1. MR JUSTICE LEWIS:
2. On 24th October 2013 the appellant, John Larsen, was convicted in the Crown Court at Mold of five offences. Three were offences of arson. The fourth offence was an offence of causing an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious injury to property. The fifth was an offence of possessing an explosive substance with intent to endanger life or cause serious injury to property. The appellant was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for each of the three counts of arson and 18 years' imprisonment for each of the two explosive offences. All the sentences were to run concurrently. He now appeals with leave of the single judge against the sentences of 18 years imposed for the two explosive offences.
3. The background is this. Between early February and 18th April 2013 there was a series of explosions in the Lenten Pool area of Denbigh in North Wales. On 15th March 2013 there was an explosion which caused damage by fire to a car. That formed the subject matter of the first count. On 16th March 2013 there was a further explosion which damaged two parked cars and set them alight. That formed the subject matter of counts 2 and 3.
4. Shortly after 12.45 am on the morning of 24th March 2013 an improvised explosive device was placed on top of the nearside wheel of a Land Rover. Thirteen metal ball bearings were within or attached to that explosive device. The device exploded. Some of the metal ball bearings travelled a considerable distance. Four of the ball bearings smashed into the house of a nearby resident, shattering windows. Two were found in the hallway, one was found embedded in the headboard of a bed in an upstairs bedroom. The victim was so frightened of further attacks she ultimately sold her home and left the area. Another property near the scene of the explosion was Holland House. That was a residential home for people with mental health problems. That house also sustained broken windows in the explosion. It was that explosion which formed the subject matter of count 4.
5. Count 5 was an offence of possessing an explosive substance with intent to endanger life or cause serious injury to property. The offence related to the period between 1st February 2013 and 20th April 2013, which is the period when the explosions were taking place. Mr Larsen was arrested on 19th April 2013.
6. The appellant, John Larsen, was 46 years of age at the time of these offences. He had no previous convictions. He was a councillor in Denbigh. He had in fact been the mayor of Denbigh some years previously.
7. As the judge said in his sentencing remarks, during the early part of 2013 the appellant had subjected the residents of Denbigh to a sustained campaign of deliberate terror. Residents were frightened of the risk of further attacks. Those residents included the person with mental health difficulties at Holland House. The frightened residents also included those living at another property which provided sheltered accommodation for other vulnerable residents.
8. The sentencing judge observed that the explosion on 24th March 2013, which is the subject of count 4, involved the appellant targeting the vehicle of a woman who lived opposite him. He described the explosive device, which involved the use of metal ball bearings. He noted that that woman was extremely lucky to have survived the explosion which was calculated to both endanger life and to cause serious injury.
9. The sentencing judge took into account the fact that the appellant had no previous conviction. He expressly referred to the fact that no serious injury or physical injury had in fact been caused.The reason for the campaign is unclear. The sentencing judge considered that the appellant had an inflated sense of his own self importance and enjoyed being at the centre of the investigation. He enjoyed the attention that he received. He enjoyed speaking to the media and others about the explosions and his own fears for himself and his family. He cared nothing for the vulnerable residents living near him who were living in fear. The judge did take into account the fact that the appellant had been diagnosed with a serious physical illness and he reduced the sentence accordingly. He therefore imposed sentences of 18 years concurrent on each of the explosive offences and 3 year for each of the arson offences, all to be served concurrently.
10. There was no pre‑sentence report available at the hearing at which sentence was imposed. But a report has been prepared for this appeal. This report notes that the appellant has been assessed as posing a high risk of serious harm to the public. The nature of the risk is identified as excessive use of violence and that the appellant may use explosives as a tool to cause harm. The report also notes that Mr Larsen has expressed little empathy with his victims and did not appear to acknowledge the potentially serious consequences that his actions could have had. It notes that Mr Larsen had abused his position within the local community in order to shift blame and suspicion from him and he had used the media as a tool to do this.
11. In his oral and written submissions Mr Hennell, for the appellant, submits that the sentence of 18 years for the two explosive offences is manifestly excessive for two reasons. First, he submits that the starting point of 18 years was too high, as the appellant was not shown to have any connection with any terrorist groups. He submitted that the judge was wrong in applying the approach used in terrorist cases and in particular in relying point the approach in R v Martin [1999] 1 Cr App R(S) 477. Secondly, Mr Hennell submitted that the judge was unduly influenced by what the appellant might have done if he had not been arrested; that is he might have killed or caused someone serious injury.
12. In relation to the first ground of appeal the starting point is to consider the elements of the relevant offences. Those are set out in section 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b) of the Explosive Substances Act 1883. The section reads as follows:
"(1)A person who in the United Kingdom or a dependency or (being a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies) elsewhere unlawfully and maliciously—
(a)does any act with intent to cause, or conspires to cause, by an explosive substance an explosion of a nature likely to endanger life, or cause serious injury to property, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, or .
(b)makes or has in his possession or under his control an explosive substance with intent by means thereof to endanger life, or cause serious injury to property, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, or to enable any other person so to do,
shall, whether any explosion does or does not take place, and whether any injury to person or property is actually caused or not, be guilty of an offence and on conviction on indictment shall be liable to imprisonment for life, and the explosive substance shall be forfeited."
The offence in count 4 therefore involves doing an act intending to case an explosion likely to endanger life or to cause serious injury to property. The offence in count 5 involves by definition possessing explosive substances with intent to endanger life or cause serious injury to property. These are by their nature, serious offences.
13. Secondly, the sentencing judge considered that the case was more appropriately compared with the decision in Martin rather the decision in R v Jalil [2009] 2 Cr App R(S) 40. In Martin the Court of Appeal dealt with three individuals who planned to cause explosions to six sub‑stations in rural locations near London as part of a terrorist campaign. The Court of Appeal indicated that at that date a bracket of 20 to 35 years would be likely to accommodate most of the previous cases involving acts done or conspiracies involving terrorist actions. The court noted that the appropriate sentence would depend on a large number of specific factors. The Court of Appeal also recognised that there may be some property-directed conspiracies where a sentence of less than 20 years might be appropriate.
14. Mr Hennell contends that the judge was wrong to apply the approach taken in Martin. He contends that Mr Larsen is not a conventional terrorist and should not therefore have been sentenced to 18 years. He contends that the appropriate approach is to be taken from two other linked cases namely R v Wildy [2004] 1 Cr App R(S) 99 and R v Griffiths [2005] 1 Cr App R(S) 108. The two cases relate to one incident whereby two men were preparing letter bombs. The two letter bombs in fact exploded in the house where they were being manufactured before they were sent. Both offenders were convicted of two offences, one of having an explosive substance with intent to endanger life and one offence of doing an act with intent to cause an explosion. Both were sentenced to terms of 15 years' imprisonment for each offence to run concurrently. Submissions that the sentences were manifestly excessive were dismissed in each case. Mr Hennell submitted today that that should be seen as the starting point and then there should be a further reduction to reflect Mr Larsen's previous good character, his testimonials and the fact that he was suffering from a serious physical illness.
15. Turning to the present case, in our judgment, a sentence of 18 years was severe but was not manifestly excessive for the following reasons. First, it is necessary to bear in mind the element of the offences for which the appellant was sentenced. The sentences were imposed for the offence of causing an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious injury in relation to count 4. In relation to count 5 it was possession of explosive materials with that intent. These are serious offences irrespective of whether or not they are motivated by political considerations.
16. Secondly, the specific facts of these offences emphasise their gravity. One offence involved using an improvised explosive device which had metal ball bearings inside it or attached to it. Given the nature of the device, the explosion carried a real risk of endangering the life of a person, or causing serious injury to a person, or serious damage to property. The other offence involved possessing of explosives over a period of 3 months with the intention of using those explosives to endanger life or cause serious injury.
17. Thirdly, the offences were part of a sustained campaign of deliberate terror. The campaign caused real fear on the part of the residents of Denbigh including the vulnerable residents that we have referred to.
18. . In our judgment, a sentence of 18 years' imprisonment for each of these two explosive offences is not manifestly excessive given the nature and the particular circumstances of the offence. The fact that sentences of 15 years were imposed in other cases involving different facts does not in our judgment alter that. It is important to bear in mind in particular that in the Wildy and Griffiths cases the two letters bombs exploded in the house where they were being assembled. They were not sent out. Here the facts surrounding the explosions are different. Similarly the fact that the appellant was not engaged in creating terror for political aims does not alter the fact that sentences for these particular offences, in the particular circumstances is not manifestly excessive. Ground 1 is therefore not made out.
19. In relation to the second ground, it is not in our judgment correct to suggest that the sentencing judge was unduly influenced by what the appellant court might have done rather than focusing on the offences of which he had been convicted. The sentencing judge was aware of and expressly referred to the fact that no death or physical injury was caused to any person. He did however sentence the appellant for what he had done, which was to cause an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious injury to property. He had possessed explosives with that intent. The sentencing judge was doing no more than referring to the fact that if the appellant had not been arrested, he would have killed or caused someone serious injury. Given the nature of the offences and the use of metal ball bearings in relation to one explosion, that was simply a statement of the obvious risk that these offences involved. There is no basis for saying the judge sentenced the appellant on the wrong basis. He sentenced this appellant for the serious explosive offences of which he had been convicted. This is severe sentence, but it is not manifestly excessive. For those reasons this appeal is dismissed.