The Student Room Group

What is morality?

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My arguments might imply such ("think of... ...morality"), though I don't see how.
Nor do I believe such.
It's quite hard to put a definition to the word "morality", kind of like "a set of morals/values", only not making a distinction between those morals/values, e.g. in the context of "what determines morality?"

How can I assume what the nature of morality is, when there is a definition for which there's a general consensus?
And if we do go the semantics route, wouldn't it be "presume"? ("presume" meaning "to assume in all probability", because there's the general consensus upon the meaning.)(From "semantics route" this was just covering that avenue.)

And how am I trying to show what morality is?

I was merely saying (can't check post on app atm, so off memory) that a(n albeit tenuous) link can be made to objectivity, I believe, and was saying what determines a morality, a set of morals with no distinction between, was I believe both biological factors, socialisation, and the ability for independent thought (outside the influences of society and culture)(what I attribute to independent thought anyway.) Both biological factors and effects of culture and society etc. vary between the individual, and the ability of independent thought also, for reasons I haven't expanded upon.)

(Thus, in my eyes, the circular argument you mentioned is not applicable.)

I might be able to see where you're coming from (on the other hand I'm not sure I understand it), but I still disagree.

(Think most of what you said isn't relevant.)
(Is it about me now saying I make no distinction, then saying that these factors still determine (affect)[different] moralities? If you go that route I'd still disagree, ‘cos we'd have different meanings of the word.)

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Original post by TorpidPhil
You're massively over-simplifying the notion of objectivity/subjectivity in this debate. This is not a debate about the universality of moral beliefs, which is rather simply whether or not what everyone believes to be moral is the same worldwide or can be the same worldwide because that debate is purely empirical and anthropology tells us that moral beliefs is not at present universal. That's a fact.

The subjective/objective debate concerns the question - Can moral claims be true and if so what makes them true? There are three broad responses to this question.

The first is moral objectivism which is the most intuitive view by far and suggests that moral claims can be true and thereby there are moral facts and that these moral facts are made true by something other than the opinions of any human or group of humans. Different objectivists will argue about what exactly it is that makes it true.

The second is moral subjectivism. Moral subjectivist approaches concede that moral claims may be true but what makes them true is either the beliefs of the person making the claim, the beliefs of the person considering the morality of the claim, the beliefs of an ideal observer considering the claim, the beliefs of a deity on the claim, the beliefs of a God on the claim. Do you see the similarities? Subjectivist views all argue that some sentient being, or a group of sentient being's beliefs about moral claims are what dictates whether or not they are true or false.

Thirdly you have the non-cognitivist approaches which simply outright deny that moral claims can be true in the first place. There are numerous different reasons for them doing this based on their own separate theories, but this is the other approach one may take.

Why the hell are you always up so late if you ain't willing to philosophise XDCheck out the other post as it clarifies the debate quite well I think.


Subjective morality and view points don't begin and end at religion and spirituality. Atheists hold subjective views, as do religious people. I think your view is your own, and you are entitled to it, but the trouble with these types of 'debates' is they become religious vs non religious, and subjectivity can encompass more that those two categories.
Reply 22
Original post by ILovePancakes
There are no such things as morals :moon:

There are investment of millions by large and small businesses as well as multiple govt. to instruct on "proper" responses to ethical dilemmas and issues to reflect not just a positive image for a company or govt. program but to institute stability within said company and program.

several groups (more than religious) instruct and demand "moral" behavior to build on a community and develop personal well being. Mental instability is recognized among those who have acted "immoral"

above acts suggest morals is a thing and a thing of importance. have you not dealt w/ morality in your own life?
(edited 8 years ago)
Reply 23
May morality be "graded" or measured upon a scale?
I don't believe there is such a thing as an objective morality, i.e. An inviolable set of rules set down by a God. Morality appears to be subjective and something that we've come up with to live more cooperatively and harmoniously with each other.
Original post by Ya Dunno
I actually think the word is rather void as there are no consequences to your actions if you so choose to do an action which society deems as "morally wrong". It just is, it's an action based on human nature, not morals. That's if you don't believe in karma or god, then morality has no right or wrong, it just is.


I would say karma does exist its not a belief
The actual meaning of karma is that whatever act you commit you immediately deal with the consequences of it internally
Where a person is very selfish in their life, they will get themselves into this habit of treating people like that and that can have negative consequences for their own wellbeing

This idea shows how there are consequences to our actions and so morals matter at the very least on an individual level for the person committing acts

At the same time I agree with you that an act is based on human nature and this is why I say we have morals but we don't judge because behaviour just is
Reply 26
lol, you clearly dont fully understand what nihilism is.

Anyhow, cool, in that case, I'll believe in objective morality when you bring me evidence unicorns exist.
No its not contradictory, you misunderstand.
The basis for morality are built in at a cortical level, but at the same time, are relatively subjective in that there is significant variation, as belief systems determining morality can be manipulated and change over time.
(edited 8 years ago)
Original post by *Deidre*
Subjective morality and view points don't begin and end at religion and spirituality. Atheists hold subjective views, as do religious people. I think your view is your own, and you are entitled to it, but the trouble with these types of 'debates' is they become religious vs non religious, and subjectivity can encompass more that those two categories.


What do you mean by a subjective view? Do you mean an opinion? Do you mean a view that cannot be factually true or false? Either way, yes, atheists hold both, as do theists. But our opinions on this debate are not like that as this debate has clear cut answers that are either true or false. Also, whether one is a theist or an atheist doesn't force you to be a moral objectivist or subjectivist or non-cognitivist. I for example am a moral objectivist despite being an atheist, whereas the majority of atheists seem to prefer moral non-cognitivism. Quite a few theists are moral subjectivists since they believe in divine command theory. It is possible to believe in a God like deity and be a moral non-cognitivist too. Religion is only tangentially important to this debate.

If you're arguing that the term subject is used incorrectly here... Well, that's just how the term is used within academic meta-ethics. Hey, terminology can always be improved, but that doesn't undermine an argument made on this topic...

Original post by MAINE.
lol, you clearly dont fully understand what nihilism is.

Anyhow, cool, in that case, I'll believe in objective morality when you bring me evidence unicorns exist.


Moral nihilism is very different from existential nihilism. For some reason the term nihilism gets thrown around a lot in different parts of philosophy each time with different meaning, but his use of moral nihilism was correct in that case. I know you like Nietzsche so you probably are thinking of existential nihilism when he says that, right?
(edited 8 years ago)
Original post by ImNotReallyMe
I would say karma does exist its not a belief
The actual meaning of karma is that whatever act you commit you immediately deal with the consequences of it internally
Where a person is very selfish in their life, they will get themselves into this habit of treating people like that and that can have negative consequences for their own wellbeing

This idea shows how there are consequences to our actions and so morals matter at the very least on an individual level for the person committing acts

At the same time I agree with you that an act is based on human nature and this is why I say we have morals but we don't judge because behaviour just is


Wha do you mean by the person immediately deals with the consequences of it internally?

Say there's a psychopath who kills for pleasure, what consequences is he dealing with the second he murders someone? Especially as you're insinuating that those consequences are products of a conscience.
Morality, assuming itexists, is a set of binding commands that allows mankind to distinguish betweenright & wrong and identify what should or should not be done. From what wecan observe, all societies (regardless of geographical, chronological, etc.separation) seem to share in a common “moral code”, which would suggest theexistence of a universal, objective moral law that is present independent ofmankind’s existence. It’s nature, therefore, is that it is inherent, universal,objective, and that it entrusts in mankind an obligation to do “the rightthing”. Yet does the fact that morality is inherent, universal, objective, andbinding (i.e. we have a duty to do what is right by this “moral code”) enableit to skirt the existence of God? It seems, however, that the contrary is true.The existence of morality, and its nature necessitates the existence of God –such is the conclusion of the Moral Argument.Thereare two types of moral argument: the theoretical and the practical. Thetheoretical moral argument (posited by the likes of H.P. Owen, John Newman, andC.S. Lewis) uses deduction to argue the existence of God, whereas the practicalmoral argument (as posited by Kant) explores the idea of obligation to showthat the existence of God is a logical necessity. Yet is this really the case?Does, in other words, the moral argument succeed in proving the existing ofGod?Thetheoretical moral argument is as follows. We, as humans, encounter experiencesof morality and its nature during our lives (e.g. it feels as if we and thosewho we encounter - are dutifully bound by virtue of a common “conscience” to dothe right thing, and also as if we and those who we encounter feeluncomfortable when we do the wrong thing). Furthermore, it seems as if allhuman communities (past, and present) share a common notion of what is rightand what is wrong. Therefore, it is argued, morality (i.e. the moral law)exists independent of mankind as something objective and absolute. In order forthere to be such a law, there must be, by definition, a moral law-maker who hasthe power to create it. Only God, however, is capable (by virtue of his nature– i.e. omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient, etc.) of creating an objectiveand absolute moral law. Therefore, it is argued, that God must exist. This isflawed.“If, as is thecase, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened at transgressing thevoice of conscience, this implies there is one to whom we are responsible…ifthe cause of these emotions does not belong to the visible world, the object towhich our perception is directed must be supernatural and divine- JohnHenry NewmanNewmanargues to God from the idea of the conscience. He recognizes that there seemsto be something intrinsic in all men that regulates behaviour by rewarding“moral” actions (through positive emotions) and punishing “immoral” ones(through negative emotions such as guilt and shame). He proceeds to infer thatthe conscience must be the voice of God within us, thus necessitating theexistence of God. Yet Newman’s argument makes far too many assumptions to beconvincing. Since, Newman claims, the conscience is more than a man’s own self”, and that the man himself has no power over it, or only with extremedifficulty...he did not make it…he cannot destroy it”, the existence of theconscience proves the existence of God. Newman, however, is arguing from a positionof faith and thus fails to consider a secular explanation for the existence ofthe conscience (e.g. the socio-biological advantage of being biologicallyconditioned to respond positively to actions that are conducive to promotingtrust and mutual benefit within a community– “moral actions” and to respondnegatively to actions that are conducive to the contrary “immoral actions” sinceit is beneficial in assuring mutual survival). Instead, he assumes that theconscience is indicative of a being exteriorto ourselves” (i.e. God) as it is a product of said exterior being. Thisassumes that God exists necessarily (as an intelligent designer or a FirstCause), which is demonstrative of circular reasoning. Furthermore, the verycommonality and nature of morality (and the conscience) seem to be indicativethat it is merely an evolutionary adaptation that has a genetic origin. Indeed,studies in animal behaviour (cf. CanAnimals Be Moral?) have shown that social mammals (e.g. rats, dogs,primates) can choose to act “morally” or “immorally” evidence that moralityis not proper to humans and that both it and the conscience can be explainedbiologically. This shows that the nature of morality is not such that Godexists (as an alternative explanation that does not invoke a transcendent,omnipotent, divine being can be used to explain the phenomenon that is morality– which, according to Occam, is a superior one by virtue of simplicity) - thereforeNewman’s argument fails to prove the existence of God.Itis, however, argued by Hal Herzog that animal “morality” is rooted in instinct.This, he claims, is distinct from human morality, as human morality seems to beinformed more by conscious choice than by instinct. The distinction is evidentif we are to assess, as it were, the flip side of the coin immorality.Ifwe observe the atrocities being carried out (and those that have been carried out)across the world (e.g. Syria, Nanking, Hiroshima, Rwanda, the Holocaust, and soon) we are able to discern an aspect of morality (i.e. extreme immorality),which is proper only to human beings. From this we can, through empiricalinduction, determine that there exists an exclusively human capacity for(extreme) immorality. A beast can neverbe as cruel as a human being, so artistically, so picturesquely cruel”writes Dostoevsky, alluding to this facet of morality which only humans seem tohave the capacity to achieve. If this is true, it can also be argued that therealso exists an exclusively human capacity for (extreme) morality - this canalso be empirically verified (e.g. St. Francis, Mother Teresa, FlorenceNightingale, Dr. David Nott, and so on). Such capacities imply that there is aconscious choice to act in a biologically untoward manner (i.e. doing good forthe sake of doing good & doing evil for the sake of doing evil), whichanimals lack. Therefore it seems that it is this predilection for autonomousvirtue (or vice) which characterizes human morality and distinguishes (but doesnot separate) it from animal (biological) morality. Where on earth, this beingthe case, does this morality comefrom then?Kantmakes a distinction between what we considered to be animal morality (i.e.“moral” in consequence, but “biologically selfish” in intent) and humanmorality (i.e. “moral” in consequence and in intent good for the sake ofgood) by separating autonomous actions (dispassionate, moral actions performedout of a conscious sense of duty) from heteronomous actions (emotive actionsthat are selfish in intent and, thus, can never be moral). This is instrumentalto Kant’s version of the moral argument - dissimilar to the theoretical moralargument proposed by Newman and his ilk (Owen & Lewis). In addition, theaspect of autonomous virtue (or vice) mentioned in the previous paragraph isconsidered within the structure of the practical moral argument. Moreover, Kantexplains how the practical moral argument is logically superior to thetheoretical one. Kantreasons that if God did exist, then he must exist outside the phenomenal realmand hence any objective knowledge of God is unavailable to us (since we existwithin the phenomenal realm). In addition to this, Kant proposes that the humanmind determines the way in which we experience reality, thus it is impossiblefor us to know things in themselves”but only as we perceive them to be. This nullifies the inductive reasoning thatclaims it is possible obtain knowledge of God from an experience or feelingencountered in the phenomenal realm. This renders the theoretical moralarguments void (by virtue of being invalid). However, Kant claims that we mayobtain knowledge of God if we consider our sense of morality (right, wrong,duty, good, and their opposites). This forms the basis of the practical moralargument.Thepractical moral argument is as follows. Morality is based on duty (i.e. what weought to do). We are under obligation to be autonomously virtuous (i.e. dutyfor duty’s sake). Reason suggests we ought to act according to the categoricalimperative (“an unconditional moralobligation which is binding in all circumstances and is not dependent on aperson’s inclination or purpose”). A duty to do something implies anability to do said thing (ought implies can). We ought to aim for the summum bonum (the life of moralityrewarded by happiness), and, because ought implies can, the summum bonum must be acheiveable. However,we know cannot know empirically that the summumbonum is achievable because it is often the case, according to 2Pac, thatthe good die young (i.e. bad thingsfrequently happen to good people). Therefore it is only an omnibenevolent andomnipotent God who can guarantee that we attain the summum bonum. Thus if morality is to be at all meaningful, we mustassume that God is the guarantor of the summumbonum if not in this life, then in the next. Hence, because ought impliescan and there is no can without God, the moral argument necessitates theexistence of God. Or does it?
Goodness is one thing with me and another witha Chinaman, so it’s relative. Or isn’t it? questions Ivan Karamazov.Indeed, Dostoevsky raises an important issue with the moral argument in The Brothers Karamazov no two peopleexperience the same version of morality (as Kant argues, no one can ever seesomething as a thing in itself, merely a personal version of such thing).Despite this, it can still be argued that the notion of morality is fairlyconsistent throughout a given population. Yet the variation in morality,however, is both greater and more prominent between different cultures. It is,for example, perfectly acceptable (if not just) to stone a woman to death forwearing jeans or driving a car in certain parts of the Middle East; thispractice, however, would be considered intolerable and barbaric anywhere else.Another example would be the fundamentally differing attitudes towards raising(disciplining) children. It is commonplace in parts of East & South Asia(or part of Asian culture) for a parent to be more demanding and critical oftheir children (the infamous “Tiger Parent” style of raising children asdetailed by Amy Chua), whereas this form of parenting would be thought of ascruel and abusive to parents in the West. It is the very contrast between thesetwo styles of parenting that has gained popular attention in China, resultingin a series entitled Tiger Mum & CatDad”. Indeed, the “Cat Dad” character (representative of the more nurturingstyle of parenting commonly employed in Western culture) has been subject toharsh criticism by viewers who frequently question the character’s masculinityand diminish his role in society. Unsurprisingly, Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother drew similar flak from readers inthe United States, who questioned Chua’s method and likened it to child abuseand torture it was, in their culture, immoral.

In 1950 a study wasconducted by Solomon Asch to determine the effects of the pressure of socialconformity. Volunteers were shown two cards one with a single vertical lineand another with several. They were then asked to point out which two lineswere of the same height. In the control experiment, no problems wereencountered (i.e. volunteers answered correctly each time). It was when othervolunteers (these “volunteers” were actually hired by Asch to answerincorrectly) were present that discrepancies started to occur. On average theerror rate rose from under 1% (when the volunteer answered independently) toover 37% (when placed in the same room as other “volunteers” who were allgiving the same incorrect answer). This study enforces the idea that moralityis shaped by social pressures.

We can also, forexample, consider the citizens of AppenzellAusserhoden and Appenzell Innerhoden(two Cantons within Switzerland) during the late 20th Century whenthese two regions of Switzerland did not recognize women’s suffrage until 1989and 1991 respectively, despite global support for women’s suffrage (at thetime) amounting to over 95%. Evidence of what psychologists term the “insulteffect” (where exposure to vehemently contrary viewpoints serve only to inflameand re-affirm your certainty in the validity of your conviction). It’s the majority who decides what’s crazy and what isn’t” (Journey to the End ofthe Night, Celine) - yet more evidence to suggest that social pressureslargely shape morality. It seems, therefore, that the case for the existence ofan objective, universal moral law is undermined; giving rise to the suggestionthat morality is merely a form of social indoctrination. Hence if the basis foran objective, universal moral law is not substantiated, then the nature ofmorality does not necessitate the existence of God.

If, however, we areto assume the existence of a universal moral code that informs the notion ofmorality held by all different cultures (i.e. an almost indiscernible bottomlayer or “base strata” of a universal morality that underpins all variations ofmorality) then, by virtue of its nature, God’s logical existence is necessary.Yet ethical theories can exist without needing to invoke the existence a divinebeing.

Ethical theories suchas Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics do not require the existence of God. Yet indoing so, neither Mill, nor Aristotle reduces morality to a subjectivephenomenon of social indoctrination. Utilitarianism claims that man isnaturally inclined to act in a way that maximizes utility and that if he is nothe is conditioned to do so by various sanctions (both external and internal,neither divine). Indeed, even the Virtue Ethicist will not claim that moralitynecessitates the existence of God.
Inconclusion the nature of morality is such that God does not exist. Morality canbe explained naturalistically. In fact despite admitting that man has a moralobligation, Freud disputes that it is objectively binding and argues that it isan epiphenomenon of the mind. According to Freud, our sense of moral duty andthe “voice of conscience” stems from the subconscious section of the humanpsyche which he termed the “Super Ego”. This is yet further evidence to demonstrate that morality and consciencedo not necessarily require the existence of a transcendent, omnibenevolent,omnipotent, omniscient deity. Both are phenomena that can be reasonablyexplained using psychology and biology.
(edited 8 years ago)
I'm an emotivist. :smile:
Reply 32
Original post by Plantagenet Crown
I don't believe there is such a thing as an objective morality, i.e. An inviolable set of rules set down by a God. Morality appears to be subjective and something that we've come up with to live more cooperatively and harmoniously with each other.


Original post by da_nolo
Is it objective or subjective or something else completely?

Where does it come from or is it a conscious creation?

Are we born with some connection to morality or is it purely environmental?


Original post by MAINE.
No evidence to suggest there is a such thing as objective morality....I'll let you figure out the rest.


Original post by hellodave5
Morals are both inbuilt into us as humans, shown by research whereby morals are shown in infants - often using liking/dislike of puppets which do actions which are judged as good/bad.
It involves empathy whereby you feel what others feel - which is rather complex and tied in to brain functioning at a deep seated level, I think.
Morality makes humans what we are. We would never be what we are if we couldn't co-operate with each other. But I suppose in this way I suppose other animals with complex development have morality too (dogs, cats, apes etc.).
Its completely subjective - in that it is both defined on a personal level with your beliefs, and influenced by societal beliefs (and associated belief systems).


Original post by Kiytt
I believe morality is entirely subjective; our perception of moral right and moral wrong is moulded by our life experiences, social influences and interactions.

It is not a conscious creation by any means; our moral compass is merely an inherent byproduct of our species' superior intellect and cognitive capacity. The human ego seeks to simplify what it is capable of comprehending, and does this by categorising certain actions and beliefs across a spectrum of right and wrong—and we use this as guidance to justify our decisions in day-to-day life. We refer to this as our "conscience", and this could be considered a subconscious creation of the psyche.

Our ability to comprehend our surroundings and experiences is interdependent upon our capacity for empathy, ultimately affecting our conscience; brain damage often leads to limited comprehension, which reduces our capacity for empathy and therefore hinders the effectiveness of our conscience (or nullifies it entirely).


So many moral nihilists and subjectivists here!

Objective moral values can be arrived at through reason, as the great philosopher Henry Sidgwick demonstrated.

Every sentient being aims to minimise its own suffering and maximise the satisfaction of its interests. However, there is no rational justification for anyone to assign more importance to their suffering, or their interests, than to anyone else's: their suffering is no less real when they experience it than when you do. Thus, if we are to aim to minimise our suffering, and maximise the satisfaction of our interests which it is impossible not to it logically follows that we are obligated to do the same for others. Hence, we come as close to an objective morality as possible, in the form of utilitarianism; specifically, preference utilitarianism. This moral system is also universal, given that there is not a sentient being out there which does not try to maximise the satisfaction of its interests, and minimise its suffering.

Another way to get there is to recognise that, say, suffering, is bad for all sentient beings. It is, one could therefore state, objectively bad. Given that morality is about doing good, and preventing bad, then, objectively, we ought to be minimising the suffering of everyone; that is, minimising the bad in the world. As Magnus Vinding puts it: suffering and its inherent badness is a fact about consciousness, and this is not a made-up value statement, anymore than the assertion that the moon exists is a made-up value statement and something we could decide to change. We cannot just decide that suffering is not bad.
I'm pretty sure morality is a construct we create or is inherent to living beings that are conscious and need to co-operate to survive. So if we aren't talking about morality in the context of living things, then whats the point in this discussion? Not a dig, but I'm trying to understand at what you're trying to get at.

Your 2 statements are very vague:

"(1) If the basis is 'built in', then we ought to see some sort of connecting thing between all 'versions' of morality. (2) Your methodology is completely erroneous. You're using what people think about morality to assert what the nature of morality is."

Can you extrapolate what you mean by these?

Also, generally, what is your overall view on morality?
Original post by viddy9
So many moral nihilists and subjectivists here!

Objective moral values can be arrived at through reason, as the great philosopher Henry Sidgwick demonstrated.

Every sentient being aims to minimise its own suffering and maximise the satisfaction of its interests. However, there is no rational justification for anyone to assign more importance to their suffering, or their interests, than to anyone else's: their suffering is no less real when they experience it than when you do. Thus, if we are to aim to minimise our suffering, and maximise the satisfaction of our interests which it is impossible not to it logically follows that we are obligated to do the same for others. Hence, we come as close to an objective morality as possible, in the form of utilitarianism; specifically, preference utilitarianism. This moral system is also universal, given that there is not a sentient being out there which does not try to maximise the satisfaction of its interests, and minimise its suffering.

Another way to get there is to recognise that, say, suffering, is bad for all sentient beings. It is, one could therefore state, objectively bad. Given that morality is about doing good, and preventing bad, then, objectively, we ought to be minimising the suffering of everyone; that is, minimising the bad in the world. As Magnus Vinding puts it: suffering and its inherent badness is a fact about consciousness, and this is not a made-up value statement, anymore than the assertion that the moon exists is a made-up value statement and something we could decide to change. We cannot just decide that suffering is not bad.


But people are not always rational though (usually not rational, even)?
For instance, people put 'but's' on to if their moral code (which as you say, can be objective), in that you can pick and choose when it is applied.

Beliefs aren't set in stone either, and global beliefs within culture have significance in what is deemed moral to do. Sure, some things are biologically programmed as 'bad' in that they are always highly detrimental to the other organism and to the society to which you belong (like murder), but for the smaller and more arbitrary things which are deemed moral or immoral, I would have thought that be different? (as these things aren't in any logical way detrimental, not not accepted within that particular society at that particular time).
Original post by picklescamp
I'm an emotivist. :smile:


Let's say I'm a murderer. Should I murder again? Should I be thrown in jail for my crime?
Original post by hellodave5
But people are not always rational though (usually not rational, even)?
For instance, people put 'but's' on to if their moral code (which as you say, can be objective), in that you can pick and choose when it is applied.

Beliefs aren't set in stone either, and global beliefs within culture have significance in what is deemed moral to do. Sure, some things are biologically programmed as 'bad' in that they are always highly detrimental to the other organism and to the society to which you belong (like murder), but for the smaller and more arbitrary things which are deemed moral or immoral, I would have thought that be different? (as these things aren't in any logical way detrimental, not not accepted within that particular society at that particular time).


Yes, they are different, and your point is?

That doesn't in anyway undermine the objectivity of morality. Objective morality =/= universal morality.

The subjective/objective debate concerns the question - Can moral claims be true and if so what makes them true? There are three broad responses to this question.

The first is moral objectivism which is the most intuitive view by far and suggests that moral claims can be true and thereby there are moral facts and that these moral facts are made true by something other than the opinions of any human or group of humans. Different objectivists will argue about what exactly it is that makes it true.

The second is moral subjectivism. Moral subjectivist approaches concede that moral claims may be true but what makes them true is either the beliefs of the person making the claim, the beliefs of the person considering the morality of the claim, the beliefs of an ideal observer considering the claim, the beliefs of a deity on the claim, the beliefs of a God on the claim. Do you see the similarities? Subjectivist views all argue that some sentient being, or a group of sentient being's beliefs about moral claims are what dictates whether or not they are true or false.

Thirdly you have the non-cognitivist approaches which simply outright deny that moral claims can be true in the first place. There are numerous different reasons for them doing this based on their own separate theories, but this is the other approach one may take.
(edited 8 years ago)
Original post by da_nolo
May morality be "graded" or measured upon a scale?


I think it should be fairly obvious that the morality of actions occurs on a spectrum of more good/less good. It isn't just discretely good/bad/amoral. This is because it seems to me any sensible normative theory of ethics would be empirical. And so based on the empirical facts of the matter things can be more or less good.
Reply 38
Original post by hellodave5
But people are not always rational though (usually not rational, even)?
For instance, people put 'but's' on to if their moral code (which as you say, can be objective), in that you can pick and choose when it is applied.


That's certainly true, but it doesn't have a bearing on whether objective moral values actually exist or not. I contend that they do, and that we can reach them through the use of reason and logic, as shown above.

People can choose whether to be moral or not, but if they choose not to, they are being objectively immoral.

Original post by hellodave5
Beliefs aren't set in stone either, and global beliefs within culture have significance in what is deemed moral to do. Sure, some things are biologically programmed as 'bad' in that they are always highly detrimental to the other organism and to the society to which you belong (like murder), but for the smaller and more arbitrary things which are deemed moral or immoral, I would have thought that be different? (as these things aren't in any logical way detrimental, not not accepted within that particular society at that particular time).


I would say that the smaller, more arbitrary things always come down to preference-satisfaction and suffering at the end of the day, however.

A good example is homosexual behaviour. In the 1700s, it was, of course, mostly frowned upon. But, the philosopher Jeremy Bentham reasoned his way to utilitarianism, and even though he personally had an aversion to homosexual behaviour (as would have been the case for most people in that time), he realised that his personal 'disgust' didn't mean that homosexual behaviour was immoral.

For homosexuals, the behaviour, of course, brought them happiness, mostly in private too, so he concluded that, despite his personal disgust, their preferences, or happiness, far outweighed his own disgust or suffering.

Bentham is a great example of someone who reached the objective moral system of utilitarianism and thus overcame the prejudices of his time and his culture: as well as gay rights, he was a proponent of women's rights, the abolition of slavery, the abolition of the death penalty, the abolition of corporal punishment and animal rights, all of this in the 1700s.
(edited 8 years ago)
Original post by viddy9
That's certainly true, but it doesn't have a bearing on whether objective moral values actually exist or not. I contend that they do, and that we can reach them through the use of reason and logic, as shown above.

People can choose whether to be moral or not, but if they choose not to, they are being objectively immoral.



I would say that the smaller, more arbitrary things always come down to preference-satisfaction and suffering at the end of the day, however.

A good example is homosexual behaviour. In the 1700s, it was, of course, mostly frowned upon. But, the philosopher Jeremy Bentham reasoned his way to utilitarianism, and even though he personally had an aversion to homosexual behaviour (as would have been the case for most people in that time), he realised that his personal 'disgust' didn't mean that homosexual behaviour was immoral.

For homosexuals, the behaviour, of course, brought them happiness, mostly in private too, so he concluded that, despite his personal disgust, their preferences, or happiness, far outweighed his own disgust or suffering.


Interesting! I now see what you and mean to some extent I think, now, maybe.
Though would that not assume that humans actively make decisions though? It seems more like a computational systemic morality calculation without error which would work in an organism which calculates everything they do; but humans rely extremely heavily on biases to function. Higher functioning people will I guess recognise these biases and countermeasure them in instances they aren't useful, maybe like 'Jeremy B'.
So I guess although maybe you could define objectively morality (really interesting notion!) - I'm not sure where this would stand with highly flawed biological systems.

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