Revision:Replica Theory - John Hick

The Theory

• Holistic, materialistic human beings. One of the most important points of Hick’s theory is that it allows for a separate reincarnation of a person without resorting to the fuzzy area of dualism (and all the problems associated with a body-soul interaction).
• An eschatological reward – Hick’s theory is entirely based upon justifying this eschatology, rather than the other way round as in many eschatological beliefs (e.g. The Christian Heaven/Hell used to show the justice and goodness of God)
  • This reward is completely independent to any sort of moral behaviour – you do not pass on because you are good, but because you are human
• A ‘Replica’ of You – Hick’s theory states that upon death, a ‘replica’ of you is placed in a special, separate place (usually thought of as a different ‘plane’ of existence). This ‘replica’ is exactly like us in every way (except for its location).
• Hick uses big inverted commas in his ‘replica’ for a very good reason – he asserts that the ‘replica’ of which he speaks is not the same as a replica (no quotes), of which one could potentially create hundreds. Hick maintains that there can only be one ‘you’ because we as human beings are individuals – if I had several versions of myself, I would not ‘be’ all of them, just one, and while the others would be eerily similar versions of myself I would not consider them to be the current me.
• Your dead body would, of course still exist. But this version of yourself is no longer you, it is simply a dead body, an inanimate object made almost entirely out of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen and with nothing more to it than that. Hick says this is not a problem. The actual ‘you’ is no longer on Earth, but…elsewhere.
• Recreation of the body in the resurrection world is a divine act, which Hick says might occur immdeiately, or perhaps after a certain wait (in accordance with a Judgement Day, perhaps.) When God does remake your body, he remakes you completely whole, as you were. There is not, at any point, a seperation of body and soul or anything else. This, Hick says, is impossible.

Some Strengths

• The theory deals with some problems of dualism (most notably the question of how the mind interacts with the soul) but also allows for an eschatology.

Hick’s eschatology isn’t being used arbitrarily, to justify another belief (as in Iranaeus’ and Kant’s ideas, for example). It is being argued for independently, and cannot be undermined by attacking a separate thing which it is trying to support.

• Hick allowance of only one ‘replica’ avoids one obvious objection from the problem of identity – if there was more than one ‘you’ at any one time, that would be a paradox – since individuality is an aspect of yourself and without that, none of you are you anymore!

...And Some Criticisms

• The chief flaw that I find convincing is that of Paul Davies, who argues that it would be no consolation to me that a replica version of myself were to suddenly be created upon my death; because I would still be dead. Hick defends this objection by distinguishing between a replica, or copy, of which there could be an innumerable series, and a ‘replica’ of which there can only be one version ever existent, as if this makes a difference. I say that the question of individuality is immaterial; whether a replica or a ‘replica’ the other version of myself in the resurrection world would not be the same as the version of myself that has died on Earth, because there is no physical continuity. The version in the resurrection world would only think that it was me, the ‘me’ who is writing these words will never actually experience the resurrection world but will just die. How then, is a replica, even if it is a ‘replica’, any consolation to me?
• With only one replica world, Hick seems to ignore the question of punishment or judgement for sins – no matter how evil someone has been in life, their replica will still exist in the resurrection world no matter what. This seems unfair particularly when applied to a benevolent god, and to trivialise the point of good and evil on Earth, when the eschatological reward will be the same.
• By stating that the version of the person which is created in the resurrection world upon death is an exact ‘replica’, Hick seems to be suggesting that upon resurrection we will almost instantaneously die once again (since we’ll all be in a dead or near-dead condition upon our, um, death.) For the resurrection world to have any point at all, we must be a slightly different ‘replica’ of ourselves, for example younger if we died of old age or miraculously healed if we died of a grievous injury. But this ‘replica’ of ourselves is no longer exactly the same person as the original.
  • The question, then, is why this matters. Surely, it would be preferable for us all to be magically transformed into ‘us’ in our prime, rather than as an old (or dead) person.
    • The answer, once again, lies with continuity. It’s ridiculous to create a new body that bears no resemblance to ‘us’ as we are when we die, because that simply is not the same person. I look back on my past and am sometimes quite worried by some of the childish behaviour I exhibited. That person is not the person I am today, and becoming them would mean losing myself.
• At the end of the day, the theory that Hick argues seems, at least on the surface, to be logically possible. However, just because there is no evidence to suggest that his theoretical resurrection does not occur, does not mean that it actually does occur. Hick proves a possibility, not a certainty.

Notes

These notes are based on OCR A-Level Philosophy and Ethics, Module G581: A2 Philosophy of Religion Originally written by MrSwampy