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Assault and causation - NEED HELP ASAP

Hi All!

I'm currently answering a problem question, in which a victim is threatened with a gun by the defendant. When establishing whether the defendant is liable for assault, do i need to consider causation etc?

I've not covered this for ages, and my notes aren't helping!!

Thanks all! :smile:

Reply 1

Tarnybxxx

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Original post by AMT6

Reply 2

agaata5

Original post by AMT6

It depends. Is it just a threat or is there something happening to the victim? (e.g. heart attack)

Some notes, which you might find useful:

Assault

‘An assault is any conduct by which D, intentionally or recklessly, causes V to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence’.

This definition:

- adopted in Fagan v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439;

- approved in R v. Savage and Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699; and

- applied by the House of Lords in R v. Ireland; R v. Burstow [1998] AC 147.

A) Actus reus

D caused V to apprehend immediate unlawful force.

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Immediacy?

R v. Lewis [1970] Crim LR 647. – D threaten V, his wife. She was in a room upstairs and the threats were so serious that she jumped out of a window and broke her bones. D was charged with maliciously inflicting GBH. We can imply from the decision, in relation to assault, that there must be some element of immediacy between words spoken and the apprehensive act. She tried to escape hearing the words of her husband.

Logdon v. DPP [1976] Crim LR 121. – the court stressed the need to D cause V to believe that force was about to be inflicted.

Smith v. Chief Superintendent of Woking Police Station (1983) 76 Cr App R 234. – D committed an assault by looking through the window, sitting on a bedsit watching V in her night clothes. By looking through the window, V apprehended immediate harm. There was a psychical barrier – window, D scared the V.

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Immediacy and D’s ‘mere’ words?

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Not combined with the force.

R v. Constanza [1997] 2 Cr App R 492. – D has been stalking V for about 2 years. Stalking – not in the sense of modern meaning. V was receiving unpleasant letters. It was held that letters constituted bodily harm, because the letters were so unpleasant that V developed a psychiatric condition, medically recognised. There has to be an initial assault or battery to constitute serious bodily harm. There was no psychical actions. Words can amount to apprehend immediate unlawful force. The ‘mere’ words have caused it. The court held that as long as there was a fear of violence occurring in the some point in future that is meeting the requirements.

R v. Ireland; R v. Burstow (above). – Constanza was discussed in these cases.

Ireland – D was stalking V by silent phone calls. The court considered whether these phone calls can be linked to apprehend immediate unlawful force or cause serious bodily harm. It has to be apprehension of a immediate crime. A threat to inflict some harm at some point in the future is not enough.

What counts as immediate? The court did not answer this question. There is no guidance. Days and weeks would be problematic.

* J. Horder, ‘Reconsidering Psychic Assault’ [1998] Criminal Law Review 392.

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D’s inability to carry out threat?

There might be an assault, when D is not able to carry out a threat.

R v. Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981. – D pointed an unloaded or imitation gun and V knew it. There was no assault, V could not fear.

Logdon v. DPP (above). – contrasting case to Lamb – the court discussed the situation in the sense if V believed the gun was real, this could be an assault and V would apprehend immediate unlawful force.

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D’s words negating the threat in D’s actions?

Only one case reported.

Tuberville v. Savage (1669) 1 Mod Rep 3. – D had a sword and D was standing there, talking to V. V is verbally abusing D so D lays the hands on sword and states ‘if the were not assize-time, I would not take such a language from you’. Assize-time is when the judges were in town for court sessions. D stated he will not commit any crime towards V, because the judges were in the town or village.

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D’s words as a conditional threat?

Blake v. Barnard (1840) 9 C & P 626. - A man put his gun at the head of another and said, 'Be quiet or I blow your brain out'. No assault. If the person did what he is told, nothing would happen.

Read v. Coker (1853) 13 CB 850. - A man was told to leave. At that moment he became a trespasser because he did not leave. The other one said, 'If you do not leave, we will break your neck'. Assault. It was held that threat was excessive.  

B) Mens rea

D intended, or was subjectively reckless as to, V’s apprehension of immediate unlawful violence.

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Intention OR recklessness will suffice:

R v. Venna [1976] QB 421.

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Standard of recklessness?

DPP v. K [1990] 1 WLR 1067 (‘Caldwell’ recklessness) - OBJECTIVE

R v. Spratt [1990] 1 WLR 1073 (‘Cunningham’ recklessness) – SUBJECTIVE, the Caldwell recklessness was rejected.

R v. Savage and Parmenter (above) (‘Cunningham’ recklessness ... now presumed to be the test in R v. G + R [2003] UKHL 50). – the subjective approach was confirmed.