Debunking the 'missile defence' myth

The Regional/Theater BMDS demonstrates a limited capability to defend the U.S... areas of responsibility for small numbers of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats (1,000 to 4,000 km)

There is not a missile defence weapon in existence that could offer a reliable protection against a determined North Korean attack with multiple missiles, countermeasures and efforts to suppress the defences.

Even if the stars were aligned however, attempting to shoot down a non-threatening missile test would be hugely provocative act and supply invaluable data to adversaries… A miss, which is more likely than an intercept, would be embarrassing and undermine confidence in U.S. defenses. [Kingston Reif - director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association]

After North Korea's recent ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) test, General Lori Robinson (commander of NORAD) expressed "unwavering... confidence that we can fully defend the U.S. against this ballistic missile threat".

The United States's national missile defence system - the ground-based midcourse defence (GMD) - has cost $40 billion to date. Its record in intercept tests is woeful: it has only successfully intercepted (heavily role-played) targets in 10/18 tests since 1999. This poor record, barely over 50% success rate, is despite the heavily-scripted conditions in which its tests operate (e.g. knowing the flight-path and flight-location in advance, having radars and intercept systems set up in certain positions to maximise chances of success, and the target missiles having no countermeasures - e.g. decoys). The GMD only successfully intercepted a ICBM-type target in a test launch for the first time ever in May 2017. A 2016 assessment by the Pentagon indicated that the GMD had a "limited" capability of defending the U.S.:



There are currently 44 interceptors planned to be in force in the U.S. by the end of 2017. The Pentagon's current "shot doctrine" entails launching as many as 5 interceptors per ICBM target. Not only does this mean that the system could be easily overwhelmed, but at a cost of $70m per interceptor the system is also very cost-ineffective.

North Korea (etc) could easily defeat U.S. missile defence systems through the following measures:

1) Solid-fuel missiles - these reduce launch preparation time, thus reducing the time the U.S. has to identify hostile launches.
2) Mobile/SLBM - these also make hostile launches harder to identify by not requiring fixed launch sites.
3) Salvo launches - there is consensus among all levels of the military/intelligence communities that the current missile defence systems could easily be overwhelmed by multiple hostile missiles.
4) Decoys and countermeasures - distinguishing between a real and several 'decoy' warheads is something the GMD has not been tested in, and basic countermeasures have already been developed by North Korea.

Joe Cirincione (arms control expert) summarises the US's vulnerability:


Even if missile defence systems were credible, however, there would still be strong reasons not to attempt to intercept hostile missile launches:


To conclude, there is no such thing as a 'missile defence' system that has been proven to reliably operate in real-world conditions, thus the prevailing myth to the contrary creates a false sense of security. This myth will only continue to lead to 1) more billions spent on missile defence, and 2) bad decision-making re: foreign threats such as North Korea (based on a misguided confidence in missile defence capability).

This myth will only continue to lead to 1) more billions spent on missile defence

iron dome worked very well didnt it

Why are you talking about NORAD? Why do I care about the North American missile defence system?

Intercepting a bullet with a bullet isn't ever going to be easy, especially when you consider the sheer velocity that ICBMs travel at. Air & ground based direct energy weapons will surely have more success in the future.

The most effective way to stop the DPRK's nukes is destroy them on the ground using VLO assets like the B-2, F-35, F-22 etc as they currently don't have a sizable arsenal. However, the more time they have to construct more weapons then the harder this task will be.

There's a moment in the timeline of everything where that thing didn't work.

Later on in their timelines, they did work, because people kept on developing them, kept on making improvements.

Because the U.S. does not only protect its own territory, but its systems are also used to protect NATO (ergo Europe).

What about our long-range defenses, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, or GMD, interceptors based in Alaska and California? There the test record is even worse. Even under ideal conditions, where the defenders knew the time, direction and trajectory of the test target and all the details of its shape, temperature, etc., this system has only hit its target half of the time.

“The success rate of the GMD systems in flight intercept tests has been dismal,” says former director of operational testing for the Pentagon, Philip Coyle. Our chances of intercepting a threat missile, even under ideal conditions, are basically “at least as good as a coin toss,” says the former head of the Missile Defense Agency, retired Lt. Gen. Trey Obering.

Yet, reporters routinely use words like “shield” and “dome” to describe our supposed capability, giving us a false sense of security.

Just yesterday President Trump said in an interview "we have missiles that can knock out a missile, in the air, 97% of the time" in the context of the U.S.'s potential reaction to North Korea.

If you're relying on Trump accurately reporting the effectiveness of various arms of the military then you're probably going to get the wrong results.

General John Hyten, a USAF general, is the current Commander of the United States Strategic Command.

Just last month General Hyten said that if North Korea fired at missile at the U.S., "we will shoot it down".

So now it is the President of the United States, the Commander of NORAD and the Commander of the United States Strategic Command that are propagating a false sense of security in U.S. missile defence.

If you're relying on Trump accurately reporting the effectiveness of various arms of the military then you're probably going to get the wrong results.