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Term Limit for Abortion

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Original post by VV Cephei A
Yes you are right, if the analogy wasn't completely fallacious, then perhaps we could use the violinist scenario to justify abortion..


Again, this has nothing to do with what I said.

Using your argument, you can justify forced organ donation. You don't even dispute that.
The linchpin of the paper is a horrendously flawed analogy. It doesn't even get off the ground. It's been torn apart by pro-choicers and pro-lifers alike.

The laws on abortion in every country are entirely based around the developmental status of the fetus and it's right to life, not the woman's right to bodily autonomy. Some countries deem this to be after the first trimester, others at the point of viability, but ultimately these considerations are what the legislation is based on. Can you enlighten us on the countries of the world where a baby can be aborted up until the moment of birth, in respect of the woman's bodily autonomy?
Well hang on. I think the argument the OP is making is that if a foetus is viable (i.e. could survive without remaining in the mother's uterus) then it is morally wrong to abort that foetus. So I don't see how this is a claim that the mother is obligated to ensure that the foetus lives. One way or another the mother could get the foetus out of her uterus, it's simply that once the foetus has reached a viable stage it would be wrong to kill it unnecessarily.



That is the position which underpins the current law. Proposals to move the cut-off point are simply made on the basis of improvements in medicine.



Well supporters of the existing legal position (no right to abort after a certain point in time) would say that the mother does not have a right to autonomy that the foetus' life cannot override. The difference which the foetus' viability makes is that it could be extracted from the womb without necessarily killing it, so an abortion would not be necessary for the mother to exercise her bodily autonomy.



Does it? This needs to be argued, because the entire difference between our positions rests on that point. Rights flow from personhood, so the question becomes what constitutes a person and when a foetus becomes one.



I don't think it's as black and white as that. As somebody wiser than me once said, my freedom to swing my arm ends at your face. That doesn't mean that I don't have bodily autonomy.
You can keep positing that everyone hasn't read this paper you've posted, but the more likely scenario is that it has been read and none of the arguments have been remotely convincing, as countless published critics of the paper have also noted. Given the piss poor analogy which the paper's entire argument is based on, this shouldn't be surprising to you. A scenario which is actually analogous to pregnancy might be:

A woman intentionally inflicts a fatal kidney impairment on her own child, then connects herself up to him in order to prolong his life, then makes the decision to actively kill him by cutting up his body/crushing his skull so she no longer has to sustain him.

Now, suddenly, we are faced with a very different scenario indeed, one which does not logically conclude with justifying abortion based on the mother's autonomy. And so, since the linchpin of the paper is a hilariously bad analogy, its argument does not succeed. "Forced organ donation" is just a shorthand reference to the violinist scenario, because forced-fatal-kidney-impariment-circulatory-system-linkup is long to type. Being this pedantic on an internet forum just seems to indicate your feigned e-intellect is all you've got going.

Secondly, the only poor reasoning here is yours my friend. The primary concern of lawmakers regarding this issue is when the fetus accrues the rights of a person. That is the debate being had and that is what separates different countries with differing consensuses on what developmental stage this occurs at. As you yourself said, if life stages impact abortion laws, then a woman's right to bodily autonomy has been rejected. If that is the case, then bodily autonomy has not, in practice, been followed through at all, and the state of the fetus has instead been the primary concern of abortion ethics. When it is not considered a person, it can be aborted, and when it is considered a person, it cannot be aborted, end of story. JJT's argument is massively flawed and has not been taken as a given, anywhere, and there are far more pressing considerations which drive legislation in this debate.
(edited 8 years ago)
Original post by TurboCretin


That is the position which underpins the current law. Proposals to move the cut-off point are simply made on the basis of improvements in medicine.


.


Well, there has not been that much improvement in medicine. The babies survive for longer but their outcomes are almost as poor as 20 years ago.
The point I'm making is that the mother's right to bodily autonomy wouldn't even come into play, because the fetus doesn't even need to reside within the mother at that stage for its survival to be viable.
Reply 66
Original post by viddy9
The key word is cannot: a person under anaesthetic could reason if he was not under anaesthetic.


Neither an anaesthetised person nor a foetus can reason. Both of them will be able to reason at some time in the future.

Original post by viddy9

I am not shifting the goalposts, but I may be communicating my position poorly. To be clear, I'm talking about the capacity for self-awareness and rational thought


A capacity that neither an anaesthetised person nor a foetus possess at that moment in time.

Original post by viddy9

Preferences may be subjective, but satisfying them is objectively good. Every sentient being aims to maximise its preference-satisfaction, but there's no logical justification for putting one's own preferences above those of others'. Thus, if we are to satisfy our own preferences, which it is impossible not to do, it follows that we must maximise the preference-satisfaction of every sentient being; that is, every being that is able to have any preferences at all.


Good, so you agree they cannot be universalised.

And so back to the problem than an anaesthetised person is not sentient and cannot express preferences.

Additionally, individuals with permanent impaired capacity through cognitive impairment (either through learning disability or dementia) seem to potentially fare pretty badly in this set up, mainly because they may not be able to express a preference (and are therefore 'nothing' and easily disposable/expendable)

Additionally individuals with transient impaired capacity through severe depression of psychosis may express a preference not to live (even though it is likely to be transient and reverse with treatment), in which case incidental murder of these people could not be considered murder at all

Original post by viddy9

The key point is that you couldn't have had any preferences in the first place as a foetus, and whilst you cannot go back to being a foetus, you can be anaesthetised.


And that is relevant why?

Original post by viddy9
Once a baby has been born, the mother has been through the excruciating pain and the stress of being pregnant, so it's much easier, say, to give the baby up for adoption. Depending on the demand for adoptive children (insofar as I'm aware, there's a lack of demand at the moment), the permissibility of infanticide in everyday life may be in a state of flux. (This is because the adoptive family will have their preferences satisfied when they adopt the child).

There are some clear-cut examples of where infanticide would be permissible, though. If three people - two parents and a newborn infant - are stranded on an island and there's only enough food for two of them, it would be permissible to kill the infant.


What about if the mother just wanted to watch the baby die as part of her enjoyment? Would that be acceptable infanticide? Or that the baby turned out to be too dark and she only wanted a white child?

Original post by viddy9

I do not see how anyone can be harmed by this; harm requires a being to object to an action. Our emotions and intuitions are notoriously bad at helping us to engage in logical, ethical decision-making.


So killing a baby by lethal injection does no harm?

Poisoning somebody subtly does no harm? (after all they have not objected to the action)

And we could resurrect the issue of the anaesthetised person, who again cannot object to any action.

Original post by viddy9
Our moral intuitions also lead to more money being donated to a charity when people are shown a picture of a single victim of poverty as opposed to data on how many people are in poverty; it leads to people being more concerned about people closer to them rather than people suffering a lot more further away from them. It leads people to generally object to pushing the Fat Man off a footbridge to stop a trolley from hitting five people tied to a track, but to be fine with pulling a lever which opens a trapdoor through which the Fat Man falls into the track to stop the trolley.


Your absolute utilitarianism doesn't work in real life, since it can only be implemented through totalitarian means

Also I assume you approve of abortion based on the gender of the foetus (with this invariably leading to abortion of female foetuses in the overwhelming majority of cases where gender based abortion is carried out)
(edited 8 years ago)
Reply 67
Original post by VV Cephei A
The linchpin of the paper is a horrendously flawed analogy. It doesn't even get off the ground. It's been torn apart by pro-choicers and pro-lifers alike.

The laws on abortion in every country are entirely based around the developmental status of the fetus and it's right to life, not the woman's right to bodily autonomy. Some countries deem this to be after the first trimester, others at the point of viability, but ultimately these considerations are what the legislation is based on. Can you enlighten us on the countries of the world where a baby can be aborted up until the moment of birth, in respect of the woman's bodily autonomy?


Isn't this the case in the Canada?
Original post by Rat_Bag
Isn't this the case in the Canada?


I'm not sure about Canada, they would be a rare exception if that were the case.
Reply 69
Original post by VV Cephei A
I'm not sure about Canada, they would be a rare exception if that were the case.


I believe abortion is legal in Canada at any stage of the pregnancy and it is a longstanding position of the country and 3 main political parties not to regulate abortion in any way (I believe for this nonsense bodily autonomy reason)
Original post by Rat_Bag
I believe abortion is legal in Canada at any stage of the pregnancy and it is a longstanding position of the country and 3 main political parties not to regulate abortion in any way (I believe for this nonsense bodily autonomy reason)
Pretty ludicrous, and certainly not a view held by the majority of the world.

As people have pointed out, even if you fully granted the bodily autonomy argument, that still would not justify unrestricted abortion. Particularly in the case of late term babies who are viable; all it would justify is premature delivery by C-section, or "unplugging" of the baby, not actively killing it.
Reply 71
Original post by VV Cephei A
Pretty ludicrous, and certainly not a view held by the majority of the world.


I think China and Vietnam have no restrictions either, but this is for other reasons, and neither of these countries can be held up as examples of where the autonomy of the individual is respected

I believe also in the States, federal law allows termination at any stage of the pregnancy on demand, and then individual states can set limitations: with some states imposing no limitations at all
Reply 72
Original post by Rat_Bag
I believe abortion is legal in Canada at any stage of the pregnancy and it is a longstanding position of the country and 3 main political parties not to regulate abortion in any way (I believe for this nonsense bodily autonomy reason)
As a Canadian I can confirm that this is true although it is nearly impossible to find anyone willing to perform a third-trimester abortion
Reply 73
Original post by Rat_Bag
A capacity that neither an anaesthetised person nor a foetus possess at that moment in time.


An anaesthetised person still retains this capacity, and has therefore had the capacity prior to being anaesthetised meaning that he has had preferences.

Original post by Rat_Bag
Good, so you agree they cannot be universalised.


No, they can be universalised in that they can be weighed and compared with each other.

Original post by Rat_Bag
And so back to the problem than an anaesthetised person is not sentient and cannot express preferences.


It's not about expressing preferences, it's about whether they have expressed a preference, which comes by virtue of their capacity to hold preferences.

Original post by Rat_Bag
And that is relevant why?


Because, as I said at the start, I would want my own preference-satisfaction to be maximised, and there's no rational justification for putting my own preferences above those of others'. It follows, then, that I should strive to maximise the preference-satisfaction of every sentient being; that is, whether they are expressing the preferences at a specific moment in time or not.

Original post by Rat_Bag
What about if the mother just wanted to watch the baby die as part of her enjoyment?


As long as the baby's preference not to feel pain and suffer is not frustrated, then I'll stick with Mill's harm principle in the abstract. On a societal level, it's unlikely that unnecessary suffering won't be inflicted, so there may be a case for keeping after-birth abortions illegal.

Original post by Rat_Bag
So killing a baby by lethal injection does no harm?


As long as it does not cause them to endure pain and suffer.

Original post by Rat_Bag
Poisoning somebody subtly does no harm? (after all they have not objected to the action)


They do object to the action, though, because they their preference to continue to live is frustrated, as are their preferences for the future.

Original post by Rat_Bag
Your absolute utilitarianism doesn't work in real life, since it can only be implemented through totalitarian means


Incorrect - if everybody accepted the use of logic in every circumstance, it could be implemented entirely through individual means. I'm not saying it will be, but those of us who are utilitarians will continue to try to maximise utility impartially.

Original post by Rat_Bag
Also I assume you approve of abortion based on the gender of the foetus (with this invariably leading to abortion of female foetuses in the overwhelming majority of cases where gender based abortion is carried out)


This may aid and abet societal discrimination based on gender on a societal level, so, again, there may be a case for not allowing this to occur, if at all possible, perhaps by withholding the gender of the foetus from the parents.

But, as a hypothetical, I would, again, stick with Mill's harm principle.
Reply 74
A lot of the arguments in this thread seem to be predicated on the idea that if a woman has sex, she gives her consent to carrying any resulting fetus to term.

This is quite demonstrably untrue, and has been at the very least since 1963. If you consent to a process, and the process has a certain other by-process which is a very unlikely side-effect to the first (and this is true even without the use of contraception, as most instances of unprotected sexual intercourse do not result in pregnancy), it does not follow that you also consent to the second process being completed on you.

If you cross the road, which comes with the small chance of being run over,and you are then run over- even if non-fatally- no one says that you consented this and no medical action to heal you can thus be taken.
Original post by NYU2012
Your analogy fails. It's beyond a poor analogy, it's an entirely different situation - and the fact that you've even tried to present these as at all similar is demonstrable of the fact that you have no actual familiarity with the subject nor do you have any training in logic nor philosophy.Your scenario predicates itself on the infliction of an injury. It's predicated on the woman whose bodily autonomy is at issue intentionally causing a harm, then asking the question what her right to bodily autonomy is. This doesn't work, it's not an analogous situation. The inadvertent or intentional creation of a fetus is not an intentional harm.If you bothered to read the paper, you would know that the author provides a much better analogy. One where an individual consents to act as a body life supporter to another person, then after a time, wants to revoke their consent.In cases of abortion, it involves the termination of the fetus because the fetus cannot sustain itself outside of the womb (before a certain developmental point) and, as such, there is no point in performing surgery to remove the fetus (as might be more analogous to removing yourself from the other who are you supporting).I'm sorry, but this is simply wrong. You're wrong on the legal facts. Go read Row v Wade. Courts are lawmakers just as much as legislators. Since most developed countries recognize a right of bodily autonomy, cases have been appealed on this basis.In fact, in English law, a fetus isn't a person [and therefore has no legal rights] until after it is born.


It's a far better parallel to what pregnancy and abortion actually is than the ludicrous analogy given in the paper. The mother herself causing her child's dependence on her body better represents what a pregnancy is, not a random unrelated 3rd party kidnapping her and forcing her to become a surrogate pair of kidneys for another random unrelated 3rd party; you would have to be pretty dimwitted to seriously give credence to something so stupid. Where the f*ck in the scenario does the woman initially consent to the procedure? She is kidnapped, presumably drugged and then wakes up forcibly attached to someone - there seems to be only one person here who hasn't read the paper and it isn't me. Furthermore, the existence of a fetus is not an intentional harm on the mother either, as the kidnapping and forced surrogate kidney scenario tries to portray. The act of unplugging a dependent is also not the same as killing him were he capable of survival on his own. Which is why this argument fails spectacularly at the first hurdle, and one which considers the accountability of the mother as well as what the process of abortion actually involves is far more accurate.

Roe v. Wade clearly identified the need to balance bodily autonomy with protecting the potentiality of human life. If, as you yourself claimed earlier on, placing any kind of stage limits on abortion means rejecting bodily autonomy, then in practice (what actually matters) bodily autonomy is clearly not the primary consideration of abortion ethics and law. Our restrictions on abortion are evidently based on giving greater weight to the developmental status of the child, its potentiality for life and personhood, which may be based on the development of certain key organs, or its extrauterine viability, or whatever else.



Absurd. Let's say the violinist makes a miraculous recovery and his kidneys begin to function, and henceforth no longer needs to be connected to the woman. Would the woman be justified in choosing to kill him before disconnecting him, versus simply disconnecting him, given that the option exists? Even if disconnecting him would, say, hypothetically leave her with a scar whilst the latter option somehow would not? Under what moral framework would someone honestly suggest that it would be justifiable to kill a perfectly healthy man in the given scenario? Remember, we aren't talking about different methods of removing the healthy dependent individual, we are talking about removing a healthy individual versus killing him. The woman has a right to choose how the baby is removed from her, whether that is via premature C-section or via a natural birth at full term. She has no right to end the life of the baby.

What you're proposing is ludicrous - that the woman has the right to any medical procedure whatsoever in this scenario. That's quite clearly not how it works; patients are offered certain medical procedures which the doctors are willing to perform in the given context, and they choose. A patient cannot choose to have X cancer operation instead of Y cancer operation if doctors do not offer X procedure anymore; is this a loss of bodily autonomy? No. If a certain procedure is no longer performed with justifiable reason, she has no "right" to demand to have it.

It's quite evident that the bodily autonomy argument conceals a far deeper purpose, which is to give women the ability to absolve themselves of parental responsibilities at any time during pregnancy, no matter how morally repugnant. Fortunately in the real world, this isn't generally permitted.
(edited 8 years ago)
Reply 76
Original post by viddy9
An anaesthetised person still retains this capacity, and has therefore had the capacity prior to being anaesthetised meaning that he has had preferences.


An anaesthetised person has no capacity whatsoever. That's what an anaesthetic does to them.

Original post by viddy9

No, they can be universalised in that they can be weighed and compared with each other.


But it doesn't mean they can be transferred between individual, since individuals' preferences are subjective and reflective of that individual.

Original post by viddy9
It's not about expressing preferences, it's about whether they have expressed a preference, which comes by virtue of their capacity to hold preferences.


So a person in a coma can never have the 'life support' equipment switched off?

Original post by viddy9

Because, as I said at the start, I would want my own preference-satisfaction to be maximised, and there's no rational justification for putting my own preferences above those of others'. It follows, then, that I should strive to maximise the preference-satisfaction of every sentient being; that is, whether they are expressing the preferences at a specific moment in time or not.


And as mentioned, this rigid utilitarianism can only work with a totalitarian system to implement it.

Original post by viddy9

As long as the baby's preference not to feel pain and suffer is not frustrated, then I'll stick with Mill's harm principle in the abstract.


Except Mill would not agree with you one bit.

Original post by viddy9
On a societal level, it's unlikely that unnecessary suffering won't be inflicted, so there may be a case for keeping after-birth abortions illegal.


Same could be said for abortions (particularly late 2nd and 3 trimester ones)

Anyway, the fact you entertain the concept of killing babies and infants as perfectly moral (as long as they don't suffer) is just indicative of how impractical your proposed system is.

Original post by viddy9

As long as it does not cause them to endure pain and suffer.


And at what age roughly would this become wrong?

Original post by viddy9

They do object to the action, though, because they their preference to continue to live is frustrated, as are their preferences for the future.


They may not have expressed such preferences.

Original post by viddy9

Incorrect - if everybody accepted the use of logic in every circumstance, it could be implemented entirely through individual means. I'm not saying it will be, but those of us who are utilitarians will continue to try to maximise utility impartially.


I guess this is where Stalin went wrong.

The value system you are proposing is accepted by almost no one.

Original post by viddy9

This may aid and abet societal discrimination based on gender on a societal level, so, again, there may be a case for not allowing this to occur, if at all possible, perhaps by withholding the gender of the foetus from the parents.

But, as a hypothetical, I would, again, stick with Mill's harm principle.


Doesn't sound very pro-choice at all.

Your viewpoint on this is one big mess.
We were discussing the central analogy of the paper. It makes no mention of consent, and in fact quite clearly implies the lack of consent, given the kidnapping element of the scenario. Stop lying. I was also addressing a different issue - the cause of the violinist's predicament, and whose responsibility it is. In the analogy, it is either no one's responsibility, or if the kidney impairment was somehow self inflicted, then his own responsibility. A pregnancy however is starkly different. In almost all pregnancies, the woman is the only party at least somewhat responsible for the existence of the fetus and its situation of dependency, the amount varying based on her level of carelessness (in some cases, she may be entirely responsible, if she had willingly tried for a baby then later decided to abort!). However, in no pregnancies, barring rape and Biblical stories, is the woman completely absolved of any responsibility for the pregnancy. And no one else, not the fetus nor another 3rd party, bears any responsibility whatsoever; the knowing actions of no one but the mother (and father of course, but not relevant here) have resulted in the scenario. Thus the original violinist analogy is way off the mark in representing pregnancy, as the violinist's predicament is in no way causally linked to the woman's actions, a point you repeatedly fail to see. That's just one in a long list of problems with it as well. Failed analogy, failed argument.


Regarding the issue of law, you've contradicted yourself here continuously. On the previous page, you said this:

“How does the stage of life suddenly override the woman's right to bodily autonomy? Either she has a right to bodily autonomy that the fetus's right to life cannot override; or she doesn't.

Any claim saying that she ought to be restricted from obtaining an abortion after any X number of weeks is somehow saying'before X weeks she has bodily autonomy, but after X weeks she does not.' Yet, this argument doesn't make any sense - any argument about bodily autonomy assumes that the fetus has a right to life from the moment of conception. Nothing about rights changes because of life stages.

The only way to make an argument to the effect that life stages of the fetus impact when an abortion is obtainable is to reject a woman's right to bodily autonomy.”


If autonomy is either completely present or outright rejected as you say, and we do have plenty of restrictions on abortion, then evidently in reality it is in fact rejected, given the fact that life stages do affect the attainability of an abortion. Yet in the same breath, you claim that abortion laws and practices proceed based entirely on bodily autonomy. Make your damn mind up. We can argue in philosophical abstracts all day, but evidently there are other considerations which have been given greater importance than bodily autonomy by groups of legislators around the world - otherwise abortion would be legal until birth, and that's that.


My analogy re. the abortion process works, you simply misunderstand or misrepresent it. One procedure involves merely removing the dependent, the other requires the killing of the dependent as part of the process of removing him. I even mentioned that the former could leave more of a side effect on the woman, eg. a bad scar. It's exactly analogous. Would it still be morally justified to choose the second option, given the first exists? Your understanding of autonomy and its relation to medical procedures is also appalling. You have a right to refuse any treatment, you do not have a right to demand any treatment. You have a right to choose between the treatments that are offered to you in the given situation. And it is perfectly reasonable that certain treatments may not be offered by the medical community if they are inappropriate for the situation, outdated, unsafe, or importantly here - unethical. This does not constitute a loss of bodily autonomy.

A simple example: Some countries have placed restrictions on the use of metal fillings in Dentistry, over environmental concerns re. the mercury content, even though they are still the most successful long term restorative material. Is this a loss of bodily autonomy for all the patients who wish to have one? Of course not! A loss of autonomy would be if patients were forced to have another type of filling. They aren't. The former type of procedure has simply been discontinued for an ethically justified reason, and they are free to either have or not have a different type of filling on offer. No loss of autonomy anywhere. You’re performing some quite spectacular mental gymnastics in order to attempt to justify the killing of a healthy, viable baby, which says an awful lot about your moral character. Hell, even Thomson alludes to what I am saying here:

"I am not arguing for the right to secure the death of the unborn child," "You may detach yourself even if this costs him his life; you have no right to be guaranteed his death, by some other means, if unplugging yourself does not kill him."
.

Detach. We can ethically detach without killing. No killing. Read it again. 50% of your posts just consist of slyly touting your supposed philosophical and logical abilities, which is strange since the arguments that follow are pure turd.
(edited 8 years ago)
Sure, she may have the right to remove the fetus from her body, as part of her bodily autonomy.

The right to kill it after it has been removed (or the right to actively decide that doctors must not try to keep it alive) is a matter which has nothing to do with her bodily autonomy, because it's someone else's body now being dealt with, not her own.
Original post by VV Cephei A

Detach. We can ethically detach without killing. No killing. Read it again. 50% of your posts just consist of slyly touting your supposed philosophical and logical abilities, which is strange since the arguments that follow are pure turd.


He always does this bizarrely, yet, like you mentioned, much of his explanations don't always match up with his bragging.

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