There is no such thing as right and wrong. Morality is entirely fabricated.

There is no such thing as objective good or evil, and no action is intrinsically right or wrong. Good and evil are completely subjective, and for the most part what we consider good or evil is just a reflection of social attitudes at the current time. For example, pedophilia was accepted in Greek times (men would have relations with teenage boys below the age of 16), but now its considered completely abhorrent.

Discuss, rebutt, support, etc

Your argument doesn't support the conclusion that there is no objective morality. The fact that views on what is right and wrong have changed doesn't mean that there aren't correct moral views. The proposal that objective morality exists is simply the proposal that there is a logical and correct way for us to behave - ethics is about asking "how are we to live?"

As it happens, I believe that objective moral values do exist. As the 19th Century moral philosopher Henry Sidgwick wrote: "the good of any one individual is of no more importance (from the point of view of the universe) than the good of any other". What drives all sentient beings to behave the way they do - what is the 'good' for an individual? Preferences. Every sentient being aims to maximise the satisfaction of its preferences, when it comes down to it.

Yet, as we have seen, there is no logical justification for putting one's own preferences above those of others'. Thus, if we are to maximise our preference-satisfaction, which it is impossible not to do, it follows that we should be maximising the preference-satisfaction of all sentient beings - failing to do so would be to put our preferences above those of others, which is illogical.

So, I do believe that there is an objective moral system, and its name is Preference Utilitarianism.

It's also important to note that the majority of philosophers disagree with you on this (with those who believe in objective morality or moral realism outnumbering those who do not by more than two-to-one) and that a number of recent works have made good arguments in favour of objective morality, including Peter Singer and Katarzyna de-Lazari Radek in The Point of View of the Universe and Derek Parfit in On What Matters. Henry Sidgwick also laid a lot of the groundwork for this in his Methods of Ethics, but it's quite a dry read so I'd recommend The Point of View of the Universe in particular as they expand on his arguments.

Your argument doesn't support the conclusion that there is no objective morality. The fact that views on what is right and wrong have changed doesn't mean that there aren't correct moral views. The proposal that objective morality exists is simply the proposal that there is a logical and correct way for us to behave - ethics is about asking "how are we to live?"As it happens, I believe that objective moral values do exist. As the 19th Century moral philosopher Henry Sidgwick wrote: "the good of any one individual is of no more importance (from the point of view of the universe) than the good of any other". What drives all sentient beings to behave the way they do - what is the 'good' for an individual? Preferences. Every sentient being aims to maximise the satisfaction of its preferences, when it comes down to it.Yet, as we have seen, there is no logical justification for putting one's own preferences above those of others'. Thus, if we are to maximise our preference-satisfaction, which it is impossible not to do, it follows that we should be maximising the preference-satisfaction of all sentient beings - failing to do so would be to put our preferences above those of others, which is illogical.So, I do believe that there is an objective moral system, and its name is Preference Utilitarianism.It's also important to note that the majority of philosophers disagree with you on this (with those who believe in objective morality or moral realism outnumbering those who do not by more than two-to-one) and that a number of recent works have made good arguments in favour of objective morality, including Peter Singer and Katarzyna de-Lazari Radek in The Point of View of the Universe and Derek Parfit in On What Matters. Henry Sidgwick also laid a lot of the groundwork for this in his Methods of Ethics, but it's quite a dry read so I'd recommend The Point of View of the Universe in particular as they expand on his arguments.

There is no such thing as objective good or evil, and no action is intrinsically right or wrong. Good and evil are completely subjective, and for the most part what we consider good or evil is just a reflection of social attitudes at the current time. For example, pedophilia was accepted in Greek times (men would have relations with teenage boys below the age of 16), but now its considered completely abhorrent.

Discuss, rebutt, support, etc

i dont see how you came to that conclusion as i never disagreed with OP
i was merely pointing out my opinion, i said I 'believe', this is my way of deciding
between right and wrong
there are things that every one agrees on
e.g stealing of an innocent is wrong, all would agree thats wrong as no one would want someone else stealing from them
and thats why 1 person doesnt decide the law, the law is basically opinions of people living at the time at that place
and the law is the minimum benchmark that shows right and wrong
and these morality come from the people so it is personal but its not personal to a single person if most other people agree with it
some people use religion to decide between right and wrong and that would be personal

What's your argument for objective morality?

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Sentient beings wishing for a pleasurable life or satisfaction of their preferences do not reflect considerations of objective morality. Pleasure/misery are not in any way synonymous with moral notions of good/evil.

I've already given it. Every sentient being aims to maximise its own preference-satisfaction, yet there is no logical justification for putting one's own preference-satisfaction above that of other people's. Thus, if we are to aim to maximise our own preference-satisfaction - which it is impossible not to do - it follows that we should do so for others - to do otherwise would be to put our own preference-satisfaction above that of other people's.

I've already given it. Every sentient being aims to maximise its own preference-satisfaction, yet there is no logical justification for putting one's own preference-satisfaction above that of other people's. Thus, if we are to aim to maximise our own preference-satisfaction - which it is impossible not to do - it follows that we should do so for others - to do otherwise would be to put our own preference-satisfaction above that of other people's.

I've already given it. Every sentient being aims to maximise its own preference-satisfaction, yet there is no logical justification for putting one's own preference-satisfaction above that of other people's. Thus, if we are to aim to maximise our own preference-satisfaction - which it is impossible not to do - it follows that we should do so for others - to do otherwise would be to put our own preference-satisfaction above that of other people's.

Ethics is about answering the question "how are we to live?", and the above argument tells us the correct way to live.



My argument doesn't fall prey to the is-ought distinction. My argument simply tells us the correct way to live given the facts about the universe. Call it morality, call it whatever you want: ethics to me aims to answer the question "how am I to live?". It so happens that there isn't a sentient being out there who doesn't think that preference-satisfaction is a good thing, and that we can't not aim to maximise our own preference-satisfaction, meaning that, logically, we should do the same for others.

I am sympathetic to Harris' argument, but not fully convinced by it. It depends on how broadly one defines 'morality'. Is it not enough to simply observe an 'is', such as that suffering is inherently bad, and that the flourishing of sentient beings is inherently good? I don't think so, so I do believe in the distinction between is and ought. At the same time, if morality really is about 'good' and 'bad', then Harris' argument isn't as weak as it may seem. Indeed, Foot and Anscombe have both argued that people ascribe too much power to the word 'ought' - it isn't some magical binding force.

If we're in the business of observing what is good and bad (relativists, for instance), and relativists do believe that some things are at least subjectively right and wrong, then when it comes down to it, well-being and suffering can be shown to be right and wrong, as Harris and others have shown. The alternative is moral nihilism, whereby you would say that your own well-being and your own suffering aren't even good or bad. But, the trap for them is that they still aim to maximise their own preference-satisfaction, despite logic telling us that their own preference-satisfaction matters no more than anyone else's. They would argue that it doesn't matter at all, yet they still can't get out of the trap. Seeing as they're in the trap, they should, logically, be aiming to maximise the preference-satisfaction of everyone else, in accordance with logic.

You also say that the fact that sentient beings want to avoid suffering doesn't mean that suffering is an objective moral wrong. Yet, it is wrong to them, and to deny that it is wrong is to deny reality - if something is wrong for someone, it is wrong, full-stop. This wrong may be outweighed by more rights, but it is still wrong.

I believe right and wrong depends on how it affects people around you,
if your actions will hurt someone then that's wrong,
if it will make someone happy then chances are you are probably doing the right thing.

You sound like a pussy

Quite an empty argument. Why is hurting people wrong?

Because it is (it's not really wrong to hurt people, sometimes it might be right to hurt some peoplet. But let's say that other people's suffering matters as much as your own suffering matters). There's no non-circular way to answer this question. Just as there is no non-circular way to answer the question of whether other people really are real.

The reason to accept other people exist and are concious is that to not do so would have the potential to create massive harm (accepting it has no potential for harm).

I'm confused.

You believe that "other people are real" should be accepted as true to prevent massive harm?? or should it be accepted because it is harmless to accept it?

Well, to accept there are other minds like yours means you also accept they are capable of suffering. To think otherwise would lead one to act without considering others (and we all know how that goes down)

Nothing else exists, not other people and definitely no other conscious, actual people.

Yes but why should I care? There is no reason why we have to care about anyone else/thing. There is no god telling us to. We are jut a configuration of atoms with sentience.

Neither is there any logical justification for not putting one's own preference-satisfaction above that of other people's. So neither does it follow that aiming to maximise our own preference-satisfaction means we should do so for others.

But we are aiming here to find ontological grounding for moral values and duties, in something that is truly objective, and completely independent of human thought or desire. In order for you to say "we have an objective duty to maximise everyone's preference-satisfaction", you would have to explain where that duty stems from and what makes it objectively true. You may consider it illogical to put our own preferences above others, but even if true, that wouldn't mean that doing so is a moral evil. Plenty of things humans do are illogical, but morally neutral; there is no objective moral requirement that we act logically. I don't agree with the statement either; there are perfectly logical reasons why humans put their own personal preferences above those of others.

Without conscious life, morality isn't going to exist. So, if your definition of "objective" is "completely independent of human thought or desire", then you won't find what you're looking for. What I've outlined is the correct way to live, and seeing as ethics is concerned, ultimately, with the question "how are we to live?", I think this provides an answer - the answer.As I was saying to ChaoticButterly, asking "why ask logically?" is a circular argument, because you're expecting a logical answer. In other words, you're presupposing the existence of logic by just participating in this discussion. If you really want to be sceptical about logic, then go ahead, but then you'd have to withdraw yourself from arena of debate.There's no compulsion in my system of ethics, but that's besides the point: one can fail to maximise the preference-satisfaction of all sentient beings, but then one would be doing something illogical and incorrect.I'd like to hear some of the logical reasons people have for putting their preference-satisfaction above that of others.

That's kind of the definition of objective morality though; that which is independent of human (or any other sentient being) thought or opinion. Morality is obviously meaningless in the absence of sentient beings, but if morality is to be objective, it must exist independent of them.

The question is: what is the ontological basis for this morality? Monotheists ground them in a metaphysically necessary being with the property of omnibenevolence, which is logically coherent, but no proof of such a being has ever been provided. What would a naturalist/atheist ground these values in? I've never seen a convincing answer to that question, and a lot of atheist philosophers do agree that on naturalism objective morality cannot exist.

Your system of ethics says that to act morally, we must maximise preference-satisfaction of all beings. This is essentially a more nuanced way of saying we must maximise pleasure and minimise displeasure for as many beings as possible. The problem is, you make a leap from satisfaction of preferences to moral goodness. There is no reason why I have a objective moral duty to help maximise the preferences of anyone at all. Even if we agreed that it was "illogical" or "incorrect" of me not to do so, that doesn't show that doing so is objectively immoral. There's really no equivalence between acting logically and acting morally; it may be illogical of me to play certain moves in chess, but that wouldn't make doing so a moral evil., Ultimately the argument falls prey to the same issues that Harris's does IMO.