But you didn't argue that there could anything outside of time and space. You just asserted it (or perhaps I missed the argument?) notice that this isn't just to do with God if your point is nothing can exist outside of time and space. You seem to be arguing for nominalism by extension. That's just a consequence for your argument.
I find your previous scientific points intriguing with their implications for simultaneous causation. There certainly could be wriggle room to argue against it. However, that doesn't settle the contention, remember, though I brought up simultaneous causation and one specific example the main point was to highlight that there is currently no consensus on the directionality of causation. You'll find many a contemporary scientist and philosopher arguing against the basic cause precedes effect. That was my main point. That you need to be aware of the current literature on causation when confidently describing it the way you did.
Do you think there is some cause and effect in quantum mechanics then? Causality isn't necessarily tied with Newtonian determinism.
I said that there certainly are interpretations of quantum mechanics which are deterministic. I didn't say that you said all interpretations are correct. I said that they all give the correct answers to measurements and in that sense are equally correct (with regards to verification and falsification). The central point is that, contrary to 'talk meaningfully of the physical world
, you will need to fashion yourself a scientific hat', you will not be able to use the central tenants of science to discover the true interpretation of quantum mechanics. Your shelf is going to need to make room for a philosophical hat to wear when it comes to physically interpreting QM. Similarly, you absolutely are going to need metaphysics when talking meaningfully of causality. It seems to argue others is to either side with Hume's restricted, empirically based idea of causation or somehow use science (or empiricism) to argue against it. Hume's idea of causation has been brutally attacked with good reasons to reject it. That leaves the latter option, though it seems tough how you could use empiricism to argue against a position which goes only as far as empiricism allows.
You are right, I didn't compare Einstein to Hume. I said it would be more suitable to compare your position to Hume rather than Einstein.
I'll just appeal to authority here and use a quote to explain my point:
'It is true that, given Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty, we cannot precisely predict individual subatomic events. What is debated is whether this inability to predict is due to the absence of sufficient causal conditions, or whether it is merely a result of the fact that any attempt to precisely measure these events alters their status. The very introduction of the observer into the arena so affects what is observed that it gives the appearance that effects occur without sufficient or determinative causes. But we have no way of knowing what is happening without introducing observers into the situation and the changes they bring. In the above example, we simply are unable to discern the intermediate states of the electron's existence. When Heisenberg's indeterminacy is understood not as describing the events themselves but rather our knowledge of the events, the Causal Principle still holds'
And to address you point about not needing philosophical ideas when talking of QM, I guess you could give some reason that would show Einstein and Bhor to be unnecessary in discussing the philosophy of QM?
'Einstein rejects the probabilistic interpretation of Born and insists that quantum probabilities are epistemic and not ontological in nature. As a consequence, the theory must be incomplete in some way. He recognizes the great value of the theory, but suggests that it "does not tell the whole story", and, while providing an appropriate description at a certain level, it gives no information on the more fundamental underlying level:'
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bohr–Einstein_debatesFurthermore, it's just undeniable that to actually understand the quantum physics, more than simply to the standard of representing it on the language of equations, you're going to need philosophical notions. Here's a good, short response on the these philosophical questions, with a teasing conclusion:
'For all these and other reasons, I tend to be skeptical of ontological interpretations of probabilistic propositions and QM. Subjective epistemological interpretation of probabilities and QM is more coherent with all standard models of reality. Many thinkers in a wide range of fields tend to embrace "ontological indeterminacy" as if it frees them from the language games of logic and vindicates their certainty about free-will and moral agency, none of which are actually related. "Ontologically indeterminacy" is at best ill-defined, and attempts thus far to define it have resulted in contradictions and paradoxes.'
It's the reply by Quinn Rusnell
https://www.quora.com/Theoretical-Physics/Is-probability-epistemological-or-ontologicalPosted from TSR Mobile