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    (Original post by The Bachelor)
    That 4 implies 5 is immediately contentious.
    How so?

    NB 1 & 2, and 3 & 4, are separate lines that both lead to 5.
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    boink, 1 doesn't imply 2 either then. They only imply each other if such a thing is logically possible (a la Carol quote above).

    And unless one uses the naive version of logic (anything that you can put in words goes; but this leads to comments about barbers who shave the head of everyone who doesn't shave their own head), one needs to show that things are logically consistent. To be sure, most of us use the naive version anyway, because it's just so intuitive, but with a few restrictions. The main restriction is that when something comes up that's contentious, one needs to show that it is actually consistent.
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    (Original post by The Bachelor)
    boink, 1 doesn't imply 2 either then. They only imply each other if such a thing is logically possible (a la Carol quote above).

    And unless one uses the naive version of logic (anything that you can put in words goes; but this leads to comments about barbers who shave the head of everyone who doesn't shave their own head), one needs to show that things are logically consistent. To be sure, most of us use the naive version anyway, because it's just so intuitive, but with a few restrictions. The main restriction is that when something comes up that's contentious, one needs to show that it is actually consistent.
    The argument then I suppose moves onto whether the definition of God is that he is transcendent enough to be above logic. A logical paradox to try and disprove God would then be irrelevant, as we would be enforcing rules of logic to a God that is not bound by the rules of logic.
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    (Original post by Calumcalum)
    The argument then I suppose moves onto whether the definition of God is that he is transcendent enough to be above logic. A logical paradox to try and disprove God would then be irrelevant, as we would be enforcing rules of logic to a God that is not bound by the rules of logic.
    Then your Lewis Carol quote no longer really applies.
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    (Original post by The Bachelor)
    Then your Lewis Carol quote no longer really applies.
    And neither does the question which it answered.
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    (Original post by The Bachelor)
    Can God create a rock so heavy he himself could not lift it?
    I don't think there's such a thing as a rock that so heavy that God cannot lift it. It is logically impossible for that sort of thing to exist, and that God cannot do the logically impossible is no real limit on His omnipotence.
    (Original post by The Bachelor)
    That 4 implies 5 is immediately contentious.
    Why?

    4. God is capable of creating a situation where an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omniscient God, and suffering can coexist.
    5. Therefore it is possible that an all loving, all knowing, all powerful God can exist, despite the existence of suffering.

    4 entails 5 (or at least, it looks like pretty logically impeccable inference to me). If X is a creatable world, then it is possible that God creates it. If it is possible for God to create a world, it's possible for that world to exist.
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    This is back to front.

    The problem is really [2]. If there is a possible world whereby a Theistic God and evil can exist, then we don't need the rest of the argument - one can simply state:

    There is a possible world whereby a Theistic God and evil both exist.

    The Problem of Evil in logical form isn't quibbling about whether God can actualize any possible world, or whether God knows of all possible worlds (or at least a subset including this solution) but rather whether a possible world like this exists. If it does, the lPoE fails, if not, then the lPoE carries, and God doesn't exist. At the moment, presuming libertarian free will, there is pretty good reason for thinking that such a possible world can exist (and I think, in fact, showing a given theodicy to be possible is a back-of-the-envelope exercise and can be extended to non-libertarian ideas of free will.)

    Of course, there is a rather large gap between possibility and credibility (alien landings, scientology, etc.) Thus what really needs to be done for PoE variants is to give a credible answer, as opposed to a merely possible one. I don't really think credibility has been established anything like as firmly, although it is still a matter of considerable debate. For my part, I think it carries pretty strongly - that evil exists is pretty good grounds to reject Theism, other things notwithstanding, and I have yet to see a credible (still less convincing) reason to adjust that judgement.
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    (Original post by GregoryJL)
    This is back to front.

    The problem is really [2]. If there is a possible world whereby a Theistic God and evil can exist, then we don't need the rest of the argument - one can simply state:

    There is a possible world whereby a Theistic God and evil both exist.

    The Problem of Evil in logical form isn't quibbling about whether God can actualize any possible world, or whether God knows of all possible worlds (or at least a subset including this solution) but rather whether a possible world like this exists. If it does, the lPoE fails, if not, then the lPoE carries, and God doesn't exist. At the moment, presuming libertarian free will, there is pretty good reason for thinking that such a possible world can exist (and I think, in fact, showing a given theodicy to be possible is a back-of-the-envelope exercise and can be extended to non-libertarian ideas of free will.)

    Of course, there is a rather large gap between possibility and credibility (alien landings, scientology, etc.) Thus what really needs to be done for PoE variants is to give a credible answer, as opposed to a merely possible one. I don't really think credibility has been established anything like as firmly, although it is still a matter of considerable debate. For my part, I think it carries pretty strongly - that evil exists is pretty good grounds to reject Theism, other things notwithstanding, and I have yet to see a credible (still less convincing) reason to adjust that judgement.
    In order to defeat the lPoE though, it is not necessary to show that a possible world is plausible. Or rather, a plausible response to the lPoE is merely one that shows that there is a possible world in which God and evil coexist. So, in the context of the lPoE credible answers have been given.

    Perhaps credible answers have not been given to the ePoE. But that's quite a different beast.
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    (Original post by RawJoh1)
    In order to defeat the lPoE though, it is not necessary to show that a possible world is plausible. Or rather, a plausible response to the lPoE is merely one that shows that there is a possible world in which God and evil coexist. So, in the context of the lPoE credible answers have been given.

    Perhaps credible answers have not been given to the ePoE. But that's quite a different beast.
    I concur entirely - I'm sorry for not being clear. Logical problems of Evil are satisfactorily responded to by showing a suitable possible world. However, the more general beast of the problem of Evil (as I hope one of the larger aspects of philosophy of religion was centered around an argument which is obviously wrong) isn't so defeated.

    Harking back a month or few ago, I confess I'm confused by your earlier claim that a theodicy which doesn't presuppose libertarian free will 'couldn't escape Mackie'. I would have thought any theodicy, providing we can't show it to be necessary false (or meaningless, etc.) would carry in providing a possible world solution. Even the idea of 'second order goods', which Mackie attacks, could still provide a solution if it just so happens that all our observed evils will indeed give second order goods, but our first order goods don't give second order evils. Am I missing something?
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    (Original post by RawJoh1)
    Why?

    4. God is capable of creating a situation where an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omniscient God, and suffering can coexist.
    5. Therefore it is possible that an all loving, all knowing, all powerful God can exist, despite the existence of suffering.

    4 entails 5 (or at least, it looks like pretty logically impeccable inference to me). If X is a creatable world, then it is possible that God creates it. If it is possible for God to create a world, it's possible for that world to exist.
    Right, I meant that 3 implies 4. Sleepy, I guess.
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    (Original post by GregoryJL)
    I concur entirely - I'm sorry for not being clear. Logical problems of Evil are satisfactorily responded to by showing a suitable possible world. However, the more general beast of the problem of Evil (as I hope one of the larger aspects of philosophy of religion was centered around an argument which is obviously wrong) isn't so defeated.
    Interestingly, up until Plantinga, many atheist philosophers thought that the lPoE was a pretty bulletproof refutation of theism. Mackie, for instance, certainly takes it to be a demonstrative proof of atheism.
    (Original post by GregoryJL)
    Harking back a month or few ago, I confess I'm confused by your earlier claim that a theodicy which doesn't presuppose libertarian free will 'couldn't escape Mackie'. I would have thought any theodicy, providing we can't show it to be necessary false (or meaningless, etc.) would carry in providing a possible world solution. Even the idea of 'second order goods', which Mackie attacks, could still provide a solution if it just so happens that all our observed evils will indeed give second order goods, but our first order goods don't give second order evils. Am I missing something?
    I was probably wrong when I said that.

    Mackie's argument works (if it does) even if we have libertarian free-will. That's partly why it's such a good argument against a traditional free-will defence.

    I'm not so knowledgeable about second-order goods defences, but what you've said seems right. A problem though is that with (at least some) second-order goods defences, the theist commits himself to often controversial ethical systems. Often, the theist ends up looking like a consequentialist (as if God's some sort of divine knob twiddler with a felicific calculator), and that's always a bad thing since consequentialism's a load of ****.

    Plantinga's FWD is far, far better, since it doesn't get hung up on controversial ethical premises.

    As for the ePoE - if I'm honest I think the distinction between demonstrative and non-demonstrative arguments is often a red herring. ePoEs often collapse into lPoEs of sorts (though the conclusion will be "it is irrational to believe that God exists" or "the evidence points to God not existing" rather than "God does not exist"). But still, I think those more modest conclusions are very hard to establish, and as far as I know they haven't been done satisfactorily.
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    (Original post by The Bachelor)
    Right, I meant that 3 implies 4. Sleepy, I guess.
    Ah yes. I agree then.
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    When we start suspending the normal rules that logic follows by saying "well God can get around logic somehow because he's omnipotent" is there any point in continuing discussion of God?

    More specifically, how can any religion prepared to state that our logic is useless when discussing God then begin to imply things like there being a need to worship him. There being any sense of a "need", to know what "God" is at all, let alone in what way he can "love" us seems meaningless. If language has such a radically different meaning when referring to God that logic cannot be applied then surely no language to be applied. Why is the statement "God loves us" any more meaningful that "God fillibustub bloef"?

    And I still maintain that 43% of people having no faith means 57% of people having some sort of faith.
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    (Original post by DrunkHamster)
    I actually think that for all the effort that religious philosophers have (for obvious reasons) put into attempting to refute the problem, it really is still quite straightforward. I guess the easiest way to put it is the following argument:

    1) If God exists, God is omnipotent, omniscient and all-loving.
    2) If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
    3) If God is omniscient, then God is aware of all evil.
    4) If God is all loving, then God desires to eliminate all evil.
    5) If God has the power to eliminate all evil, is aware of all evil, and desires to eliminate all evil then evil cannot exist
    6) Evil exists
    C) Therefore God doesn't exist

    Which is valid and, I think, has true premises. I imagine you'd dispute 2 and maybe 4, but I'm interested to hear your precise response.
    As long as (1) holds, depending on how one wished to define God, I agree with the following logic entirely. Of any disagreements I've seen over that logic in the past, they're nothing more than two people playing the semantics game...
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    (Original post by monty1618)
    As long as (1) holds, depending on how one wished to define God, I agree with the following logic entirely. Of any disagreements I've seen over that logic in the past, they're nothing more than two people playing the semantics game...
    Like I said before. Premise 2 can be disputed, as can 4 (4 actually begs the question at issue - it rules out that God can have a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil. That shouldn't be ruled out without an argument to back it up).
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    You still need to define what evil is before you can debate it!
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    (Original post by CJ99)
    You still need to define what evil is before you can debate it!
    In the context of the PoE, it's perfectly clear what evil is. If you don't like the word 'evil', use "suffering of conscious agents" instead.
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    (Original post by RawJoh1)
    In the context of the PoE, it's perfectly clear what evil is. If you don't like the word 'evil', use "suffering of conscious agents" instead.
    If it is perfectly clear give me a definition!
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    (Original post by CJ99)
    If it is perfectly clear give me a definition!
    This is not an exhaustive definition, but the person pressing the problem of evil would say that human suffering is evil. Now, maybe they're wrong - but that's (part of) what they mean when they talk about evil in the context of the problem of evil.
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    (Original post by RawJoh1)
    This is not an exhaustive definition, but the person pressing the problem of evil would say that human suffering is evil. Now, maybe they're wrong - but that's (part of) what they mean when they talk about evil in the context of the problem of evil.
    Part of? See there seems to be no definative definition which supports my argument that evil is an opinion, generally that of the majority.
 
 
 
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