Would you save a drowning child no matter the circumstance?

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I got 70%. :erm:

I don't donate because I can't see where that money is going.

at the problem with overseas aid is that much of it swallowed up in waste, and sometimes even corruption, meaning that only a small proportion of any particular donation will ever end up helping those in need (with the large part likely benefitting people who do not deserve to be benefitted). This argument is empirically dubious - reputable aid organizations are not particularly inefficient - but the issue we're interested in here is whether the argument even works in principle. We attempted to discern where you were likely to stand on this issue by asking the following question:

It so happens that you cycle to work, and the pond is located in a park where you know a gang of bicycle thieves operates. You don't have time to lock up your bike, and you know that if you leave it, even briefly, to rescue the child, there's a good chance that it'll be stolen. It's a battered old bike, it doesn't hold any particular sentimental value to you, and you can easily replace it. Does the possibility your bike will be stolen while you're saving the child mean you're no longer obliged to go ahead with the rescue?
You responded that this possibility made no difference - you were still obliged to go ahead with the rescue. It seems, then, that you do not think the mere fact that undeserving people might benefit as a result of an action that would be otherwise obligatory is enough to cancel its obligatory character. It follows that if you have good reason to suppose that at least some part of any donation you make to an overseas aid agency will end up helping those in desperate need, then you can't argue, without pain of inconsistency, that the possibility that some significant proportion of your donation will get swallowed up by corruption and the like (if indeed this were true) cancels your obligation to make the donation.

Reply 21

tehforum

Original post by Reue

Stupid quiz and was obvious what was going on as soon as the foreign child question came up.

70% because I don't believe in donating money to foreign charities.

There is the strong possibility that at least some people will object to being told they have a moral obligation to make a charitable donation to an overseas aid agency if (a) they think otherwise; and/or (b) they've not made such a donation and have no intention of doing so. In fact, they might just object anyway. So it's probably wise that we talk about some of the more obvious objections to the analysis we've offered here. (And in all likelihood we'll add to the list of objections as and when new ones come up).

1. I Don't Donate Because I'm a Non-Cognitivist Crypto-Anarchist Virtue Ethicist

This objection is just that the test has failed to detect some incredibly involved and convoluted reason why a donation isn't obligatory given a particular combination of responses.

The rejoinder is easy. Get a grip! It's an interactive online activity, not an exercise in mind reading. Of course there might be some vasty complex reason why in any particular instance a donation is not morally obligatory. The issues raised by Singer's arguments are still being debated, from which it is possible to deduce two things: (1) it isn't clear that his argument - or, indeed, the version of it here - works; and (2) if you think you've come up with a knock down argument to show it doesn't work, then (a) good for you; and (b) likely you haven't.

2. How Many Drowning Children, You Say!? - Part 1

This objection holds that there would be some number of drowning children at which point any moral obligation to attempt a rescue would be dissolved. So, for example, while it might be true that if you had saved a drowning child last week, you would still be obliged to save a drowning child this week, it might not be true that if you had saved 100 drowning children in the last week, you woud still be morally obliged to save the 101st. The point of this objection is that if you're already making a regular donation to a charity such as Oxfam, then it's not obviously the case that you're obliged to make a larger donation simply because by doing so you might save additional lives.

This is undoubtedly a complex issue. However, there are a couple of things that can be said. First, most people are just not in this situation: unless you're giving away a significant proportion of your income, the burden upon you is much closer to that exerienced by the person who has to rescue a drowning child once a week than it is to the person who saves 100 children every week. Second, although the situation where you're constantly coming across drowning children, and having to choose whether to save them, is undoubtedly dystopic, it is at least arguable that if a successful rescue has marginal utility (i.e., it prevents more suffering than it causes, where your suffering, and that of your dependants, is part of the calculus) , then you do have obligations in this regard (though working out exactly how this cashes out in the sort of situation we're talking about is monumentally complicated).

3. How Many Drowning Children, You Say!? - Part 2

A related objection holds that if one kept coming across drowning children, it would demonstrate that simply rescuing children wasn't working, and that another approach is required. The point here is that merely donating to an overseas aid agency isn't necessarily morally obligatory, because actually the extent of on-going suffering shows that some other approach is necessary.

There is something to this argument, of course, but it isn't obvious that it gets people off the hook in the context of this activity. Partly because the test dealt with this sort of argument by asking a question about the wider problem of water safety: if you responded that it was still obligatory to rescue the child even though it wouldn't solve the wider problem of water safety, then it isn't clear that you can invokve this sort of argument without being inconsistent. But also because it's entirely possible to donate to an overseas aid agency that doesn't merely opt for a "sticking plaster" solution to the problem of suffering, but rather looks to facilitate wider structural changes. In other words, you can choose a charity that best fits with your broader view of these issues.

4. Hang On a Minute, There's No Way of Knowing That My $50 Dnation is Going To Save a Life

This objection is that acting at a distance via an overseas aid agency is not the same as saving a drowning child through your own actions, because in the former case you can never be sure that any donation you make will actually save a life.

Again this objection has some force, but isn't decisive. The first point to note is that the test dealt with the issue of uncertainty, which means that unless you claimed that uncertainty annuled your obligation to save the child, it's not easy to see you can invoke uncertainty in the case of overseas aid in order to argue that a donation is not required.

Moreover, even if you think that uncertainty is a relevant moral factor here, it doesn't follow that in this sort of situation it would simply cancel your obligation to make a donation. So, for example, perhaps the fact you can't be sure that a small donation made to a large aid agency will actually save a life means that you're obliged to make a larger, targeted donation (where it will be easier to see its results).

There are complexities here, of course, but a couple of things are certain: (1) if people stop making small donations to overseas aid agencies, then more people will end up dying; and (2) a small amount of money can make a real difference (for example, a common estimate is that $50 will provide a single person with clean water for three months).

5. Overseas Aid Agencies? No thanks.

This objection is straightforward enough. It holds that overseas aid agencies are not the best way to deliver aid, that they're inefficient, sometimes corrupt, etc.

Obviously, it is true that overseas aid agencies are not perfect, that there are inefficiencies in the delivery of aid, and so on. However, it is important to note, as Peter Singer points out, "that even if a substantial proportion of our donations were wasted, the cost to us of making the donation is so small, compared to the benefits that it provides when it, or some of it, does get through to those who need our help, that we would still be saving lives at a small cost to ourselves – even if aid organizations were much less efficient than they actually are."

Moreover, in the terms of this interactive test, the objection lacks force unless your response to the stolen bike version of the drowning child scenario indicates that you think waste and corruption function to dissolve our moral obligation to give aid.

Summing Up

Of course, these brief words do not constitute a definitive rejoinder to these objections. However, they do show how such objections might be handled, and also that the complexities of these issues mean that likely there aren't straightforward knock down arguments that demonstrate that Professor Singer's thought experiment doesn't show what it is designed to show; namely, that we are at the very least morally obliged to make a small donation to an overseas aid agency.

(edited 9 years ago)

70%.

Original post by Karla_Steinbach

Finns can't be vikings! Just like Jews can't be pirates, or paladins

Spoiler

Contemporary Finnish population is pretty much the result of Swedish colonisation (more so than British being the consequence of Norman conquest). Our paternal haplogroups are largely not even Finnish. I am sure there have been Jewish pirates historically, pretty sure about that. Maybe even some paladins.

Reply 24

TorpidPhil

One objection that I would have that would permit me to allow myself to not need to donate ceaseless entrails of currency to foreign aid companies post-empirical-research and thereby maximise the moral output of my spending, would be that there is additional moral value to aiding one's own community in favour of that of others. That said however, that is only going to be a continuum. You know? Saving 1 life in my community still cannot possibly be morally superior to saving... 1000 elsewhere. But it's a start.

Next I could add in other reasons to refrain from absolute altruism (if I may call it such) even as a utilitarian so as to bring about the most developed society and cause the most human social/economic development in the long run. Such as, if you do have a certain level of excess you do have the right, as that is your property, to consume it without any feelings of moral guilt. This however is again a continuum. And there would be two factors which would influence whether that means you have to give away any of your money or not.

Firstly, obviously, how much excess you actually have. If you have great excess, you still need to give some away. Secondly however, I think it's important in a society to reward hard work and innovation. A lot of jobs are quite menial, they can be quite monotonous and they don't pay greatly. But if that is you performing at your own personal peak then you should be allowed to enjoy a greater proportion of that income without feeling moral guilt from not having donated to others to aid them with your excess - this is because feeling guilt in such a scenario isn't really conducive to a great society. I feel that would, in the long run, lead to societies full of selfish people, the mentally ill, the un-cooperative and generally just an inferior society.

Clearly, societal development for my ethics is key. I think I can from that perspective, that is, one of a more welfare utilitarian sort of approach, defend my not donating significant chunks of my excess income to others. However, I do think that Singer's argument does follow through for anybody that would happen to have a very similar theory of normative ethics to himself, that is, some basic form of consequential utilitarianism that is heavily heavily focused on the outcomes in terms of people's actions, states of being or people's preferences being achieved.

Nice couple of posts above though. Appreciate that.

Reply 25

TorpidPhil

Original post by mackemforever

The whole quiz is a thinly veiled attempt to guilt people into donating money to charity.

Make people say repeatedly that they have a moral obligation to help children that cannot help themselves and then try to make them feel bad if they do not donate money to a charity that helps children.

Pathetic.

If deciphering moral obligations is to you the same as "making you feel guilty" then yes, it is. I worry greatly for you though if those things are synonymous with you. The only reason you don't murder someone when it would benefit you greatly to do so is that society has brainwashed you to feel guilty at doing such AND, of course, the physical repercussions? Nothing more? Worrying.

I don't find it pathetic at all. I find it progressive and beneficial.

Reply 26

Eva.Gregoria

I got 100%. I do believe that we are morally obliged to donate money to those less fortunate if you have the resources and spare money to spend on things like dominos or a new shirt. However at that long a distance, you can't be sure where exactly your money is going. I still plan on regularly giving donations but only to reputable and reliable charities.

Reply 27

TimmonaPortella

70% too, I made it up until they wanted me to travel. I figured (roughly) where it was trying to lead us, but I think the reasoning's tenuous. This sort of obligation isn't black and white. The directness of the help you can give matters, and the closeness of the harm to you matters. You're obligated to do something about the child because you're the person, or one of the people, who is there to do something about it, and it would be inhuman to do nothing in that circumstance. Giving money is good, but it's a matter of balance.

Incidentally, if they'd taken the 'you've just saved another child recently' line further, and, say, every single day you saw several drowning children on your way to work, I think I'd eventually take the view that you're not obliged to do anything, on the basis that there's no longer anything connecting you specifically to one drowning child, as there is when you actually see a drowning child (again, proximity, basically).

So there's my 4am top of my head ramble for you all.

Incidentally I give quite a bit, mainly on the basis that any time a charity person asks me for money I can't think of a valid excuse not to give it to them, but I don't know if I consider myself obligated to do that.

(edited 9 years ago)

Reply 28

nulli tertius

100%

Surely the difference is that I am under an obligation to someone who specifically presents themselves to me in danger whom I am able to help. What imposes the obligation is that the victim is particularised for me. In Christian terms (but this obligation does not arise from belief in a religion), it is the finding of the Israelite by the side of the road which makes the Israelite the Samaritan's neighbour.

In that case it doesn't matter how geographically remote they are from me (in other words if I receive a mobile phone call from a child clinging to a rock in a pond on the other side of the world, I am as obligated to help (within my powers) as if I walk past them and see them drowning).

However, I am not obligated to help Oxfam that seeks my money in order to go out and find people to help because:-

1 The charity itself is not in danger unless the Isis and Cherwell are in flood.

2 As I am not morally obligated to go and seek out drowning children to rescue (or any other category of persons in need) directly, I am not morally obligated to fund others to do so.

3 If the drowning child (or any other category of person in need) makes what amounts to a moral call on Oxfam for assistance (perhaps the drowning child is observed during an Oxfam trustees' awayday), Oxfam may have a moral obligation to do all within its power to save the child; but that does not impose any specific moral obligation on me greater than my obligations to the rest of humanity (such as my moral obligation not to pour poison in the pond). The fact that a person seeks assistance from someone else (even if that someone else is an aid charity) doesn't have the effect of particularising that person for me so as to impose a higher moral duty on me.