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• Classical Utilitarianism: (Bentham & James Mill) encapsulated in princip that only pleasure has intrinsic value, & right conduct is that which maximises pleasure, or best promotes general welfare, where this is conceived as the sum of all pleasures. Only pleasure is good & that rightness consists in the production of those consequences that are best in terms of pleasure they contain.

• Traditional School: (e.g. Isaiah Berlin & Gertrude Himmelfarb) JSM brought to recognise the limitations of classical utilitarianism but unable entirely to emancipate himself from influence of father and Bentham, with the result that he remained an inconsistent and merely eclectic thinker in whose work no coherent doctrine can be found.

• Himmelfarb’s view: pointless to seek for a logical connection between the philosophy of utilitarianism and On Lib because JSM manifestly simply gave up on attempting any systematic link between freedom and utility. H. contends that JSM invokes Harm Principle (or Principle of Liberty) as an ‘absolute’ defence of indiv. freedom vs. utility-based considerations, precisely cos. he perceives tendency of the latter to justify social encroachments upon indiv. lib in name of maximising general happiness. H. maintains this in no way involves Mill abandoning utilitarianism: not that Mill changes his mind over years, but that there was in JSM’s mind a profound tension between strictly incompatible principles, exhibited inter alia in fact that though JSM prepared Utilitarianism & On Lib for press pretty well contemporaneously, he proceeds in each upon distinct & incommensurable premises – utility & freedom respectively. H.’s interpretation problematic:
  1. JSM certainly never saw himself as being torn between contending principles, and in Autobiography, stresses concern for consistency.
  2. Interpretation somewhat forced: when JSM wrote in On Lib that Lib Principle was ‘entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in terms of compulsion and control’ - could argue that he intends term ‘absolute’ to refer to the application, rather than derivation, of the Principle.
  3. Berlin’s views: (JSM capable of great complexity but susceptible to deep ambivalence)

• Central claim that Mill’s mind essentially self-divided and no coherent doctrine to be found in his writings:
  1. Above all, JSM fails to square his theoretical commitment to an aggregative & welfarist utilitarianism, in which indiv. lib only has an instrumental value, with his substantive view that human choice, autonomy, individuality, and freedom of action, have moral importance in themselves, indep. of their contribution to general welfare (values them for their own sake). As no util argument can possibly show that liberty has intrinsic value and should be given priority over general welfare, project of On Lib doomed from start.
  2. Suggests JSM, without explicitly theorising the insight, & resisting its implications for ethical theory, recognises an ultimate diversity of values that are often in conflict, rarely fully combinable & lack any overarching principle to arbitrate conflicts & tradeoffs – value-pluralist position: but at variance with the explicit monism of JSM’s official ethical theory.
  3. Mill’s mind also divided vs. itself in his conception of the relations between moral theory and moral judgement. JSM’s official view – theory should prevail over intuition (like classical utils); but In Practice, his moral & pol judgements often imposs. to justify in classical utilitarian terms. Berlin believes that this attempt to weave theory and intuition into equilibrium bound to end in failure.

• Though regards On Lib fatally flawed in terms of philos rigour and consistency: it’s value is as passionate and inspiring call-to-arms in cause of indiv. liberty, as eloquent invitation for us to share vision and value human choice, autonomy, individuality, and freedom of action.

• Surely correct when he says that Mill’s understanding of freedom reflects his understanding of human nature.

• The Revisionary Theme: Berlin’s central claim (self-division) increasingly questioned.

• (Alan Ryan, John Rees, and John Gray)

• Alan Ryan’s View: JSM’s work can be shown to contain a coherent and unitary theory, of which On Lib is a consistent application. JSM’s terminology isn’t entirely consistent, but Ryan maintains that his intention’s clear: primarily to distinguish the sphere of Morality from those of Prudence (the concern for one’s own interests) and Excellence (which he sometimes calls Nobility – pursuit of beauty or nobility in character). As set forth in the later chapters of his System of Logic, all these spheres of practical reasoning governed by P of U which affirms that only pleasure, or happiness, has ultimate value. Only Morality generates obligations, and none specifies an obligation to promote the general welfare. As Ryan construes it, JSM identifies Morality with enforceability and harm prevention: the subject of morality is that of enforceable obligations about harm prevention. Hence Mill’s position: Prudence and Nobility inherently outside the sphere of enforcement, & therefore, of morality (but compulsory education?) – they belong to the self-regarding sphere – the sphere of liberty. In excluding both paternalist restraint on liberty to prevent self-harm, & moralist or perfectionist limitations of liberty aimed at promoting virtue or worthiness in character, P of L revealed as a theorem, or at least plausible application, of doctrine of the Art of Life itself.

• Bridges supposed logical hiatus asserted by traditionalists between utility and freedom: On Lib now fragment of a larger philosophical project of which Utilitarianism is a further component. It’s as a principle of justice, and not merely of morality, that the P of L should properly be interpreted.

• Traditional Objection to JSM’s doctrine in On Lib: Principle of Liberty thoroughly indeterminate in its meaning and application – what is to count as harming others?

• Rees’s Reading: the self-regarding area is not the sphere of conduct that affects no-one else, which would surely be virtually empty, but rather the area in which the interests of others are not affected injuriously – considerable textual support in On Lib: provides a way of avoiding at least some of the problems generated by the notion of the vagueness of the notion of harm.

• John Gray’s Account: (project is of weaving together the principal elements of Ryan, Rees and others coherently) accepts that harm for JSM means injury to interests, & goes on & maintains that Mill’s accounts of vital human interests are interests in security and autonomy. Argues that JSM’s is a distinctive species of indirect utilitarianism in that in it the Principle of Utility functions as an axiological rather than as an action-guiding principle, specifying that only happiness has intrinsic value – his contribution to this book largely concerns application of JSM’s indirect util to the project of On Lib. Argues that Mill supports his argument for the P of L by way of a theory of the vital human interests in security and autonomy (JSM’s argument for status of security as a vital interest in last chapter of Utilitarianism.) Argument for autonomy as a vital interest found esp. in chapter 3 of On Lib, (indiv vital to well-being). Gray thinks that Mill’s conception of happiness differs markedly from that of classical utilitarianism, & in ways that tend to support Mill’s argument for the importance of liberty: happiness connected inseparably with successful activity in which each person’s generic and specific powers are realised, i.e. JSM conceives human happiness as a mode of flourishing in which the powers distinctive of the human species find full expression: it represents the completion of human nature, not just in terms of the powers common to species, but also of the nature which is particularly his own – his individuality.

• How Gray’s interpretation helps On Lib:
  1. Confirms pluralistic character of Mill’s utilitarianism by maintaining that happiness has a unique content for each person.
  2. Given infinite diversity of content and conditions of human happiness, it’s best promoted by according indivs max. freedom to try out ‘experiments in living’.
  3. (Latent in On Lib, esp. chap 3) Need for autonomy in higher pleasures

• (Personal point: if happiness different for all of us – how does Mill feel he can claim that we all want higher pleasures? – fails to reconcile this individuality with his assertion that for all of us higher pleasures are better – this conception of happiness sits ill at ease with implicit argument that our happiness and pleasures are different for all of us).

• On Lib can thus be seen as an argument for status of autonomy as a vital human interest, as an essential part of the ‘permanent interests of man as a progressive being’. Overall strategy of JSM in On Lib is thus to forge conceptual links between liberty & human happiness, in terms of which the claim that the promotion of happiness requires the protection of liberty, even at apparent cost to happiness, becomes plausible & defensible in the broader context of his indirect utilitarianism.

• C.L. Ten’s view: none of aforementioned reformulations of Mill’s arguments in On Lib succeed in reconciling Mill’s util & liberal commitments. (e.g. In different ways each of these revisionist writers tries to show how excluding certain consequences – e.g. feelings of offence – from the utilitarian calculus as other-regarding grounds can be justified in utilitarian terms). Ten writes that there are no good reasons for not weighing all preferences in the utilitarian calculus – which tends to undermine P of L.

• C.L. Ten’s Criticism of Gray’s interpretation of On Lib as exercise in indirect utilitarianism:
  1. Even an indirect utilitarian argument couldn’t support the absolute (or at least quasi-absolute) status Mill wishes to confer on the P of L.
  2. Even if JSM’s indirect utilitarian argument were formally coherent, it would fail cos. it depends on premises that are doubtful or false. (e.g. claim that those who have experienced the pleasure of liberty will never renounce them is unsupported).

• G.S. Smith’s contribution: According to Mill in System of Logic, can alter our character, but only if we have requisite desire to do so (JSM was professed empiricist and determinist – hence vital necessity for indivs to live in societies marked by a ‘variety of situations’ and multifarious ‘experiments in living’ – for only in these circs may we expect the crucial desire for self-change to be stimulated and individuals to engage in the exercise & dev. of capacities they enjoy, as ‘progressive beings’. The ‘self-amendment’ of The System of Logic evolves naturally into the ‘individuality’ of On Lib.

• G.S. Smith on Mill’s tone in On Lib: kids/mentally incapable apart, Mill professes himself confident in most people’s ability in a modern soc. to respond +vely to influence of education & example, and, if nec., exhortation & criticism; & the protective net of the P of L cast correspondingly widely. But even here JSM lapses, placing entire pops in ‘backward’ socs. Beyond the pale of liberty. Smith concludes that the scope of principles is thus radically indeterminate, expanding & contracting according to Mill’s fluctuating opinions as to the prospects of the majority aspiring to/becoming capable of, genuine liberty of action. Berlin depicts JSM as paying the price of philosophical consistency for his liberalism. For Smith: his liberalism neither particularly consistent nor, given its assumptions, particularly liberal.

• Richard Wollheim’s Contribution: ascribes to JSM a species of utilitarianism which is complex but non-hierarchical. Also claims that utility itself is complex for JSM in that (once a certain level of civilisation achieved) every person will have their own conception of their utility in the from of their personal conception of the good or plan of life. Like others, Wollheim writes that JSM has hierarchical utilitarianism inasmuch as a form of ‘preliminary utilitarianism’ until people achieve the capacities needed to form their own conception of the good. After that point JSM’s util’m has a non-hierarchical character in that P of U no longer dominates personal conceptions of utility as it does in classical util’sm, where utility stands to secondary principles in a straightforwardly instrumental, means-end relation. But in Millian complex utilitarianism, 2ndary principles become partly constitutive of utility in virtue of their role as elements in personal conceptions of utility or the good. Preliminary and complex utilitarianism hierarchical in that complex comes into play only when demands of prelim util satisfied. Complex util not itself hierarchical, since utility is then to be found only in the diverse conceptions people form of their own utilities. Complex utilitarianism undergirds JSM’s arg. For liberty because liberty is a condition for formation and practical actualisation of personal conceptions of utility. JSM’s complex utilitarianism and liberalism are thus not competitive but aspects of each other.

• Objection to Wollheim: neglects poss. of conflict between preliminary and complex util’ism.

• Criticism of the Art of Life: - no recognition of conflict between the various spheres or areas of practice. Where conflict occurs (say Prudence and Morality), hard to see how recourse to P of U can be avoided. In that case, the maxims of Morality, including the P of L, could well be defeated by the claims of utility.

• Criticism of Mill: despite apparently distributive role of the P of L, JSM’s theory lacks resources to protect equal distribution of liberty that’s surely essential element of any liberal morality.

• Another criticism of Mill (his conception of happiness): even the complex and pluralistic account of happiness fails to do justice to radical conflicts among its various ingredients: some forms of happiness/flourishing/excellence/virtue are liable to drive others out/exclude them: sometimes no rational means of arbitration. JSM fails to recognise latent conflicts within the natures and forms of happiness of human beings.

• Conclusion: Traditional critique of JSM On Lib retains considerable force, and the reinterpreted argument of On Lib remains vulnerable to most of the traditional criticisms.

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