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moral philosophy

which objections apply to moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism, from Humes Fork and Ayers verification, Humes belief moral judgements not motivation, Humes ought-is gap, mackies argument from relativity and queerness?
Reply 1
Go visit the SEP
Reply 2
Original post by FurtherMaths2020
which objections apply to moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism, from Humes Fork and Ayers verification, Humes belief moral judgements not motivation, Humes ought-is gap, mackies argument from relativity and queerness?


Well to be honest there isn't a strict answer regarding which criticises which, since Hume was around before these distinctions existed. However for the purposes of A level, these are the simplest pairings:

Hume's fork criticises naturalism.
Hume's theory of motivation criticises cognitivism.
Hume's is-ought gap criticises naturalism.
Ayer's verification principle criticises non-naturalism.
Mackie's arguments criticise non-naturalism.
Original post by Joe312
Well to be honest there isn't a strict answer regarding which criticises which, since Hume was around before these distinctions existed. However for the purposes of A level, these are the simplest pairings:

Hume's fork criticises naturalism.
Hume's theory of motivation criticises cognitivism.
Hume's is-ought gap criticises naturalism.
Ayer's verification principle criticises non-naturalism.
Mackie's arguments criticise non-naturalism.


Are you a teacher/student? I’ve done them like you’ve suggested already. :smile:
Original post by gjd800
Go visit the SEP

Does it provide arguments for and against?
Reply 5
Original post by FurtherMaths2020
Does it provide arguments for and against?

Go look and find out.
Original post by Joe312
Well to be honest there isn't a strict answer regarding which criticises which, since Hume was around before these distinctions existed. However for the purposes of A level, these are the simplest pairings:

Hume's fork criticises naturalism.
Hume's theory of motivation criticises cognitivism.
Hume's is-ought gap criticises naturalism.
Ayer's verification principle criticises non-naturalism.
Mackie's arguments criticise non-naturalism.

@krinyapajti
Original post by gjd800
Go visit the SEP

"Mackie’s argument from queerness depends on his understanding of what moral realism claims. In particular, he takes moral realism to be committed to the idea that moral properties are mind-independent and part of reality. Both these ideas need careful thought.

‘Reality’ here can’t mean simply the world as physics describes it space, time, matter and perhaps causal relations between them. But obviously, physics won’t tell us right from wrong. But why should we think that all reality is like physical reality? Moral properties, if they exist, aren’t going to be like physical properties. Even reductive naturalists think the most likely natural properties to be moral properties are psychological properties.

Are psychological states ‘part of reality’? They certainly exist whether one is happy or not is a psychological fact. In one sense, it is not a mind-independent fact, because it is a fact about a mind. In another sense, we can argue that it is a mind-independent fact, because whether you are happy or not is true or false independent of what anyone thinks."

how does that make sense - how is a fact about the mind different to a fact about whether you're happy or not?
(edited 4 years ago)
Original post by FurtherMaths2020
In one sense, it is not a mind-independent fact, because it is a fact about a mind. In another sense, we can argue that it is a mind-independent fact, because whether you are happy or not is true or false independent of what anyone thinks."

how does that make sense - how is a fact about the mind different to a fact about whether you're happy or not?

First of all, thanks for tagging me, that answer was really useful to me too! :smile:
And I think the bit I quoted just means that it's both mind-independent and not mind-independent depending on how you mean it: for one, it's mind-dependent (it can't exist without a mind, because it's a state of mind) but at the same time, it's mind-independent (at least to other people) because its truth doesn't depend on what others think (doesn't depend on their minds)

Tbh if you ask me I think the second bit is quite wonky as an argument, it's as if they're disagreeing with the claim that mind-dependent objects depend on all minds, which, who is claiming that? Just because it's mind independent to other people, it doesn't mean it's objectively mind-independent. Why would we particularly consider other people's perspectives and that be our deciding factor? It's mind-dependent because it can't exist without a mind, IMO. But i'm just a student, so this is just me venting.
Original post by krinyapajti
First of all, thanks for tagging me, that answer was really useful to me too! :smile:
And I think the bit I quoted just means that it's both mind-independent and not mind-independent depending on how you mean it: for one, it's mind-dependent (it can't exist without a mind, because it's a state of mind) but at the same time, it's mind-independent (at least to other people) because its truth doesn't depend on what others think (doesn't depend on their minds)

Tbh if you ask me I think the second bit is quite wonky as an argument, it's as if they're disagreeing with the claim that mind-dependent objects depend on all minds, which, who is claiming that? Just because it's mind independent to other people, it doesn't mean it's objectively mind-independent. Why would we particularly consider other people's perspectives and that be our deciding factor? It's mind-dependent because it can't exist without a mind, IMO. But i'm just a student, so this is just me venting.


Original post by gjd800
Go look and find out.


Original post by Joe312
Well to be honest there isn't a strict answer regarding which criticises which, since Hume was around before these distinctions existed. However for the purposes of A level, these are the simplest pairings:

Hume's fork criticises naturalism.
Hume's theory of motivation criticises cognitivism.
Hume's is-ought gap criticises naturalism.
Ayer's verification principle criticises non-naturalism.
Mackie's arguments criticise non-naturalism.


cool, also, does Foot argue against Kant's idea that morality is a system of categorical imperatives, by arguing we commonly contrast moral judgments with hypothetical imperatives - which is about use of language. She also uses an example of a non-hypothetical imperative via etiquette, to prove Kant is wrong that morality is a system of categorical imperatives in the same sense he talks about it??????????

or are they in favour of Kant because they show what you should ought to do, independent of what you want?
(edited 4 years ago)
Original post by FurtherMaths2020
cool, also, does Foot argue against Kant's idea that morality is a system of categorical imperatives, by arguing we commonly contrast moral judgments with hypothetical imperatives - which is about use of language. She also uses an example of a non-hypothetical imperative via etiquette, to prove Kant is wrong that morality is a system of categorical imperatives in the same sense he talks about it??????????

or are they in favour of Kant because they show what you should ought to do, independent of what you want?


No, she agrees/concedes that we commonly contrast moral judgements with hypothetical imperatives but then says that this isn't enough to show that morality is categorical in the sense Kant means it, it just shows that morality is non-hypothetical (and gives the example of the rules of a club to support this)

She says that even though morality is non-hypothetical, this doesn't mean that it gives everyone a reason to act according to it (which is what Kant believes) Kant argues that being immoral is to be irrational, but she says this isn't true; being irrational would involve someone disregarding a rule which they've previously agreed to, which not everyone does. (Like with the club - if you don't like the club rules, don't join or if you don't like what the etiquette says, move to a country where it's different) (i believe what she's trying to say here is that Kant's not shown that morality is not different in its nature to etiquette or club rules, so why can't someone opt out of morality too, just by not agreeing to its rules in the first place? Not sure about this though) she argues that our view on morality and that it applies to everyone and that you must follow it, comes from culture instead, because it's much more strictly enforced than other things like etiquette, so we take it much more seriously.
Original post by krinyapajti
No, she agrees/concedes that we commonly contrast moral judgements with hypothetical imperatives but then says that this isn't enough to show that morality is categorical in the sense Kant means it, it just shows that morality is non-hypothetical (and gives the example of the rules of a club to support this)

She says that even though morality is non-hypothetical, this doesn't mean that it gives everyone a reason to act according to it (which is what Kant believes) Kant argues that being immoral is to be irrational, but she says this isn't true; being irrational would involve someone disregarding a rule which they've previously agreed to, which not everyone does. (Like with the club - if you don't like the club rules, don't join or if you don't like what the etiquette says, move to a country where it's different) (i believe what she's trying to say here is that Kant's not shown that morality is not different in its nature to etiquette or club rules, so why can't someone opt out of morality too, just by not agreeing to its rules in the first place? Not sure about this though) she argues that our view on morality and that it applies to everyone and that you must follow it, comes from culture instead, because it's much more strictly enforced than other things like etiquette, so we take it much more seriously.

what's the difference between non-hypothetical, hypothetical and categorical imperatives?

ok, she also says being motivated by reasons (like caring) and not just reason, are still moral acts?
Original post by krinyapajti
No, she agrees/concedes that we commonly contrast moral judgements with hypothetical imperatives but then says that this isn't enough to show that morality is categorical in the sense Kant means it, it just shows that morality is non-hypothetical (and gives the example of the rules of a club to support this)

She says that even though morality is non-hypothetical, this doesn't mean that it gives everyone a reason to act according to it (which is what Kant believes) Kant argues that being immoral is to be irrational, but she says this isn't true; being irrational would involve someone disregarding a rule which they've previously agreed to, which not everyone does. (Like with the club - if you don't like the club rules, don't join or if you don't like what the etiquette says, move to a country where it's different) (i believe what she's trying to say here is that Kant's not shown that morality is not different in its nature to etiquette or club rules, so why can't someone opt out of morality too, just by not agreeing to its rules in the first place? Not sure about this though) she argues that our view on morality and that it applies to everyone and that you must follow it, comes from culture instead, because it's much more strictly enforced than other things like etiquette, so we take it much more seriously.


Just watched this https://youtu.be/9IpeX-JX-mY

And it makes more sense, thanks :smile:
Original post by FurtherMaths2020
Just watched this https://youtu.be/9IpeX-JX-mY

And it makes more sense, thanks :smile:

That's so funny, I'd literally just found this and was halfway through it when I came on here and saw your post!

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