The Student Room Group

Nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union

Scroll to see replies

Reply 20
Original post by MatureStudent36
regurgitating terminology I doubt you fully understand.


Presumably that's what's occurring when someone says "low trajectory SLBM", not realising the term is "depressed trajectory"?
Reply 21
Original post by the bear
a film was made recently about this courageous man:



Thanks for the link, I haven't seen that movie. I'll check it out!

Any good?
Original post by ExcitedPup
Thanks for the link, I haven't seen that movie. I'll check it out!

Any good?


it is on my to see list :wink:
Reply 23
Original post by the bear
it is on my to see list :wink:


Oh cool, I might go and rent it now then, I'll tell you how it is :smile:

Have you seen The Gatekeepers? It's a documentary film where all six living former heads of the Israeli Shin Bet go on camera to talk about their career in intelligence, to talk about the occupation of the territories, of intelligence operations they were involved in.

Not only is it extremely well-made, it is actually quite moving; probably the most profound documentary I've seen
(edited 8 years ago)
Original post by ExcitedPup
Oh cool, I might go and rent it now then, I'll tell you how it is :smile:

Have you seen The Gatekeepers? It's a documentary film where all six living former heads of the Israeli Shin Bet go on camera to talk about their career in intelligence, to talk about the occupation of the territories, of intelligence operations they were involved in.

Not only is it extremely well-made, it is actually quite moving; probably the most profound documentary I've seen


no. i recently watched a really good movie about a Mossad operation. "The Debt" stars Helen Mirren.
Reply 25
Original post by the bear
no. i recently watched a really good movie about a Mossad operation. "The Debt" stars Helen Mirren.


Definitely check out the Gatekeepers then, it is amazing. Not just good, but exceptional. Seen the Honourable Woman? That's quite good.

Thanks for the heads up re The Debt.

[video="youtube;HdMjr8cuEy8"]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HdMjr8cuEy8[/video]
Just to say on both sides of the Atlantic no one wanted to start a war. When Russia thought it to be winnable, they were probably talking about "if the US attacked first" - otherwise there would have been an all out war started by the Russians and well theres not been s WW3 has there?
Original post by ExcitedPup
Presumably that's what's occurring when someone says "low trajectory SLBM", not realising the term is "depressed trajectory"?


I used to have the misfortune of dealing with a USMC sniper who reminds me of you.

He'd constantly go on about how a sniper rifle was an indirect weapon due to the trajectory of its bullet at range.

We all thought he was a boring w*****r.
Original post by ExcitedPup
Definitely check out the Gatekeepers then, it is amazing. Not just good, but exceptional. Seen the Honourable Woman? That's quite good.

Thanks for the heads up re The Debt.

[video="youtube;HdMjr8cuEy8"]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HdMjr8cuEy8[/video]


Munich is a great film about the hunt for the terrorists who attacked the Olympic Games in 1972.

http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/munich/
Reply 29
Original post by MatureStudent36
I used to have the misfortune of dealing with a USMC sniper who reminds me of you.

He'd constantly go on about how a sniper rifle was an indirect weapon due to the trajectory of its bullet at range.

We all thought he was a boring w*****r.


Nice little bit of whataboutery there

For kicks, I googled "low trajectory SLBM". The only websites that mention it are conspiracy websites. If you search '"depressed trajectory" SLBM' then it comes up in all the places you'd expect.

Mate, your silly sniper anecdote is just making you look desperate. This is an area where you clearly do not know a huge amount. That's okay, I'm not judging you. But it's clearly a major part of your self-image to be the pre-eminent military expert on TSR, not just in one area but in every area.

I'm sorry you feel that way, it means you spout uninformed opinions and are unable to actually respond when someone who does know something about the subject puts some substantive points to you (I note with interest you still haven't made any comment about how the Soviets could have overcome the flight time synchronisation issue that would be an issue for any pre-emptive nuclear attack by any either side. Nor have you explained why you think the low yield and high CEP of Soviet SLBM's wouldn't matter in attacking a Minuteman field)
(edited 8 years ago)
Reply 30
Original post by the bear
Munich is a great film about the hunt for the terrorists who attacked the Olympic Games in 1972.

http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/munich/


Ah yes, I've seen Munich, great movie. Out of interest, have you seen the original 1979 Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy?

Bloody awesome, seeing the Le Carre world of espionage; middle-aged civil servants having drinks at the bar of the Travellers, searching out a Soviet mole of the sort who went to Oxford and wears a pinstripe suit, backbiting in the Foreign Office and amibtions for knighthoods and peerages, rather than car chases and gun fights.

I don't know, maybe it's just me :wink: Did you see the recent BBC spy thriller The Game?

[video="youtube;vLdp4kiuT-U"]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLdp4kiuT-U[/video]
Original post by ExcitedPup
Ah yes, I've seen Munich, great movie. Out of interest, have you seen the original 1979 Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy?

Bloody awesome, seeing the Le Carre world of espionage; middle-aged civil servants having drinks at the bar of the Travellers, searching out a Soviet mole of the sort who went to Oxford and wears a pinstripe suit, backbiting in the Foreign Office and amibtions for knighthoods and peerages, rather than car chases and gun fights.

I don't know, maybe it's just me :wink: Did you see the recent BBC spy thriller The Game?

[video="youtube;vLdp4kiuT-U"]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLdp4kiuT-U[/video]


i agree that Alec Guinness was far better suited to playing George Smiley. A brilliant series. The book is even better.

this film is worth watching:

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0087629/
Reply 32
Original post by the bear
i agree that Alec Guinness was far better suited to playing George Smiley. A brilliant series. The book is even better.


Most definitely, I absolutely loved the books, loved the series. And it's interesting that the series follow the books so closely, they didn't rewrite dialogue, they essentially lifted it straight out of the book. It's a testament to just how strong the source material is.

I didn't particularly like the recent Tinker, Tailor movie, it was too short to be able to tell the short.

A friend of mine is a member of the Travellers Club and when he took me there for dinner I thought it was the most awesome thing in the world

this film is worth watching:

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0087629/


You're kidding!! I had no idea The Little Drummer Girl had been made into a movie. I absolutely loved the book, I actually read it when I was on holiday in Greece so that felt suitably appropriate :wink: Thank you sooooo much for that link, I'm off now to go watch it
Original post by ExcitedPup
Most definitely, I absolutely loved the books, loved the series. And it's interesting that the series follow the books so closely, they didn't rewrite dialogue, they essentially lifted it straight out of the book. It's a testament to just how strong the source material is.

I didn't particularly like the recent Tinker, Tailor movie, it was too short to be able to tell the short.

A friend of mine is a member of the Travellers Club and when he took me there for dinner I thought it was the most awesome thing in the world



You're kidding!! I had no idea The Little Drummer Girl had been made into a movie. I absolutely loved the book, I actually read it when I was on holiday in Greece so that felt suitably appropriate :wink: Thank you sooooo much for that link, I'm off now to go watch it


have fun. watch out for the lamplighters :wink:
This was really far from my main interests, but in the past two or three months I've become really engrossed in military theory, particularly about nuclear weapons. I'm beginning to find it really fascinating. Since you seem quote knowledgeable, I'm wondering if you have any recommended (non-fiction) reading?

Original post by ExcitedPup
It's true that Soviet doctrine planned for conventional forces fighting in a nuclear battlefield environment, but it's also true that we know the Soviets were never planning a first strike and that they were terrified the Americans were.


To me this seems to discredit the argument on unfair grounds. You acknowledge the importance of game theory and psychology in modelling nuclear weapons as a defensive mechanism, yet discredit the idea that first strike was the greatest threat at the time in terms of the lack of a comprehensive strategy given a nuclear war scenario.

Perhaps it wasn't the greatest threat in empirical terms, and in accurately presenting the past one has to accept the interdisciplinary nature of the endeavor, but I believe that it is fair to argue that both superpowers were terrified of a first strike, and that as a perception is enough to label it as a threat. You're absolutely aware that the mutuality of this perception is the central pillar of deterrence theory.

Whether such fears could have actually led to a first strike or a nuclear exchange is, I guess for people who study this, an awkward and frustrating, if fortunate, counterfactual. Someone else in this thread linked the case of Petrov, which is perhaps the most famous case demonstrating just how easily a first strike would have led to an unimaginably disproportionate response precisely because both countries were so fearful of that first strike. This constant state of alertness even led to some fears of first strike because of technical malfunctions (I've heard of one situation in which a detection system was given a tape with a hypothetical all-out war scenario on it, although I can not cite this). If first strike and its concomitant response, in deterrence theory at least, of mass retaliation was such a real, existent, and evident threat, then retrospective assessments of countervalue versus counterforce targetting, missile accuracy and precision, military strategy, and geopolitical concerns, don't seem to me the best way to discredit the claim that first strike was the greatest fear. In fact, from what I understand of the intellectual history, they may even have appeared to people on both sides at the time as rather facile and uninspiring criticisms.

In other words, I might express this in such a way: deterrence was designed to prevent force escalation. Any violation of this trend or rule would have led to a responsive escalation. Given the size of the nuclear arsenals at the time of your video's production, this escalation could have gone on, effectively, ad infinitum.

As I say, I'm very new to this kind of stuff. I don't know if you have any justification for getting angry at the other poster, but I'd be interested in your thoughts on this since you seem knowledgeable.

ExcitedPup
I would have thought Minot was probably inappropriate for a depressed trajectory strike given its elevation and its distance from the coast.e


In a paper I read by Gerold Yonas, who worked on the Fletcher Panel, he described that missiles could be counteracted at four stages: the boost phase, the post-boost phase, the mid-course boost phase, and the terminal phase. He gives data on the approximate length of each phase for ICBMs and SLBMs, such that the boost phase is 150-300 seconds and 150-200 seconds respectively, and the mid-course phase 10-15 minutes and 7-10 minutes respectively. I've not come across the terms depressed trajectory or CEP before. What I want to ask is if all SLBMs were launched using a depressed trajectory and if this significantly influence flight times and also if a depressed trajectory has any noteworthy effect on accuracy (which I assume to be roughly equatable with CEP)?
(edited 8 years ago)
Reply 35
Original post by Roseland
This was really far from my main interests, but in the past two or three months I've become really engrossed in military theory, particularly about nuclear weapons. I'm beginning to find it really fascinating. Since you seem quote knowledgeable, I'm wondering if you have any recommended (non-fiction) reading?


The absolute bible, in my opinion, for reading up on nuclear strategy through the Cold War, and how it evolved in light of different weapons systems and eras is a book called The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy by Lawrence Freedman. For example, the strategy in the 1950s (when neither side had ICBMs or SLBMs, but the US had over 1,000 nuclear jet bombers like B-52s and a stockpile of 5,000 warheads, compared to the Soviet's hundreds of warheads and a small bomber fleet) is very different to strategy in the 1980s (when both sides had tens of thousands of warheads, satellite-based infrared early warning systems, thousands of ICBMs and SLBMs on each side etc).

The more you read about it, the more interesting you will find it; the interplay between psychology and game theory, the technology, the strategy and the planning, the incomplete understanding on each side of their adversary's intentions and capabilities. It is one of the most interesting fields of study I've dived into.

In other words, I might express this in such a way: deterrence was designed to prevent force escalation. Any violation of this trend or rule would have led to a responsive escalation. Given the size of the nuclear arsenals at the time of your video's production, this escalation could have gone on, effectively, ad infinitum.


I agree with what you've said about deterrence; in fact, you've restated standard deterrence theory with which I am in full agreement. It is late and I do think your comments deserve a full response so I will tomorrow morning as I've already written too much

Are you familiar with the distinction between counterforce and countervalue? (apologies if the question is patronising, I don't know how much you know about the subject). The distinction was increasingly important as the Cold War progressed, as nuclear weapons become more accurate, and as it becomes plausible for one side to target the other side's strategic weapons systems and command/control systems rather than their cities (that is known as counterforce). The navy with its SSBNs tended to have a countervalue philosophy (that is, deter attack with the threat is city-busting). I think it's important, when talking about the genuine threat of a first strike, and the practical likelihood and what deterrence theory says about that, to distinguish between the two. Wil have more to say about this tomorrow

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pre-emptive_nuclear_strike
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue

The wikipedia article on the SIOP is actually a good place to start, it goes through the evolution of US nuclear targeting doctrine through the Cold War

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_Integrated_Operational_Plan

I've not come across the terms depressed trajectory or CEP before. What I want to ask is if all SLBMs were launched using a depressed trajectory and if this significantly influence flight times and also if a depressed trajectory has any noteworthy effect on accuracy (which I assume to be roughly equatable with CEP)?


CEP is so important in nuclear strategy. It means Circular Error Probable; it's the radius of a circle within which 50% of rounds are expected to hit. So if we are talking about an MX Peacekeeper ICBM with a CEP of 40 metres, that means that 50% of warheads, statistically speaking, will hit within that radius of 40 meters

Two other very important concepts are overpressure in psi (pounds per square inch) and the inverse square rule. A nuclear detonation will cause a blast effect; overpressure. The strength of the overpressure will reduce according to the inverse square rule (take a look at the nuclear weapons effects calculator below)

http://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/
Overpressure
Physical Effects
20 psi Heavily built concrete buildings are severely damaged or demolished.

10 psi Reinforced concrete buildings are severely damaged or demolished.
Most people are killed.

5 psi Most buildings collapse. Injuries are universal, fatalities are widespread.

3 psi Residential structures collapse. Serious injuries are common, fatalities may occur.

1 psi Window glass shatters Light injuries from fragments occur.

In essence, due to the inverse square law, you are far better investing in accuracy than bomb yield to get a better outcome in terms of target destruction. If you have a warhead with a 200 kiloton yield and a CEP of 200 meters, you would be far better off increasing the CEP to 20 meters than the yield to 2 megatons (just for a note, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were about 10-20 kilotons)

Anyway, that's a very basic overview. The reason Soviet SLBMs would be inadequate for taking on a field of Minuteman ICBM silos is that the silos are usually hardened to withstand 2,000 psi (that's extremely tough). Even on the Soviet SS-N-20 SLBM which was a late model, they had a CEP of about 500 meters and a yield of 100-200 kilotons. Not nearly enough to bust a Minuteman silo.

To bust a silo, you need a weapon much more like the US MX missile, which carried ten warheads of 500 kilotons each and a CEP of about 40 meters. You need to get pretty close to a silo to bust it.

So, depressed trajectory... basically, ICBMs and SLBMs follow a ballistic trajectory where they arc very high, in a suborbital trajectory, detach the warhead bus which then ejects warheads at the right moment so that it will fall on the target you want it to fall on. The problem with a big, arcing trajectory high above the surface of the earth is that it makes it easy to detect with radar, and it has a longer flight-time. The flight-time of an SLBM from the mid Atlantic to a continental US target would be about 10-15 minutes.

But if you fire it on a depressed trajectory (think of it like you are firing a rifle, rather than an artillery shell; instead of arcing high into the atmosphere and falling back, you are firing it at a much lower angle). This means you have a much shorter flight time, closer to 5 minutes. The adversary has far less warning. That would be very useful for a decapitation strike against Washington DC.

The problem with this is that ballistic missiles are not designed for this manoeuvre; a missile which otherwise has a range of 4,000-5,000 miles might have it reduced to 1,000 miles or even less on a depressed trajectory, simply because it is encountering far more aerodynamic resistance as against the thrust the rocket can produce. On the issue of accuracy, a lot of the accuracy of MIRV warheads comes from the fact they are in a zero-g or close to zero-g environment at the zenith of their flight, they can have much more control over how and where they re-enter the atmosphere. Also, many navigation systems for these rockets use astronavigation; they have an infrared camera that literally takes pictures of the stars to work out where they are (I know that sounds mad, it's true). If they are within the atmosphere an astro fix will be a much more difficult proposition and they will have to rely purely on inertial navigation (gyroscopes and accelerometers attached to a flight computer)

Sorry, I know that is a massive rambling post, but I thought I'd outline some of the basics. It's one of the most interesting areas of study, nuclear strategy and arms control. To really get a handle on it, the first thing I'd encourage you to do is get a handle on the technology; most of the strategy flows from the technical characteristics of the weapons. Check out the Minuteman, the MX, Polaris/Poseidon/Trident, the SS-18, the SS-20 and BGM-109.

Hope this makes sense, just start reading and keep reading. Wikipedia is genuinely a pretty good place to start, to get your bearings, and then start reading some books and scholarly articles.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effects_of_nuclear_explosions
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_on_warning
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_response
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail-deadly
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_strike

The bibliographies in the wiki articles also provides some decent pointers as to what to read.
(edited 8 years ago)
Original post by ExcitedPup
The absolute bible, in my opinion, for reading up on nuclear strategy through the Cold War, and how it evolved in light of different weapons systems and eras is a book called The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy by Lawrence Freedman.


Thank you for this recommendation. I've heard of his book 'Strategy: A History' before; this looks perfect.

Original post by ExcitedPup
Are you familiar with the distinction between counterforce and countervalue? (apologies if the question is patronising, I don't know how much you know about the subject). The distinction was increasingly important as the Cold War progressed, as nuclear weapons become more accurate, and as it becomes plausible for one side to target the other side's strategic weapons systems and command/control systems rather than their cities (that is known as counterforce).


I think I am. Crudely, countervalue targets are military targets and counterforce targets are civilian targets; or countervalue targets are those that pose a military threat and counterforce targets are those that don't. In some things I've read, I've felt there's been the implication that countervalue has strategic weight as opposed to counterforce which has tactical weight, although I'm not sure what you think about this. I read a book yesterday called The Fate of the Earth by Jonathon Schell. It is much more journalistic than academic in tone, and is a philosophical polemic against nuclear weapons, but he claims that, regardless of accuracy, the number of nuclear weapons in both countries could lead to a situation in which nuclear weapons would be effectively hunting people down person-by-person.

Sometimes I feel the distinction could be obscured. Instances like garrisoning, conscription, or, as you point out, of ABM launchers around major cities would blur the distinction.

Original post by ExcitedPup
Two other very important concepts are overpressure in psi (pounds per square inch) and the inverse square rule. A nuclear detonation will cause a blast effect; overpressure. The strength of the overpressure will reduce according to the inverse square rule (take a look at the nuclear weapons effects calculator below)


I read in the aforementioned book that higher overpressure can be created by detonating atomic weapons closer to the ground (a ground burst). If I understand the inverse square rule, this is a way of exemplifying it?

Original post by ExcitedPup
In essence, due to the inverse square law, you are far better investing in accuracy than bomb yield to get a better outcome in terms of target destruction... To bust a silo, you need a weapon much more like the US MX missile, which carried ten warheads of 500 kilotons each and a CEP of about 40 meters. You need to get pretty close to a silo to bust it.


That's really interesting. Was there an inequality in the resilience of silos between the two superpowers?

Original post by ExcitedPup
So, depressed trajectory... basically, ICBMs and SLBMs follow a ballistic trajectory where they arc very high, in a suborbital trajectory, detach the warhead bus which then ejects warheads at the right moment so that it will fall on the target you want it to fall on. The problem with a big, arcing trajectory high above the surface of the earth is that it makes it easy to detect with radar, and it has a longer flight-time. The flight-time of an SLBM from the mid Atlantic to a continental US target would be about 10-15 minutes.


This is the paper that I read recently. It goes through the different phases of missile launch. If you can get access to both Vol. 114 no. 2 and no. 3, I think you'd find pursuing them really interesting.

Original post by ExcitedPup
But if you fire it on a depressed trajectory (think of it like you are firing a rifle, rather than an artillery shell; instead of arcing high into the atmosphere and falling back, you are firing it at a much lower angle). This means you have a much shorter flight time, closer to 5 minutes. The adversary has far less warning. That would be very useful for a decapitation strike against Washington DC... The problem with this is that ballistic missiles are not designed for this manoeuvre; a missile which otherwise has a range of 4,000-5,000 miles might have it reduced to 1,000 miles or even less on a depressed trajectory, simply because it is encountering far more aerodynamic resistance as against the thrust the rocket can produce.


So, to answer my question, all missiles were fired using a suborbital rather than a depressed trajectory? Or was the option to fire with a depressed trajectory available at control centres? Do you know what accounts for the lower flight time of SLBMs - is it simply that submarines are closer to the United States?

Original post by ExcitedPup
Sorry, I know that is a massive rambling post, but I thought I'd outline some of the basics. It's one of the most interesting areas of study, nuclear strategy and arms control. To really get a handle on it, the first thing I'd encourage you to do is get a handle on the technology; most of the strategy flows from the technical characteristics of the weapons. Check out the Minuteman, the MX, Polaris/Poseidon/Trident, the SS-18, the SS-20 and BGM-109.


Any book recommendations on this point? At this point, I haven't looked into military technology at all.
Reply 37
Original post by Roseland

I think I am. Crudely, countervalue targets are military targets and counterforce targets are civilian targets; or countervalue targets are those that pose a military threat and counterforce targets are those that don't. In some things I've read, I've felt there's been the implication that countervalue has strategic weight as opposed to counterforce which has tactical weight, although I'm not sure what you think about this.


The other way around. A counterforce strike would be against your adversary's strategic nuclear arsenal, his command and control systems, early-warning radars, leadership bunkers and so on, with the aim of disarming him. A countervalue strike would be striking his cities, with the sole intention of destroying his industrial base / killing as many people as possible. Having said all that, a counterforce strike would still cause a lot of deaths; it was estimated that on either side you would kill about 10 million people even in a counterforce-only strike.

Sometimes I feel the distinction could be obscured. Instances like garrisoning, conscription, or, as you point out, of ABM launchers around major cities would blur the distinction.


You are absolute right. There are dozens of counterforce targets in and around Moscow, such as the underground bunker housing the headquarters of the Air Defence Force (PVO-Strany), or Khodinka Airfield (which is the main airfield of Soviet military intelligence and right next to the headquarters of the GRU), or Perkushkovo, which is the leadership bunker of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces (Their ICBMs had their own branch of the military, as did the Air Defence)

Even in a purely counterforce strike, it's likely Moscow and some other major cities would be hit very hard.

I read in the aforementioned book that higher overpressure can be created by detonating atomic weapons closer to the ground (a ground burst). If I understand the inverse square rule, this is a way of exemplifying it?


It's complex. Usually an airburst will give you a much broader swathe of destruction (as the blast wave reflects back off the ground creating what is known as a Mach stem, causing much greater damage). So airburst are often preferred (and this is a critical consideration) they cause far less radioactive fallout; if you airburst at an altitude that the fireball does not touch the ground, then most of the radiactive nuclei will blow up into the atmosphere where it will dissipate). If you do a groundburst, the radioactive nuclei fuse with the dirt which throws up a very radioactive nuclear dust cloud. So airbursts were preferred as they were much cleaner and more effective for many classes of target. But a ground burst would be very effective against a bunker target as it would transmit the shockwave through the ground.

For Soviet hardened bunker targets, the US held onto the B53 bomb to the end of the Cold War (a 9 megaton air-dropped weapon, despite that class of very large air dropped bombs being retired for all other purposes like city busting). In fact, the B53 was retained until just a couple of years ago

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B53_nuclear_bomb

Having said that, as the Grabel shot showed, sometimes a smaller yield at a lower altitude will cause a very abnormal waveform called a precursor wave which is absolutely devastating at ground level.

The inverse square law (I'm not particularly mathematical so I know I am butchering this) is that the blast effect of nuclear weapon decreases according to distance in a logarithmic way. That is, say you have 100 psi at 300 meters from ground zero, at 600 meters it won't be 50 psi, it will be more like 10 psi (hence why accuracy is always the better investment over yield, and the yields of weapons decreased over the course of the cold war)

That's really interesting. Was there an inequality in the resilience of silos between the two superpowers?


Absolutely. The Soviets hardened some of their SS-18 Satan silos to 7,000 psi (which is hardened almost beyond imagining, though such a silo would be vulnerable even to a relatively small 30 kiloton shot is the warhead exploded right on top of it), whereas the maximum US hardening was to about 2,000 psi.

This was a physical expression of the mismatch in microcomputer technology; the Americans could build missiles that were much more accurate due to their superior microelectronic technology, and to compensate the Soviets had to harden their silos to a much greater degree. The Soviets also created road-mobile ICBMs, which would drive around to different places to complicate US targeting (almost like a submarine-based missile, only it was on land to take advantage of the Soviet Union's vast physical space)

This is the paper that I read recently. It goes through the different phases of missile launch. If you can get access to both Vol. 114 no. 2 and no. 3, I think you'd find pursuing them really interesting.


I will check it out, thanks for the heads up! :smile:

So, to answer my question, all missiles were fired using a suborbital rather than a depressed trajectory? Or was the option to fire with a depressed trajectory available at control centres? Do you know what accounts for the lower flight time of SLBMs - is it simply that submarines are closer to the United States?


Precisely. All deployed missiles were designed to fly suborbitally; into space though without (nor do they require) sufficient velocity to enter orbit. As to depressed trajectories, all missiles would in theory be capable of it as it would be a matter of programming the control fins to angle towards the horizon more rapidly. However, the degree of control as to such a mode would always depend; it would depend whether the weapons designers had programmed the fire control system to have such an option. I would be very surprised if land-based ICBMs were programmed with it, though it is likely some later-model SLBMs were programmed with the option.

As to the lower flight time, that's correct; a missile flying from the mid-Atlantic or Pacific (where Soviet SSBNs would patrol) to the US would take 10 to 15 minutes (or as little as 5 minutes if it was a coastal target). A Soviet ICBM or US ICBM, by contrast, would take 25-30 minutes as it would fly from their base into space over the North Pole and then down onto the targets. Greater flight-time is simply a function of the longer distance.

Actually, one interesting exception is the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System. The Soviets developed a missile system that flew an orbital trajectory. It was based on the knowledge that US early-warning radars were pointed north towards the pole and east. They asked how they might design a weapon to bring warheads from the opposite direction (over the south pole) from a direction the Americans were not expecting.

They adapted their R-36 missile with an orbital vehicle. The advantage of this weapon is that not only would the Americans not expect the direction, but you could also place it in orbit and then keep it there until you required it. Even if the Americans could track it (difficult, the warhead bus was much smaller than a satellite), that wouldn't determine the target as it could be de-orbited at any point along its flight path (and on either side as the warhead bus had a sufficient degree of manoeuvrability to perform a braking manoeuvre prior to dropping the warhead for re-entry).

You could keep it in orbit for years, until you decided to strike, in which case it would de-orbit and hit its target within minutes with no warning whatsoever. The Soviets de-activated this system in the early 1980s on the basis it was incredibly destabilising (as are land-based MIRVed ICBMs generally, because they place a premium on first strike in a way that submarine based systems do not) and it was a forbidden space-based weapons system according to the Outer Space Treaty.

Interesting, huh :smile:

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Sov-FOBS-Program.html

Any book recommendations on this point? At this point, I haven't looked into military technology at all.


There's a book called Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces which is an excellent reference work for Soviet systems. I don't have an analogous book for American systems, but the Federation of American Scientists websites is extremely good. It even has a lot of reference material for early warning radars, counterforce targets

http://fas.org:8080/nuke/guide/

I just thought I'd mention one other thing which gives you a sense of the very different strategic approaches of the two powers. In the 1970s the US decided to develop the MX missile system as they were concerned the Minuteman force was becoming vulnerable. As I said above, it had a very small CEP of 40 meters, ten warheads of about 500 kilotons each (for reference, Nagasaki was 20 kilotons).

At the same time, the Soviets developed the SS-18 Mod 3, with had a CEP of about a kilometer and a yield of 20 megatons. That is over 1,000 times as powerful as the Nagasaki bomb. That is utterly insane. If an SS-18 Mod 3 hit the centre of London, almost every buildling from Dagenham in the East to Hounslow in the West would be flattened. People in Luton and Windsor 30 miles away would suffer third-degree burns just from the heat/light flash that lasted miliseconds at the instant of the blast. The fireball itself would envelop all of Westminster and the City of London.

Thank goodness nuclear war never happened. Also a good illustration how, as the 1970s came along, the Americans increasingly focused on miniaturization of warheads and greater accuracy. It was only towards the very end of the Cold War the Soviets were even getting down towards 200 meter CEPs (hence the need for larger warheads in the ICBM force)

A 1965 movie called The War Game is a very good antidote, I find, to the cold logic of nuclear strategy, where you rationally talk about millions of death with little sense of the real-world implications.

http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1kwz5u_the-war-game-peter-watkins-1965_tv

The actual nuclear war bit starts at around 14 minutes
(edited 8 years ago)
Reply 38
Original post by Roseland
X


Oh just one other thing I thought I'd show you; for a sense of how far the Americans progressed in miniaturisation of warheads. The first American implosion device, the Fat Man, weighed 5 tonnes and had a yield of 20 kilotons



Thirty years later, the Americans had progressed to the W80 warhead, designed to be placed in a cruise missile. The W80 had a "dial-a-yield" of 5 kilotons to 150 kilotons.



This is why the Americans could build thousands of cruise missiles, basically small pilotless aircraft with very small and efficient turbofan engines. You would mount 20 each on a bomber, have them fly over the North Pole and then release their swarm of cruise missiles which would fly into Soviet airspace at treetop level, giving very little warning



That's how the Americans responded in the 1970s to the increasing vulnerability of their land-based missiles
Reply 39
Original post by Roseland

This is the paper that I read recently.
...
Any book recommendations on this point? At this point, I haven't looked into military technology at all.


I'm just reading it now. Can I suggest two other papers in response which you will find useful to expand your knowledge of the technological side of strategic weapons systems, in the first case the US Fleet Ballistic Missile programme (Polaris, Poseidon and Trident) and in the second the B-1 bomber in the US Strategic Air Command

The first is fascinating in that it discusses how the US Navy's strategic mission shifted from one of countervalue city-busting to counterforce warfighting as the technology developed and sea-launched ballistic missiles came to possess accuracy that had previously been the preserve of land-based ICBMs. It looks at the technology, the strategy and the bureaucratic considerations

The Shaping of Nuclear Weapon Systems Technology: US Fleet Ballistic Missiles Guidance and Technology Part I : Polaris to Poseidon

Social Studies of Science, Vol 18, No. 3 (Aug, 1988)

http://www.jstor.org/stable/285232?&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

And a very good paper on the arguments for the B-1 bomber. It really puts you in the frame of mind of the strategic nuclear challenges facing the use in the late 1970s in terms of deterring a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union

The Case for the B-1 Bomber

International Security, Vol 1, No 2 (Fall 1976)

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538500?&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
(edited 8 years ago)

Quick Reply

Latest

Trending

Trending