Here you go
Nazi War Economy:War Production:- Responsibility for planning of war economy shared out between competing agencies: Ministry of War led the armaments programme, but was rivalled by the Ministry of Economics (led by Funk) and the office of Goering’s Four Year Plan
- Between 1939-40, in order to maintain morale, output in the arms industry fell by 12.5% and output in the consumer industry rose by 16%
- March 1940: There was confusion with regards to war production and so the Ministry of Munitions was created with Fritz Todt as head to solve these problems
- 1941: Operation Barbarossa rapidly increased military expenditure on production for the war
- 1939-42: the economy wasn’t mobilised for war, instead it fought a series of Blitzkrieg and this didn’t place a great demand on the production, but the strains on the economy inevitably grew
- Lack of workers demanded increased efficiency. In Feb 1942, Albert Speer was appointed Minister for Weapons & Munitions and he began to develop plan for the rationalisation of industry
- By 1943, Germany was struggling on the Eastern Front, thus Total War was launched- plan was to improve production & productivity by closing down all non-essential businesses. This was reinforced by the appointment of Speer as Reich Minister for Armaments & Production, which gave him responsibility for all industrial output & raw materials
Raw Materials:- 1939: Germany lacked the natural resources it needed for a sustained war effort (iron, coal, oil) Goering tried to counter this by developing the production of low grade ore, but as they needed high quality iron ore, this would never meet the demand of expanding military needs
- Germany needed to annex other nations so that they could control their resources. From 1942, Blitzkrieg started to fail and these resources weren’t forthcoming – there was a limited supply of oil, steel and coal
- The supply of high quality iron ore increased as the war went on. There were imports from the neutral Sweden and the annexations in Europe provided high quantities. Germany was able to gain access to French coal and Romanian oil as a result of its conquests.
Labour:- In the early days of the war, there was a huge labour shortage: there were 3.5 million fewer workers in 1940 than in 1939. This was made up for by using mainly French prisoners of war - 2 million extra foreign workers, but this wasn’t enough to cover the numbers being drafted into the army
- Foreign workers were treated badly and so their productivity was much lower (60-80%) than that of German workers
- To make up for this, Fritz Sauckel issues a compulsory labour decree for all occupied countries from August 1942 onwards - by the end of 1942, there were 6.4 million foreign workers in Germany
- 1939-44: only 200,000 extra women joined the workforce despite the labour shortage. This was due top Hitler’s refusal to allow the conscription of women. Also the benefits being paid to the wives of soldiers served as a great disincentive to work. Many women already worked in other jobs such as textiles and agriculture, which were essential for the war
- 1944: Some attempts to increase production by improving the situation for all workers- in terms of pay and overtime. March 1944: All Eastern workers were given the same pay and benefits as other foreign labourers.
- But this was too little too late as thousands dies on projects such as the V2 rocket production due to a lack of basic food, shelter and sanitary provisions
The chaotic nature of the Nazi government structure explains the failures in German war production during WW2. How far do you agree? In the Second World War, the German war economy failed to meet the demands of the war for a number of reasons, including the chaotic nature of the Nazi government structure. Other factors which played a major role in causing the failures in German war production were the labour shortages suffered and the shortages in raw materials. Leading individuals in the economic sphere also played a part in the failures of the war economy.
It can be argued that the chaotic nature of the Nazi governmental structure was a cause for the failures in German war production as the responsibility for the planning of the war economy was shared among competing agencies. The Ministry of War led the armaments programme and this rivalled the Ministry of Economics, led by Funk, and Göring’s Four-Year Plan. This competition between agencies led to inefficiency of the war economy and chaos in terms of policy. However, this was reduced to a considerable extent with the appointment of Fritz Todt and the creation of a Ministry of Munitions under him. Todt ended the confusion in terms of war production, but as the war went on, Germany began to struggle in other areas, for example having labour shortages. Therefore, it was necessary for there to be increased efficiency in terms of war production to make up for downfalls in other areas. In February 1942, Albert Speer was appointed Minister for Weapons and Munitions and he developed plans for the rationalisation of industry. As a supremely gifted organiser, Speer concentrated production by having bigger factories but less of them as well as cutting out waste and duplication to streamline production. This was largely effective and resulted in significant increases in productivity. However, despite impressive improvements under Speer, the continuing chaos and lack of consistency between agencies meant that failure soon became inevitable.
Although the war economy became increasingly productive towards the end of the Second World War, Germany was let down in terms of labour. The considerable labour shortages in Germany could serve as an explanation for the failures in German war production. Germany suffered a considerable shortage in labour in the early years of the war. There were 3.5 million fewer workers in 1940 than in 1939. There were extensive efforts made to make up for this, mainly using French prisoners of war. Despite there being 2 million extra foreign workers, this was still not enough to cover the numbers being drafted into the army. Even though there were large numbers of foreign workers from France, Poland and other conquered territories, they were 60-80 % less productive than German workers. This was mostly down to the fact that they were treated appallingly. For example from 1940, Polish workers suffered numerous restrictions, including being forced to wear a yellow badge marked with a P and not being able to use public transport. In order to make up for the shortage of workers and the lack of productivity, in August 1942, Fritz Sauckel issued a compulsory labour decree for all occupied countries. Due to this, by the end of 1942, there were 6.4 million foreign workers in Germany. In 1944, there were attempts to increase production by improving the situation for all workers in terms of pay and overtime. In March 1944, all Eastern workers were given the same pay and benefits as other foreign labourers. However, any attempts to improve conditions for foreign workers from 1944 were too little too late. Another reason for the labour shortages was Hitler’s refusal to allow conscription of women, an ideological stance as the Nazi view of the role of women revolved around ‘Kinder, Küche, Kirche.’ Due to this, between 1939 and 1944, only 200,000 extra women entered the workforce. Furthermore, the benefits paid to the wives of soldiers served as a great disincentive to work.
Furthermore, Germany lacked the natural resources that it needed for a sustained war effort, the main resource being iron-ore. Göring tried to counter this by developing the production of low grade ore but this would never meet the demand of expanding military needs. In order to sustain the war, Germany needed to annex other lands and control their natural resources. By 1940, Germany had annexed Austria, Bohemia, Poland and Alsace-Lorraine, from which they gained vast quantities of iron-ore. As well as this, Germany became dependent on constant imports from Sweden to keep the war going. In 1940, Germany imported 5.4 million tons of iron-ore from Sweden and in 1943, this figure rose slightly to 5.6 million tons. There was still a major shortage of oil and steel, both of which were needed even more as Germany went into total war. Though Germany’s ally Romania exported 3 million tons of oil in 1943, this was still not enough to supply an economy and armed forces engaged in total war. There was a chronic shortage of steel throughout the war, especially before 1942. In 1941, demand for steel exceeded supply by 30%. Steel production was limited greatly by a shortage of coal, which despite Germany’s large natural reserves and acquisition of large mining reserves in the Soviet Union and Belgium, was insufficient. In the Soviet Union, mining reserves and any large industries had been destroyed by the Soviets and this greatly impacted upon German war production. The failure of the Nazis to fully exploit the raw materials of the countries they occupied was crucial in preventing the expansion of the German economy necessary to fight a major war.
Some may argue that the failure of German war production in the Second World War was not caused by the shortage of labour, the lack of raw materials or by the chaotic nature of the Nazi government but rather by the role played by certain leading individuals in the war economy. Göring was one of the leading individuals in the German war economy, as Commissioner of Raw Materials and Commissioner of the Four-Year Plan, the aim of which had been to make Germany self-sufficient. One of the reasons for the failures of the German war economy could well be that individuals such as Göring, who were essentially in charge of the war economy, had little understanding of economics. Instead, Göring’s adherence was based on an understanding of the Führer’s wishes. The failure of Göring’s Four-Year Plan and the economic chaos in the early years of the war was altered to a considerable extent with the appointment of Todt in 1940 as Minister of Munitions. Todt helped to end confusion in the economic sphere which had come about as a result of various competing agencies. Another individual who made significant efforts to rebuild the German war economy was Albert Speer, who from 1943 onwards, introduced a variety of labour, time and space saving methods to boost production. These included promoting the better use of floor space, reducing the number of tank models, centrally controlling raw materials, reducing the amount of aluminium needed in guns and setting up production lines, which increased the number of tanks. Despite Speer’s efforts, by 1943, it seemed Germany was fighting a losing war. Therefore, the role of individuals in the early years of the Second World War could well serve as an explanation for the failures of the German war economy. However, this isn’t a complete explanation, as this was reversed towards the end of the war, by individuals such as Todt and Speer.
In conclusion, there are a number of factors which serve as causes for the failure of German war production during the Second World War. The main factors which led to economic failure, it turns out, were the shortage of raw materials and lack of labour. Though the chaotic nature of the Nazi government didn’t help the cause, it cannot serve as the sole cause for the failures of the German war economy, as there were considerable efforts made by individuals such as Speer and Todt to reverse this chaos.
Opposition to the Nazi Regime: Churches:
· April 1941 - Adolf Wagner demanded removal of all crucifixes from Bavarian schools, but was met with protest in the form of meetings, letters, petitions etc. - forced to overturn - this wasn’t direct opposition to the regime/ authority of the Führer, just defending their own culture · Bishop von Galen - 1941 - challenged the Nazi policy of killing of asylum patients - led to Hitler calling off the campaign to close religious institutions and ending the euthanasia programme · Knew about extermination of Jews as early as 1942, but failed to say anything in public · Opposition was motivated by an attempt to maintain independence and integrity rather than as a direct objection to Nazism · Dissent was individual rather than institutionalised · Individual priests such as Dietrich Bonhöffer went against policies of their Church and opposed the regime · Official policy of Churches remained as one of ‘pragmatic cooperation’
From the Left:
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