Revision:Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control
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Nuclear Proliferation / Arms Control
What are WMDs and why do states wish to develop them?
- There is no treaty or customary international law that contains an authoritative definition. Instead, international law has been used with respect to the specific categories of weapons within WMD, and not to WMD as a whole.
- Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) generally include nuclear, biological, chemical and, increasingly, radiological weapons. The term first arose in 1937 in reference to the mass destruction of Guernica, Spain, by aerial bombardment.
- The US military refers to WMD as: “Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons.”
- Following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and progressing through the Cold War, the term came to refer more to non-conventional weapons.
- The phrase entered popular usage in relation to the U.S.-led multinational forces' 2003 invasion of Iraq.
- Because of their indiscriminate impacts, fear of WMD has shaped political policies and campaigns, fostered social movements, and has been the central theme of many films.
- Support for different levels of WMD development and control varies nationally and internationally.
- Until 1998 the declared nuclear powers were the permanent members of the Security Council (USA, UK, Russia, France and China), but now after carrying out a series of nuclear tests India, Pakistan and Israel have joined the list. However there are opaque nuclear states that are widely believed to have nuclear programmes including Iran and North Korea.
- states “develop nuclear weapons because [they] feel insecure or you want to project power or influence” (Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency) He went on to say that they look at the 8 nuclear declared countries and see that they still heavily rely on their nuclear weapons and so feel that that is the right way to go. Reluctance of nuclear ‘haves’ to give up nuclear deterrence provides model to others and undermines call to prevent horizontal proliferation.
- Nuclear Deterrence
- “Some countries… may decide to develop nuclear weapons because they fear a more powerful neighboring country may attack them” (Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies)
- "Nations develop nuclear weapons because they feel threatened. Unless you address the threat, you cannot address proliferation” (Scott Gartner)
- Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China and Minister of Foreign Affairs in a speech to the General Assembly in November 1971 said “China is compelled to develop nuclear weapons because she is under the nuclear threat of the two superpowers. We develop nuclear weapons solely for the purpose of self-defence and for breaking the superpowers' nuclear monopoly and finally eliminating nuclear weapons.”
- Shafqat Mahmood of Pakistan stated that they needed to “develop nuclear weapons because [they] needed to feel secure”
What is meant by vertical and horizontal proliferation?
- Vertical proliferation
- “Vertical nuclear proliferation [is] an increase in the capabilities of the existing nuclear powers” (Kegley and Wittkopf) Non-nuclear states generally worry about this
- Horizontal proliferation
- “Horizontal nuclear proliferation [is] an increase in the number of states that possess nuclear weapons” (Kegley and Wittkopf) States that worry about this are generally those who already have declared nuclear capability
What has been done to combat the proliferation of WMDs?
- In the post-Cold War period there is greater concern about nuclear proliferation. “the spread of nuclear weapons themselves and the technology and knowledge required to build them” (J. Spear and F. Robertson-Snape)
- “Reflecting the power positions of the nuclear weapons states … horizontal proliferation always received much greater attention” (J. Spear and F. Robertson-Snape) For example the Nuclear Non-proliferation *Treaty of 1968 placed great emphasis on horizontal proliferation, barely mentioning vertical proliferation at all.
- The development and use of WMD is governed by international conventions and treaties, although not all countries have signed and ratified them:
- Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) 1963
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1968
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 1996
- Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) 1972
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 1993
- In 1996 the International Court of Justice provided an advisory opinion regarding the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. The statement is an authoritative legal pronouncement but not legally binding. It stated that any threat of the use of force, or the use of force, by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter or that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51 would be unlawful.
- Adopted by the UN Security Council on April 28, 2004, UN Resolution 1540 recognizes the threat posed to international peace and security by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery. It calls upon greater effort by nations to limit proliferation of such weapons.
- “Treaties and conventions are the international legal arrangements designed to limit proliferation” (J. Spear and F. Robertson-Snape)
- The key treaty covering the proliferation of nuclear armaments is the NPT. However there have always been concerns over the discrimination inherent within the treaty which prioritized horizontal over vertical proliferation and was perceived to give all the duties to the non-nuclear states and all the rights to the nuclear weapon states. (J. Spear and F. Robertson-Snape)
- Another important treaty is the CTBT. 44 named states have to ratify the treaty for it to come into force. So far, as of April 2006, only 34 of the 44 countries have ratified it. Those who are yet to ratify it include the US, India, Pakistan, China and Israel.
- 178 states are party to the CWT which came into force in 1997 and aims to have removed all chemical weapons by April 2012. At the present time 6 member countries still have chemical weapon stockpiles and 12 have chemical weapons production facilities including the US, Russia and India. By the end of 2004, 47 of 64 declared facilities had been destroyed or converted to civilian uses. Of the world’s declared chemical stockpiles 17% had been destroyed by January 2006. Several countries that are not members are suspected of having chemical weapons, especially Syria and North Korea while some member states (including Sudan and China) have been accused by others of failing to disclose their stockpiles. “Critics remain sceptical of the CWC’s deterrent abilities” (J. Spear and F. Robertson-Snape)
- The BWC was entered into force in March 1975 and presently has 171 signatories. However the BWC has important shortcomings; most importantly it has no verification regime.
- “Because of these shortcomings it is recognized that the CWC and BWC are in themselves insufficient to deal with the chemical and biological weapons threat” (J. Spear and F. Robertson-Snape)
- “Because of suspicions about other states it is very hard to entrust a state’s security to an international arrangement, so the agreements that do exist are limited in scope” (J. Spear and F. Robertson-Snape)
- There is a strong tradition of export control over WMDs and their components, particularly important are the London Group and the Australia Group both set up in 1975.
- However all the export regimes have limitations which inhibit their effectiveness:
- These export control arrangements do not include every supplier state and therefore the coverage they supply is incomplete, for example the refusal of China to participate in them.
- Each of these export control regimes relies upon national interpretation and implementation of the rules
- “the level of enforcement of the export controls differs markedly among the various countries…[and] non-proliferation concerns regularly take a back seat to commercial and foreign policy goals” (Peter van Ham)
- National interpretation of export controls can also lead to disputes over whether or not a transfer is breaking a regime’s guidelines, for example disputed between China and the US over Chinese missile sales to Pakistan
- Because they are supplier-led they tackle the symptoms but not the causes of the insecurity that leads to the proliferation of WMDs
- Multilateral agreements to establish nuclear weapons-free zones, e.g. the Bangkok Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty, help to combat the proliferation of WMDs:
- They are confidence-building measures designed to prevent the operation of the security dilemma by showing that no state in the region will destabilize the situation by seeking nuclear weapons
- They are designed to safeguard the region form the nuclear weapons of outside powers who invited to become signatories
- They are intended to boost efforts towards nuclear disarmament by questioning the legitimacy and desirability of nuclear weapons.
Why is nuclear proliferation such a concern in the post-Cold War world?
- Worries regarding Iraq in aftermath of Golf War
- Demise of USSR has led to increased danger of spread of nuclear materials and know-how, maybe even to terrorist groups
- Worries regarding new arms race in South Asia and fears that Kashmir crisis could lead to nuclear exchange
- Continued problem of insecurity / security dilemma for many states only makes arms escalation more likely
International community only willing to look at supply-side of proliferation issue rather than demand side
- Hypocrisy of power e.g. USA championing non-proliferation but ‘opting-out’ of international agreements and failing to significantly reduce nuclear stockpiles
Why is it such a difficult problem to solve?
- “The obstacles to increased proliferation are fragile, as shown by the nuclear development programs of India and Pakistan in 1998, and the collapse of the nuclear test-ban’s future following the U.S. rejection of the CTBT. The incentives to join the nuclear club and to acquire missiles and bombers for delivery are strong” (Kegley and Wittkopf)
- The materials needed to make a nuclear weapon are widely available. This is partly due to the widespread use of nuclear technologies for generating electricity. Today 428 nuclear power and research reactors are in operation in 44 countries throughout the world (Defense Monitor) States could reprocess the uranium and plutonium to make secret nuclear weapons. In the early 2000s commercial reprocessing reactors were producing enough plutonium to make 40000 nuclear weapons.
- The scientific expertise needed has spread with the globalisation of advanced scientific training.
- Export controls are weak.
- The safeguards built into the non-proliferation regime are “simply inadequate to detect and prevent secret nuclear weapons development programs” (Kegley and Wittkopf)
- “Non-proliferation concerns regularly take a back seat to commercial and foreign policy goals” (Peter van Ham)
- “Nuclear weapons serve as a symbol of status and power” (Kegley and Wittkopf)
- “The underlying belief that it is acceptable to develop a nuclear capacity for deterrence, political influence and prestige was expressed in 1999 by India’s national security advisor…when he justified India’s nuclear ambitions” (Kegley and Wittkopf)
- It is unlikely that the nuclear threat will cease “There’s not a snowball’s chance in hell we’ll eliminate all nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. That genie is long since out of the bottle and there is no chance of ever getting him back in” (Matthew Bunn, editor of Arms Control Today)
- “The problem is, if you eliminate them all, then any country that built just a few nuclear weapons would have enormous blackmail power” (Davidson)
Comments
These notes are aimed at people studying for Edexcel A Level Politics, module 5 and 6, route D, but will be suitable for other people too.
Originally submitted by joker13na on TSR Forums.
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