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The problem of evil.

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Reply 100
This is back to front.

The problem is really [2]. If there is a possible world whereby a Theistic God and evil can exist, then we don't need the rest of the argument - one can simply state:

There is a possible world whereby a Theistic God and evil both exist.

The Problem of Evil in logical form isn't quibbling about whether God can actualize any possible world, or whether God knows of all possible worlds (or at least a subset including this solution) but rather whether a possible world like this exists. If it does, the lPoE fails, if not, then the lPoE carries, and God doesn't exist. At the moment, presuming libertarian free will, there is pretty good reason for thinking that such a possible world can exist (and I think, in fact, showing a given theodicy to be possible is a back-of-the-envelope exercise and can be extended to non-libertarian ideas of free will.)

Of course, there is a rather large gap between possibility and credibility (alien landings, scientology, etc.) Thus what really needs to be done for PoE variants is to give a credible answer, as opposed to a merely possible one. I don't really think credibility has been established anything like as firmly, although it is still a matter of considerable debate. For my part, I think it carries pretty strongly - that evil exists is pretty good grounds to reject Theism, other things notwithstanding, and I have yet to see a credible (still less convincing) reason to adjust that judgement.
Reply 101
GregoryJL
This is back to front.

The problem is really [2]. If there is a possible world whereby a Theistic God and evil can exist, then we don't need the rest of the argument - one can simply state:

There is a possible world whereby a Theistic God and evil both exist.

The Problem of Evil in logical form isn't quibbling about whether God can actualize any possible world, or whether God knows of all possible worlds (or at least a subset including this solution) but rather whether a possible world like this exists. If it does, the lPoE fails, if not, then the lPoE carries, and God doesn't exist. At the moment, presuming libertarian free will, there is pretty good reason for thinking that such a possible world can exist (and I think, in fact, showing a given theodicy to be possible is a back-of-the-envelope exercise and can be extended to non-libertarian ideas of free will.)

Of course, there is a rather large gap between possibility and credibility (alien landings, scientology, etc.) Thus what really needs to be done for PoE variants is to give a credible answer, as opposed to a merely possible one. I don't really think credibility has been established anything like as firmly, although it is still a matter of considerable debate. For my part, I think it carries pretty strongly - that evil exists is pretty good grounds to reject Theism, other things notwithstanding, and I have yet to see a credible (still less convincing) reason to adjust that judgement.

In order to defeat the lPoE though, it is not necessary to show that a possible world is plausible. Or rather, a plausible response to the lPoE is merely one that shows that there is a possible world in which God and evil coexist. So, in the context of the lPoE credible answers have been given.

Perhaps credible answers have not been given to the ePoE. But that's quite a different beast.
Reply 102
RawJoh1
In order to defeat the lPoE though, it is not necessary to show that a possible world is plausible. Or rather, a plausible response to the lPoE is merely one that shows that there is a possible world in which God and evil coexist. So, in the context of the lPoE credible answers have been given.

Perhaps credible answers have not been given to the ePoE. But that's quite a different beast.


I concur entirely - I'm sorry for not being clear. Logical problems of Evil are satisfactorily responded to by showing a suitable possible world. However, the more general beast of the problem of Evil (as I hope one of the larger aspects of philosophy of religion was centered around an argument which is obviously wrong) isn't so defeated.

Harking back a month or few ago, I confess I'm confused by your earlier claim that a theodicy which doesn't presuppose libertarian free will 'couldn't escape Mackie'. I would have thought any theodicy, providing we can't show it to be necessary false (or meaningless, etc.) would carry in providing a possible world solution. Even the idea of 'second order goods', which Mackie attacks, could still provide a solution if it just so happens that all our observed evils will indeed give second order goods, but our first order goods don't give second order evils. Am I missing something?
RawJoh1

Why?

4. God is capable of creating a situation where an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omniscient God, and suffering can coexist.
5. Therefore it is possible that an all loving, all knowing, all powerful God can exist, despite the existence of suffering.

4 entails 5 (or at least, it looks like pretty logically impeccable inference to me). If X is a creatable world, then it is possible that God creates it. If it is possible for God to create a world, it's possible for that world to exist.


Right, I meant that 3 implies 4. Sleepy, I guess.
Reply 104
GregoryJL
I concur entirely - I'm sorry for not being clear. Logical problems of Evil are satisfactorily responded to by showing a suitable possible world. However, the more general beast of the problem of Evil (as I hope one of the larger aspects of philosophy of religion was centered around an argument which is obviously wrong) isn't so defeated.

Interestingly, up until Plantinga, many atheist philosophers thought that the lPoE was a pretty bulletproof refutation of theism. Mackie, for instance, certainly takes it to be a demonstrative proof of atheism.
GregoryJL
Harking back a month or few ago, I confess I'm confused by your earlier claim that a theodicy which doesn't presuppose libertarian free will 'couldn't escape Mackie'. I would have thought any theodicy, providing we can't show it to be necessary false (or meaningless, etc.) would carry in providing a possible world solution. Even the idea of 'second order goods', which Mackie attacks, could still provide a solution if it just so happens that all our observed evils will indeed give second order goods, but our first order goods don't give second order evils. Am I missing something?

I was probably wrong when I said that.

Mackie's argument works (if it does) even if we have libertarian free-will. That's partly why it's such a good argument against a traditional free-will defence.

I'm not so knowledgeable about second-order goods defences, but what you've said seems right. A problem though is that with (at least some) second-order goods defences, the theist commits himself to often controversial ethical systems. Often, the theist ends up looking like a consequentialist (as if God's some sort of divine knob twiddler with a felicific calculator), and that's always a bad thing since consequentialism's a load of ****.

Plantinga's FWD is far, far better, since it doesn't get hung up on controversial ethical premises.

As for the ePoE - if I'm honest I think the distinction between demonstrative and non-demonstrative arguments is often a red herring. ePoEs often collapse into lPoEs of sorts (though the conclusion will be "it is irrational to believe that God exists" or "the evidence points to God not existing" rather than "God does not exist"). But still, I think those more modest conclusions are very hard to establish, and as far as I know they haven't been done satisfactorily.
Reply 105
The Bachelor
Right, I meant that 3 implies 4. Sleepy, I guess.

Ah yes. I agree then.
Reply 106
When we start suspending the normal rules that logic follows by saying "well God can get around logic somehow because he's omnipotent" is there any point in continuing discussion of God?

More specifically, how can any religion prepared to state that our logic is useless when discussing God then begin to imply things like there being a need to worship him. There being any sense of a "need", to know what "God" is at all, let alone in what way he can "love" us seems meaningless. If language has such a radically different meaning when referring to God that logic cannot be applied then surely no language to be applied. Why is the statement "God loves us" any more meaningful that "God fillibustub bloef"?

And I still maintain that 43% of people having no faith means 57% of people having some sort of faith.
Reply 107
DrunkHamster
I actually think that for all the effort that religious philosophers have (for obvious reasons) put into attempting to refute the problem, it really is still quite straightforward. I guess the easiest way to put it is the following argument:

1) If God exists, God is omnipotent, omniscient and all-loving.
2) If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
3) If God is omniscient, then God is aware of all evil.
4) If God is all loving, then God desires to eliminate all evil.
5) If God has the power to eliminate all evil, is aware of all evil, and desires to eliminate all evil then evil cannot exist
6) Evil exists
C) Therefore God doesn't exist

Which is valid and, I think, has true premises. I imagine you'd dispute 2 and maybe 4, but I'm interested to hear your precise response.


As long as (1) holds, depending on how one wished to define God, I agree with the following logic entirely. Of any disagreements I've seen over that logic in the past, they're nothing more than two people playing the semantics game...
Reply 108
monty1618
As long as (1) holds, depending on how one wished to define God, I agree with the following logic entirely. Of any disagreements I've seen over that logic in the past, they're nothing more than two people playing the semantics game...

Like I said before. Premise 2 can be disputed, as can 4 (4 actually begs the question at issue - it rules out that God can have a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil. That shouldn't be ruled out without an argument to back it up).
Reply 109
You still need to define what evil is before you can debate it!
Reply 110
CJ99
You still need to define what evil is before you can debate it!

In the context of the PoE, it's perfectly clear what evil is. If you don't like the word 'evil', use "suffering of conscious agents" instead.
Reply 111
RawJoh1
In the context of the PoE, it's perfectly clear what evil is. If you don't like the word 'evil', use "suffering of conscious agents" instead.


If it is perfectly clear give me a definition!
Reply 112
CJ99
If it is perfectly clear give me a definition!

This is not an exhaustive definition, but the person pressing the problem of evil would say that human suffering is evil. Now, maybe they're wrong - but that's (part of) what they mean when they talk about evil in the context of the problem of evil.
Reply 113
RawJoh1
This is not an exhaustive definition, but the person pressing the problem of evil would say that human suffering is evil. Now, maybe they're wrong - but that's (part of) what they mean when they talk about evil in the context of the problem of evil.


Part of? See there seems to be no definative definition which supports my argument that evil is an opinion, generally that of the majority.
Reply 114
CJ99
Part of? See there seems to be no definative definition which supports my argument that evil is an opinion, generally that of the majority.

When I say "part of" I mean that the entailment only runs one way. So, the crudest versions of the problem of evil would say that human suffering is evil. So, however, it doesn't follow from that that if X is evil, then X is human suffering. There isn't a biconditional.

The subjectivist thought that evil is an opinion is irrelevant to the problem of evil. This is because it's an attack on the theistic position, and the interlocutors assume that the theist is right that there are objective moral truths (that things really are evil, good etc).

Now, lots of people don't think there are objective moral truths. They're welcome to that view. But, if they want to talk about the problem of evil, then they must assume for the purposes of argument that there are moral truths of some form or another. That's just how the debate works.
Reply 115
RawJoh1
When I say "part of" I mean that the entailment only runs one way. So, the crudest versions of the problem of evil would say that human suffering is evil. So, however, it doesn't follow from that that if X is evil, then X is human suffering. There isn't a biconditional.

The subjectivist thought that evil is an opinion is irrelevant to the problem of evil. This is because it's an attack on the theistic position, and the interlocutors assume that the theist is right that there are objective moral truths (that things really are evil, good etc).

Now, lots of people don't think there are objective moral truths. They're welcome to that view. But, if they want to talk about the problem of evil, then they must assume for the purposes of argument that there are moral truths of some form or another. That's just how the debate works.


The OP didn't actually specify any particular problem. And since the way evil is percieved is arguably a problem with evil i think its perfectly fair to debate whether anything actually is unconditionaly evil, as surely that one of the problems of evil, that what is considered evil changes depending on personal view.
Reply 116
CJ99
The OP didn't actually specify any particular problem. And since the way evil is percieved is arguably a problem with evil i think its perfectly fair to debate whether anything actually is unconditionaly evil, as surely that one of the problems of evil, that what is considered evil changes depending on personal view.

The Problem of Evil is a particular (set of) problem(s) in the philosophy of religion. It is these problems that the OP refers to.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/
RawJoh1
The Problem of Evil is a particular (set of) problem(s) in the philosophy of religion. It is these problems that the OP refers to.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/


This is kind of unrelated, but I'm interested to hear what you think. If miracles do happen, as has been claimed by quite a few (thinking!) Christians in their time, do you think this undermines claims of the goodness of God? For instance, I talked to a friend of mine (you might well know her - I think she's quite active in the Christian crowd at Oxford) who swears blind that when she was in Africa, she witnessed a severely ill child miraculously get up, healed, saying 'Jesu' repeatedly (despite having never heard the word before). What's more, she thinks that this is a wondrous thing. What I pointed out is this: if God really did heal the child, it is a fortiori clearly within his power to heal children - and what's more, he is clearly prepared to do so. That means that in the vast, vast majority of cases where children are ill and do not recover miraculously, God has actively chosen not to heal them. And it's plausibly true that any moral agent that has the ability to end suffering with no or minimal personal cost has the obligation to do so. Now I understand you can maintain that there must be a hidden cost in the case of all these other kids that are not saved and that this is why God is not intervening, but is this really plausible?
Reply 118
DrunkHamster
This is kind of unrelated, but I'm interested to hear what you think. If miracles do happen, as has been claimed by quite a few (thinking!) Christians in their time, do you think this undermines claims of the goodness of God? For instance, I talked to a friend of mine (you might well know her - I think she's quite active in the Christian crowd at Oxford) who swears blind that when she was in Africa, she witnessed a severely ill child miraculously get up, healed, saying 'Jesu' repeatedly (despite having never heard the word before). What's more, she thinks that this is a wondrous thing. What I pointed out is this: if God really did heal the child, it is a fortiori clearly within his power to heal children - and what's more, he is clearly prepared to do so. That means that in the vast, vast majority of cases where children are ill and do not recover miraculously, God has actively chosen not to heal them. And it's plausibly true that any moral agent that has the ability to end suffering with no or minimal personal cost has the obligation to do so. Now I understand you can maintain that there must be a hidden cost in the case of all these other kids that are not saved and that this is why God is not intervening, but is this really plausible?

Well, I'm not sure about that particular case, but let's grant it as a miracle. I guess it's logically possible that God have a morally sufficient reason for saving that child and that another, so that's the logical problem of evil done.

Now onto the evidential problem - there's a famous paper by William Rowe which brings our attention to "pointless" suffering - suffering which appears to serve no greater good etc.
http://philosophy.endpovertytoday.com/readings/theology/problemofevil7.pdf

So, your question is a bit like Rowe's - given that there seems to be lots of pointless suffering, and God obviously doesn't intervene to prevent it - does this allow us to conclude that God doesn't exist?

I know far more about the logical problem of evil than the evidential one, so I don't have any decent replies to hand. There's a good paper though by Stephen Wykstra called "the Humean objection to evidential arguments from suffering" which you'll be able to get online. Wykstra argues that we don't have the relevant epistemic access to make the sort of judgements that Rowe needs. I imagine that that's the kind of line I would try to pursue.
Reply 119
RawJoh1
Like I said before. Premise 2 can be disputed, as can 4 (4 actually begs the question at issue - it rules out that God can have a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil. That shouldn't be ruled out without an argument to back it up).


1) If God exists, God is omnipotent, omniscient and all-loving.
2) If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
3) If God is omniscient, then God is aware of all evil.
4) If God is all loving, then God desires to eliminate all evil.
5) If God has the power to eliminate all evil, is aware of all evil, and desires to eliminate all evil then evil cannot exist
6) Evil exists
C) Therefore God doesn't exist

I won't even comment on (2) being disputed because I've never put an ounce of weight into the dispute.

As for (4) being disputed by God having a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil, it's a simple question: Does God not also have the power to prevent a situation from reaching the point where there is a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil?

Again, I chalk it up as semantics, with 'all' being the word that receives the picky plays here and there.

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