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    hey ive been given this mooting question for monday and basically its about part payment of debt however the question is

    whether or not the judge has erred in applying the princible in Williams v Roffey. That the benefits obtained by the party payment of a debt should be treated the same as those benefits obtained under a contract for the provision of goods/services.

    prediament
    A contract with B for £6m. Agreeing to pay 4m upon delivery of the product and then a further 2m at a later date (april 3rd)

    B delivers product to A on specified date in which 4m was paid

    A goes through financial difficulties and therefore B agrees to accept £500,000 in full satisfaction, in which A pays.

    B later wants to claim the outstanding £1.5m

    in the first court, williams v roffey is applied. On appeal Foakes and Bear is applied. Then coming to the current in the supreme court.

    My thoughts on the question was to go with Williams v Roffey then onto Re Select and then onto Foakes v Beer and promissory estoppel.


    IS THIS WHAT YOU WOULD DO? AM I RIGHT? ANY TIPS?
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    There's not enough detail there to know if Williams v Roffey has been cited with much authority.

    But Foakes v Beer can be considered (sic) to be on its way out. From the judgement in Collier (2007), if A offers part, B agrees and A actually pays - we have PE binding B from claiming the outstanding sum.

    So - if it is your wont, you can argue that with some authority.

    But you haven't said who you are the advocate for.
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    (Original post by Clip)
    There's not enough detail there to know if Williams v Roffey has been cited with much authority.

    But Foakes v Beer can be considered (sic) to be on its way out. From the judgement in Collier (2007), if A offers part, B agrees and A actually pays - we have PE binding B from claiming the outstanding sum.

    So - if it is your wont, you can argue that with some authority.

    But you haven't said who you are the advocate for.
    im advocate for the respondent, saying that they have provided good consideration, in which i was going to rely on promissory estoppel, to state that they are not liable to pay the outstanding amount.

    my question for the moot is that the judge in the court which first heard the case has not erred in applying the princible from Williams v Roffey. the benefits obtained by a part payment should be treated the same as those under a contract for goods/services.

    Does that make more sense?
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    sorry i mean adv for the appeallant not resp
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    (Original post by unistudent369)
    im advocate for the respondent, saying that they have provided good consideration, in which i was going to rely on promissory estoppel, to state that they are not liable to pay the outstanding amount.

    my question for the moot is that the judge in the court which first heard the case has not erred in applying the princible from Williams v Roffey. the benefits obtained by a part payment should be treated the same as those under a contract for goods/services.

    Does that make more sense?
    I suppose. Like I said, Collier is much more recent and is about a part-payment unsupported by consideration (ergo, no need to try and argue that it was - you won't find a Williams v Roffey "out" in your scenario). I don't see the need to go on about services vs part payment.
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    (Original post by Clip)
    I suppose. Like I said, Collier is much more recent and is about a part-payment unsupported by consideration (ergo, no need to try and argue that it was - you won't find a Williams v Roffey "out" in your scenario). I don't see the need to go on about services vs part payment.
    im not but the question directly says Williams v Roffey, so surely i have to mention it somehow right?

    and as it is on consideration wouldn't promissory estoppel be a better method as there has been reliance on the promise?
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    (Original post by Clip)
    I suppose. Like I said, Collier is much more recent and is about a part-payment unsupported by consideration (ergo, no need to try and argue that it was - you won't find a Williams v Roffey "out" in your scenario). I don't see the need to go on about services vs part payment.
    plus ive never heard of this collier case, can you tell me more about it?
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    Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd (2007) EWCA Civ 1329; (2008) 1 WLR 643

    If you want to look it up on Lexis or Justis or something.

    The judgement is about applying PE to contemporary part-payment situations. One could argue that it ends modern reliance on Foakes v Beer.
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    (Original post by Clip)
    Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd (2007) EWCA Civ 1329; (2008) 1 WLR 643

    If you want to look it up on Lexis or Justis or something.

    The judgement is about applying PE to contemporary part-payment situations. One could argue that it ends modern reliance on Foakes v Beer.
    sorry what do you mean by modern reliance?
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    (Original post by Clip)
    Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd (2007) EWCA Civ 1329; (2008) 1 WLR 643

    If you want to look it up on Lexis or Justis or something.

    The judgement is about applying PE to contemporary part-payment situations. One could argue that it ends modern reliance on Foakes v Beer.
    I don't think Lady Justice Arden's judgment, for all her attempts to kill Foakes v Beer, has ended reliance on that case. Re Selectmove, also a CA decision, also works in the promisee's favour.

    I think it's important here to separate PE from Foakes. In particular, Longmore LJ says in Collier v Wright
    If, as Arden LJ puts it, the “brilliant obiter dictum” of Denning J in the High Trees case [1947] KB 130 did indeed substantially achieve in practical terms the recommendation of the Law Revision Committee chaired by Lord Wright MR in 1937, it is perhaps all the more important that agreements which are said to forgo a creditor's rights on a permanent basis should not be too benevolently construed.
    Longmore LJ's statement suggests that agreements/PE can terminate a right, but that they do not necessarily do so--a creditor's rights might be suspended on a temporary basis. Arden LJ says that under *some* circumstances PE might extinguish a right--but it's implicit in her statement that PE does not invariably extinguish a right. I don't think Foakes v Beer is dead--it's a HL decision, where Collier v Wright is a CA decision. Arden LJ does make some strong statements, but Longmore LJ seems to be more sceptical. Mummery LJ agrees on the facts that there is a real prospect of success were PE to be pleaded--but he does *not* concur in Arden LJ's reasoning or argument (of course, neither does he disagree). Re Selectmove seems to lean against Collier v Wright, though of course the latter is a more recent judgment. Collier v Wright offers scope to wriggle out of Foakes, but until the HL overturned Foakes or approved Collier v Wright it's position isn't cemented. A search on Westlaw reveals only two reported cases citing Collier; both are first instance decisions.
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    (Original post by jjarvis)
    I don't think Lady Justice Arden's judgment, for all her attempts to kill Foakes v Beer, has ended reliance on that case. Re Selectmove, also a CA decision, also works in the promisee's favour.

    I think it's important here to separate PE from Foakes. In particular, Longmore LJ says in Collier v Wright


    Longmore LJ's statement suggests that agreements/PE can terminate a right, but that they do not necessarily do so--a creditor's rights might be suspended on a temporary basis. Arden LJ says that under *some* circumstances PE might extinguish a right--but it's implicit in her statement that PE does not invariably extinguish a right. I don't think Foakes v Beer is dead--it's a HL decision, where Collier v Wright is a CA decision. Arden LJ does make some strong statements, but Longmore LJ seems to be more sceptical. Mummery LJ agrees on the facts that there is a real prospect of success were PE to be pleaded--but he does *not* concur in Arden LJ's reasoning or argument (of course, neither does he disagree). Re Selectmove seems to lean against Collier v Wright, though of course the latter is a more recent judgment. Collier v Wright offers scope to wriggle out of Foakes, but until the HL overturned Foakes or approved Collier v Wright it's position isn't cemented. A search on Westlaw reveals only two reported cases citing Collier; both are first instance decisions.
    You might be interested, this is what my DoS says about LJ Arden in Collier v Wright:
    Spoiler:
    Show

    Brings into law Denning’s judgment in High Trees case. Hughs v Met Railway – equitable principle of estoppel. At common law only applies to past or present facts. Here ‘you don’t have to pay whole of the debt’ is reference to future. Not just shield to suspend the creditor’s rights.

    MJ Denning – can extinguish debt if equitable. This existed so long, developed in D&C Builders v Rees – Longmore reluctantly agrees. Third judge says nothing. Why? At common law you have to pay (Foakes v Beer), but in equity you’re estopped from relying on this, has shield that goes above common law.

    Is her analysis persuasive on what constitutes reliance? She says it suffices and is necessary that debtor should make relevant part payment. Promise releases debtor AFTER you’ve relied on it by making part payment. Not really detrimental though is it? Should part payment be necessary? What if he does something else? Ajay v Briscoe – Lord Hodson says promise made by creditor only becomes irrevocable if debtor can’t resume his position.
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    (Original post by The West Wing)
    You might be interested, this is what my DoS says about LJ Arden in Collier v Wright:
    What?! He doesn't find the reasoning convincing?! I'm shocked! (Hint: neither do I.)
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    (Original post by jjarvis)
    I don't think Lady Justice Arden's judgment, for all her attempts to kill Foakes v Beer, has ended reliance on that case. Re Selectmove, also a CA decision, also works in the promisee's favour.

    I think it's important here to separate PE from Foakes. In particular, Longmore LJ says in Collier v Wright


    Longmore LJ's statement suggests that agreements/PE can terminate a right, but that they do not necessarily do so--a creditor's rights might be suspended on a temporary basis. Arden LJ says that under *some* circumstances PE might extinguish a right--but it's implicit in her statement that PE does not invariably extinguish a right. I don't think Foakes v Beer is dead--it's a HL decision, where Collier v Wright is a CA decision. Arden LJ does make some strong statements, but Longmore LJ seems to be more sceptical. Mummery LJ agrees on the facts that there is a real prospect of success were PE to be pleaded--but he does *not* concur in Arden LJ's reasoning or argument (of course, neither does he disagree). Re Selectmove seems to lean against Collier v Wright, though of course the latter is a more recent judgment. Collier v Wright offers scope to wriggle out of Foakes, but until the HL overturned Foakes or approved Collier v Wright it's position isn't cemented. A search on Westlaw reveals only two reported cases citing Collier; both are first instance decisions.
    hey sorry i know i might seem dumb, but can you explain this in a more simplier way please?
 
 
 
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