The Student Room Group

Nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union

I found this marvelous old propaganda video from the late 1970s which depicts a Soviet surprise first strike on the United States using nuclear weapons. It depicts US nuclear forces as they are under that attack and trying to respond.

The scenario it depicts at the end is OTT (the Soviets would have difficulty obtaining a result that good, in terms of the number of Minuteman missiles destroyed) but it is quite interesting and accurate in that it depicts just how quickly things would go from totally normal, everyone living their lives, to all-out nuclear war, in the space of 25 minutes, and how in some ways the whole process is almost on autopilot

You can click the little YouTube button on the bottom right if you want to watch full-screen

[video="youtube;jlPEBROvR9w"]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlPEBROvR9w[/video]

Parts 2 through 6 are also worth watching, as goes to a talking head documentary discussing US nuclear strategy in the 1980s, the best way of maintaining nuclear superiority. It's very interesting stuff, the way nuclear strategy mixes pscyhology and game theory, the technology, etc
(edited 8 years ago)

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A very real threat at the time.
Reply 2
Original post by MatureStudent36
A very real threat at the time.


It was, though the threat that this documentary depicts is overblown. The Soviets would be very lucky indeed to wipe out pretty much the entire bomber force and the entire Minuteman force.

And the MX scheme that many were promoting was ludicrous, $50 billion for a scheme where each missile would have 21 shelters linked by railway tracks (so that the Soviets would have to target each shelter to be sure of hitting the missile), but each shelter also had a roof that could be moved to an open position so the missiles could be counted by Soviet satellites for SALT verification purposes.

Reagan was right to call it a Rube Goldberg scheme

Probably more important is the documentary makers did not understand the degree to which SLBMs would become as accurate as land-based ICBMs. The talking heads talk about how vulnerable the land-based Minuteman force is, and that only the Minuteman force can take out time-critical hardened Soviet targets. But Trident II would end up being as accurate as MX (i.e. it would be capable of counterforce targeting).

In any case, I do like the depiction and I think it's pretty unique in terms of publicly available material.
Original post by ExcitedPup
It was, though the threat that this documentary depicts is overblown. The Soviets would be very lucky indeed to wipe out pretty much the entire bomber force and the entire Minuteman force.

And the MX scheme that many were promoting was ludicrous, $50 billion for a scheme where each missile would have 21 shelters linked by railway tracks (so that the Soviets would have to target each shelter to be sure of hitting the missile), but each shelter also had a roof that could be moved to an open position so the missiles could be counted by Soviet satellites for SALT verification purposes.

Reagan was right to call it a Rube Goldberg scheme

Probably more important is the documentary makers did not understand the degree to which SLBMs would become as accurate as land-based ICBMs. The talking heads talk about how vulnerable the land-based Minuteman force is, and that only the Minuteman force can take out time-critical hardened Soviet targets. But Trident II would end up being as accurate as MX (i.e. it would be capable of counterforce targeting).

In any case, I do like the depiction and I think it's pretty unique in terms of publicly available material.


Not quite.

The biggest threat during the Cold War was an unprovoked first strike.

Their were many in the soviet high command who thought a nuclear war was winnable.

As for taking out minuteman, a low trajectory SLBM system would've given the Americans even less time than we had.
Reply 4
Original post by MatureStudent36
Not quite.

The biggest threat during the Cold War was an unprovoked first strike.

Their were many in the soviet high command who thought a nuclear war was winnable.


It's true that Soviet doctrine planned for conventional forces fighting in a nuclear battlefield environment, but it's also true that we know the Soviets were never planning a first strike and that they were terrified the Americans were.

As for taking out minuteman, a low trajectory SLBM system would've given the Americans even less time than we had.


What about the flight time synchronisation issue? (and indeed the SLBM CEP issue, they were not suitable weapons against a 2,000 psi hardened silo) As far as I know, no Soviet planners (or Americans theorists) ever squared that circle
Original post by ExcitedPup
It's true that Soviet doctrine planned for conventional forces fighting in a nuclear battlefield environment, but it's also true that we know the Soviets were never planning a first strike and that they were terrified the Americans were.



What about the flight time synchronisation issue? (and indeed the SLBM CEP issue, they were not suitable weapons against a 2,000 psi hardened silo) As far as I know, no Soviet planners (or Americans theorists) ever squared that circle


http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Cold-War-Military-History/dp/0312241836

Worth reading.
Reply 6
Original post by MatureStudent36

As for taking out minuteman, a low trajectory SLBM system would've given the Americans even less time than we had.


Also, leaving aside the flight-time synchronisation issue and the CEP issue for the Soviet SLBM force (even the SS-N-20 was probably outside the kind of performance envelope for counterforce attacks given the very moderate yield and poor CEP relatively speaking), I would have thought Minot was probably inappropriate for a depressed trajectory strike given its elevation and its distance from the coast.

What we know of Soviet strategy was that SLBM force would be used against the bomber bases, against DC and naval bases and C3I targets, and the ICBM force would be used against the Minuteman fields (which makes perfect sense given the performance characteristics of the two types of weapons; that's exactly the same as the American strategy for the Soviets pre-Trident II)

But with all that in mind, afaik no-one was ever able to determine how the flight-time synchronisation issue would be overcome to prevent the Minuteman executing a launch-on-warning. Which is, of course, why it was generally said that the Soviets could probably take out the bomber force, or the Minuteman force, but not both
Reply 7


I might give it a go. Is there something in the book about the flight-time synchronisation issue? If there was some answer to the problem in that book that I hadn't heard of, I would be astonished (as would a considerable number of people with an interest in nuclear strategy and arms control)
Reply 8


I would just add, it's very easy to conjure up a frightening scenario by talking about a depressed-trajectory SLBM strike on DC because it gives you almost no warning (three or four minutes flight-time to a city like DC). But depressed trajectory is really only suitable for city-busting, and for cities relatively close to the coast at that

You can't fire an SLBM 2,000 miles on a depressed trajectory (the approx distance from Minot to where a Soviet SSBN would probably be). Re your mentioning a "low trajectory SLBM system", it's not a system per se; any SLBM can in theory be programmed to fly on a depressed trajectory, it's whether you want to do that because of the issues of massively decreased accuracy (no astronavigation, inertial only) and range (think about the effect of gravity pulling the missile down, and that it cannot rely on any appreciable lift effect)

Finally, I'm unsure how the Soviets could overcome their vulnerability to SOSUS; if they had another 20 years from 1990 to work on their submarine technology, it's quite possible they could have. But in the mid-1980s? There are simply too many problems and unanswered issues for them to have worked out all the problems to overcome in order to undertake a successful first strike

The only slightly open avenue I can think of (entirely theoretical) is if the Soviets devised and practiced a technique for "pindown" on the Minuteman fields using SLBMs, but that is a theoretical tactic
(edited 8 years ago)
Original post by ExcitedPup
I would just add, it's very easy to conjure up a frightening scenario by talking about a depressed-trajectory SLBM strike on DC because it gives you almost no warning (three or four minutes flight-time to a city like DC). But depressed trajectory is really only suitable for city-busting, and for cities relatively close to the coast at that

You can't fire an SLBM 2,000 miles on a depressed trajectory (the approx distance from Minot to where a Soviet SSBN would probably be). Re your mentioning a "low trajectory SLBM system", it's not a system per se; any SLBM can in theory be programmed to fly on a depressed trajectory, it's whether you want to do that because of the issues of massively decreased accuracy (no astronavigation, inertial only) and range (think about the effect of gravity pulling the missile down, and that it cannot rely on any appreciable lift effect)

Finally, I'm unsure how the Soviets could overcome their vulnerability to SOSUS; if they had another 20 years from 1990 to work on their submarine technology, it's quite possible they could have. But in the mid-1980s? There are simply too many problems and unanswered issues for them to have worked out all the problems to overcome in order to undertake a successful first strike

The only slightly open avenue I can think of (entirely theoretical) is if the Soviets devised and practiced a technique for "pindown" on the Minuteman fields using SLBMs, but that is a theoretical tactic


http://nation.foxnews.com/russia/2012/08/14/russian-attack-submarine-sailed-gulf-mexico-undetected-weeks

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-35_anti-ballistic_missile_system
there was a very scary incident where the Soviet early warning system falsely flagged up an American Nuclear launch.
the decision on whether to retaliate rested on the shoulders of one man:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov
Reply 11


Have you ever heard of SOSUS? After World War 2, the Americans laid thousands of undersea microphones in the Atlantic (some in the Pacific too) to detect enemy ships and submarines. It meant the Americans had warning of pretty much every Soviet submarine entering the Atlantic (though the Victor III was fairly quiet)

In the mid-90s, the US dismantled SOSUS. It therefore stands to reason that a report that a Russian submarine penetrated the Gulf of Mexico in recent years tells us very little about their capability to do so in the 1980s



I'm not sure what that demonstrates? The ABM treaty permitted the Soviets to have one ABM system with maximum of 100 interceptors. They decided to install theirs around Moscow (the Americans were going to install the Safeguard system around the Minuteman fields but decided the game wasn't worth the candle). It would certainly help a little bit, but the Soviets would be facing over a thousand warheads hitting Moscow.

The British Chevaline system was designed by itself to overcome A-35 (and while it probably would not have totally spoofed it, the Chevaline "threat tube" would soak up Soviet interceptors, a few W-76s would get through and then the large mass of American strikes would follow on through the hole created by the British Polaris system)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevaline
(edited 8 years ago)
Reply 12
Original post by the bear
there was a very scary incident where the Soviet early warning system falsely flagged up an American Nuclear launch.
the decision on whether to retaliate rested on the shoulders of one man:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov


He was apparently punished afterwards; that's so characteristic of the Soviets :lol:
Original post by ExcitedPup
Have you ever heard of SOSUS? After World War 2, the Americans laid thousands of undersea microphones in the Atlantic (some in the Pacific too) to detect enemy ships and submarines. It meant the Americans had warning of pretty much every Soviet submarine entering the Atlantic (though the Victor III was fairly quiet)

In the mid-90s, the US dismantled SOSUS. It therefore stands to reason that a report that a Russian submarine penetrated the Gulf of Mexico in recent years tells us very little about their capability to do so in the 1980s



I'm not sure what that demonstrates? The ABM treaty permitted the Soviets to have one ABM system with maximum of 100 interceptors. They decided to install theirs around Moscow (the Americans were going to install the Safeguard system around the Minuteman fields but decided the game wasn't worth the candle). It would certainly help a little bit, but the Soviets would be facing over a thousand warheads hitting Moscow.

The British Chevaline system was designed by itself to overcome A-35 (and while it probably would not have totally spoofed it, the Chevaline "threat tube" would soak up Soviet interceptors, a few W-76s would get through and then the large mass of American strikes would follow on through the hole created by the British Polaris system)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevaline


I'm fully aware of all that you're talking about. And I didn't get my knowledge from them off the internet.
Original post by ExcitedPup
He was apparently punished afterwards; that's so characteristic of the Soviets :lol:


According to Wiki he was not punished nor rewarded.

Crazy to think that one man saved humanity.
Reply 15
Original post by MatureStudent36
I'm fully aware of all that you're talking about. And I didn't get my knowledge from them off the internet.


That's funny, given throughout this conversation I've been posting based substantially based on knowledge I have, and you've been responding with internet links.

To be honest mate, it's been pretty clear from the moment you wrote "low trajectory SLBM", and from your inability to even comment on the flight-time synchronisation issue, that this isn't really your field :wink:

It's okay for someone else to know more than you, the fact you're not an expert in every area of military endeavor won't cause me to doubt you were were in the army or whatever
(edited 8 years ago)
Original post by ExcitedPup
He was apparently punished afterwards; that's so characteristic of the Soviets :lol:


a film was made recently about this courageous man:

[video="youtube;y6WvXxMkBWg"]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y6WvXxMkBWg[/video]
Reply 17
Original post by MatureStudent36
I'm fully aware of all that you're talking about. And I didn't get my knowledge from them off the internet.


And just re not getting your knowledge from the internet, it would seem that's exactly where you get it given you posted a Fox News link as evidence for the proposition that Russian submarines could penetrate the Atlantic seaboard of the US in the 1980s.

As I said above, it's okay for you not to be an expert on this. What might make me think you're a little bit of a poser, and an internet warrior, is if you're one of those guys who claims that he did everything and learned everything when he was in the forces. You obviously didn't even know of SOSUS' existence, so you're already kind-of out on a limb
(edited 8 years ago)
Original post by ExcitedPup
That's funny, given throughout this conversation I've been posting based substantially based on knowledge I have, and you've been responding with internet links.

To be honest mate, it's been pretty clear from the moment you wrote "low trajectory SLBM", and from your inability to even comment on the flight-time synchronisation issue, that this isn't really your field :wink:

It's okay for someone else to know more than you, the fact you're not an expert in every area of military endeavor won't cause me to doubt you were were in the army or whatever

You're writing in great depth about a 35 year old made for TV film and throwing out regurgitating terminology I doubt you fully understand.
Reply 19
Original post by MatureStudent36
You're writing in great depth about a 35 year old made for TV film and throwing out regurgitating terminology I doubt you fully understand.


:lol: Wow, it really pushes your buttons when someone knows more about you in a particular area of military endeavor, even if it has nothing to do with what you did in the army. Is that a really important part of your self-image? Seeing yourself as the TSR military expert?

As for fully understanding the terminology, I'm happy to discuss in detail anything I've brought up on this thread :smile: You haven't been, you've avoided responding to anything in depth because you know you're out of your depth, but the idea that someone else might know more than you in this area clearly irritates the **** out of you. It's pretty sad mate
(edited 8 years ago)

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