This is back to front.
The problem is really [2]. If there is a possible world whereby a Theistic God and evil can exist, then we don't need the rest of the argument - one can simply state:
There is a possible world whereby a Theistic God and evil both exist.
The Problem of Evil in logical form isn't quibbling about whether God can actualize any possible world, or whether God knows of all possible worlds (or at least a subset including this solution) but rather whether a possible world like this exists. If it does, the lPoE fails, if not, then the lPoE carries, and God doesn't exist. At the moment, presuming libertarian free will, there is pretty good reason for thinking that such a possible world can exist (and I think, in fact, showing a given theodicy to be possible is a back-of-the-envelope exercise and can be extended to non-libertarian ideas of free will.)
Of course, there is a rather large gap between possibility and credibility (alien landings, scientology, etc.) Thus what really needs to be done for PoE variants is to give a credible answer, as opposed to a merely possible one. I don't really think credibility has been established anything like as firmly, although it is still a matter of considerable debate. For my part, I think it carries pretty strongly - that evil exists is pretty good grounds to reject Theism, other things notwithstanding, and I have yet to see a credible (still less convincing) reason to adjust that judgement.