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    *Resuscitates Philsoc*
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    Shush! This is quiet time where we reflect on things that have been said.

    That being said, I've got a new theory of truth if anyone cares to hear it.


    We have a body of beliefs and language.
    We have sense experience.
    The beliefs and language together dispose up to interpret the sense experience in a particular way to form a sentence of interpretation which we call a fact. ie. "the lamp is on the table".
    A statement is true then if it is synonymous or logically entailed by the way we interpret the world to be.
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    (Original post by Calvin)
    Shush! This is quiet time where we reflect on things that have been said.
    6 days is long enough - we don't want to head for the borderline between a temporarily dormant thread and a dead one.

    (Original post by Calvin)
    That being said, I've got a new theory of truth if anyone cares to hear it.


    We have a body of beliefs and language.
    We have sense experience.
    The beliefs and language together dispose up to interpret the sense experience in a particular way to form a sentence of interpretation which we call a fact. ie. "the lamp is on the table".
    A statement is true then if it is synonymous or logically entailed by the way we interpret the world to be.
    Can't really respond as I don't understand the last part - could you elaborate, maybe give an example? Although I'm sceptical about talking about beliefs + language and sense experience as two seperate categories that then 'come together'.
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    (Original post by wanderer)
    6 days is long enough - we don't want to head for the borderline between a temporarily dormant thread and a dead one.



    Can't really respond as I don't understand the last part - could you elaborate, maybe give an example? Although I'm sceptical about talking about beliefs + language and sense experience as two seperate categories that then 'come together'.

    I'm not sure I'm entirely against them being seperate categories. (beliefs, language, sense data.) They are certainly distinct but I don't have any a priori objection to them being of the same sort of class. I'm not really saying anything either way on that point, partly because I don't think I need to for now.

    The gist is that I get certain sense data- white patches, brown patches etc
    My beliefs and language dispose me to interpret these in a certain way- "I am seeing a white patch..." and then eventually "I am seeing a lamp on a desk" and with further consideration of beliefs "there is a lamp on the desk"

    Thus if you were to offer the statement "There is a lamp on the desk". I would agree that statement is true because it is synonymous with the way I interpret the world to be.
    The questionable statement- "there is a lamp on the desk"
    My interpretation of the world- "there is a lamp on the desk"

    And so my evaluation of the questionable statement is that it is true because the two are the same.

    And that's what truth is, its corresponding with the way I interpret the world to be.
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    (Original post by Calvin)
    We have a body of beliefs and language. We have sense experience. The beliefs and language together dispose up to interpret the sense experience in a particular way to form a sentence of interpretation which we call a fact. ie. "the lamp is on the table". A statement is true then if it is synonymous or logically entailed by the way we interpret the world to be.
    It seems a bit like communitarianism, I think. Who has this "body of beliefs"? A person, a community, or both? How do we resolve conflicts between sets of beliefs? What happens when sense experience conflicts with the body of beliefs? It's still an idealist stance - in that your system cannot (currently) determine between fact and fiction. That is, unless you're going to give precedence to sense experience over the body of beliefs in some way.
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    (Original post by Calvin)
    I'm not sure I'm entirely against them being seperate categories. (beliefs, language, sense data.) They are certainly distinct but I don't have any a priori objection to them being of the same sort of class. I'm not really saying anything either way on that point, partly because I don't think I need to for now.

    The gist is that I get certain sense data- white patches, brown patches etc
    My beliefs and language dispose me to interpret these in a certain way- "I am seeing a white patch..." and then eventually "I am seeing a lamp on a desk" and with further consideration of beliefs "there is a lamp on the desk"

    Thus if you were to offer the statement "There is a lamp on the desk". I would agree that statement is true because it is synonymous with the way I interpret the world to be.
    The questionable statement- "there is a lamp on the desk"
    My interpretation of the world- "there is a lamp on the desk"

    And so my evaluation of the questionable statement is that it is true because the two are the same.

    And that's what truth is, its corresponding with the way I interpret the world to be.
    So how does this differ between belief and truth?

    Also, we don't see a white patch. We see a lamp on the desk. Resolving sense data into objects isn't done at a conscious level.
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    Are we falling into the veil of perception thing again?
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    I am going to do this course via the NEC or by self-teaching.
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    (Original post by grumballcake)
    It seems a bit like communitarianism, I think. Who has this "body of beliefs"? A person, a community, or both? How do we resolve conflicts between sets of beliefs? What happens when sense experience conflicts with the body of beliefs? It's still an idealist stance - in that your system cannot (currently) determine between fact and fiction. That is, unless you're going to give precedence to sense experience over the body of beliefs in some way.
    Ah there you are!
    - Who has this body of beliefs? I have this body of beliefs.
    - How do we resolve conflicts? What conflicts? Truth is how I interpet the world to be, if somebody else interprets it differently they're wrong. Though of course the same goes for them. Call it relativism if you will but the way I see it I'm only paying lip service to their set of beliefs. I can only interpret the world through my body of beliefs so I can only interpret their truth through my beliefs and notions of truth. Ultimately truth has to be somewhat solipsistic on any theory which accepts we interpret the world rather than directly perceive it. And I think science can support me in sayng that's what happens. So Hear the Thunder I think I'd say embacing the veil of perception rather than falling in but essentially yes. But look at what we can see from science about how perception works. Perception is electrical impulses, not objects themselves. There will always be interpretation between the two. That is the veil of perception.
    - What happens when sense experience and my beliefs conflict? Why would they do that on my theory more than we already allow that they do? I mean, already we make predictions and things don't turn out as expected. If that's the case then we say we were wrong. On my theory the same thing happens. If I make a prediction and it turns out to be wrong (I interpret the world as not corresponding to that prediction) then that prediction was wrong.
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    (Original post by wanderer)
    So how does this differ between belief and truth?

    Also, we don't see a white patch. We see a lamp on the desk. Resolving sense data into objects isn't done at a conscious level.
    A belief is something I don't have sufficient information to prove true or false. That is, I don't have enough information to interpret that part of the world.
    As for conscious level- I see no need to commit myself to sayings it's all done at a conscious level. I can accept some if not all is unconscious.
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    Welcome ot the party Icy Ghost
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    (Original post by Calvin)
    A belief is something I don't have sufficient information to prove true or false. That is, I don't have enough information to interpret that part of the world.
    As for conscious level- I see no need to commit myself to sayings it's all done at a conscious level. I can accept some if not all is unconscious.
    Fine, I think the unconscious part strenghtens the idea considerably. Now lets deal with this belief/knowledge distinction.

    You say that we have sense experience of something - we see an object on another object - and then we interpret it using our 'interpretation system' (invent your own phrase if you want, but I think referring to it as beliefs is confusing - wouldn't want to mix up the kind of belief you've just defined with the ones used for interpretation) - we label the objects as 'lamp' and 'desk', add the assumption that the lamp cannot fall through the desk, etc. - to give an 'interpretation', which is everything we pack into 'the lamp is on the desk'. A true statement of language is one that corresponds to this interpretation. So essentially you're saying that truth is our empirical knowledge as we perceive it, correct?

    Now, say I have heard that a lion is loose in London. I believe it, because I trust the people who told me. However, I have had no direct experience to confirm it. Later, I see pictures of the carnage, but not the lion, on TV. Then I go to London. First I see the carnage for myself - blood, bodies, etc. Then I see the lion. So we have four situations:

    A) I have been told that the lion is loose.
    B) I have seen evidence that the lion is loose second-hand.
    C) I have seen said evidence with my own eyes.
    D) I have had direct confirmation that the lion is loose.

    At A, I get some sense data, hearing sounds, which I interpret into language. I then further interpret it, using my belief in my informant's trustworthiness, as being true. So the statement 'a lion is loose in London' corresponds with my interpretation of my sense data. Does that make it true, under your definition? Or is it an unconfirmed belief? If it is, at what point between A and D does it become true? If it is true, then what happens if I find out my informant was lying or misinformed? Does it cease to be true? If so, was it previously true, or always false? I think answering this should clarify what you're saying.
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    (Original post by wanderer)
    Fine, I think the unconscious part strenghtens the idea considerably. Now lets deal with this belief/knowledge distinction.

    You say that we have sense experience of something - we see an object on another object - and then we interpret it using our 'interpretation system' (invent your own phrase if you want, but I think referring to it as beliefs is confusing - wouldn't want to mix up the kind of belief you've just defined with the ones used for interpretation) - we label the objects as 'lamp' and 'desk', add the assumption that the lamp cannot fall through the desk, etc. - to give an 'interpretation', which is everything we pack into 'the lamp is on the desk'. A true statement of language is one that corresponds to this interpretation. So essentially you're saying that truth is our empirical knowledge as we perceive it, correct?

    Now, say I have heard that a lion is loose in London. I believe it, because I trust the people who told me. However, I have had no direct experience to confirm it. Later, I see pictures of the carnage, but not the lion, on TV. Then I go to London. First I see the carnage for myself - blood, bodies, etc. Then I see the lion. So we have four situations:

    A) I have been told that the lion is loose.
    B) I have seen evidence that the lion is loose second-hand.
    C) I have seen said evidence with my own eyes.
    D) I have had direct confirmation that the lion is loose.

    At A, I get some sense data, hearing sounds, which I interpret into language. I then further interpret it, using my belief in my informant's trustworthiness, as being true. So the statement 'a lion is loose in London' corresponds with my interpretation of my sense data. Does that make it true, under your definition? Or is it an unconfirmed belief? If it is, at what point between A and D does it become true? If it is true, then what happens if I find out my informant was lying or misinformed? Does it cease to be true? If so, was it previously true, or always false? I think answering this should clarify what you're saying.

    You could claim the same difficulty with belief. At what point do I believe a Lion is loose in london as opposed to just having evidence to support this claim? I'm not sure you're pointing to a unique difficulty of the theory I'm expounding. We have these problems anyway and yet we deal with them rather than denying belief.
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    (Original post by Calvin)
    You could claim the same difficulty with belief. At what point do I believe a Lion is loose in london as opposed to just having evidence to support this claim? I'm not sure you're pointing to a unique difficulty of the theory I'm expounding. We have these problems anyway and yet we deal with them rather than denying belief.
    Not at all. Belief is the mental state wherein I believe that its true.
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    Agreed- (though it hardly amounts to an explanation of belief- its horribly circular)
    But essentially on any theory of truth you are going to have beliefs being 'the belief that X is true'.
    What I'm saying then is that once you believe something is true, once you interpret the world in a particular way- have adopted the interpretation as part of your set of beliefs- then you begin to use that belief to evaluate statements. If you later come to some different belief (if your previous belief is shown to be false) you adopt a new belief and use that to evaluate statements.
    This would mean the content of your true beliefs change, but as the criteria for truth is always your current set of beliefs it becomes the case that your belief previously was false because it doesn't meet with your current interpretation of the world. You believed it true at the time but it doesn't meet your current standard for truth and so is by necessity false. If you want the fact of the matter that makes it true my old belief was false all along then that fact is exhibited by my current interpretation of the world.
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    (Original post by Calvin)
    Who has this body of beliefs? I have this body of beliefs.
    Really? So where did you get them? By divine fiat, perhaps? Have you always had that body of beliefs? I see that you admit that those beliefs could change, but why? If they are true for you, then you have to admit the concept of an external reality or truth, otherwise there is nothing which can change your belief set. In other words - for you to admit that something which you currently believe is now false, you have to submit to an outside opinion or event. So your own set of beliefs is not the reference point at all - the external reality is.
    How do we resolve conflicts? What conflicts? Truth is how I interpet the world to be, if somebody else interprets it differently they're wrong.
    That's both arrogant and unrealistic. If you tried that with your tutor, he might well giggle at you. Most human beings are aware that they do not have a complete picture of even a small part of the world. Your philosophical model denies being wrong as a possibility, despite your attempts to defend it later in your post. I'm not sure why you can't see the inconsistency. Without privileging observation/experience, you can never change your belief set.
    Ultimately truth has to be somewhat solipsistic on any theory which accepts we interpret the world rather than directly perceive it. And I think science can support me in sayng that's what happens.
    You think incorrectly. Science is utterly realist in its philosophy.
    A belief is something I don't have sufficient information to prove true or false. That is, I don't have enough information to interpret that part of the world.
    Yet, it is obvious to me that you can never have enough information to declare something true or false, except in a tautologous system like maths.
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    (Original post by Calvin)
    Agreed- (though it hardly amounts to an explanation of belief- its horribly circular)
    But essentially on any theory of truth you are going to have beliefs being 'the belief that X is true'.
    What I'm saying then is that once you believe something is true, once you interpret the world in a particular way- have adopted the interpretation as part of your set of beliefs- then you begin to use that belief to evaluate statements. If you later come to some different belief (if your previous belief is shown to be false) you adopt a new belief and use that to evaluate statements.
    This would mean the content of your true beliefs change, but as the criteria for truth is always your current set of beliefs it becomes the case that your belief previously was false because it doesn't meet with your current interpretation of the world. You believed it true at the time but it doesn't meet your current standard for truth and so is by necessity false. If you want the fact of the matter that makes it true my old belief was false all along then that fact is exhibited by my current interpretation of the world.
    You still haven't given a clear explanation of what the difference is in your system between you believing something and it being true, at a given point in time. And don't say you can't do this in any system - correspondence theory can. Maybe not preactically, but there is a clear distinction.
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    (Original post by grumballcake)
    Really? So where did you get them? By divine fiat, perhaps? Have you always had that body of beliefs? I see that you admit that those beliefs could change, but why? If they are true for you, then you have to admit the concept of an external reality or truth, otherwise there is nothing which can change your belief set. In other words - for you to admit that something which you currently believe is now false, you have to submit to an outside opinion or event. So your own set of beliefs is not the reference point at all - the external reality is.
    By interpreting sense data, by being told things as I grow up, by having experiences, reading and so forth... I'm not sense data. Where does sense data come from? I haven't the foggiest! And I can't know because of the way truth is piped through my interpretations of the world. My interpretations of senes data are the ultimate reality that I can interact with. Sense data can provide the reference points without being an external reality.



    (Original post by Grumballcake)
    That's both arrogant and unrealistic. If you tried that with your tutor, he might well giggle at you. Most human beings are aware that they do not have a complete picture of even a small part of the world. Your philosophical model denies being wrong as a possibility, despite your attempts to defend it later in your post. I'm not sure why you can't see the inconsistency. Without privileging observation/experience, you can never change your belief set.
    She's a she. And you're probably right. But that doesn't stop your argument just being a mild ad hominem. (I'm not offended, but thats essentially what your response is.) My model doesn't deny being wrong as a possibility. My interpretations may have to be alterered in light of a better explanation becoming available. So in short I do see the inconsistency you're pointing too, but I'm not denying privalaged experience, sense data provide the raw material for that. All I'm saying is that before I can do anything with it I have to interpret it.

    (Original post by Grumballcake)
    You think incorrectly. Science is utterly realist in its philosophy.
    I'm not saying science isn't realist. I'm saying science shows that I don't perceive the object directly but the electrical impulses my brain interprets as sensations and which I interpret again as objects. I'm just pointing to the screens of interpretation and representation science shows us exist between object and consciousness.

    (Original post by Grumballcake)
    Yet, it is obvious to me that you can never have enough information to declare something true or false, except in a tautologous system like maths.
    :confused: Are you making certainty a requirement for all truth? My system does I'll agree with you, but my theory has truth as more instrumentalist than most. Are you pointing it out as a reprocussion of mine or making a claim about your own theory of truth?


    (Original post by Wanderer)
    You still haven't given a clear explanation of what the difference is in your system between you believing something and it being true, at a given point in time. And don't say you can't do this in any system - correspondence theory can. Maybe not preactically, but there is a clear distinction.
    A belief is a state which causes a disposition to action.
    Truth is a statement corresponding to my interpretation of the world (which is a further statement- though I believe it too).

    My interpretation of the world is formed on the basis of my beliefs. So I believe truths. But not all beliefs are true.
    Beliefs about the future make a clear distinction I think. They dispose me to action but they don't correspond with the way I interpret the world to be because I don't yet interpret the world to be that way- its in the future.

    In the case of present tense believs- I might believe something but not have enough information to interpret the world as being that way. I believe its raining outside, but I don't know whether its true because I'm not yet disposed enough to interpret the world to be that way. What would dispose me enough? Well probably looking out of the window. That's the theoretical distinction anyway.
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    (Original post by Calvin)
    By interpreting sense data, by being told things as I grow up, by having experiences, reading and so forth... I'm not sense data. Where does sense data come from? I haven't the foggiest! And I can't know because of the way truth is piped through my interpretations of the world.
    I agree, but what your argument suggests is that your internal paradigm is the only reality. I'm pointing out that this internal reality has been formed by contact with an external reality. When the internal view and the external one conflict, it is (usually) the internal one which changes. See Thomas Kuhn for how such paradigms operate in scientific notions of reality. Thus, is it the external reality which shapes the internal, and it its the external reality which wins in any conflict. Even if you don't believe that gravity exists, you will fall if you step off a cliff. You will then adjust your notions of gravity, if you survive the fall.

    My point has been that you seem to assume that your internal model is an object, when I contend that it is not. It is simply a set of rules which have enough apparent consistency for you to feel that you can make sense of what you perceive externally. Those rules are massively fluid, although they become less so with age.
    I'm not saying science isn't realist. I'm saying science shows that I don't perceive the object directly but the electrical impulses my brain interprets as sensations and which I interpret again as objects. I'm just pointing to the screens of interpretation and representation science shows us exist between object and consciousness.
    I don't think that anyone disagrees, but that doesn't make the interpretation the reality. If I have a different interpretation then how will we resolve the dispute? Inevitably by reference to the observations of the external object or event. We may concoct hypotheses of what the 'real' rules are, but we test them by experiment and observation.
    Are you making certainty a requirement for all truth? My system does I'll agree with you, but my theory has truth as more instrumentalist than most. Are you pointing it out as a reprocussion of mine or making a claim about your own theory of truth?
    No, I believe that certainty is unobtainable without a closed system and omniscience of that system. As I've said, you can manage that for maths, where a formal proof may be available, or for tautologies like "red is red". However, neither of those is much use in philosophy. What we can have is a weight of opinion and degrees of certainty. I'm pretty certain that the sun will appear to rise tomorrow. I'm even more certain that it did rise this morning.
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    (Original post by Calvin)
    A belief is a state which causes a disposition to action.
    Truth is a statement corresponding to my interpretation of the world (which is a further statement- though I believe it too).

    My interpretation of the world is formed on the basis of my beliefs. So I believe truths. But not all beliefs are true.
    Beliefs about the future make a clear distinction I think. They dispose me to action but they don't correspond with the way I interpret the world to be because I don't yet interpret the world to be that way- its in the future.

    In the case of present tense believs- I might believe something but not have enough information to interpret the world as being that way. I believe its raining outside, but I don't know whether its true because I'm not yet disposed enough to interpret the world to be that way. What would dispose me enough? Well probably looking out of the window. That's the theoretical distinction anyway.
    A state which causes a disposition to action? I don't think that works. Actions are a result of our reaction to and evaluation of how we believe the world to be, as well as of the beliefs themselves. Your belief that it is raining is a belief. But the state that causes your dispostion to action (or inaction) if you then decide not to go out is your desire not to get wet.

    You seem to say that the only case in which you can believe something without it being true is if you perceive it as such - if you are unsure of whatever it is you believe. What about you believing something to be true (and I mean true by your standards - it fits with your interpretation of the world), believing that you have enough information to judge it - this is belief in the normal sense. Does your system distinguish this from truth, or are you reducing truth to a kind of belief?
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    (Original post by grumballcake)
    I agree, but what your argument suggests is that your internal paradigm is the only reality. I'm pointing out that this internal reality has been formed by contact with an external reality. When the internal view and the external one conflict, it is (usually) the internal one which changes. See Thomas Kuhn for how such paradigms operate in scientific notions of reality. Thus, is it the external reality which shapes the internal, and it its the external reality which wins in any conflict. Even if you don't believe that gravity exists, you will fall if you step off a cliff. You will then adjust your notions of gravity, if you survive the fall.
    Its not that you're pointing it out. You're contending it, because it is just on that point I disagree with you. You accept (further down) that we recognise there are veils of perception between us and the world. That we see Plato's shadows on the wall and never the real objects yet you (a) still posit an external world and more surprisingly (b) Suggest we can use that world to evaluate our beliefs and resolve disagreements.
    How is (b) possible if you accept veils of perception constantly between us and the world?

    (Original post by Grumballckae)
    My point has been that you seem to assume that your internal model is an object, when I contend that it is not. It is simply a set of rules which have enough apparent consistency for you to feel that you can make sense of what you perceive externally. Those rules are massively fluid, although they become less so with age.
    Ignoring the 'perceive externally' point which I've discussed above-

    You can say it isn't an object if you want, I don't attach a great deal of meaning to that term so I'm not going to argue it for now. Perhaps it is just rules- I'm not against that considering how arbitrary human interpretation and thought appears to be. I'll go further and admit they aren't rules but customs and habit. But that doesn't as far as I see damage my theory as an account of truth. It doesn't even affect my metaphysics because altering the status of my reality only really makes sense in comparison to the external reality you're positing. As I don't accept it, I don't see any loss in status for my interpretive reality.

    (Original post by Grumballcake)
    I don't think that anyone disagrees, but that doesn't make the interpretation the reality. If I have a different interpretation then how will we resolve the dispute? Inevitably by reference to the observations of the external object or event. We may concoct hypotheses of what the 'real' rules are, but we test them by experiment and observation.
    It makes the interpretation the ultimate reality we can interact with. You can still posit some further reality if you want but it seems silly. And it certainly doesn't help you with your account of truth because you have zero interaction with that objective reality anyway.

    (Original post by Grumballcake)
    No, I believe that certainty is unobtainable without a closed system and omniscience of that system. As I've said, you can manage that for maths, where a formal proof may be available, or for tautologies like "red is red". However, neither of those is much use in philosophy. What we can have is a weight of opinion and degrees of certainty. I'm pretty certain that the sun will appear to rise tomorrow. I'm even more certain that it did rise this morning.
    Well, I can agree with you there. Perhaps my statement last time was a little misleading. I don't think my theory requires truth per say, I just meant that it makes truth a little more about epistemology and a little less to metaphysics in comparison with realist theories of truth.


    Wanderer

    (Original post by Wanderer)
    A state which causes a disposition to action? I don't think that works. Actions are a result of our reaction to and evaluation of how we believe the world to be, as well as of the beliefs themselves. Your belief that it is raining is a belief. But the state that causes your dispostion to action (or inaction) if you then decide not to go out is your desire not to get wet.
    Desires play a role too I'll agree. But given certain desires the beliefs have a disposing effect (is that sensical?) It's a functionalist account of beliefs. My belief that God doesn't exist disposes me to argue with Theists. I might not desire to argue with them at some particular time, but I still have the belief because given the desire I would. It also disposes me to have certain desires. Essentially you end upwith a Humean picture. Beliefs are about how the world is, desires are about how it should be, you need both to act. But precisely how you act will be dependent on what beliefs and what desires you have. As such both dispose you to certain actions.

    (Original post by Wanderer)
    You seem to say that the only case in which you can believe something without it being true is if you perceive it as such - if you are unsure of whatever it is you believe. What about you believing something to be true (and I mean true by your standards - it fits with your interpretation of the world), believing that you have enough information to judge it - this is belief in the normal sense. Does your system distinguish this from truth, or are you reducing truth to a kind of belief?
    Essentially can I distinguish between wanting to say something is true and it actually being the case that this thing is true? Only by a matter of degrees. But I'm not sure that's as implausible as it first looks.
    You don't have much of a problem with sense data- seeing something creates an extremely powerful disposition to interpret the world in a certain way and so an extremely powerful belief. So sense data will almost always make things truths and not just beliefs.
    There will be a fine line in some cases where you have just enough information to think you can interpret the world (Which will still require a lot). How about, for example, the truth that acceleration due to gravity is roughly 9.8m/s/s. I believe that and it's true. It's true because I have been told is a number of times. I anticipate that if I asked more people they would tell me that is the case. If I were to perform experiments they would return that answer. Which makes me interpret the world similarly and thus the statement 'Acceleration due to Gravity is roughly 9.8m/s/s' is true.
    Were I to drastically alter my world view tomorrow and not interpret that as being the case 'perhaps come to interpret the world as such that accleration due togravity is 3m/s/s it would stop being true. But more than that it would never have been true because truth is constantly re-evaluated in accordance with my current body of beliefs (which will also include truths because by necessity all true things are believed by me.)
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    (Original post by Calvin)

    Wanderer


    Desires play a role too I'll agree. But given certain desires the beliefs have a disposing effect (is that sensical?) It's a functionalist account of beliefs. My belief that God doesn't exist disposes me to argue with Theists. I might not desire to argue with them at some particular time, but I still have the belief because given the desire I would. It also disposes me to have certain desires. Essentially you end upwith a Humean picture. Beliefs are about how the world is, desires are about how it should be, you need both to act. But precisely how you act will be dependent on what beliefs and what desires you have. As such both dispose you to certain actions.
    I wasn't disputing that beliefs do dispose you to actions. I just don't think a definition of a belief as 'something which disposes you to action' really describes them effectively.

    (Original post by Calvin)
    Essentially can I distinguish between wanting to say something is true and it actually being the case that this thing is true? Only by a matter of degrees. But I'm not sure that's as implausible as it first looks. You don't have much of a problem with sense data- seeing something creates an extremely powerful disposition to interpret the world in a certain way and so an extremely powerful belief. So sense data will almost always make things truths and not just beliefs.
    There will be a fine line in some cases where you have just enough information to think you can interpret the world (Which will still require a lot). How about, for example, the truth that acceleration due to gravity is roughly 9.8m/s/s. I believe that and it's true. It's true because I have been told is a number of times. I anticipate that if I asked more people they would tell me that is the case. If I were to perform experiments they would return that answer. Which makes me interpret the world similarly and thus the statement 'Acceleration due to Gravity is roughly 9.8m/s/s' is true.
    Were I to drastically alter my world view tomorrow and not interpret that as being the case 'perhaps come to interpret the world as such that accleration due togravity is 3m/s/s it would stop being true. But more than that it would never have been true because truth is constantly re-evaluated in accordance with my current body of beliefs (which will also include truths because by necessity all true things are believed by me.)
    Then truth is a very strong kind of belief. That is quite Humean. I quite like it, as a kind of descriptive version of truth - this is how 'truth' works in our heads, although of course its very limiting, as I'm sure Grumballcake is pointing out. I may even read that part of the argument at some point.
 
 
 
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Updated: September 14, 2010
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