From The Student Room

TSR Wiki > Study Help > Subjects and Revision > Revision Notes > History > Appeasement - Britain and Chamberlain

---

Comments and opinions on the topic of appeasement.

Did Britain have choices in the 1930s?

The British did have more room in foreign policy than is assumed, but they didn't use it. Baldwin and Chamberlain both consistently over-estimated their enemies and under-estimated both Britain and her allies - and potential allies.

Firstly, in diplomacy, even a weak hand can be played well. Austria before 1914 certainly did this. (although in 1908 arguably overplayed it). To do this, a politician must listen to his professional diplomats (but not always heed them) and must remain flexible. You don't need a mighty military to do this, but you do need to appear to have a limit to what you are prepared to tolerate. This forces your opponents to wonder how far they can push you and so to (sometimes) act under self-imposed moderation. Chamberlain failed to create this atmosphere. Hence Nazi demands got more strident because - to use a future quote - the other fellow kept blinking.

Hitler's professional diplomats and military advisors kept trying to restrain him - because they saw Britain's strengths and Germany's weaknesses. They were ignored because (Baldwin and) Chamberlain failed to pressure Hitler. Hitler then felt he was right and his advisors wrong and hence was further emboldened. This point is worth addressing because before 1914, the Kaiser attempted to do the same with Germany foreign policy. He talked big, he made aggressive moves but backed down in the face of force. Whether that force was usable or not wasn't important - war was avoided before 1914.

A few less than complete diplomatic victories would have forced Hitler to adopt a more cautious foreign policy. That in turn would have made war less likely, and so Chamberlain might well have delayed or prevent war. (In which case I would admire him and focus on what a loose cannon Churchill was at the time).

Appeasement also helped weaken Britain's allies, potential allies and strengthen her enemies (potential or otherwise) and so make Britain's Imperial Defence fears a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Even before Munich, Japan was testing British resolve in the Far East and in China. As mentioned elsewhere in this thread in 1902 the two nations formed an Alliance. This allowed Britain to start to concentrate her (modern) battleships against Germany and leave lighter and/or older forces in the Pacific. For Japan, it gave her if not Great Power status globally, at least Power status in her hemisphere. Japan was offended when Britain broke this alliance in 1919 in deference to the US. As Japanese politics became more bitter from 1928 onwards, her military and diplomatic leaders looked for targets to allow Japan to expand. In this context, it was important to show resolve towards Japan. The poor showing over Manchuria, and Japan’s eventual departure from the League, showed her departure from the then system of international norms. Continued appeasement over China, particularly from 1937 onwards simply made Japan bolder – and stretched British defence resources further. When the Japanese humiliated British diplomats and their wives in and around Beijing, Chamberlain did nothing – despite the Ambassador in Tokyo begging for some sort of gesture from London. (He added that the Japanese would see this as proof that Britain was unable/unwilling to defend her eastern interests and so pressure against them would be stepped up). British policy in Burma (and supplies to China) only confirmed in Japanese minds that attacking Britain (and possibly the US) was easier than attacking the USSR (the assumption before 1937). The reactions of both states between 1937 and 1940 only added weight to this policy shift.

Had Chamberlain acted with more resolve and made gestures such as sending capital ships to Singapore, the Japanese leadership would have been more circumspect about dealing with Britain. Chamberlain would have gained time and maybe seen Japan become entangled with the USSR (and further mired in China). This would have brought a temporary easing of defence commitments in the Far East. Even had this not happened, Japan would not have added such a burden to British calculations between 1937 and 1940. Also the Dominions would have been more supportive of the UK. (Again Chamberlain handled them poorly too).

Addressing the question of handling relationships badly, Chamberlain needlessly snubbed FDR and generally did little to disguise his dislike of the USA. Given that a major policy objective of British diplomacy at the time should have been to bring the USA out of isolation and back into power politics, Chamberlain should have put his personal feelings to one side. (If Salisbury could do it, then anyone could). FDR was trying to do this and some encouragement from Chamberlain would have been a big help.

Obviously, massive rearmament was out of the question but doing more and making things harder for Germany was possible. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1935), turning a blind eye to German rearmament and the Hoare-Laval Pact all were signs of making concessions without asking (let alone demanding) anything in return. It is true that all three events occurred under Baldwin but they were discussed in Cabinet and Chamberlain was established by then as Baldwin’s heir apparent. As such he could and should have (at least) spoken against them. All of them set the tone for weakness of British diplomacy in the late 1930’s, by which time Chamberlain was claiming that Germany was too strong and dangerous to deal with. (It wasn’t in September 1938 – but that will have to wait for another post).

Chamberlain was a conviction politician - is this important?

As is often pointed out, Chamberlain sincerely wanted to avoid another war. Reading his personal papers would bear this out. Like Gladstone, Chamberlain was a man of strong personal beliefs which played an important part in shaping his ideas on foreign policy. Both sought an ethical foreign policy and yet both found themselves having to do unethical things.

The problem for both men is that their convictions overrode their flexibility. It also caused them to progressively filter out and later remove anyone or anything that ran contrary to their worldview. This led to policies that were fully debated and the promotion of men who reinforce – not challenge – this viewpoint. This led Chamberlain and Gladstone to pursue principle over common sense and caused both to fail to achieve their original aims.

Furthermore, while it is not wrong to have principles in politics (and I for one also preferred Gladstone to Disraeli) it is not the be all and end all. Politicians – and especially P.M.s and presidents are judged on their policy successes. Chamberlain’s version of Appeasement failed and failed badly. It led Britain to the war he professed to dread, and saw her enter it in a more disadvantagous state than was necessary. For these reasons, I would condemn Chamberlain as a P.M.

Lastly it is worth mentioning that G. W. Bush is a conviction politician. Backed a chorus of neo-Cons, he has done terrible things to U.S. foreign policy – especially his neglect of soft power.

Comments

The notes are suitable for someone studying the topic of appeasement at A2 A Level.

These notes were originally written by liamb in this thread on TSR Forums.