This is a WJEC essay so it is out of 30 marks in 45 minutes. I wrote it under exam conditions but it wasn’t done in an actual exam. My teacher placed it in the top band (27-30).
To what extent did American governments pursue a consistent approach to foreign policy in the period from 1898 to 1941? [30]
Between 1898 and 1941, the American governments’ approaches to foreign policy often differed in certain aspects. However, the foundations of the United States inherently favour individualism and separation from European issues, and the discomfort in dealing with certain foreign issues is present at different points throughout the period. It could be argued that governments consistently tried to manipulate previous precedent to fit whatever foreign policy they felt was necessary at the time, though the re-emergence of established ideas such as the Monroe Doctrine and neutrality may suggest a genuine desire to uphold the principles set out by George Washington and the original constitution of the United States.
Possibly the most widely applied aspect of foreign policy throughout the period was the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which broadly stated that America had the right to interfere with situations within its ‘sphere of influence’. US interference in Latin America was considerably consistent between the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the 1940s, with governments attempting to gain control of both economic and political aspects of its neighbouring countries. While it is widely considered true that the explosion of the USS Maine at a Havana port triggered the American declaration of war on Spain, historians such as Carl Degler argue that US foreign policy at this time was motivated by economic factors such as an interest in Cuban sugar. Being geographically close to the US, it is unsurprising that the McKinley administration emphasised the Monroe Doctrine in fighting over Cuba. This early use of the Monroe Doctrine also exemplifies the way in which America sought to extend its sphere of influence, gaining control of Guantanamo Bay, the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam. It could be argued that the classification of America’s ‘sphere of influence’ was not completely consistent with geographical location like the McKinley administration argued because it slowly spread to the Far East as economic interests in China arose. Wanting to protect US economic interests in China, the US frequently used the fact that many US companies had interests in China to argue that it was within its sphere of influence. Concerns of Japanese imperialism in China are present in foreign policy as early as Theodore Roosevelt’s 1908 Root-Takahira Agreement, but also spread to the build up to WWII with the 1921 Washington Conference where both the US and Japan promised to limit their naval tonnage. This manipulation of the Monroe Doctrine to suit economic interests may be fairly consistent between 1898 and 1941, but the fact that the degree of manipulation changed to suit the needs of the US suggests that its application was not completely consistent.
Following the First World War, there was a marked change in relations with Latin American countries in comparison to earlier selfish policies. Earlier ‘big stick’ attitudes that supported the Roosevelt Corollary to interfere in military unrest, such as the 1903 intervention in Panama which led to the acquisition of land to build the Panama Canal, seemed to lesson from Wilson’s presidency onwards. Starting with the building of highways, bridges and hospitals throughout Latin America in 1912, US benevolence in Latin America culminated in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1930s ‘Good Neighbour’ policy. It could be argued that this policy was a reversion along the more original lines of the Monroe Doctrine, with the US monitoring situations and helping where it could, with little military interference. US investment in Latin America doubled from $1.5 billion in 1924 to $3 billion in 1929 due to the spread of manufacturers such as General Motors to countries such as Argentina and Brazil. Furthermore, 10 trade treaties had been signed with Latin American countries by 1938 The State Department hired economists such as Edward Kemmer to create economic plans for Latin American countries, which suggests that the economic motive for using the Monroe Doctrine was still present in the newer ‘Good Neighbour’ policy. Nevertheless, political involvement in Latin America somewhat decreased as the government paid Colombia $25 million as compensation for its earlier interference in Panama and US troops were withdrawn from Nicaragua in 1925, though 5000 were sent back a year later.
Despite the founding of the United States being inherently anti-imperialistic, less traditional forms of imperialism were reasonably consistent in US foreign policy between 1898 and 1941. Often, US imperialism was intrinsically interwoven with the justification of the Monroe Doctrine, such as progressive imperialism during the Spanish-American War that challenged the horrible conditions Cubans were subjected to, but want for economic-growth underpinned most other forms of imperialism. Preclusive imperialism was quite consistent, and George Herring argues that America held a key position in the 20th century fight between colonists and the colonised. The US practically decimated the Spanish Empire following the 1898 war, and it could be argued that its main adversary during the period 1898 to 1941 was the Japanese Empire. The location of both Japan and the American West Coast on the Pacific Ocean caused significant tension as America sought to expand westwards and Japan sought to expand eastwards. Following the end of the American Frontier, US policy was partially driven by expansionism elsewhere. The 1898 annexation of Hawaii exemplifies US naval interest in the Pacific, and the tension between the two nations came to logger-heads with the December 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbour by Japan as the Asian country sought to control the Pacific. While the Monroe Doctrine was often used to justify interference in China, one could suggest that US policy regarding China was a form of preclusive imperialism that spanned the period. Furthermore, the US stance in regard to China did not significantly change as the various governments all sought to protect US interests. Wanting to stay ahead of Japan, the US tried to prevent a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1922, and the Four Power Treaty of the same year saw the US and Japan agreeing to respect each other’s interests in China and the Chinese Open Door Policy. After the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Congress limited US oil supplies for Japan and eventually froze all Japanese assets in the US in 1941, which demonstrates the well-established importance of China in US foreign policy.
Despite the extensive interference of the US in other countries between 1898 and 1941, the drive to remain neutral in European affairs was a common factor in US foreign policy and a matter of extreme ridicule when it came to presidential and congressional elections. Whether this policy of neutrality was successful is questionable considering the United States fought in two world wars which originated in Europe. Reluctance to join European wars can be seen in US foreign policy where the US only joined after much of the fighting had taken place. Wilsonianism during the First World War tried to model foreign policy on the basis that Christianity rejected war, yet Kennedy argues that Wilson’s moralistic imperialism was probably the main factor in the US declaring war on Germany in April 1917. Consistent pro-British and anti-German sentiments in the general American population are evident around both World Wars, yet the governments had foreign trade policies such as ‘cash and carry’ that meant that the US could trade with all belligerents during the war. Despite this, US foreign policy tended to favour the Allied forces before American entry into war, with US trade with the Allies standing at $3.2 billion in 1916, which was ten times that of the Central Powers. In a similar fashion, the US arguably acted as the ‘Arsenal of Democracy’ during WWII by providing weapons to the Allies with the ‘Lend-Lease’ scheme and Atlantic Charter in late 1941. This is a marked inconsistency under Roosevelt because between 1935 and 1941 Congress had passed a series of five Neutrality Acts that sought to keep America out of the brewing European conflict. However, historians such as Borgan argue that the actions of Germany with unrestricted submarine warfare during WWI and the attack on Pearl Harbour by Japan in WWII forced the US to change its foreign policy away from neutrality, suggesting that there was still consistency in the idealisation of neutrality.
One could argue that attitudes towards neutrality and individualism saw the most significant differences between Democratic and Republican administrations. The World Wars were conducted under Democratic presidents, and a certain moralistic trend can be seen in the motivations of both. Following WWII, Wilson published his 14 Points, which outlined principles of European self-determination and sought to set up the League of Nations. Despite founding the League of Nations, Congress did not ratify either US membership or the Treaty of Versailles because 37 Republican senators signed a document against it and a ⅔ majority was made impossible by this. The American people were probably against the idea of such extensive US involvement in Europe, which led to the Republican Harding’s defeat of Wilson in the 1920 Presidential Election. Attitudes towards Europe during the Republican-dominated 1920s were embodied in a ‘Return to Normalcy’ policy that followed independent internationalism. Most of America’s involvement in Europe was economically-driven during this time rather than politically motivated with the 1924 Dawes Plan and the 1929 Young Plan aiming to regulate German reparation payments so that the Allies could pay their war debts to the US. However, there is some consistency with Democratic policy in that Harding and Coolidge sought to ensure war was avoided; the 1921 Washington Disarmament Conference and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact were ratified by the Senate because they promised less interference rather than the moral imperialism that Wilson had sought.
American foreign policy between 1898 and 1941 was fairly consistent in its aims, though its execution varied somewhat depending on the international situations of the times. The Monroe Doctrine was used consistently to justify US interference in Latin America, even though the aggression of policy lessened as the US utilised more moralistic imperialism. Preclusive imperialism in the Far East was also fairly consistent due to vested interests in the Chinese economy, and the consideration of Japan as a possible threat is seen consistently between 1918 and 1941. Despite Democratic attempts to spread American morals in Europe, Congress usually managed to adhere to policies of neutrality. While neutrality sometimes wavered, the policy of refraining from battle until it was necessary was considerably consistent throughout the period.