There is no such thing as right and wrong. Morality is entirely fabricated.

Original post by VV Cephei A

All this leaves us with is a subjective set of ethics which you personally believe is the logical way to behave, just like any other system of ethics which is affirmed by their proponents to be the logical way to behave. Which is fine, but like I said, there's nothing actually "objective" about it by all common definitions of that word.

I think I demonstrated that it was the logical way to behave. You said that you questioned one of the premises, namely that there's no logical justification to put our own interests above those of others, but you never explained your challenge to this premise.

Reply 42

Original post by viddy9

I think I demonstrated that it was the logical way to behave. You said that you questioned one of the premises, namely that there's no logical justification to put our own interests above those of others, but you never explained your challenge to this premise.

Firsly, the quantification of preference satisfaction is an impossibility to the point of absurdity; there has never and will never be a way to accurately value the subjective preferences of different individuals and henceforth decide which preferences should outweigh others. Can you conclusively demonstrate that there was no net gain of preference-satisfaction when Fritzl kept his daughter captive and systematically raped her for years?

Secondly, human self interest has been a driving force for our survival and prosperity as a species; it allowed everything from our initial evolution through difficult conditions, to more recently the movement of hundreds of millions to billions of people from positions of poverty into relative comfort. If we adopted some kind of self-sacrificial behaviour based on completely vague and undefinable notions of maximising the preferences of others, it's safe to say none of us would be sitting here today and this question of morality wouldn't even be relevant.

But all this is spectacularly missing the point. All you've done here is given us your personal account of what you think is the most logical or correct moral philosophy, namely Utilitarianism. And you've given your arguments for that, which is fine. But the definition of objective morality is that which is independent of human opinion. It's a question of ontology - what is the grounding for a set of moral principles being objectively true? So that even if everyone in the world (including yourself, after a knock on the head) thought that Utilitarianism was a grossly immoral philosophy, what would make Utilitarianism still hold true as an objectively moral? You're falling into the exact same trap that Harris does, giving us your preferred framework of "how we should live" and calling it objective simply because you personally argue that it is logical, and equating words like "logical" and "correct" with the concept of moral goodness. I'm afraid the theists are right on this one.

Reply 43

Original post by VV Cephei A

Firsly, the quantification of preference satisfaction is an impossibility to the point of absurdity; there has never and will never be a way to accurately value the subjective preferences of different individuals and henceforth decide which preferences should outweigh others. Can you conclusively demonstrate that there was no net gain of preference-satisfaction when Fritzl kept his daughter captive and systematically raped her for years?

Using a test of universalizability can give a good indication of whether a preference outweighs another. Which preference would Josef Fritzl rather see frustrated: the preference to keep his daughter captive and systematically rape her for years, or the preference not to be held captive and be systematically be raped for years. It's obvious that he would have chosen not to be held captive and systematically raped himself.

Original post by VV Cephei A

Secondly, human self interest has been a driving force for our survival and prosperity as a species; it allowed everything from our initial evolution through difficult conditions, to more recently the movement of hundreds of millions to billions of people from positions of poverty into relative comfort. If we adopted some kind of self-sacrificial behaviour based on completely vague and undefinable notions of maximising the preferences of others, it's safe to say none of us would be sitting here today and this question of morality wouldn't even be relevant.

So, you've just made a Utilitarian argument here. If you're right, then all you've demonstrated is that, on Utilitarian grounds, we shouldn't be act utilitarians in every moment of our lives, particularly not when we're participating in our current economic system. As an aside, if everyone acted in accordance with logic and were Preference Utilitarians, then we wouldn't have our current economic system in place, but that doesn't mean that we wouldn't prosper. Indeed, you miss out the part where, through government, charity and altruism, society has been made more prosperous. If everyone acted in an entirely self-interested fashion, we wouldn't be where we are today either.

But, most Utilitarians would agree with you: I don't spend every minute of my life calculating how to maximise expected utility, although there are some Utilitarians I know of who would come close. Nonetheless, there are good Utilitarian reasons not to do so, such as emotional burnout.

So, nothing you've said has actually weakened the logical case for Preference Utilitarianism: you've argued that it is difficult to measure the strength of preferences, but it would be absurd to deny that some preferences are stronger than others in reality, and I think that there's a perfectly acceptable way of getting a strong indication of whether one preference is stronger than another, as stated above. You've also made an argument stating that we shouldn't always be entirely self-sacrificial, appealing to our prosperity as a result of not being self-sacrificial, but this is entirely consistent with Preference Utilitarianism

Original post by VV Cephei A

But all this is spectacularly missing the point. All you've done here is given us your personal account of what you think is the most logical or correct moral philosophy, namely Utilitarianism. And you've given your arguments for that, which is fine. But the definition of objective morality is that which is independent of human opinion. It's a question of ontology - what is the grounding for a set of moral principles being objectively true? So that even if everyone in the world (including yourself, after a knock on the head) thought that Utilitarianism was a grossly immoral philosophy, what would make Utilitarianism still hold true as an objectively moral?

Logic would. Logic isn't "human opinion". Something would be logical even if every human thought it wasn't.

Original post by VV Cephei A

and equating words like "logical" and "correct" with the concept of moral goodness.

Again, you may have a point here, but again I think it's irrelevant. The system I have outlined sets out how each one of us is to behave and conduct ourselves in every aspect of life. Arguing over whether this is or is not morality misses the point, in my view.

(edited 8 years ago)

Reply 44

Original post by viddy9

Arguing over whether this is or is not morality misses the point, in my view.

That is what we're arguing though. We're not debating the merits of a particular moral system in this thread (as interesting as that may be), we're asking the question of whether objective morality exists independent of human thought and what the ontological basis for it is.

Your whole post kind of served to illustrate my point; Preference Utilitarianism is something which needs to be argued for, and there is no truly right or wrong perception of how exactly it would be applied, in what situations one's own interests could take priority over anothers (you made the concession that in some cases, it could), what the universal definition or quantification of utility actually is, and so forth. Utilitarians would disagree significantly on different aspects of the philosophy, and none could claim to be "more right" than another. Kantian-type thinkers would flat out disagree entirely, and argue that using humans as a means to an end in this way is completely immoral. Why are they objectively wrong?

If you personally believe Preference-Utilitarianism is the best way for humans to live, then that is fine, but to argue that it is objectively the moral way to behave is, IMO, to misunderstand the argument as a whole. Your belief is grounded in human opinion; that is by definition not objective.

Reply 45

Original post by VV Cephei A

If you personally believe Preference-Utilitarianism is the best way for humans to live, then that is fine, but to argue that it is objectively the moral way to behave is, IMO, to misunderstand the argument as a whole. Your belief is grounded in human opinion; that is by definition not objective.

My point was that a system which tells one the logical or correct way to conduct oneself is indistinguishable from a system of morality. Ethics endeavours to answer the question "how are we to live?", and the system I have outlined answers that question.

Preference Utilitarianism needs to be argued for in a trivial sense, but as I said previously, logic is independent of human thought and opinion. Nothing you have said has weakened the logical case for Preference Utilitarianism, and contrary to what you say, what I outlined in my previous post concerning the weighting of preferences and so on is simply a logical extension of an already logical system. So, I would claim that the system of utilitarianism that I've outlined is correct and that other forms of utilitarianism - and other forms of morality - are not.

Objective does mean independent of human thought and opinion, and logic is objective. A near scientific-fact such as evolution also needs to be argued for in a trivial sense, but evolution would be true independent of human thought and opinion, and the same is true of Preference Utilitarianism.

"Why should I follow logic?" is essentially your final question, and embodies your objection to my equating of logic with moral goodness. But, as I have argued previously, such an argument is a circular argument, because you're expecting a logical answer. In other words, you're presupposing the existence of logic by just participating in this discussion. If you really want to be sceptical about logic, then go ahead, but then you'd have to withdraw yourself from arena of debate. "Why should I follow logic?" doesn't make sense as a question.

Reply 46

Original post by viddy9

My point was that a system which tells one the logical or correct way to conduct oneself is indistinguishable from a system of morality. Ethics endeavours to answer the question "how are we to live?", and the system I have outlined answers that question.

Preference Utilitarianism needs to be argued for in a trivial sense, but as I said previously, logic is independent of human thought and opinion. Nothing you have said has weakened the logical case for Preference Utilitarianism, and contrary to what you say, what I outlined in my previous post concerning the weighting of preferences and so on is simply a logical extension of an already logical system. So, I would claim that the system of utilitarianism that I've outlined is correct and that other forms of utilitarianism - and other forms of morality - are not.

Objective does mean independent of human thought and opinion, and logic is objective. A near scientific-fact such as evolution also needs to be argued for in a trivial sense, but evolution would be true independent of human thought and opinion, and the same is true of Preference Utilitarianism.

"Why should I follow logic?" is essentially your final question, and embodies your objection to my equating of logic with moral goodness. But, as I have argued previously, such an argument is a circular argument, because you're expecting a logical answer. In other words, you're presupposing the existence of logic by just participating in this discussion. If you really want to be sceptical about logic, then go ahead, but then you'd have to withdraw yourself from arena of debate. "Why should I follow logic?" doesn't make sense as a question.

We can already see that there is no discernible definition of Preference Utilitarianism when it is explored beneath the surface. You moved from self interest being entirely illogical, to it sometimes being permissible, as an example. The extent to which we can act in self interest while still being consistent with the philosophy, is completely open to subjective argument. The answers could range from such actions being almost always permissible, to them being almost never permissible, depending on one's personal opinion of the importance self interest has played in human flourishing. I could be a Preference-Utilitarian but come to a completely different conclusion about its application in the world to you, essentially morphing it into a completely different set of duties and behaviours. Again, notice we are no closer to an objective answer to 'how are we to live?'.

And as I said previously, there is no objective reason why satisfaction of preferences must be the benchmark by which a system of morality should be judged. Kantians would argue that the use of humans as a means to achieve a certain end is immoral, and doesn't respect the intrinsic worth of a human. You may disagree, but there is no basis (the grounding that this question is looking for) for claiming they are objectively incorrect, and that preference-satisfaction is to be valued while the intrinsic worth of a being is not to be. Merely, opinions, opinions, and more opinions.

Reply 47

Howard

5

Original post by Gucci Mane.

There is no such thing as objective good or evil, and no action is intrinsically right or wrong. Good and evil are completely subjective, and for the most part what we consider good or evil is just a reflection of social attitudes at the current time. For example, pedophilia was accepted in Greek times (men would have relations with teenage boys below the age of 16), but now its considered completely abhorrent.

Discuss, rebutt, support, etc

That doesn't mean that buggering teenage boys was morally right in Greek times; merely that it was an accepted norm.

Reply 48

Original post by VV Cephei A

We can already see that there is no discernible definition of Preference Utilitarianism when it is explored beneath the surface. You moved from self interest being entirely illogical, to it sometimes being permissible, as an example. The extent to which we can act in self interest while still being consistent with the philosophy, is completely open to subjective argument. The answers could range from such actions being almost always permissible, to them being almost never permissible, depending on one's personal opinion of the importance self interest has played in human flourishing. I could be a Preference-Utilitarian but come to a completely different conclusion about its application in the world to you, essentially morphing it into a completely different set of duties and behaviours. Again, notice we are no closer to an objective answer to 'how are we to live?'.

No. Whatever maximises the preference-satisfaction of all sentient beings is what is logical. There is an objectively correct answer to this, and just because different humans and different preference utilitarians may get it wrong, it doesn't mean that the system itself is not correct. Acting in a superficially self-interested fashion to maximise the preference-satisfaction of all sentient beings is still carried out in order to maximise utility, not because being self-interested in itself is at all logically justifiable.

Original post by VV Cephei A

And as I said previously, there is no objective reason why satisfaction of preferences must be the benchmark by which a system of morality should be judged. Kantians would argue that the use of humans as a means to achieve a certain end is immoral, and doesn't respect the intrinsic worth of a human. You may disagree, but there is no basis (the grounding that this question is looking for) for claiming they are objectively incorrect, and that preference-satisfaction is to be valued while the intrinsic worth of a being is not to be. Merely, opinions, opinions, and more opinions.

I'm not saying that preference-satisfaction should be valued, however, unlike someone like Harris who does think that well-being should be valued. Harris's argument goes something like: "well-being is good and this is a fact about consciousness, and if humans value well-being, then they ought to increase well-being". To which his detractors would reply "why choose well-being?" and "why maximise the good?". These are all valid criticisms of Harris's argument: in essence, he is making value-judgements without justification.

In contrast, I'm saying that given certain facts about the universe which are true regardless of human opinion such as the fact that every sentient being aims to maximise its preference-satisfaction, and that it is impossible not to satisfy one's own preferences, there is a logical and correct way to behave, given that there is no logical justification for putting one's own preference-satisfaction ahead of another's.

Thus, I didn't arbitrarily choose preferences; rather, they're the only universal amongst conscious beings, and I'm not saying that they have value in any case. There's no evidence whatsoever for humans or any other beings having "intrinsic worth", so Kantians are wrong.

Given that this answers the question of "how are we to live?", and is indistinguishable from a system of morality in any case, and that logic is not just the product of "human opinion" but is objective, and that asking why we should follow logic makes no sense as a question, I deem this to be the objective moral system. We could also call it the logical or correct way to conduct onself.

(edited 8 years ago)

Reply 49

Original post by viddy9

No. Whatever maximises the preference-satisfaction of all sentient beings is what is logical. There is an objectively correct answer to this, and just because different humans and different preference utilitarians may get it wrong, it doesn't mean that the system itself is not correct. Acting in a superficially self-interested fashion to maximise the preference-satisfaction of all sentient beings is still carried out in order to maximise utility, not because being self-interested in itself is at all logically justifiable.

I'm not saying that preference-satisfaction should be valued, however, unlike someone like Harris who does think that well-being should be valued. Harris's argument goes something like: "well-being is good and this is a fact about consciousness, and if humans value well-being, then they ought to increase well-being". To which his detractors would reply "why choose well-being?" and "why maximise the good?". These are all valid criticisms of Harris's argument: in essence, he is making value-judgements without justification.

In contrast, I'm saying that given certain facts about the universe which are true regardless of human opinion such as the fact that every sentient being aims to maximise its preference-satisfaction, and that it is impossible not to satisfy one's own preferences, there is a logical and correct way to behave, given that there is no logical justification for putting one's own preference-satisfaction ahead of another's.

Thus, I didn't arbitrarily choose preferences; rather, they're the only universal amongst conscious beings, and I'm not saying that they have value in any case. There's no evidence whatsoever for humans or any other beings having "intrinsic worth", so Kantians are wrong.

Given that this answers the question of "how are we to live?", and is indistinguishable from a system of morality in any case, and that logic is not just the product of "human opinion" but is objective, and that asking why we should follow logic makes no sense as a question, I deem this to be the objective moral system. We could also call it the logical or correct way to conduct onself.

Why can WLC's criticism of Harris's argument not be levied against your own? Harris states that sentient creatures prefer to be in a state of well being, as opposed to a state of misery. You state that sentient creatures prefer to have their preferences realised, as opposed to denied. Both statements are true and on equal logical footing. The question WLC asks is, why is creaturely well-being a moral good, as opposed to simply creaturely well-being? In the debate excerpt, he even directly acknowledges the fact that all creatures prefer to be in a state of well-being, but goes on to say that this doesn't do anything to answer the ontological question, to which Harris has no response. Replace well-being with preference-satisfaction and you've got a direct parallel, and the exact same problem.

Earlier I used the example of Fritzl, to which you responded by invoking the concept of universalisation. And while, as you said, it may usually be the case in these scenarios that the individual would choose not to be victimised themselves, this misses the entire point of the question. The question is asking: are actions such as those of Fritzl truly, intrinsically, unobjectionably wrong, and if so, what is the justification for such a judgement? So that even if, hypothetically, Fritzl would have allowed himself to be raped and abused if it meant being able to rape and abuse his daughter, AND his satisfaction greatly outweighed his daughters misery, his actions would still be considered morally despicable.

A simpler/more relevant example here would be: a religious extremist who kills himself along with an innocent victim in a suicide bomb. By what standard can this act be judged as truly morally evil? The furthest you can get is arguing that the victim's preferences to continue living outweigh that of the extremist to martyr himself. But again, this is just pure conjecture, and missing the point of the question.

(edited 8 years ago)

Reply 50

Original post by VV Cephei A

Why can WLC's criticism of Harris's argument not be levied against your own? Harris states that sentient creatures prefer to be in a state of well being, as opposed to a state of misery. You state that sentient creatures prefer to have their preferences realised, as opposed to denied. Both statements are true and on equal logical footing. The question WLC asks is, why is creaturely well-being a moral good, as opposed to simply creaturely well-being? In the debate excerpt, he even directly acknowledges the fact that all creatures prefer to be in a state of well-being, but goes on to say that this doesn't do anything to answer the ontological question, to which Harris has no response. Replace well-being with preference-satisfaction and you've got a direct parallel, and the exact same problem.

Earlier I used the example of Fritzl, to which you responded by invoking the concept of universalisation. And while, as you said, it may usually be the case in these scenarios that the individual would choose not to be victimised themselves, this misses the entire point of the question. The question is asking: are actions such as those of Fritzl truly, intrinsically, unobjectionably wrong, and if so, what is the justification for such a judgement? So that even if, hypothetically, Fritzl would have allowed himself to be raped and abused if it meant being able to rape and abuse his daughter, AND his satisfaction greatly outweighed his daughters misery, his actions would still be considered morally despicable.

A simpler/more relevant example here would be: a religious extremist who kills himself along with an innocent victim in a suicide bomb. By what standard can this act be judged as truly morally evil? The furthest you can get is arguing that the victim's preferences to continue living outweigh that of the extremist to martyr himself. But again, this is just pure conjecture, and missing the point of the question.

The actions of Fritzl aren't intrinsically wrong (and surely you would agree, if you think nothing is right or wrong). If we concoct a wildly implausible scenario in some parallel universe where Fritzl cannot derive the same level of preference-satisfaction from any other action and his preference satisfaction outweighs the preference frustration of the victim, then it wouldn't be wrong. Essentially, he would be a utility monster.

The very fact that the victim's preference frustration outweighs the preference satisfaction of the criminal in cases in the real world makes the actions of criminals, in general, wrong. They are behaving in an illogical and incorrect manner. They're choosing the wrong way to live.

My argument doesn't fall into the same trap as Harris's because I am not making value-judgements about preference satisfaction. I'm not saying that preference-satisfaction is good, whereas Harris is saying that well-being is good. I'm saying that given certain facts about the universe, there is a logical and correct way to behave, and this way of living is indistinguishable from a system of morality given that it answers the question "how are we to live?" I'm also saying that asking "why act logically?" doesn't make sense as a question, and that we can therefore choose to live in a correct or incorrect fashion.

(I'm assuming that you agree with me that you can't achieve objective morality on a theistic worldview?)

(edited 8 years ago)

Reply 51

lolakirk

11

Original post by Gucci Mane.

There is no such thing as objective good or evil, and no action is intrinsically right or wrong. Good and evil are completely subjective, and for the most part what we consider good or evil is just a reflection of social attitudes at the current time. For example, pedophilia was accepted in Greek times (men would have relations with teenage boys below the age of 16), but now its considered completely abhorrent.

Discuss, rebutt, support, etc

No. The Greeks weren't pedophiles. Pedophilia is attraction to pre-pubescent children, aka children younger than thirteen. Greek men ****ed teenage boys, not children and we all know men still **** teenagers these days so nothing much has changed.

The pedos are those third world mutants who marry 9 year old children as we are speaking right now.

(edited 8 years ago)

Reply 52

Original post by viddy9

The actions of Fritzl aren't intrinsically wrong (and surely you would agree, if you think nothing is right or wrong). If we concoct a wildly implausible scenario in some parallel universe where Fritzl cannot derive the same level of preference-satisfaction from any other action and his preference satisfaction outweighs the preference frustration of the victim, then it wouldn't be wrong. Essentially, he would be a utility monster.

The very fact that the victim's preference frustration outweighs the preference satisfaction of the criminal in cases in the real world makes the actions of criminals, in general, wrong. They are behaving in an illogical and incorrect manner. They're choosing the wrong way to live.

My argument doesn't fall into the same trap as Harris's because I am not making value-judgements about preference satisfaction. I'm not saying that preference-satisfaction is good, whereas Harris is saying that well-being is good. I'm saying that given certain facts about the universe, there is a logical and correct way to behave, and this way of living is indistinguishable from a system of morality given that it answers the question "how are we to live?" I'm also saying that asking "why act logically?" doesn't make sense as a question, and that we can therefore choose to live in a correct or incorrect fashion.

(I'm assuming that you agree with me that you can't achieve objective morality on a theistic worldview?)

I think nothing is objectively right or wrong, in any pure sense of that word. The arguments for objective morality would posit that Fritzl's action are truly morally evil with no further considerations to speak of. As implausible as it may seem in a real world scenario, the fact that the disclaimer "as long as the preference-satisfaction of Fritzl doesn't outweigh his daughter's preference-frustration" exists, his actions were never truly objectively wrong, just incidentally wrong based on subjective human measures of pleasure/misery. There certainly is no evidence with which to claim that all actions which you deem immoral fit in neatly with this "weighting of preferences" assessment. From the other example, you couldn't possibly tell me with any certainty that there is a net loss of preference-satisfaction when a suicide bomber blows up himself and a victim, or that there is a net gain of preference-satisfaction if the bomber is prevented from carrying it out.

Harris's argument isn't that different from your own. He is also saying that creatures prefer to be in a state of well-being, and prefer not to be in a state of misery, so we should aim to maximise that which all creatures prefer. You are ultimately assigning a value to preferences and suggesting they are all that matter as far as morality is concerned, so if it were the case that an individual derived such immeasurable pleasure from the rape of a victim (unlikely, but not unthinkable), he should be freely allowed to do so. A true position of objective morality would deem the action of rape despicable no matter the situation, and the ontological grounding theists find for that is God.

As for your last question, I haven't looked too deeply into the question of God being a source of morality/counterarguments. I think theists could possibly be correct, particularly since the famous Euthyphro Dilemma has been refuted long ago (a third option exists which it fails to account for). So on the whole I think their reasoning is sound, but I may be wrong.

(edited 8 years ago)

Reply 53