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Term Limit for Abortion watch

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    (Original post by tazarooni89)
    The same cannot be said of pregnancy (unless it's a case of rape or something like that). There is no analogous equivalent of the reckless driver or the kidnapper who can have the blame for the undesirable situation placed upon them. So there is no "fault" as such. The couple can't blame someone else for acting in an inappropriate manner that resulted in a pregnancy. The pregnancy is a result of nobody's actions but their own.
    Your argument simply doesn't hold water. You're now using a 'but for' causation rule, but then claiming that fault can only occur where certain aspects obtain - an 'inappropriate manner'.

    But for my action of getting in the car, the 'inappropriate driver' could not have hit me. The agent is still responsible for getting in the car. Their agency, their choice, to get into the car is nobody's action but their own. They could have not gotten into the car and avoided the outcome.

    Now you're presupposing a moral condition to prove that same moral condition - you're assuming that there is "wrongness" logical condition in the "fault" action necessary to produce a liability. You're then implicitly assuming that this condition obtains in the case of the negligent driver, so he can be held liable for being "at fault", whereas the person who got into the car and was not negligent was not liable.

    According to this, you're then claiming that the pregnant woman has no "fault" in her situation. She is blameless. There is no moral wrongness to attach fault to her. Yet, at the same time, you're claiming that she is causally the reason for her situation and therefore cannot obtain an abortion. She has responsibility for her situation.

    These are inconsistent positions. Either "fault" is morally loaded, and she's not morally liable for her situation and therefore has no moral responsibility as she did not "wrong" act; or else, "fault" simply means causal relations in a 'but for' manner, and the probability argument applies.

    Either way, your conception here isn't tenable.
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    (Original post by NYU2012)
    It's entirely apparent that you are unable to comprehend the argument in its entirety as provided by the paper. I quote, verbatim:"But certainly the violinist has no right against you that you shall allow him to continue to use your kidneys. As I said, if you do allow him to use them, it is a kindness on your part, and not something you owe him." (Consent).The kidnapping is used to situate the example, it is not a precondition of the example. It's not a condition of the example at all. It's designed to set up the hypothetical.You've become far too hung up on the wrong committed in the kidnapping. The wrong committed by the kidnapping isn't a morally relevant part of the hypothetical. We can all agree that kidnapping is wrong, and we can all agree that engaging in sex that results in pregnancy is not identical to kidnapping. The point is allegorical, not a logical condition - the fetus is holding your body against your will.
    The fetus is not "holding" anything against one's will. The fetus has been absurdly portrayed as a conscious aggressor willingly inflicting a harm on the mother. This is beyond stupid. The very existence of the fetus, and its situation of dependency, is causally linked to actions of the mother. The situation of dependency of the violinist (being in the position of requiring surrogate kidneys) is not causally linked to the woman in the scenario, in any way. Either it is not linked to any persons, or perhaps it is self inflicted, but certainly not linked to the woman. No actions of the woman have resulted in the violinist needing the body of another to sustain himself. Again, this is just one of the fundamental ethical differences between these scenarios, which make any comparisons useless to us. Perhaps other arguments from different authors do exist, but as you saythis the most famous philosophical defense of abortion, and the one you have presented in this thread, and frankly it fails.

    Well, prima facie, I'm going to disagree with you there. Women don't just pop out babies without the help of someone of the male sex (or perhaps in vitro). Humans females are not hermaphroditically reproducing and they're not asexually reproducing either. You'll also find a huge plethora of feminist philosophy literature refuting the idea that women are the solely responsible party.
    The father is irrelevant here - the father cannot possibly have the potential responsibility of child bearing, the woman however does. Thus, she is the one who is ultimately culpable for the consequence of pregnancy, since she had every ability to refuse sex. Unless she was raped, in which case she has absolutely no ability to prevent the pregnancy. Otherwise, she has every ability to prevent the pregnancy, simple as.

    Again, a failure to understand the argument. The kidnapping scenario makes it such that the violinist's current situation is casually linked to the woman. Should she detach herself from the life support machine, then she will be the cause of his death (barring someone else taking up the mantle of life support machine).Even if you dislike the particular example used, many more have since been offered. The basics of the argument remain the same. I never claimed that JJT's particular examples were the best, nor that better ones could not be made. I put the paper forward as being the most famous piece of philosophical literature on abortion. You've taken it to attempt to attack my position because the paper I've presented has, according to you, poor examples; you've implicitly assumed that my position is based on her provided example because I provided the paper. This is an incorrect assumption. I provided the paper for educational purposes to people who were curious. It's typically a foundational piece of literature for those proceeding into the abortion debate. Your pedantry over her points is, all things considered, a waste of everyone's time.
    Her examples are flat out flawed, and whilst it is an interesting thought experiment, it doesn't hold up to scrutiny. The scenario is fundamentally different to pregnancy in numerous ways which means that any kind of meaningful parallels cannot be drawn. The actions of the woman are not in any way causally linked to the violinist's scenario - she has not done anything whatsoever to cause his situation of being dependant on someone else's body, as I have explained.

    I both understand it and reject it is as working. You can try to defend it all you like, but you're creating a situation non-analogically. Your situation, as you've constructed it is to (1) remove yourself or (2) kill the person and then remove yourself.This doesn't work, because killing the person first isn't necessary, nor does it amount in a different procedure for removal.No, it's not. Because medically, these procedures don't factually map out. In the case of abortion we're choosing between cutting someone open, or performing a less invasive procedure. The former may results in fetal life, or may not; the latter results in fetal death.The analogy you're attempting to provide doesn't work because in the hypothetical you're hooked up to the individual via needles, tubes, etc. your body is effectively acting as his filtration system. Killing him will not change how these needles, tubes, etc. are disconnected.The analogy you provide has to map onto the situation appropriately and, as we're trying to make analogous situations to actual medical practice, they have to map onto medically hypothetically viable situations.
    You're seemingly not understanding what an analogy is supposed to achieve here. The analogy does not have not have to be "medically hypothetically viable", it simply serves to set up an ethical comparison to illustrate a point. Eg. JJT uses "people seeds" as one of her analogies; we wouldn't reject this simply because it does not pertain to the real world, we would only reject it if the situation it attempted to draw a parallel to was fundamentally different and thus parallels could not actually be drawn, and ethical comparisons could not be made. I am simply saying: If there were two methods of "disconnecting" the violinist, one which, for some hypothetical reason, required him to be actively killed as part of disconnecting, and the other not requiring to kill him while disconnecting, then we have an exact analogy for abortion/C-section. I can even grant that the former procedure may somehow be "more invasive" on the woman. And the conclusion any sane person would reach is that there is no ethical justification for choosing the process which involves killing.

    I can refuse any treatment, this is correct. This also maps onto a positive right to demand to be able to have certain procedures. A negative right will, in a number of cases, turn into a positive right depending on the situation. A right to free speech (conceptually typically thought of as a negative right) will, in some cases, turn into a positive right (a right to demand something of the government).Using a capabilities approach to liberty (see Nussbaum's work) or a negative conception of liberty (Locke, Hobbes, Berlin), in fact, removing my option to choose a certain medical procedure does constitute a restriction of my freedom and thereby my bodily autonomy. Even in positive liberty theory such as Green and Bosanquet, there could be certain situations where a removal of 'juridical freedom' would constitute an infringement of 'true freedom'.Mill, for example, is a negative liberty thinker who tries to deny that any restrictions are necessarily restrictions on liberty. He does this through the 'harm principle' claiming that you have no pre-existing freedom to choose a harmful proposition. MacCallum has a similarly morally loaded conception in his triadic freedom.However, rejecting morally loaded conceptions of liberty (as Berlin would have us do), this would constitute a restriction in bodily freedom. As an aside, if you don't understand theories of freedom, then you're in no depth to be claiming what would or would not constitute a restriction of a freedom-based right.More pragmatically, however, is that suppose we assume your world where I have an option to either (1) carry to term or (2) have a cesarean section. The problem with this conception is that it ignores real world fact. This is the fact that (1) non-cesarean section abortion will continue to be available abroad (unless the entire world legislates simultaneously and unanimously to prevent all abortion); and (2) back alley abortion will continue to be available and, when abortion restrictions are heightened, the number of back alley abortions increases; which of course, presents greater harm to the women. However, we know that women will risk this option for any number of perhaps incorrect reasons, but this is a fact of human psychology that must be acknowledged.
    You've completely lost the plot here. We can agree to disagree on every other issue and that's fine, but what you're saying regarding this final point is just flat out false, and painfully silly. You're needlessly arguing in philosophical abstracts and overcomplicating what is a simple issue. We only need to look at how medical treatment and autonomy are actually related in practice: the simple fact is that you do not have a right to demand any treatment you want, end of story. I really really don't know where you've got this idea from. Between the treatments that you are offered by the current standards of medical practice, you of course have full autonomy in deciding which to have, or alternatively in rejecting all of them even if it will result in harm. You can not pick and choose any medical procedure whatsoever and demand that doctors perform it on you.

    Procedures may be restricted based on situation - you cannot, for example, demand to have surgery on an inoperable tumour which surgeons will not operate on. Others may be restricted based on cost. They can also, quite obviously, be restricted based on ethics.The example of metal fillings in Dentistry I posted above illustrates this very simply. An established and successful treatment has been discontinued in some jurisdictions for an ethically justifiable reason relating to environmental concerns, and as such patients can no longer have it. They are free to choose between other options which the medical community offers.

    If you deny this concept, then you are implying that we have the right to any kind of medical intervention no matter how horrific the consequences or prerequisites may be. We could justify the most terrifying medical experimentation on humans claiming a "right" to the best possible treatment. This is clearly insane. Even if we grant you all the bodily autonomy arguments as absolute, which I personally don't and evidently isn't granted in practice either, you still cannot jump to the conclusion of "I have a right to an abortion at any stage of pregnancy". No logical pathway from one to the other. You want to "disconnect" a late term baby? You can have it removed from you without killing it, simple as that.

    The issue of legislation around the world is also completely irrelevant. Remember, we are talking about late term abortions here, when the fetus is viable. These are generally not permitted in almost all developed countries in the world, even in the USA and the UK which have some of the most lenient laws. Yes, back alley abortions may exist, but that is a piss poor justification for allowing unrestricted abortion, and is really neither here nor there. There are plenty of dodgy, unethical doctors in 3rd world countries who probably do all kinds of procedures that would never be permitted in our society; that does not give us a reason to start implementing them here.
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    (Original post by NYU2012)
    According to this, you're then claiming that the pregnant woman has no "fault" in her situation. She is blameless. There is no moral wrongness to attach fault to her. Yet, at the same time, you're claiming that she is causally the reason for her situation and therefore cannot obtain an abortion. She has responsibility for her situation.

    These are inconsistent positions. Either "fault" is morally loaded, and she's not morally liable for her situation and therefore has no moral responsibility as she did not "wrong" act; or else, "fault" simply means causal relations in a 'but for' manner, and the probability argument applies.
    What on earth is inconsistent about that? Yes, she caused her own situation, but she is not "at fault" for it because she hasn't acted in a way that is morally wrong or negligent (assuming all proper contraception was used). Seems pretty simple to understand.

    I am not claiming that, because she is causally the reason for her situation, she must not be allowed to get an abortion. I am claiming that denying her from getting an abortion is not analogous to a forced organ donation. I have already pointed out what the difference is between the two: The kidnapper who forces an individual to donate organs is "at fault", and is causally the reason for that person's predicament in the first place. In the case of pregnancy, there is no analogous equivalent of that kidnapper. The state did not get her pregnant in the first place.
 
 
 
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