Edexcel: From kaiser to fuhrer 1900-1945, his03/d exam friday 10th june 2016

I think it's almost a given that we can expect a 30 marker on either Golden Years or Final Solution so is anyone up for sharing some resources/revision they have on these two? I've gone over my notes so much it'd be nice to see some fresh resources. Thanks in advance

Does anyone have a plan or essay for opposition in Germany during WW2?

I'm struggling to answer 'To what extent did the Nazi regime face serious opposition within Germany during the years 1939-45?'

I don't know what to include in this essay, would you include why there was little opposition like the fact that it was a terror state? Or do you include why opposition failed like it had little support?

‘Towhat extent was the Final Solution caused by the chaos of WW2?’ The origin and motive of the Nazi decision,reached at the Wannsee Conference in 1942, to adopt the ‘Final Solution’ forthe systematic extermination of the Jewish population is a highly debatedtopic. Dawidowicz and other intentionalist historians argue that it was thedistinct desire of Hitler and long—term anti-Semitism in Germany which hadculminated in a planned escalation of policy to the point of extermination. Onthe other hand, Functionalist historians such as Schleunes and Mommsen suggestthat the primary cause of the decision lies in the chaos of the the SecondWorld War and the disorder of the government at the time, which shaped policyand forced the Nazi’s to seek a short-term solution to the increasing number ofJews under German control. This essay will argue a synthesis of both views, andthat while it is important to consider the role of long-term aspirations ofHitler in directing policy, the chaos of WW2 was, to a great extent, pivotal indetermining when and how the Final Solution evolved as it did. Intentionalist historians such as Flemingand Dawidowicz both see Hitler, and his long-term drive for the ‘elimination ofworld Jewery’, as the crucial cause of the Holocaust, and to an extent, thereis a level of evidence to suggest the role of this desire, instead of theimmediacy of war, to the development of the Final Solution. Hitler’santi-semitic belief, documented in ‘Mein Kampf’ in which he argued that WW1could have been won if 100,000 Jews had been killed, was a fundamental elementof Nazi policy. Dawidowicz comments that the Final Solution was caused as aresult of a planned ‘gradual escalation’ of this policy, from the conception ofideas in the 1920’s, shown in Mein Kampf and the Nazi’s 25-point program, toimplementation in the 1930’s, with incidents such as Kristallnacht, to theclimatic extermination of Jews in the 1940’s. Hitler’s 1939 ‘prophecy’ speechto the Reichstag, in which he declared that in the event of war the‘annihilation of Jews’ would be a ‘necessary consequence’ adds weight to intentionalist’sview that Hitler foresaw a Holocaust in some form. However, some have pointedout the comparison between the moderate anti-Semitism during the 1920’s andparts of the 1930’s, such as during the Berlin Olympics, as indicative ofHitler not being fully committed or able to pursue Jewish exterminationthroughout the period, instead demonstrating the decisive role of WW2 in providingthe opportunity to transform anti-Semitic sentiment from weak policy to one of extermination.While Dulger maintains that the Holocuast was inconceivable with Hitler’s willand authority driving the escalating policy, Goldhagen argues that the prevalenceof anti-Semitism amongst the German people and their complicity as Hitler’s‘willing executioners’ was, instead, a crucial trigger and driver in thedevelopment of the Final Solution, and thus the cause lay not only with Hitlerbut with the German population as a whole. The Orpo police, for example, playeda pivotal role in the administration of the early mass murder of Jews, withover 2,000 members in Warsaw, highlighting the willing role and ambition of thepublic in the implementation and development of the Final Solution. The increasein Nazi support to 37% of the electorate in July 1932, in the wake of itsideological developments such as the 25-point program’s ‘Point 4’ thatdenounced all Jews as non- Germans, could be seen to indicate this nation-wideanti-Semitic intention which was responsible for the Final Solution. However,as identified by Muhlberger, Nazi appeal was heterogeneous and was not only linkedto anti-Semitism, suggesting to an extent that this link is weak. Moreover, theearlier opposition towards the intensifying policies of exclusion and murderwithin Germany, such as the Catholic opposition to the 1939 Euthanasia program,which was subsequently stopped by the Nazis in response, indicate that generalextermination and anti-Semitism was not a fully entrenched part of societalopinion prior to the war. Lending weight, therefore, to the view, as argued byGotz Aly, that the chaos of war was crucial in ‘destroying all German ties totradition’, and providing a situation of disorder which enabled the extrememethods of the ‘Final Solution’ to become a possible option. Indicating that, whileintentioinalist’s argument of the role of long-term anti-Semitism and desiresfor a solution to the ‘Jewish question’ certainty played a part in facilitatingthe growth of an anti-Jewish policy, the need for a short-term resolution as aresult of the pressures of war was key to determining when and in what way the‘Final Solution’ developed. Conversely, functionalist historians suchas Mommsen argue that the Final Solution was ‘not based on a long-termprogram’, and arose instead purely out of the chaos of Nazi government administrationin the face of war and the failure of previous solutions. The invasion ofPoland in 1939, which increased the number of Jews under German control by 3million, and the USSR in 1941, significantly increased the pressure andresponsibility of the Jewish race in Germany, leading to an escalation inpolicy and requirement for solution. Schleunes had argued that the road towardsthe Final Solution was a ‘twisted one’ and did not follow a direct path fromintentional anti-Semitism, but evolved out of the changing circumstances anddifficulties of war. Originally, it was deportation, not extermination that wasthe preferred solution, with Madagascar and then later Siberia that wereproposed as relocation territory for the Jewish population, lending weight toSchleunes’s assertion that the Final Solution did not follow a planned andstraightforward escalation. It was the chaos of war that rendered these optionsvoid. Firstly, Madagascar wasruled out due to the nature and practicalities of ‘total war’, and the laterSiberia initiative in the face of renewed Russian resistance at Stalingrad in1942, the same year as the Wannsee Conference at which it is argued the ‘FinalSolution’ was devised. As Lee has pointed out, it was as a result of‘inadequacies instead of efficiencies’ in German policy that led to the FinalSolution, as evidenced in the Nazi attempt and failure to utilise the SS deathsquad, the Einsaztrgruppen, as the initial way to remove the Jewish populationin response to the unsuccessful outcome of relocation plans. It was the failure of these solutions due tothe constraints of war, and increasing number of Jews that were brought underGerman control through war that escalated Nazi policy to form the Final Solutionto resolve these pressures. Given thatthe Final Solution and method of extermination was only devised in 1942, thereis significant evidence to suggest it was the impediments and demands of warthat caused the Nazis to resort the Final Solution. The disorder of war alsofacilitated an increasingly chaotic Nazi government and the overlappinginstitutions led to the emergence of numerous groups in government vying forthe creation of a preferred solution to the Jewish question. Emerging on topwas the Himmler led SS, who expanded their influence and position of terror inGermany during the turmoil of war, and the well documented role they played inorchestrating the Final Solution lends further weight to the structuralist viewthat it was the emergence of competing extreme Nazi groups during the war, andnot before, that caused the frantic escalation towards the extermination of theJewish population in the form of the Final Solution. Structualists andIntentionalist are not mutually exclusive, however, and it appears that whilstthe Holocaust may have had the process of Functionalists, which includes thecrucial developments of the Second World War, it was inspired by the motive ofintentionalists. Most significantly,the synthesis lens of historiography has fused the notion of long-termanti-Semitism with the impact of WWII. While the motive for the ‘FinalSolution’ lies in the long-term anti-Semitism and desires of Hitler and theGerman people, the chaos of WW1 undoubtedly was the crucial trigger for theNazi government to want, and to be able to, seek an efficient and immediateresolution to the growing burden of the Jewish population. Although there isevidence, in Hitler’s earlier policies of exclusion, of the existence of adesire to remove the Jewish population, it is hard to envisage the FinalSolution taking place outside the realms of war, despite Hitler’s drive to‘eliminate world Jewry’. Unlike Fleming, who argues the path to the Finalsolution in Germany was a ‘direct one’, Tim Snyder has argued WWI was pivotalin that it exposed to Germany that Jews could be eradicated through murder,with no concern of the need to appease Allied Powers, as had been the casepreviously, such as the Berlin Olympics. Thus, World War One provided thecontext in which the anti-Semitic desire could be expressed in the form of theFinal Solution. This suggests that whilst the impetus of the Holocaust lieswith Hitler, the means in which it was carried out lies with a plethora ofpeople, organisations and factors in the chaos ensuing after 1939. In conclusion, thechaos of World War One was undoubtedly a significant element in the developmentof the Final Solution, due to the increasing pressure and changingcircumstances that provided a background for the possibility of Jewishextermination. While the long-term anti-Semitism, and a desire to remove Jews,of Hitler and the Jewish population suggest that, to an extent, the responsibilitylies with Hitler, the chaos of War was crucial to the Solution developing asand when it did. In the wake of the growing number of Jews and failure ofprevious methods during the War, the catastrophic method of extermination ofthe ‘Final Solution’ was facilitated as an immediate solution. Thus, to a greatextent, it was neither the clear intentions of Hitler, nor the chaos of War,that exclusively caused the Final Solution, but an amalgamation of both. Whilstthe Second World War crucially shaped the fate of Europe’s Jews, it did notdetermine it, as it was the pre-existing aim of Hitler that initiated itsescalation.
28/30

if anyone could post their weimer republic & golden year essays that would be marvelous

Thanks for sending this over. I've got a lot of stats for the final solution and know most of the main events just hadn't done an essay on it before. Greatly appreciated!

After the invasion of the USSR the KPD started to operate 89 underground cells to spread their ideas andencourage resistant and sabotage

Church Resistance increased significantly. Bishop Galen spoke out against the Euthanasia programme in 1940and archbishop Frings spoke out against the murder of PoWs

Youth resistance increase withthe emergence of the Edelweiss Pirates and the Swing youth

Student Resistance emerged withthe White Rose Movement

Elite and military resistanceincreased peaking in the failed Stauffenberg Bomb Plot of 1944 Ultimately though Propaganda/fear meant opposition didn't do very much to destabilise Nazi control.

Does anyone have a plan or essay for opposition in Germany during WW2?

I'm struggling to answer 'To what extent did the Nazi regime face serious opposition within Germany during the years 1939-45?'

I don't know what to include in this essay, would you include why there was little opposition like the fact that it was a terror state? Or do you include why opposition failed like it had little support?

‘Towhat extent was the Final Solution caused by the chaos of WW2?’ The origin and motive of the Nazi decision,reached at the Wannsee Conference in 1942, to adopt the ‘Final Solution’ forthe systematic extermination of the Jewish population is a highly debatedtopic. Dawidowicz and other intentionalist historians argue that it was thedistinct desire of Hitler and long—term anti-Semitism in Germany which hadculminated in a planned escalation of policy to the point of extermination. Onthe other hand, Functionalist historians such as Schleunes and Mommsen suggestthat the primary cause of the decision lies in the chaos of the the SecondWorld War and the disorder of the government at the time, which shaped policyand forced the Nazi’s to seek a short-term solution to the increasing number ofJews under German control. This essay will argue a synthesis of both views, andthat while it is important to consider the role of long-term aspirations ofHitler in directing policy, the chaos of WW2 was, to a great extent, pivotal indetermining when and how the Final Solution evolved as it did. Intentionalist historians such as Flemingand Dawidowicz both see Hitler, and his long-term drive for the ‘elimination ofworld Jewery’, as the crucial cause of the Holocaust, and to an extent, thereis a level of evidence to suggest the role of this desire, instead of theimmediacy of war, to the development of the Final Solution. Hitler’santi-semitic belief, documented in ‘Mein Kampf’ in which he argued that WW1could have been won if 100,000 Jews had been killed, was a fundamental elementof Nazi policy. Dawidowicz comments that the Final Solution was caused as aresult of a planned ‘gradual escalation’ of this policy, from the conception ofideas in the 1920’s, shown in Mein Kampf and the Nazi’s 25-point program, toimplementation in the 1930’s, with incidents such as Kristallnacht, to theclimatic extermination of Jews in the 1940’s. Hitler’s 1939 ‘prophecy’ speechto the Reichstag, in which he declared that in the event of war the‘annihilation of Jews’ would be a ‘necessary consequence’ adds weight to intentionalist’sview that Hitler foresaw a Holocaust in some form. However, some have pointedout the comparison between the moderate anti-Semitism during the 1920’s andparts of the 1930’s, such as during the Berlin Olympics, as indicative ofHitler not being fully committed or able to pursue Jewish exterminationthroughout the period, instead demonstrating the decisive role of WW2 in providingthe opportunity to transform anti-Semitic sentiment from weak policy to one of extermination.While Dulger maintains that the Holocuast was inconceivable with Hitler’s willand authority driving the escalating policy, Goldhagen argues that the prevalenceof anti-Semitism amongst the German people and their complicity as Hitler’s‘willing executioners’ was, instead, a crucial trigger and driver in thedevelopment of the Final Solution, and thus the cause lay not only with Hitlerbut with the German population as a whole. The Orpo police, for example, playeda pivotal role in the administration of the early mass murder of Jews, withover 2,000 members in Warsaw, highlighting the willing role and ambition of thepublic in the implementation and development of the Final Solution. The increasein Nazi support to 37% of the electorate in July 1932, in the wake of itsideological developments such as the 25-point program’s ‘Point 4’ thatdenounced all Jews as non- Germans, could be seen to indicate this nation-wideanti-Semitic intention which was responsible for the Final Solution. However,as identified by Muhlberger, Nazi appeal was heterogeneous and was not only linkedto anti-Semitism, suggesting to an extent that this link is weak. Moreover, theearlier opposition towards the intensifying policies of exclusion and murderwithin Germany, such as the Catholic opposition to the 1939 Euthanasia program,which was subsequently stopped by the Nazis in response, indicate that generalextermination and anti-Semitism was not a fully entrenched part of societalopinion prior to the war. Lending weight, therefore, to the view, as argued byGotz Aly, that the chaos of war was crucial in ‘destroying all German ties totradition’, and providing a situation of disorder which enabled the extrememethods of the ‘Final Solution’ to become a possible option. Indicating that, whileintentioinalist’s argument of the role of long-term anti-Semitism and desiresfor a solution to the ‘Jewish question’ certainty played a part in facilitatingthe growth of an anti-Jewish policy, the need for a short-term resolution as aresult of the pressures of war was key to determining when and in what way the‘Final Solution’ developed. Conversely, functionalist historians suchas Mommsen argue that the Final Solution was ‘not based on a long-termprogram’, and arose instead purely out of the chaos of Nazi government administrationin the face of war and the failure of previous solutions. The invasion ofPoland in 1939, which increased the number of Jews under German control by 3million, and the USSR in 1941, significantly increased the pressure andresponsibility of the Jewish race in Germany, leading to an escalation inpolicy and requirement for solution. Schleunes had argued that the road towardsthe Final Solution was a ‘twisted one’ and did not follow a direct path fromintentional anti-Semitism, but evolved out of the changing circumstances anddifficulties of war. Originally, it was deportation, not extermination that wasthe preferred solution, with Madagascar and then later Siberia that wereproposed as relocation territory for the Jewish population, lending weight toSchleunes’s assertion that the Final Solution did not follow a planned andstraightforward escalation. It was the chaos of war that rendered these optionsvoid. Firstly, Madagascar wasruled out due to the nature and practicalities of ‘total war’, and the laterSiberia initiative in the face of renewed Russian resistance at Stalingrad in1942, the same year as the Wannsee Conference at which it is argued the ‘FinalSolution’ was devised. As Lee has pointed out, it was as a result of‘inadequacies instead of efficiencies’ in German policy that led to the FinalSolution, as evidenced in the Nazi attempt and failure to utilise the SS deathsquad, the Einsaztrgruppen, as the initial way to remove the Jewish populationin response to the unsuccessful outcome of relocation plans. It was the failure of these solutions due tothe constraints of war, and increasing number of Jews that were brought underGerman control through war that escalated Nazi policy to form the Final Solutionto resolve these pressures. Given thatthe Final Solution and method of extermination was only devised in 1942, thereis significant evidence to suggest it was the impediments and demands of warthat caused the Nazis to resort the Final Solution. The disorder of war alsofacilitated an increasingly chaotic Nazi government and the overlappinginstitutions led to the emergence of numerous groups in government vying forthe creation of a preferred solution to the Jewish question. Emerging on topwas the Himmler led SS, who expanded their influence and position of terror inGermany during the turmoil of war, and the well documented role they played inorchestrating the Final Solution lends further weight to the structuralist viewthat it was the emergence of competing extreme Nazi groups during the war, andnot before, that caused the frantic escalation towards the extermination of theJewish population in the form of the Final Solution. Structualists andIntentionalist are not mutually exclusive, however, and it appears that whilstthe Holocaust may have had the process of Functionalists, which includes thecrucial developments of the Second World War, it was inspired by the motive ofintentionalists. Most significantly,the synthesis lens of historiography has fused the notion of long-termanti-Semitism with the impact of WWII. While the motive for the ‘FinalSolution’ lies in the long-term anti-Semitism and desires of Hitler and theGerman people, the chaos of WW1 undoubtedly was the crucial trigger for theNazi government to want, and to be able to, seek an efficient and immediateresolution to the growing burden of the Jewish population. Although there isevidence, in Hitler’s earlier policies of exclusion, of the existence of adesire to remove the Jewish population, it is hard to envisage the FinalSolution taking place outside the realms of war, despite Hitler’s drive to‘eliminate world Jewry’. Unlike Fleming, who argues the path to the Finalsolution in Germany was a ‘direct one’, Tim Snyder has argued WWI was pivotalin that it exposed to Germany that Jews could be eradicated through murder,with no concern of the need to appease Allied Powers, as had been the casepreviously, such as the Berlin Olympics. Thus, World War One provided thecontext in which the anti-Semitic desire could be expressed in the form of theFinal Solution. This suggests that whilst the impetus of the Holocaust lieswith Hitler, the means in which it was carried out lies with a plethora ofpeople, organisations and factors in the chaos ensuing after 1939. In conclusion, thechaos of World War One was undoubtedly a significant element in the developmentof the Final Solution, due to the increasing pressure and changingcircumstances that provided a background for the possibility of Jewishextermination. While the long-term anti-Semitism, and a desire to remove Jews,of Hitler and the Jewish population suggest that, to an extent, the responsibilitylies with Hitler, the chaos of War was crucial to the Solution developing asand when it did. In the wake of the growing number of Jews and failure ofprevious methods during the War, the catastrophic method of extermination ofthe ‘Final Solution’ was facilitated as an immediate solution. Thus, to a greatextent, it was neither the clear intentions of Hitler, nor the chaos of War,that exclusively caused the Final Solution, but an amalgamation of both. Whilstthe Second World War crucially shaped the fate of Europe’s Jews, it did notdetermine it, as it was the pre-existing aim of Hitler that initiated itsescalation.
28/30

if anyone could post their weimer republic & golden year essays that would be marvelous

What do people think is likely to come up? Only I only have tomorrow to revise for this exam as I have been focused on my psychology that I had today

Hi, if i got a low A last year and a middle B on my coursework, what raw mark/ums do i need in this exam to get an A overall?
Cheers

Where doe the strong or weak dictator arguement fit in Part A or B?

Also, How probable do you think this is to come up in some sort of way?

What kind of plan would we need for this :

To what extent can the years 1924-1929 be considered ones of political and economic stability?

So far I've got Stresseman and his policies ( helped hyperinflation), Government was in a much better place than before ( coalitions worked okay and also less uprisings against government and assassinations), then i said the government wasn't actually stable ( Treaty of Versaille had the potential to destroy the economy- and Germany was in severe debt- so the Youngs and Dawes plan didn't really help and also the reliance on the Americans was dangerous ' dancing on a volcano' and then i was going to do one on the Wall Street Crash.

Any other suggestions?

Talk about the collapse of the grande coalition, spd refusing to form govts with bourgeois parties
And culture
Also the freedom law against the young plan though it was unsuccessful as it only received 13% against the young plan.
Hope that helps