HELP mooting question?

There's not enough detail there to know if Williams v Roffey has been cited with much authority.

But Foakes v Beer can be considered (sic) to be on its way out. From the judgement in Collier (2007), if A offers part, B agrees and A actually pays - we have PE binding B from claiming the outstanding sum.

So - if it is your wont, you can argue that with some authority.

But you haven't said who you are the advocate for.

im advocate for the respondent, saying that they have provided good consideration, in which i was going to rely on promissory estoppel, to state that they are not liable to pay the outstanding amount.

my question for the moot is that the judge in the court which first heard the case has not erred in applying the princible from Williams v Roffey. the benefits obtained by a part payment should be treated the same as those under a contract for goods/services.

Does that make more sense?

I suppose. Like I said, Collier is much more recent and is about a part-payment unsupported by consideration (ergo, no need to try and argue that it was - you won't find a Williams v Roffey "out" in your scenario). I don't see the need to go on about services vs part payment.

I suppose. Like I said, Collier is much more recent and is about a part-payment unsupported by consideration (ergo, no need to try and argue that it was - you won't find a Williams v Roffey "out" in your scenario). I don't see the need to go on about services vs part payment.

Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd (2007) EWCA Civ 1329; (2008) 1 WLR 643

If you want to look it up on Lexis or Justis or something.

The judgement is about applying PE to contemporary part-payment situations. One could argue that it ends modern reliance on Foakes v Beer.

Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd (2007) EWCA Civ 1329; (2008) 1 WLR 643

If you want to look it up on Lexis or Justis or something.

The judgement is about applying PE to contemporary part-payment situations. One could argue that it ends modern reliance on Foakes v Beer.

If, as Arden LJ puts it, the “brilliant obiter dictum” of Denning J in the High Trees case [1947] KB 130 did indeed substantially achieve in practical terms the recommendation of the Law Revision Committee chaired by Lord Wright MR in 1937, it is perhaps all the more important that agreements which are said to forgo a creditor's rights on a permanent basis should not be too benevolently construed.

I don't think Lady Justice Arden's judgment, for all her attempts to kill Foakes v Beer, has ended reliance on that case. Re Selectmove, also a CA decision, also works in the promisee's favour.

I think it's important here to separate PE from Foakes. In particular, Longmore LJ says in Collier v Wright


Longmore LJ's statement suggests that agreements/PE can terminate a right, but that they do not necessarily do so--a creditor's rights might be suspended on a temporary basis. Arden LJ says that under *some* circumstances PE might extinguish a right--but it's implicit in her statement that PE does not invariably extinguish a right. I don't think Foakes v Beer is dead--it's a HL decision, where Collier v Wright is a CA decision. Arden LJ does make some strong statements, but Longmore LJ seems to be more sceptical. Mummery LJ agrees on the facts that there is a real prospect of success were PE to be pleaded--but he does *not* concur in Arden LJ's reasoning or argument (of course, neither does he disagree). Re Selectmove seems to lean against Collier v Wright, though of course the latter is a more recent judgment. Collier v Wright offers scope to wriggle out of Foakes, but until the HL overturned Foakes or approved Collier v Wright it's position isn't cemented. A search on Westlaw reveals only two reported cases citing Collier; both are first instance decisions.

You might be interested, this is what my DoS says about LJ Arden in Collier v Wright:

I don't think Lady Justice Arden's judgment, for all her attempts to kill Foakes v Beer, has ended reliance on that case. Re Selectmove, also a CA decision, also works in the promisee's favour.

I think it's important here to separate PE from Foakes. In particular, Longmore LJ says in Collier v Wright


Longmore LJ's statement suggests that agreements/PE can terminate a right, but that they do not necessarily do so--a creditor's rights might be suspended on a temporary basis. Arden LJ says that under *some* circumstances PE might extinguish a right--but it's implicit in her statement that PE does not invariably extinguish a right. I don't think Foakes v Beer is dead--it's a HL decision, where Collier v Wright is a CA decision. Arden LJ does make some strong statements, but Longmore LJ seems to be more sceptical. Mummery LJ agrees on the facts that there is a real prospect of success were PE to be pleaded--but he does *not* concur in Arden LJ's reasoning or argument (of course, neither does he disagree). Re Selectmove seems to lean against Collier v Wright, though of course the latter is a more recent judgment. Collier v Wright offers scope to wriggle out of Foakes, but until the HL overturned Foakes or approved Collier v Wright it's position isn't cemented. A search on Westlaw reveals only two reported cases citing Collier; both are first instance decisions.