momentum among the major powers of the region to create a democratic hedge against the authoritarian power.13 Pro-democracy platforms that could drive realignment in Asia, such as the quadrilateral initiative between the four major democracies of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, as well as an “axis of democracy” between Japan and India, could provide immense strategic value to India against a rising China.
As India’s own development budget increases, there will be additional resources for projects relevant to democratic reform. However, only time will tell to what degree Modi can overcome the country’s traditionally low-key posture on democracy promotion.
Conclusion
The new government of Narendra Modi has raised huge expectations for India’s foreign policy. Every move the government makes is being keenly watched, and there are indications that Modi’s foreign policy will be significantly different from that of his immediate predecessors. With his known aversion to the Nehruvian worldview, the most significant change will be the gradual abandonment of nonalignment for neorealism.
While expediency will demand that most foreign policy engagements be cast in terms of geoeconomics, the nationalist in Modi may push toward geopolitics and major power politics. He has long and frequently exhorted India’s ancient glory and former global role, so he is likely to drive the country’s geopolitical ambitions forward, particularly in Asia. In addition, his personality and ideological background suggest a muscular foreign policy. His strong conviction that India is not proud enough of its democratic successes is good news for democracy supporters. In short, Modi’s foreign policy engagement is going to be active and full of surprises.
Yet, one does not know for sure how different triggers will shape the foreign policy of this ambitious new Indian leader. Although his comfortable election victory potentially frees his foreign policy from being held hostage by domestic politics, this could also lead to adventurism and overambition. The recent cancellation of foreign secretary talks with Pakistan is a reminder of this. Modi can be impulsive and unpredictable.
Finally, it remains to be seen how he addresses some of the key structural bottlenecks constraining India’s foreign policy. For a country and society as diverse and as complicated as India, foreign policy should not be made in a straitjacket. The biggest challenge will likely not come from Pakistan or China; it will be internal, coming from India’s ambitious regional leaders and from Modi’s own backers in the BJP and its affiliates.
Interesting times lie ahead for India’s foreign policy.
Niranjan Sahoo is a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.
The Carnegie Endowment is grateful to the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the Ford Foundation, and the UK Department for International Development for their support of the Rising Democracies Network. The opinions expressed in this article are the responsibility of the author.
The 21st century on the West is declining.
China and India - growing superpowers.
And no India's policy is that it will remain tolerant with its neighbors. However should there be any incursions, India will reply back. Pakistan have made recent fires on the Indian border. The Indian army replied and Pakistan is constantly being beaten back. Narenda Modi has established India back onto the world stage, establishing well made alliances with countries that India had a negative past with, most certainly Australia and the US.
Modi's friendship with Abe proves one thing: Both are opposed to Chinese influence in its growing power. Why did Modi make so many trips to all the east Asian countries? Because he wanted to break the string of pearls that China had created. Nepal, Vietnam, and other countries now have more Indian influence.
In-fact I'd say that India and Japan co-operate more than China does. Despite the border incursions that Chinese troops make into India, especially when Xi Jinping visited India, the Indian troops drove them back. China is however, a vital part of India's trade and economy. One thing India cannot do is let China dominate all of its trade so that it becomes dependent on them. Which is why Modi is looking forward to other investors from other countries, especially from Japan and other states. Mostly I'd prefer an Australia-Japan-India coalition against the growing influence of China.
If India is to progress forward - it needs to bring about economic/infrastructure reforms. The Modi Government is adopting excellent schemes and is able to pass its laws despite fierce opposition from a party of 60 years of ruling the country that thoroughly destroyed it. Give the Government time and you will see a far stronger India than you saw in the past 10 years of Congress rule.
It is true that China have been building their ' posts' out in the Indian ocean. But the Indian military/navy is quite opposed to this (very opposed to this). Modi spread Indian influence to most of the states which would have two effects:
A) Modi visiting the East Asian countries boosted his and India's prestige on the world stage
B) Indian students, Indian engineers and an Indian workforce will be invited to work in those East Asian countries.
C) India will get foreign investment to invest and rebuild economy/infrastructure.
If China can build its outposts in strategic regions, then India can do the same, in effect India is smartly playing a economic game. If it cannot establish its strategic outposts yet due to negligent influence, it can however visit those countries, and pursue a economic drive. Its a far efficient policy I have ever seen - and it is smart. What you are then doing is driving Chinese influence quite far off - this is something the Chinese have been very careful about since Modi came to power. Their influence is being eroded by the presence of a Strong Government in India. While Chinese influence remains - it is slowly being eroded off.
Here are some good articles:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_Narendra_Modi
http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/10408-AusIndIns-Aii%20FearlessNadia%20Vol3-WEB%5B1%5D.pdf
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/23/decoding-modi-s-foreign-policy
Decoding Modi’s Foreign Policy
Niranjan Sahoo
ARTICLE SEPTEMBER 23, 2014
SUMMARYIndia’s new prime minister wants to expand the country’s global role. Economics will take center stage in the effort, but Modi may also emphasize democracy promotion.
Ever since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won India’s 2014 parliamentary elections in a landslide, debate has intensified over the likely direction of the country’s foreign policy. The BJP and the new prime minister, Narendra Modi, have received the strongest mandate ever for an Indian political party other than the dominant Indian National Congress. Given that, there are unprecedented expectations that the new government will finally unburden the country’s foreign policy from the ideological fixation of the Nehruvian era,1 reorienting to meet the demands of new geopolitical realities. While it is too early to know precisely what the new foreign policy will be, a few signposts—the BJP’s vision statement, Modi’s own political beliefs, and some of his recent statements—offer clues.
Modi’s foreign policy is likely to be a mix of nationalist-led geopolitics and expedient geoeconomics. These twin foci mean that democracy and human rights issues will become second-order issues. However, Modi may push international democracy more than the previous Congress-led government as part of his geopolitical agenda to extend Indian global power.
Building Brand India
The nationalist in Modi would like to revive India’s “civilizational role” and restore its ancient glory. To that end, India must assume a larger role in the shift of global power toward Asia. This can only be achieved on the basis of domestic strength. Modi’s pre-election statements suggested he would eschew any exaggerated portrayal of India’s power. As he said, “we have to put our own house in order so that the world is attracted to us.”2 For him, membership in international clubs or regional groupings does not in and of itself make India a serious contender for a seat at the high table of global power. Its path there begins with real changes in the economy, governance, and national power. “India first,”oft repeated during the election, is his clarion call.
Modi’s push to strengthen India’s domestic core is not merely governed by his own beliefs but also the country’s recent economic deceleration. Following the global economic downturn and prolonged domestic policy paralysis, India’s “tiger economy” has been stuttering below 5 percent growth (although recent figures suggest a slight upturn). India barely survived a major credit rating downgrade by Standard & Poor’s in 2013,3 which claimed its budget deficit was too high. These economic woes have greatly diminished Brand India, the campaign to bring business to the country.This has combined with significant domestic political change and an accumulated drift in foreign policy to reduce India to a local player that even the tiny Maldives can afford to snub, as it did during its 2013 election by rejecting the pro-India candidate.4
At its current pace, the Indian economy lacks the dynamism and depth to absorb the 12 million youth who join the labor market every year.5 Given the enormity of the economic challenges, the new government will necessarily emphasize trade and commercial relations. It will prioritize economic diplomacy to facilitate India’s economic revival. Modi stated recently that “I believe a strong economy is the driver of an effective foreign policy.”
To achieve this Modi will have to ensure peaceful external conditions in India’s immediate neighborhood. He is aware that an unsettled neighborhood with various failed and failing states puts considerable strain on the economy. And he has signaled his aim to reset India’s relationship with its neighborhood by taking strong action, such as imaginatively securing the participation of most South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation leaders, including Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, at his swearing-in ceremony and by choosing Bhutan as his first foreign destination after becoming prime minister.
Yet Modi’s regional engagement cannot just be based on visits; it will require efforts to harness the trade and economic potential of the neighborhood. As the long-serving chief minister of Gujarat, a state bordering Pakistan, Modi knows the transformative potential of international trade in goods and services. More than once, Modi has made clear his intention of turning border regions into porous business hubs by easing restrictions, strengthening infrastructure connectivity, and genuinely integrating common markets. Trade could fundamentally alter the region’s conflict-ridden history.
Geoeconomics Is the Key
When it comes to dealing with big powers, geoeconomics (or neomercantilism as some analysts would describe it) will likely guide Modi’s foreign policy. The prime minister is an unabashed pioneer of trade and economic diplomacy. As chief minister of Gujarat, he made several trips to China, Japan, and South Korea, cultivating a personal rapport with leaders like Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Modi plans to expand his Gujarat template to all of India. He will seek trade routes to deepen relations with big powers that matter to India’s economic revival and geopolitical rise.
For instance, geoeconomics will play a central part in driving Sino-Indian relations. Modi is well aware that China needs the big Indian market, while India desperately seeks large Chinese investments to build transit and other infrastructure critical to its economic revival. Acrimony over borders and geopolitical rivalry in the region notwithstanding, trade will be the centerpiece of India’s policy toward China.
Geoeconomics will also set many of Modi’s policy choices vis-à-vis the rest of East Asia and Southeast Asia, especially concerning India’s growing relationship with Japan. Japanese firms that are facing growing hostility in China increasingly see India as a better destination for investments. Given his rapport with Abe, this could be fertile ground for Modi.6
And the Modi government will deploy geoeconomics to strengthen India’s most critical relationship: with the United States. The Indo-U.S. relationship has suffered in recent years from stagnation on trade negotiations, disputes over intellectual property, sluggish economies, and the Obama administration’s preoccupation with Afghanistan and Syria. The once-blossoming relationship recently fell to a new low after the arrest of an Indian diplomat in New York.7 Aware of this, Modi has already taken important steps to facilitate a turnaround. The bold announcement to open India’s $250 billion defense sector to private participation,8 which of course will include U.S. firms, could revitalize Indo-U.S. economic relations.
Trade will also be the cornerstone of Modi’s foreign policy with the EU, much of the Middle East, and Eurasia. With Modi eager to make India a manufacturing hub (he called for a “Made in India” campaign in his Independence Day speech in August 2014),9 trade with Germany, India’s biggest partner in Europe, assumes greater importance.
In all likelihood, Modi will highlight issues relating to trade, investment, infrastructure, and the other economic and development inputs necessary to revive economic growth. In short, his government’s priority is to bridge the gap between the country’s development goals and its foreign policy.
Democracy Promotion: The IBSA Moment Again
Democracy is likely to be a second-order issue in Modi’s foreign policy. But it still offers opportunities for the new government, and Modi’s nationalist perspective on geopolitics and national power could mesh well with democracy promotion.
Even as the BRICS forum builds momentum, what sets India apart from those countries are its long-standing democratic credentials. For many countries striving to be democracies, India remains an inspiration. As Modi said in his first speechafter assuming office, the world should understand the strength of India’s democracy so the country gets the respect and status it deserves.10 The prime minister reiterated this during his Independence Day address when he referenced the power of democracy in his own rise from a boy selling tea to the office of prime minister.11 This is not out of character for a leader from Modi’s party—it was a previous BJP prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who took an unprecedented departure in 1999 from the tradition of nonalignment and nonintervention to dedicate funds to the Community of Democracies, former U.S. president Bill Clinton’s initiative to encourage democratic norms and institutions.
The India-West rapprochement on democracy issues has taken a beating during the last ten years of the United Progressive Alliance government, a coalition led by the Congress party. This has been largely due to the government’s ambivalence toward democracy support, which it considered interventionist in nature,12 and a series of high-profile scams and scandals that overwhelmed the government in its second term and left little time for external engagement with democracy promotion and human rights protection. This may change under Modi.
While the prime minister will personally push the BRICS through geoeconomics, Modi will also push for the democracy club IBSA—India, Brazil, and South Africa—to get its due. On the margins of the BRICS summit in Brasilia this July, Modi secured hosting the next IBSA meeting in 2015. He is keen to build on India’s soft power.
However, his natural playfield for democracy promotion will be in South Asia. With Nepal, Myanmar, Pakistan, Bhutan, the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan experiencing political upheavals and needing support to secure or achieve democracy, India’s democratic experience can be of considerable help. Modi did well in this regard during his recent visit to Kathmandu. Not only did he praise the Nepalese population for shunning violence and embracing democracy, he applauded their efforts to prepare a constitution and promised to provide the interim government all possible help in its journey toward democracy. Modi’s conviction that the “democracy glue” will eventually bind South Asia together serves the cause of democracy promotion well.
Other than its normative importance, democracy offers Modi the opportunity to consolidate and expand India’s power in the rapidly changing geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific. China’s swift rise and the uncertainties over its ambitions have generated considerable momentum among the major powers of the region to create a democratic hedge against the authoritarian power.13 Pro-democracy platforms that could drive realignment in Asia, such as the quadrilateral initiative between the four major democracies of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, as well as an “axis of democracy” between Japan and India, could provide immense strategic value to India against a rising China.
As India’s own development budget increases, there will be additional resources for projects relevant to democratic reform. However, only time will tell to what degree Modi can overcome the country’s traditionally low-key posture on democracy promotion.
Conclusion
The new government of Narendra Modi has raised huge expectations for India’s foreign policy. Every move the government makes is being keenly watched, and there are indications that Modi’s foreign policy will be significantly different from that of his immediate predecessors. With his known aversion to the Nehruvian worldview, the most significant change will be the gradual abandonment of nonalignment for neorealism.
While expediency will demand that most foreign policy engagements be cast in terms of geoeconomics, the nationalist in Modi may push toward geopolitics and major power politics. He has long and frequently exhorted India’s ancient glory and former global role, so he is likely to drive the country’s geopolitical ambitions forward, particularly in Asia. In addition, his personality and ideological background suggest a muscular foreign policy. His strong conviction that India is not proud enough of its democratic successes is good news for democracy supporters. In short, Modi’s foreign policy engagement is going to be active and full of surprises.
Yet, one does not know for sure how different triggers will shape the foreign policy of this ambitious new Indian leader. Although his comfortable election victory potentially frees his foreign policy from being held hostage by domestic politics, this could also lead to adventurism and overambition. The recent cancellation of foreign secretary talks with Pakistan is a reminder of this. Modi can be impulsive and unpredictable.
Finally, it remains to be seen how he addresses some of the key structural bottlenecks constraining India’s foreign policy. For a country and society as diverse and as complicated as India, foreign policy should not be made in a straitjacket. The biggest challenge will likely not come from Pakistan or China; it will be internal, coming from India’s ambitious regional leaders and from Modi’s own backers in the BJP and its affiliates.
Interesting times lie ahead for India’s foreign policy.
Niranjan Sahoo is a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.
The Carnegie Endowment is grateful to the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the Ford Foundation, and the UK Department for International Development for their support of the Rising Democracies Network. The opinions expressed in this article are the responsibility of the author.
(edited 9 years ago)
Original post by Spandy
I don't agree, India-China trade is estimated to touch $100bn in the next 3 years. Its about $76bn currently (not exactly sure). China has got the industrial acumen, India has the innovative entrepreneurs and frugal engineering. Cooperation is the key. Being an Indian citizen, I know that most of my pals are more enthusiastic about China than the west. But then China, being an export-based economy rather than a market economy, its soon gonna run out of steam. So is India, with its horrible infrastructure. So if you consider only China, I would say, the west, but if China and Japan get their act together, then in the face of a China-Japan-India-Russia driven east, no contest
A Sino-Russian-Indian-Japanese alliance?
Never going to happen: all are regional Asians powers seeking superpower status.
http://southasianvoices.org/indias-foreign-policy-under-modi-part-ii/
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/23/decoding-modi-s-foreign-policy
[h="1"]Indian Prime Minister Modi’s Foreign Policy: The First 100 Days[/h]By: Tanvi Madan
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When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government was sworn in, there was little expectation that foreign policy would feature prominently on his agenda; domestic priorities were expected to dominate. And if you’d only listened to the prime minister’s Independence Day speech on August 15, which did not mention foreign policy, you’d think that those expectations had been met. But looking past the rhetoric at the reality of the first 100 days of the Modi government, it is clear that foreign policy has not been missing in action. This should not surprise anyone, given that India’s geography, economic connections, energy demand, large diaspora and role in various multilateral groupings make it difficult for any Indian government to ignore the external environment or set aside foreign policy. So, when it comes to Modi’s foreign policy, what have we seen and not seen, what do we now know and still not know?
There’s been a fair bit of continuity rather than change in the overall direction of foreign policy, but we have seen changes, especially in terms of style or approach, which has the potential to affect substance.
What have we not seen thus far? We have not seen a major reorganization of ministries or responsibilities or a new coordinating mechanism put in place—though Modi has identifiedpolicy coordination as a problem across the government. We have not seen an influx of outsiders. We don’t have a sense yet of whether Modi’s foreign policy team is all in place and we still haven’t seen how the dynamics between the prime minister’s office and the Ministry of External Affairs will play out. Moreover, we don’t have clarity on where the Modi government stands on key global issues like climate change or cyber-governance, though we have got a glimpse of its view on global trade negotiations.
In addition, certain themes have been evident:
[h="2"]The Neighborhood[/h]There has been no lack of signals that Modi wants to make relations with India's neighbors a priority; his time in office indeed started with an invitation to the leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations and Mauritius to attend his government’s swearing-in ceremony. Subsequently, the importance of the neighborhood was highlighted in the president's speech to parliament, which lays out the government’s agenda. In addition, the prime minister and the foreign minister Sushma Swaraj have walked the talk, choosing neighboring countries as their first overseas stops. Over the last few weeks, the foreign minister has visited Bangladesh and Nepal, while the prime minister has traveled to Bhutan and Nepal. We’ve seen India accept a United Nations ruling and surrender its claim to a section of the Bay of Bengal, partly to improve relations with Bangladesh. We have also seen the Modi government deal with Indian state governments in order to facilitate relations with the neighbors, with the foreign minister reaching out to the West Bengal chief ministerbefore her trip to Bangladesh. On the other hand, the government has shown that it will not a let a state’s preference dictate foreign policy entirely, with an invitation to the Sri Lankan president for the swearing-in ceremony despite Tamil Nadu’s objections.
This outreach is not difficult to explain if you think about the Modi government's stated priority: economic growth and development. Instability in the neighborhood can hinder the achievement of this goal, not least because it will require a diversion of time, energy and resources. Moreover, even if India finds a way to grow despite its neighborhood, it might find it harder to play a greater role outside the region if the disparity increases—a Gulliver tied down, struggling to break free of the binds of the region. On the flip side, positive relations with its neighbors and a peaceful neighborhood can indeed facilitate Indian connectivity with West and East Asia and serve as a springboard for a greater role abroad.
Nowhere are the challenges and opportunities clearer than with Pakistan. When Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif traveled to India, there was hope that this would lead to greater political and economic engagement between the two countries. Modi's subsequent tough talkon a visit to Jammu and Kashmir and the cancellation of foreign secretary-level talks have left observers alleging a U-turn. However, this assessment ignores the fact that the reaching out was not without red lines or, as Sanjaya Baru has put it, without "lakshman rekhas."Even as Sharif and Modi had met in Delhi, the Indian foreign minister and foreign secretaryhad both made clear that India's approach was not unconditional. When asked about Pakistan just before the election results were announced, Modi had himself noted that “building trust between the two nations is prerequisite to any further meaningful movement on the relations.” It is unclear what Sharif and Modi discussed as trust-breaking steps—and if Pakistani officials meeting separatists in India constituted one—and we shall have to wait and see whether Modi and Sharif will take a trust-building one by meeting on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly opening in September in New York, i.e. if Sharif is still in office and willing to travel then.
[h="2"]India’s Asia-Pacific Policy: Getting from Look East to Act East[/h]If the first couple of months of the Modi government’s foreign policy emphasized the neighborhood, the next two can be seen as India’s period of pivoting to the Asia-Pacific. Even before he came to office, Modi had made clear his interest in East Asia. As chief minister, this interest was primarily economic, but as prime minister, there’s a strategic dimension as well. Echoing then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and many Southeast Asian countries, foreign minister Swaraj has highlighted the importance of India not just “looking east,” but "acting east” as well. She has visited Myanmar, Singapore and Vietnam and is expected to visit China shortly. While in Nay Pyi Taw, she participated in the East Asia Summit, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and India-ASEAN foreign ministers’ meetings, and met on the sidelines with the foreign ministers of Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam. When she visited Vietnam, she also held a meeting with the heads of the Indian missions in East and Southeast Asia to discuss the way forward.
Swaraj is expected to go to both China and Australia in the next couple of months. The Indian president, on his part, will visit Vietnam in September. India’s states are also continuing to engage the region—the West Bengal and Rajasthan chief ministers will be visiting Singapore; the Tamil Nadu chief minister recently met with that country’s foreign minister. Prime Minister Modi himself will travel to Japan this weekend and likely Australia for the G-20 summit in November. He has already met with the visiting Chinese and Singaporean foreign ministers, as well as Japanese CEOs and members of parliament. In addition, he will receive visits from the Australian prime minister, the Chinese president and the former Singaporean premier over the next month.
Relations with two countries, in particular, will be watched closely: Japan and China.
It was expected that Modi would double down on the previous government’s outreach to Japan. As chief minister he visited that country twice, and Shinzo Abe and he are thought to have established a personal rapport. In the last year of the previous government, there was a prime ministerial trip to Japan, visits to India by the Emperor and Empress, and Prime Minister Abe, as well as an upgrading of the bilateral defense relationship. Modi’s government, in turn, has stated that India has a “special relationship” with Japan. The prime minister sees it as a source of investment and technology (especially in the government’s priority area of infrastructure), potentially defense equipment (a US-2 aircraft sales and co-production deal might be in the offing) and defense cooperation, as well as a strategic partner. Modi has also emphasized the (democratic) values-based motivation for the relationship—a factor missing in relations with the neighbor that India and Japan share: China.
Modi and his ministers have already had some direct interaction with their Chinese counterparts and this is likely to increase over the next couple of months. The prime minister sees China, which he had visited when he had been Gujarat chief minister to attract investment and seek markets for his state, as having the potential to be a major economic partner for India. He would also not mind competition between various sources of investment. China, on its part, has been vocal about its hopeful view of Modi as a business-minded and focused leader, and Xi Jinping will likely take with him economic sweeteners to try to expand this side of the relationship. Yet, even as economic ties are an opportunity, they have also been the source of strain with bilateral trade having fallen in the last couple of years even as the trade deficit has grown to India’s detriment. Moreover, security concerns remain—over China’s rise and its intentions in general, and the border issue, China-Pakistan relations and Chinese activities in India’s neighborhood in particular. Beijing would do well to heed the lesson from India-Pakistan interactions—despite the hope and expectations, if there is a sense that a red line is crossed, relations could stumble. China, on its part, might not like the way some of India’s relationships develop (Japan, Vietnam, the U.S.), the Modi government’s planned military modernization and border infrastructure upgradation, as well as, potentially, its interactions with Tibetan leaders (Tibetan leader Lobsang Sangay was a guest at the Indian government’s swearing in). One thing to watch for is if and when Modi travels to the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims, or meets with the Dalai Lama.
[h="2"]The United States[/h]There were two approaches that Modi could have taken toward the United States.
Over the last few months, it has become clear that Modi has chosen the second option. What’s been surprising is the speed and extent to which he has done so, despite his supporters’ unhappiness. The U.S. government has been a willing and eager partner. Three U.S. cabinet members recently visited India in the space of two weeks, even as crises raged in other parts of the world. Numerous other officials have traveled to India as well. Modi himself will visit the U.S. in September, followed by the Indian Finance and Defense Minister Arun Jaitley in October. Both style and substance will be important to watch during Modi’s visit, not least because the prime minister will want to have something to show for choosing Option B.
The major challenge that lies ahead in the India-U.S. relationship will be translating the various opportunities into outcomes. This will likely involve tackling political and bureaucratic obstacles in India. It will also likely involve companies rather than the governments, limiting what officials can achieve on their part.
[h="2"]What Happens in the Middle East Doesn’t Stay in the Middle East[/h]While relations with the neighborhood, the Asia- (or Indo-) Pacific, and the U.S. have seen the Indian government be proactive, when it comes to the Middle East, the Modi government has found itself in reactive mode. Since it has come to power, it has been buffeted by the crises in the Middle East, needing to evacuate a number of its nationals from Iraq and Libya, negotiate the release of scores of Indians held hostage by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, (some are still being held) and deal with reports of ISIS trying to recruit Indian Muslims. In addition to these ongoing worries, the government will also be deeply concerned about any potential major increases in oil and gas prices, which will have ramifications for the Indian economy. Finally, any breakdown of nuclear negotiations with Iran will also have implications for India, in terms of its energy needs and its Afghanistan policy.
[h="2"]Diversification, Strategic Autonomy and Non-alignment[/h]There is some expectation that a Modi government, with the size of the mandate that it received, will break from the foreign policy of the past. Some have argued that, at the very least, it would not be “guided by India’s traditional policy of non-alignment.” Yet, Modi’s government—like the previous Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition government headed by Atal Behari Vajpayee—has not departed from the strategy that underpinned non-alignment: diversification, which involves establishing and maintaining relationships with multiple countries in order to maximize benefits and minimize risks to Indian objectives. Thus, for example, we’ve seen the government participate actively in a forum like BRICS, with Modi traveling to Brazil for the summit. We’ve also seen Modi continue to engage all the P-5 countries, including traditional partner Russia—bilaterally (with Modi meeting Vladimir Putin in Brazil and the Russian deputy prime minister in Delhi, and Putin expected to visit India in the fall), trilaterally (the Indian foreign minister is expected to travel to Beijing for the China-India-Russia meeting), as well as in multilateral settings.
This approach should not be surprising. While BJP leaders might not use the term non-alignment, they do talk of “self-reliance” and “strategic autonomy”—indeed it was a BJP minister, Jaswant Singh, who cited achieving the latter as a major motivation for India’s nuclear tests in 1998. Diversification, on its part, doesn’t remove external dependence, but Indian policymakers do think that it spreads the risks of dependence and facilitates freedom of action. Regardless, it’s worth keeping in mind that diversification doesn’t mean that each of India’s partnerships will be of equal substance or value, and doesn’t preclude India tilting toward some countries. The Modi government, on its part, will learn that diversification is a high-maintenance—and not always effective—strategy.
[h="2"]Teething Troubles?[/h]There have been a few instances that have left people scratching their heads. A couple involved the need to balance different (and competing) priorities. One was India’s stance at the World Trade Organization on negotiations for a Trade Facilitation Agreement. There were domestic constituencies arrayed on both sides of the debate on this agreement, but the government blocked the deal because of food security concerns. Regardless of whether or not the government was cognizant of or factored in the broader consequences of this step, including for India’s economic relations with East and Southeast Asia, and business sentiment, the public messaging and damage control left something to be desired.
The second instance was India’s response to the Gaza crisis. When it first broke, the Indian government sought to avoid a debate in parliament on the grounds that it did not want “discourteous references" to a friend (Israel). Eventually there was a debate after opposition complaints, but the government nixed a resolution. In its official statements, the government was consistent in expressing concern about the violence in general—and, in particular, both the loss of civilian life in Gaza and the provocations against Israel—and calling for both sides to exercise restraint and deescalate the situation. Yet, it then voted in support of the U.N. Human Rights Council resolution that condemned Israel, a move which left observers—including many in the Bharatiya Janata Party base—wondering why it didn’t instead abstain.
There have also been some scheduling snafus, for example, the prime minister’s stop-over in Berlin en route to the BRICS Summit potentially to meet with Chancellor Angela Merkel. Given that there was a strong chance she would not be there—she ended up being in Brazil for the World Cup final—and that Tokyo believed Japan would be Modi’s first bilateral visit beyond South Asia, the stop raised some questions.
Moving forward, it’ll be interesting to see what the government might or might not have learned from these instances.
[h="2"]Opportunities and Challenges Ahead[/h]Both limitations and possibilities lie ahead. A key advantage for India right now is that a number of countries see it as an opportunity and this moment as the right time to establish or expand relations with it. The high intensity of the government’s external engagement might be attributable to its recognition of this fact and its desire to capitalize on the interest in India.
While Modi’s honeymoon period at home might have ended, this is not the case abroad. However, a question that lies ahead is: can the Modi government effectively seize the opportunity that this moment offers?
For one, how long the honeymoon period will last will depend on India’s performance, especially its economic performance. Thus, in one way a key foreign policy challenge for the Modi government will be an economic one, with foreign officials and investors asking the same question that Indian voters are: can it deliver on the promise of prosperity? The wooing will continue as long as the answer seems to be yes; if the government is not seen as meeting expectations, the whining about India will start again, with countries exploring other options.
A second challenge is that of implementation. The capacity issues that posed a problem for the previous government remain. Getting things done will involve not just grappling with limitations in terms of numbers and expertise available and coordination problems, but also balancing policy and political imperatives, and making policy in the glare of the media spotlight.
A third challenge will be that of how to calibrate policy toward countries like China and Pakistan where there is an effort to reach out, but also to lay down red lines. This will be especially challenging, given that domestic dynamics in both those countries might adversely affect their approach toward India.
Finally, there are the known unknowns: the crises that this government will no doubt have to face. These could involve the safety of Indian citizens or facilities abroad, border tension with China or Pakistan (with the upcoming Jammu and Kashmir assembly elections, security officials are particularly concerned about the latter) or a terrorist attack in India. They could involve a significant deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, a region where India’s leverage is limited. Additionally, it could also involve tension or conflict between India’s partners, leaving the Modi government with some difficult or awkward decisions to make.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/08/28-modi-100-days-foreign-policy-madan
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/23/decoding-modi-s-foreign-policy
[h="1"]Indian Prime Minister Modi’s Foreign Policy: The First 100 Days[/h]By: Tanvi Madan
Share on emailShare on twitterShare on facebookShare on linkedinShare on google_plusone_shareShare on stumbleuponShare on redditShare on print
When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government was sworn in, there was little expectation that foreign policy would feature prominently on his agenda; domestic priorities were expected to dominate. And if you’d only listened to the prime minister’s Independence Day speech on August 15, which did not mention foreign policy, you’d think that those expectations had been met. But looking past the rhetoric at the reality of the first 100 days of the Modi government, it is clear that foreign policy has not been missing in action. This should not surprise anyone, given that India’s geography, economic connections, energy demand, large diaspora and role in various multilateral groupings make it difficult for any Indian government to ignore the external environment or set aside foreign policy. So, when it comes to Modi’s foreign policy, what have we seen and not seen, what do we now know and still not know?
There’s been a fair bit of continuity rather than change in the overall direction of foreign policy, but we have seen changes, especially in terms of style or approach, which has the potential to affect substance.
1.
The intensity of international engagement has increased, with a number of high-level visits to and from India that have taken place or are on the docket.
2.
There seems to be an emphasis on getting deliverables from these visits and not just photo ops.
3.
We have seen learning from the previous government’s experience. One example: over the last few years, Indian officials have been criticized for not doing enough, with enough speed, for the safety of Indians abroad. Faced with the need to evacuate or rescue Indians stuck or being held hostage in Iraq recently, the new government established a crisis management cell to monitor the situation and coordinate India’s response, set up a round-the-clock helpline to provide information and aid and sent a special envoy to Iraq. There was high-level involvement, including by the prime minister, the foreign minister who met with family members of those affected multiple times, as well as the national security advisor and intelligence bureau chief who traveled to Iraq and Saudi Arabia respectively.
4.
We’ve seen this government acknowledge to some extent the role of states in shaping Indian foreign policy—though this official recognition wasn’t entirely missing previously.
5.
Finally, we’ve seen the government use e-diplomacy to a greater degree as an instrument of engagement, targeting both domestic and foreign audiences.
What have we not seen thus far? We have not seen a major reorganization of ministries or responsibilities or a new coordinating mechanism put in place—though Modi has identifiedpolicy coordination as a problem across the government. We have not seen an influx of outsiders. We don’t have a sense yet of whether Modi’s foreign policy team is all in place and we still haven’t seen how the dynamics between the prime minister’s office and the Ministry of External Affairs will play out. Moreover, we don’t have clarity on where the Modi government stands on key global issues like climate change or cyber-governance, though we have got a glimpse of its view on global trade negotiations.
In addition, certain themes have been evident:
[h="2"]The Neighborhood[/h]There has been no lack of signals that Modi wants to make relations with India's neighbors a priority; his time in office indeed started with an invitation to the leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations and Mauritius to attend his government’s swearing-in ceremony. Subsequently, the importance of the neighborhood was highlighted in the president's speech to parliament, which lays out the government’s agenda. In addition, the prime minister and the foreign minister Sushma Swaraj have walked the talk, choosing neighboring countries as their first overseas stops. Over the last few weeks, the foreign minister has visited Bangladesh and Nepal, while the prime minister has traveled to Bhutan and Nepal. We’ve seen India accept a United Nations ruling and surrender its claim to a section of the Bay of Bengal, partly to improve relations with Bangladesh. We have also seen the Modi government deal with Indian state governments in order to facilitate relations with the neighbors, with the foreign minister reaching out to the West Bengal chief ministerbefore her trip to Bangladesh. On the other hand, the government has shown that it will not a let a state’s preference dictate foreign policy entirely, with an invitation to the Sri Lankan president for the swearing-in ceremony despite Tamil Nadu’s objections.
This outreach is not difficult to explain if you think about the Modi government's stated priority: economic growth and development. Instability in the neighborhood can hinder the achievement of this goal, not least because it will require a diversion of time, energy and resources. Moreover, even if India finds a way to grow despite its neighborhood, it might find it harder to play a greater role outside the region if the disparity increases—a Gulliver tied down, struggling to break free of the binds of the region. On the flip side, positive relations with its neighbors and a peaceful neighborhood can indeed facilitate Indian connectivity with West and East Asia and serve as a springboard for a greater role abroad.
Nowhere are the challenges and opportunities clearer than with Pakistan. When Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif traveled to India, there was hope that this would lead to greater political and economic engagement between the two countries. Modi's subsequent tough talkon a visit to Jammu and Kashmir and the cancellation of foreign secretary-level talks have left observers alleging a U-turn. However, this assessment ignores the fact that the reaching out was not without red lines or, as Sanjaya Baru has put it, without "lakshman rekhas."Even as Sharif and Modi had met in Delhi, the Indian foreign minister and foreign secretaryhad both made clear that India's approach was not unconditional. When asked about Pakistan just before the election results were announced, Modi had himself noted that “building trust between the two nations is prerequisite to any further meaningful movement on the relations.” It is unclear what Sharif and Modi discussed as trust-breaking steps—and if Pakistani officials meeting separatists in India constituted one—and we shall have to wait and see whether Modi and Sharif will take a trust-building one by meeting on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly opening in September in New York, i.e. if Sharif is still in office and willing to travel then.
[h="2"]India’s Asia-Pacific Policy: Getting from Look East to Act East[/h]If the first couple of months of the Modi government’s foreign policy emphasized the neighborhood, the next two can be seen as India’s period of pivoting to the Asia-Pacific. Even before he came to office, Modi had made clear his interest in East Asia. As chief minister, this interest was primarily economic, but as prime minister, there’s a strategic dimension as well. Echoing then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and many Southeast Asian countries, foreign minister Swaraj has highlighted the importance of India not just “looking east,” but "acting east” as well. She has visited Myanmar, Singapore and Vietnam and is expected to visit China shortly. While in Nay Pyi Taw, she participated in the East Asia Summit, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and India-ASEAN foreign ministers’ meetings, and met on the sidelines with the foreign ministers of Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam. When she visited Vietnam, she also held a meeting with the heads of the Indian missions in East and Southeast Asia to discuss the way forward.
Swaraj is expected to go to both China and Australia in the next couple of months. The Indian president, on his part, will visit Vietnam in September. India’s states are also continuing to engage the region—the West Bengal and Rajasthan chief ministers will be visiting Singapore; the Tamil Nadu chief minister recently met with that country’s foreign minister. Prime Minister Modi himself will travel to Japan this weekend and likely Australia for the G-20 summit in November. He has already met with the visiting Chinese and Singaporean foreign ministers, as well as Japanese CEOs and members of parliament. In addition, he will receive visits from the Australian prime minister, the Chinese president and the former Singaporean premier over the next month.
Relations with two countries, in particular, will be watched closely: Japan and China.
It was expected that Modi would double down on the previous government’s outreach to Japan. As chief minister he visited that country twice, and Shinzo Abe and he are thought to have established a personal rapport. In the last year of the previous government, there was a prime ministerial trip to Japan, visits to India by the Emperor and Empress, and Prime Minister Abe, as well as an upgrading of the bilateral defense relationship. Modi’s government, in turn, has stated that India has a “special relationship” with Japan. The prime minister sees it as a source of investment and technology (especially in the government’s priority area of infrastructure), potentially defense equipment (a US-2 aircraft sales and co-production deal might be in the offing) and defense cooperation, as well as a strategic partner. Modi has also emphasized the (democratic) values-based motivation for the relationship—a factor missing in relations with the neighbor that India and Japan share: China.
Modi and his ministers have already had some direct interaction with their Chinese counterparts and this is likely to increase over the next couple of months. The prime minister sees China, which he had visited when he had been Gujarat chief minister to attract investment and seek markets for his state, as having the potential to be a major economic partner for India. He would also not mind competition between various sources of investment. China, on its part, has been vocal about its hopeful view of Modi as a business-minded and focused leader, and Xi Jinping will likely take with him economic sweeteners to try to expand this side of the relationship. Yet, even as economic ties are an opportunity, they have also been the source of strain with bilateral trade having fallen in the last couple of years even as the trade deficit has grown to India’s detriment. Moreover, security concerns remain—over China’s rise and its intentions in general, and the border issue, China-Pakistan relations and Chinese activities in India’s neighborhood in particular. Beijing would do well to heed the lesson from India-Pakistan interactions—despite the hope and expectations, if there is a sense that a red line is crossed, relations could stumble. China, on its part, might not like the way some of India’s relationships develop (Japan, Vietnam, the U.S.), the Modi government’s planned military modernization and border infrastructure upgradation, as well as, potentially, its interactions with Tibetan leaders (Tibetan leader Lobsang Sangay was a guest at the Indian government’s swearing in). One thing to watch for is if and when Modi travels to the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims, or meets with the Dalai Lama.
[h="2"]The United States[/h]There were two approaches that Modi could have taken toward the United States.
•
Option A: hold the U.S. at arms’ length to pay it back for its lack of official engagement with him over the last few years.
•
Option B: continue to build on the bilateral relationship, recognizing the reality of the breadth and depth of India-U.S. relations and its potential to help his priorities (including economic growth, meeting energy needs, managing China’s rise).
Over the last few months, it has become clear that Modi has chosen the second option. What’s been surprising is the speed and extent to which he has done so, despite his supporters’ unhappiness. The U.S. government has been a willing and eager partner. Three U.S. cabinet members recently visited India in the space of two weeks, even as crises raged in other parts of the world. Numerous other officials have traveled to India as well. Modi himself will visit the U.S. in September, followed by the Indian Finance and Defense Minister Arun Jaitley in October. Both style and substance will be important to watch during Modi’s visit, not least because the prime minister will want to have something to show for choosing Option B.
The major challenge that lies ahead in the India-U.S. relationship will be translating the various opportunities into outcomes. This will likely involve tackling political and bureaucratic obstacles in India. It will also likely involve companies rather than the governments, limiting what officials can achieve on their part.
[h="2"]What Happens in the Middle East Doesn’t Stay in the Middle East[/h]While relations with the neighborhood, the Asia- (or Indo-) Pacific, and the U.S. have seen the Indian government be proactive, when it comes to the Middle East, the Modi government has found itself in reactive mode. Since it has come to power, it has been buffeted by the crises in the Middle East, needing to evacuate a number of its nationals from Iraq and Libya, negotiate the release of scores of Indians held hostage by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, (some are still being held) and deal with reports of ISIS trying to recruit Indian Muslims. In addition to these ongoing worries, the government will also be deeply concerned about any potential major increases in oil and gas prices, which will have ramifications for the Indian economy. Finally, any breakdown of nuclear negotiations with Iran will also have implications for India, in terms of its energy needs and its Afghanistan policy.
[h="2"]Diversification, Strategic Autonomy and Non-alignment[/h]There is some expectation that a Modi government, with the size of the mandate that it received, will break from the foreign policy of the past. Some have argued that, at the very least, it would not be “guided by India’s traditional policy of non-alignment.” Yet, Modi’s government—like the previous Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition government headed by Atal Behari Vajpayee—has not departed from the strategy that underpinned non-alignment: diversification, which involves establishing and maintaining relationships with multiple countries in order to maximize benefits and minimize risks to Indian objectives. Thus, for example, we’ve seen the government participate actively in a forum like BRICS, with Modi traveling to Brazil for the summit. We’ve also seen Modi continue to engage all the P-5 countries, including traditional partner Russia—bilaterally (with Modi meeting Vladimir Putin in Brazil and the Russian deputy prime minister in Delhi, and Putin expected to visit India in the fall), trilaterally (the Indian foreign minister is expected to travel to Beijing for the China-India-Russia meeting), as well as in multilateral settings.
This approach should not be surprising. While BJP leaders might not use the term non-alignment, they do talk of “self-reliance” and “strategic autonomy”—indeed it was a BJP minister, Jaswant Singh, who cited achieving the latter as a major motivation for India’s nuclear tests in 1998. Diversification, on its part, doesn’t remove external dependence, but Indian policymakers do think that it spreads the risks of dependence and facilitates freedom of action. Regardless, it’s worth keeping in mind that diversification doesn’t mean that each of India’s partnerships will be of equal substance or value, and doesn’t preclude India tilting toward some countries. The Modi government, on its part, will learn that diversification is a high-maintenance—and not always effective—strategy.
[h="2"]Teething Troubles?[/h]There have been a few instances that have left people scratching their heads. A couple involved the need to balance different (and competing) priorities. One was India’s stance at the World Trade Organization on negotiations for a Trade Facilitation Agreement. There were domestic constituencies arrayed on both sides of the debate on this agreement, but the government blocked the deal because of food security concerns. Regardless of whether or not the government was cognizant of or factored in the broader consequences of this step, including for India’s economic relations with East and Southeast Asia, and business sentiment, the public messaging and damage control left something to be desired.
The second instance was India’s response to the Gaza crisis. When it first broke, the Indian government sought to avoid a debate in parliament on the grounds that it did not want “discourteous references" to a friend (Israel). Eventually there was a debate after opposition complaints, but the government nixed a resolution. In its official statements, the government was consistent in expressing concern about the violence in general—and, in particular, both the loss of civilian life in Gaza and the provocations against Israel—and calling for both sides to exercise restraint and deescalate the situation. Yet, it then voted in support of the U.N. Human Rights Council resolution that condemned Israel, a move which left observers—including many in the Bharatiya Janata Party base—wondering why it didn’t instead abstain.
There have also been some scheduling snafus, for example, the prime minister’s stop-over in Berlin en route to the BRICS Summit potentially to meet with Chancellor Angela Merkel. Given that there was a strong chance she would not be there—she ended up being in Brazil for the World Cup final—and that Tokyo believed Japan would be Modi’s first bilateral visit beyond South Asia, the stop raised some questions.
Moving forward, it’ll be interesting to see what the government might or might not have learned from these instances.
[h="2"]Opportunities and Challenges Ahead[/h]Both limitations and possibilities lie ahead. A key advantage for India right now is that a number of countries see it as an opportunity and this moment as the right time to establish or expand relations with it. The high intensity of the government’s external engagement might be attributable to its recognition of this fact and its desire to capitalize on the interest in India.
While Modi’s honeymoon period at home might have ended, this is not the case abroad. However, a question that lies ahead is: can the Modi government effectively seize the opportunity that this moment offers?
For one, how long the honeymoon period will last will depend on India’s performance, especially its economic performance. Thus, in one way a key foreign policy challenge for the Modi government will be an economic one, with foreign officials and investors asking the same question that Indian voters are: can it deliver on the promise of prosperity? The wooing will continue as long as the answer seems to be yes; if the government is not seen as meeting expectations, the whining about India will start again, with countries exploring other options.
A second challenge is that of implementation. The capacity issues that posed a problem for the previous government remain. Getting things done will involve not just grappling with limitations in terms of numbers and expertise available and coordination problems, but also balancing policy and political imperatives, and making policy in the glare of the media spotlight.
A third challenge will be that of how to calibrate policy toward countries like China and Pakistan where there is an effort to reach out, but also to lay down red lines. This will be especially challenging, given that domestic dynamics in both those countries might adversely affect their approach toward India.
Finally, there are the known unknowns: the crises that this government will no doubt have to face. These could involve the safety of Indian citizens or facilities abroad, border tension with China or Pakistan (with the upcoming Jammu and Kashmir assembly elections, security officials are particularly concerned about the latter) or a terrorist attack in India. They could involve a significant deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, a region where India’s leverage is limited. Additionally, it could also involve tension or conflict between India’s partners, leaving the Modi government with some difficult or awkward decisions to make.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/08/28-modi-100-days-foreign-policy-madan
Read more at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/23/decoding-modi-s-foreign-policy
[h="5"]Himanil Raina[/h]Freelance writer on geopolitical and international affairs
[h="5"]Published[/h]July 9th, 2014
2 Responses
Elections, Foreign Policy,India, leadership, Policy,Politics, Uncategorized
[h="5"]Share[/h] Print
[h="5"]Related Posts[/h]
[h="2"]India’s Foreign Policy Under Modi, Part II[/h]“The Pacific is likely to take the place of the Atlantic in the future as the nerve centre of the world. Though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there.”
“India will have to play a very great part in security problems of Asia and the Indian Ocean, more especially of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, as India is the pivot around which these problems will have to be considered.”
I have already talked in the first part of this series about the continuity that pervades Indian foreign policy decision making. Modi’s worldviews as shall be seen do not represent a major break with the past. Nehru’s prophetic words have with the course of time fulfilled themselves. India is the only relative beacon of stability in an unstable region stretching from the Horn of Africa to South East Asia. As the only Asian giant capable of potentially going toe to toe with China or even surpassing it in the course of time, India has the makings of a natural great power in the region.
Whilst much ink has been spilled over the course Narendra Modi’s foreign policy will take, Modi himself has dismissed such talk as anuman (conjecture). Foreign policy has traditionally never been an issue of importance for the Indian electorate which is why Indian political parties devote it minimal attention. The few occasions on which Modi has addressed foreign policy issues his views have been remarkably consistent with the traditional Indian approach to foreign policy. Modi has repeatedly stated how foreign policy begins at home and requires a strong central government. Keenly aware of the important role played by commercial interests in shaping India’s foreign policy, he has stated that, “I believe a strong economy is the driver of an effective foreign policy… we have to put our house in order so that the world is attracted to us.” There are 2 things to be taken away from this statement. Firstly, that Indian economic interests are the organizing principles for the formulation of Indian foreign policy. Secondly, the first port of call for the Indian security establishment is internal security threats to the nation. The appointments to critical posts in the governmentas covered in Part 1 of this series reflect these priorities as well.
The BJP manifesto (believed to have been personally vetted by Modi) does not devote much space to foreign policy. It explicitly states that the BJP intends to create a ‘web of allies to mutually further our interests’ a clear departure from India’s long cherished notions of non-alignment and strategic autonomy. What exactly lies in the national interest however hasn’t been expounded upon – not even in the traditional rhetorical terms. Another statement saying that it doesn’t intend to be led by big power interests and instead shall choose to engage proactively on its own with other nations, however, reflects the age-old Indian concern with maintaining strategic autonomy. Such potentially contradictory statements are indicative of the wriggle room Modi has created for his government. Given the lack of foreign policy commitments in the run up to Modi’s ascension to power, such a framing gives him just the sort of flexibility he needs. In an era where the flag follows the trade this may very well have been the smart thing to do in the run up to elections.
However, now that he is in power, dilly dallying on a clear articulation of India’s future vision and strategic interests cannot be had. A resurgent India looking to base its foreign policy on predominantly economic considerations must acknowledge the fact that its brightest economic prospects lie Eastwards and not in the West. This is a fact acknowledged by the United States as well as its pivot to the Asia-Pacific recognizes that it is Asia where the future engines of the global economy lie. The US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific has stalled as it is called upon to firefight Russian aggression in Ukraine and a Middle East ripping itself into pieces. Coupled with US financial difficulties on the domestic front and a war-weary population, the US’s regional allies have grown uneasy of its commitment. The United States has repeatedly described India as a ‘linchpin’ in its pivot, expressing hope India would act as a ‘regional anchor’. With US support for greater Indian involvement and even East Asian nations keen for India to play larger role in Asian affairs the environment is optimal for India to make a foray. Whether India has the capabilities or even the intentions to do so though is an entirely different matter. Indo-US relations reached a highpoint beginning with Bill Clinton & culminating with George W. Bush when various nuclear related agreements were signed. President Obama’s tenure though has seen Indo-US relations grow frosty. The treatment of the Indian diplomatDevyani Khobragade and the US’s consistent refusal to grant Modi a visa when he was a Chief Minister are merely symptomatic of the deeper malaise gripping Indo-US ties. That said, Modi being the pragmatist that he is would not let such blips affect his conduct with the United States. India may, according to some analysts, prefer a US-dominated international order over a Chinese one. Even proponents of this view though would find themselves hard pressed to justify why Washington won’t relegate Indian interests to the trash bin in pursuit of their concern of a stable Afghanistan (which would entail closer US ties with Pakistan). Whilst India has pursued its Look East policy since the early 1990’s whether it is willing to put its money where its mouth is remains to be seen.
Though China is widely perceived to be India’s predominant strategic competitor, Modi’s pre-election tough talk on China has to be taken with a grain of salt. It is clear that the Chinese have high hopes of Modi; Modi himself aims to kick start India’s economy beginning with a massive Indian infrastructure overhaul even as the Chinese are seeking to direct their investments into high yielding emerging markets. Combine all these trends with the present fact that China is India’s largest trading partner and it becomes evident that there is a strong case for Indo-China cooperation. With China in a historically rare situation of finding itself unthreatened via land it is finally able to concentrate on developing its naval, air and missile forces with the increasing US presence in the Asia-Pacific clearly on its mind. As James R. Holmes has noted, for China to inflame its Himalayan territorial quarrel with India would be the height of folly, forcing it to redirect its resources to territorial defence. India has already raised a Mountain Strike Corps created specifically for employment against China. Depending on the variety of internal balancing (armed forces-centric) measures and external balancing (alliances) Modi undertakes, India may well establish a mutually profitable, stable equilibrium with China. To what extent Modi can push for such an arrangement to involve China restraining Pakistan will be Modi’s mark of genius. Pakistan has systematically used asymmetric means against India under the cover of its nuclear weapons. A repeat of 26/11 is unlikely to be met with a response as muted as that of the UPA if Modi’s statements and the past BJP responses to terror attacks are anything to go by.
The Indo-Japanese relationship, one that the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called the most promising bilateral relationship anywhere in the world, holds immense promise. Modi and Abe, with a well documented personal friendship,possess more common ground in their shared apprehensions of China’s rise. Thisrelationship though is unlikely to assume military dimensions owing to the complex Indo-Chinese relationship unless China forces India’s hand.
Closer to home, Modi has stressed the importance of sea lanes to drive India’s economic growth. In such a context India’s engagement with middle powers such as Australia needs to be closely watched. Similarly, the impending US withdrawal from Afghanistan creates highly interesting and challenging opportunities for furtherIran-Indian collaboration in addition to their existing economic ties.
Much has been made of Modi’s decision to invite the heads of SAARC states during his investiture and the fact that by 2014 every SAARC nation will have had democratic elections with the exception of Sri Lanka. The desire to pursue the goal of building a friendly near abroad at a time when the entire region is experiencing a fresh start is indeed commendable. However the Modi regime would do well to consider the words of the former foreign secretary of India Kanwal Sibal who highlights the drawbacks of the soft approach India has adopted vis-a-vis its neighbours for the better part of the past 65 years. While there have been instances wherein India has been perceived as an overbearing bully, preferential treatment needs to be made conditional to reciprocation at the least. The BJP has been critical of the Congress for allowing India’s influence to wane regionally. How exactly the BJP seeks to ensure its policies do not have a similar effect remains an open question.
Intelligent integration into the world economic order is critical for India to acquire the economic, political and strategic capabilities that will allow it to break out of the subcontinent and become a great power. China, whose economic might has accentuated its global profile, and Russia, whose economic decline has heavily impaired its global standing, are clear examples of this reality. At the same time an overly networked country lacking hard power and the will to use it can safely expect to not be taken seriously in the international community as the European Union’s helplessness against Russian aggression has demonstrated. So long as Narendra Modi strikes the correct balance between these two imperatives India may indeed rest assured in Modi’s promise of acche din aa rahe hain (Good days are approaching).
Himanil Raina is a student at the NALSAR University of Law and a freelance writer on geopolitical and international affairs.
http://southasianvoices.org/indias-foreign-policy-under-modi-part-ii/
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/23/decoding-modi-s-foreign-policy
[h="5"]Himanil Raina[/h]Freelance writer on geopolitical and international affairs
[h="5"]Published[/h]July 9th, 2014
2 Responses
Elections, Foreign Policy,India, leadership, Policy,Politics, Uncategorized
[h="5"]Share[/h] Print
[h="5"]Related Posts[/h]
[h="2"]India’s Foreign Policy Under Modi, Part II[/h]“The Pacific is likely to take the place of the Atlantic in the future as the nerve centre of the world. Though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there.”
“India will have to play a very great part in security problems of Asia and the Indian Ocean, more especially of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, as India is the pivot around which these problems will have to be considered.”
I have already talked in the first part of this series about the continuity that pervades Indian foreign policy decision making. Modi’s worldviews as shall be seen do not represent a major break with the past. Nehru’s prophetic words have with the course of time fulfilled themselves. India is the only relative beacon of stability in an unstable region stretching from the Horn of Africa to South East Asia. As the only Asian giant capable of potentially going toe to toe with China or even surpassing it in the course of time, India has the makings of a natural great power in the region.
Whilst much ink has been spilled over the course Narendra Modi’s foreign policy will take, Modi himself has dismissed such talk as anuman (conjecture). Foreign policy has traditionally never been an issue of importance for the Indian electorate which is why Indian political parties devote it minimal attention. The few occasions on which Modi has addressed foreign policy issues his views have been remarkably consistent with the traditional Indian approach to foreign policy. Modi has repeatedly stated how foreign policy begins at home and requires a strong central government. Keenly aware of the important role played by commercial interests in shaping India’s foreign policy, he has stated that, “I believe a strong economy is the driver of an effective foreign policy… we have to put our house in order so that the world is attracted to us.” There are 2 things to be taken away from this statement. Firstly, that Indian economic interests are the organizing principles for the formulation of Indian foreign policy. Secondly, the first port of call for the Indian security establishment is internal security threats to the nation. The appointments to critical posts in the governmentas covered in Part 1 of this series reflect these priorities as well.
The BJP manifesto (believed to have been personally vetted by Modi) does not devote much space to foreign policy. It explicitly states that the BJP intends to create a ‘web of allies to mutually further our interests’ a clear departure from India’s long cherished notions of non-alignment and strategic autonomy. What exactly lies in the national interest however hasn’t been expounded upon – not even in the traditional rhetorical terms. Another statement saying that it doesn’t intend to be led by big power interests and instead shall choose to engage proactively on its own with other nations, however, reflects the age-old Indian concern with maintaining strategic autonomy. Such potentially contradictory statements are indicative of the wriggle room Modi has created for his government. Given the lack of foreign policy commitments in the run up to Modi’s ascension to power, such a framing gives him just the sort of flexibility he needs. In an era where the flag follows the trade this may very well have been the smart thing to do in the run up to elections.
However, now that he is in power, dilly dallying on a clear articulation of India’s future vision and strategic interests cannot be had. A resurgent India looking to base its foreign policy on predominantly economic considerations must acknowledge the fact that its brightest economic prospects lie Eastwards and not in the West. This is a fact acknowledged by the United States as well as its pivot to the Asia-Pacific recognizes that it is Asia where the future engines of the global economy lie. The US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific has stalled as it is called upon to firefight Russian aggression in Ukraine and a Middle East ripping itself into pieces. Coupled with US financial difficulties on the domestic front and a war-weary population, the US’s regional allies have grown uneasy of its commitment. The United States has repeatedly described India as a ‘linchpin’ in its pivot, expressing hope India would act as a ‘regional anchor’. With US support for greater Indian involvement and even East Asian nations keen for India to play larger role in Asian affairs the environment is optimal for India to make a foray. Whether India has the capabilities or even the intentions to do so though is an entirely different matter. Indo-US relations reached a highpoint beginning with Bill Clinton & culminating with George W. Bush when various nuclear related agreements were signed. President Obama’s tenure though has seen Indo-US relations grow frosty. The treatment of the Indian diplomatDevyani Khobragade and the US’s consistent refusal to grant Modi a visa when he was a Chief Minister are merely symptomatic of the deeper malaise gripping Indo-US ties. That said, Modi being the pragmatist that he is would not let such blips affect his conduct with the United States. India may, according to some analysts, prefer a US-dominated international order over a Chinese one. Even proponents of this view though would find themselves hard pressed to justify why Washington won’t relegate Indian interests to the trash bin in pursuit of their concern of a stable Afghanistan (which would entail closer US ties with Pakistan). Whilst India has pursued its Look East policy since the early 1990’s whether it is willing to put its money where its mouth is remains to be seen.
Though China is widely perceived to be India’s predominant strategic competitor, Modi’s pre-election tough talk on China has to be taken with a grain of salt. It is clear that the Chinese have high hopes of Modi; Modi himself aims to kick start India’s economy beginning with a massive Indian infrastructure overhaul even as the Chinese are seeking to direct their investments into high yielding emerging markets. Combine all these trends with the present fact that China is India’s largest trading partner and it becomes evident that there is a strong case for Indo-China cooperation. With China in a historically rare situation of finding itself unthreatened via land it is finally able to concentrate on developing its naval, air and missile forces with the increasing US presence in the Asia-Pacific clearly on its mind. As James R. Holmes has noted, for China to inflame its Himalayan territorial quarrel with India would be the height of folly, forcing it to redirect its resources to territorial defence. India has already raised a Mountain Strike Corps created specifically for employment against China. Depending on the variety of internal balancing (armed forces-centric) measures and external balancing (alliances) Modi undertakes, India may well establish a mutually profitable, stable equilibrium with China. To what extent Modi can push for such an arrangement to involve China restraining Pakistan will be Modi’s mark of genius. Pakistan has systematically used asymmetric means against India under the cover of its nuclear weapons. A repeat of 26/11 is unlikely to be met with a response as muted as that of the UPA if Modi’s statements and the past BJP responses to terror attacks are anything to go by.
The Indo-Japanese relationship, one that the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called the most promising bilateral relationship anywhere in the world, holds immense promise. Modi and Abe, with a well documented personal friendship,possess more common ground in their shared apprehensions of China’s rise. Thisrelationship though is unlikely to assume military dimensions owing to the complex Indo-Chinese relationship unless China forces India’s hand.
Closer to home, Modi has stressed the importance of sea lanes to drive India’s economic growth. In such a context India’s engagement with middle powers such as Australia needs to be closely watched. Similarly, the impending US withdrawal from Afghanistan creates highly interesting and challenging opportunities for furtherIran-Indian collaboration in addition to their existing economic ties.
Much has been made of Modi’s decision to invite the heads of SAARC states during his investiture and the fact that by 2014 every SAARC nation will have had democratic elections with the exception of Sri Lanka. The desire to pursue the goal of building a friendly near abroad at a time when the entire region is experiencing a fresh start is indeed commendable. However the Modi regime would do well to consider the words of the former foreign secretary of India Kanwal Sibal who highlights the drawbacks of the soft approach India has adopted vis-a-vis its neighbours for the better part of the past 65 years. While there have been instances wherein India has been perceived as an overbearing bully, preferential treatment needs to be made conditional to reciprocation at the least. The BJP has been critical of the Congress for allowing India’s influence to wane regionally. How exactly the BJP seeks to ensure its policies do not have a similar effect remains an open question.
Intelligent integration into the world economic order is critical for India to acquire the economic, political and strategic capabilities that will allow it to break out of the subcontinent and become a great power. China, whose economic might has accentuated its global profile, and Russia, whose economic decline has heavily impaired its global standing, are clear examples of this reality. At the same time an overly networked country lacking hard power and the will to use it can safely expect to not be taken seriously in the international community as the European Union’s helplessness against Russian aggression has demonstrated. So long as Narendra Modi strikes the correct balance between these two imperatives India may indeed rest assured in Modi’s promise of acche din aa rahe hain (Good days are approaching).
Himanil Raina is a student at the NALSAR University of Law and a freelance writer on geopolitical and international affairs.
http://southasianvoices.org/indias-foreign-policy-under-modi-part-ii/
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/23/decoding-modi-s-foreign-policy
The west. For all Asias advances in recent years, our standard of living s still better by miles, and it's going to take more than a few decades to change that. Their GDP might overtake ours due to having a bigger population,but so what? They will still be well behind on a per capita basis.
Original post by Stalin
A Sino-Russian-Indian-Japanese alliance?
Never going to happen: all are regional Asians powers seeking superpower status.
Never going to happen: all are regional Asians powers seeking superpower status.
Forgetting the Sino, it is very likely that it could happen.
Original post by c_al
The west. For all Asias advances in recent years, our standard of living s still better by miles, and it's going to take more than a few decades to change that. Their GDP might overtake ours due to having a bigger population,but so what? They will still be well behind on a per capita basis.
You forget that during the Mejji Era, Japan industralized within 30 years.
You forget that in this era, both China and India are currently growing - but there are still a lot of problems.
The West will grow - but not that much.
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