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TSR Wiki > Study Help > Subjects and Revision > Revision Notes > History > Foreign Policy in Russia 1919 to 1934

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1. The Comintern was used to encourage unrest in the capitalist states at the same time as establishing normal diplomatic relations.
2. The attitude towards the League of Nations was one of constant hostility
3. Germany became of great concern b/c:
   • It had great revolutionary potential
   • It was a ‘revisionist’ power unhappy at the Versailles settlement
   • Both the USSR and Germany were ‘outcast’ powers.

In April 1922 the USSR and Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo which provided for: the establishment of full diplomatic relations between them / renouncing of any claims against each other / development of trade / the possibility of Germany’s army using Soviet territory as a training and weapons testing ground. The agreement was renewed for 5 years in 1926.

The Locarno Treaties (1925) these represented failure for the Soviets b/c Germany improved her relationship w/ her WWI enemies w/ this treaty.

The Far East was of second main interest:

• It was an area ‘ripe for revolution’ — especially China and the colonial possessions of France and G.B.
• Vital concern for security due to the sharing of a large frontier w/ the USSR and the fact that Soviet strength was concentrated in the West

The Soviets gave aid to the nationalist Sun-Yat-Sen, stopped aid when Chiang Kai-Shek came to power. Soviets were concerned at Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

The reactions to Japanese militarism in the area included:

• Strengthening of the army in Eastern USSR
• Avoiding provocative action against the Japanese (did not criticize Japanese policy / offered a non-aggression pact / sold railway interests in Manchuria to Japan)
• Restoring of diplomatic relationships w/ China in 1932
• Encouraging Chinese communists to cooperate w/ nationalists against the Japanese.

The relations between the USSR and other capitalist powers stayed at the USSR’s policy of using the Comintern to "maintain relations but subvert". The USA however, refused to recognized the Soviet Gov. until Roosevelt 1933.

Contents 1 Foreign Policy after 1933/34 2 Main events until Babarossa 3 Did Stalin miscalculate when he accepted the 1939 Pact? 4 Comments

Foreign Policy after 1933/34

A change was evident and was brought about by:

• The rise to power of Hitler
• The total control Stalin came to have over policy, which then came to be based on ‘cold blooded realism’.

As a result:

• The USSR joined the League of Nations in 1934 to adopt ‘collective security’
• Diplomatic relations w/ the USA were established and a treaty of mutual assistance signed w/ France.
• The Soviets urged communist parties to cooperate with other left wing groups against Fascism.

Soon Stalin became disillusioned b/c:

• G.B. and France clearly saw communism as a threat greater then Fascism
• Collective security failed (b/c of lack of support)
• His proposals of military cooperation against Germany failed.
• Of the appeasement policies followed by France and G.B.
• Of the exclusion of the USSR at the Munich conference.
• As a result Stalin sought a compromise w/ Hitler and this led to the Germano-Soviet Pact of August 1929.

Stalin accepted the pact b/c:

• Of suspicion of G.B. and France b/c of their lack of support against Germany
• He wanted to give time for the Red Army to recover.
• He could obtain from Hitler parts of Poland and Baltic States.
• He would push away the Soviet frontier from main Russian cities.

Main events until Babarossa

See notes. (page 4)

Did Stalin miscalculate when he accepted the 1939 Pact?

• The agreement over Poland brought Soviet gains but it also placed the Germany army in a better position to attack the USSR
• The USSR was able to continue its armaments programme and begin recovery. Thus Stalin might have ‘bought’ time. But was there immediate danger of an attack on the USSR in August 1939 which the *Pact avoided? If not, then he didn’t buy time.
• It is argued that ‘Stalin gave the green light to aggression’ since he removed fear for Germany of having to fight a two front war. Maybe Stalin hoped to weaken both Germany and the Western Allies. But then Stalin’s miscalculation lays in "believing that such a war would be a long drawn out affair rather than a ‘blitzkrieg’ victory for Germany."
• Did Stalin make the mistake of trusting Hitler? Considering his own nature, probably not. But then, why did he continue to supply Hitler with needed supplies right up until the day of the Barbarossa attack?

Comments