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grumballcake
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#821
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#821
(Original post by wanderer)
There's more disagreement among anthropologists than you indicate.
I thought I wrote "post-modernist anthropologists". Clearly not all anthropologists are post-modernists, but I think there is a general consensus that the original project to find universal themes has largely failed. You can have broad categories, as you've indicated, but a number of authors now hold that cultures are incommensurable. In other words, you can never find any useful one-to-one correspondences.

[edit] There are cultures where murder is not proscribed. Have a read of Jared Diamond. You might also look again at what you actually wrote for universals. It may not be common, I grant but we only need one exception to undermine the claim to 'universal'.
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wanderer
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(Original post by grumballcake)
I thought I wrote "post-modernist anthropologists". Clearly not all anthropologists are post-modernists, but I think there is a general consensus that the original project to find universal themes has largely failed. You can have broad categories, as you've indicated, but a number of authors now hold that cultures are incommensurable. In other words, you can never find any useful one-to-one correspondences.
Funny that. I was under the impression that incommensurable cultures was the old school. Its so tricky to get an objective view on these debates. The list of universals is reasonably impressive though, and I wouldn't say they're all broad categories - 'rape proscribed'? Plus, some of the non-ethical ones I didn't mention are fairly specific. 'Weaving', 'facial expression of anger', 'levers', 'poetry', 'giving directions' etc.
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grumballcake
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(Original post by wanderer)
I wouldn't say they're all broad categories - 'rape proscribed'? Plus, some of the non-ethical ones I didn't mention are fairly specific. 'Weaving', 'facial expression of anger', 'levers', 'poetry', 'giving directions' etc.
You might add "having two legs", "using eyes to see", "speaking with mouth", "making rope" etc. Clearly some things are a function of being human at all. We have particular characteristics such as how we communicate with one another. Those come from a long history of evolution and go deeper than our culture. We could argue about how much biology influences ethics and there's certainly a whole stream of ethical thought which links everything to biology. Diamond discusses the "sex in private" taboo as part of his thesis on the evolution of human culture, as it is quite different from other primates. Similarly some tool-making behaviours will have convergent evolution and can arise differently at different times. Some arose early, some late, like the choice of eating tools.

As to 'poetry' that's clearly open to debate isn't it? When does prose become poetry? Is story-telling different? Latin poetry has almost nothing in common with modern English poetry, for example.

Now, if you pick things carefully, you can find behaviours which are common between cultures. However, we've been talking about values and ethics, which have proved far harder to pin down.
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wanderer
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(Original post by grumballcake)
You might add "having two legs", "using eyes to see", "speaking with mouth", "making rope" etc. Clearly some things are a function of being human at all. We have particular characteristics such as how we communicate with one another. Those come from a long history of evolution and go deeper than our culture. We could argue about how much biology influences ethics and there's certainly a whole stream of ethical thought which links everything to biology. Diamond discusses the "sex in private" taboo as part of his thesis on the evolution of human culture, as it is quite different from other primates. Similarly some tool-making behaviours will have convergent evolution and can arise differently at different times. Some arose early, some late, like the choice of eating tools.

As to 'poetry' that's clearly open to debate isn't it? When does prose become poetry? Is story-telling different? Latin poetry has almost nothing in common with modern English poetry, for example.

Now, if you pick things carefully, you can find behaviours which are common between cultures. However, we've been talking about values and ethics, which have proved far harder to pin down.
Yep - as I said, I don't disagree on the ethics point. I was actually simplifying when I said 'poetry', the actual entries are 'poetic line, uniform length range', 'poetic lines characterised by repetition and variation', and 'poetic lines demarcated by pauses'.
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rahmara
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#825
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#825
(Original post by grumballcake)
No. Bentham started it. See http://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/calculus.html for a decent explanation.
ok

whoops got it wrong

thank you

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TCovenant
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(Original post by grumballcake)
“Preferred by whom? I agree that if I prefer A to B then A is preferable to B for me, but so what? That doesn't mean that A is preferable for anyone else. Or even that because I prefer A it is preferable at all. Suppose I prefer to torture animals (I don't, before you ask) is it therefore ethical to torture animals? It's obvious from common sense that it isn't, but it's not at all obvious from your formulation. You seem to have a mix of situational ethics in with utilitarianism. If a society prefers to abuse children (examples available from real societies on request), can you condemn them?”
They are preferred by the people who hold the preference, by definition. It doesn’t matter that different persons prefer different things, and thus that preferring ‘any specific thing’ is not universal. What is universal is that people prefer that which they prefer, which is sufficient.

It doesn’t need to be ‘obvious’ obviously, the strength of an ethical system is in its actual validity, not how easy to remember it is. If you prefer causing harm to another in some way, then it is clearly preferable, ceteris paribus, that your preferences aren’t frustrated as you’ll suffer from not having your preference being fulfilled. However, demonstrably by the definition of the scenario all else isn’t equal: you cause harm (denying preferences) by fulfilling your own, and in harming the other person for pleasure you will bring greater harm to yourself, frustrating other preferences. Therefore it isn’t ethical to bring harm in whatever manner, unless this harm is the least harm that could be brought about, and therefore is the most least un-preferable action.

This isn’t a mix with situation ethics, though in my view all coherent ethical systems are reducible to utilitarianism and situation ethics (correctly interpreted) is perfectly coherent. The point, regardless, is that the ethic described is utilitarianism.

If persons prefer to torture children then their preference ought not to be fulfilled, assuming that torture of children is not going to bring about the least torture (harm) all round.
“So, if a society prefers child-beating, that's a benefit?”
If persons prefer anything including child-beating, it is beneficial, ignoring all other factors, that their preference be fulfilled- that they should benefit rather than suffer. It is not actually beneficial, if we acknowledge that child-beating is not the most preferable policy to all those affected.

“Your definition is yet another tautology. If benefit is the outcome of a right action, then a right action is one which produces benefit. Yet what does that add in explanatory terms? It's like saying that red paint is paint which is red.”
That isn’t a tautology, a benefit is defined by net preferences, namely the preferences of all those affected, a right action is one which results in the best fulfillment of those total preferences.

“So you now have a neat system which allows no external critique either. If we show that it does allow atrocities, then we must be wrong because it doesn't, by its own definition. The old

Rule 1: I am always right
Rule 2: If I appear to be wrong, see rule 1

I'm afraid that cuts no ice with me. You can't say that we're "incorrectly applying" the rules just because you don't like the outcome.”
It’s not the case that utilitarianism has unreasonably set up a system that defines itself as right- and maintains that “opponents are wrong because we don’t like them.” Such is the nature of definition- we have simply defined atrocity in two different ways, I’ve defined an atrocity on account of it bringing suffering. You’ve chosen to define atrocity in some contrary way, such that it can be an “atrocity” even if the action minimises suffering/maximised benefit to the best level possible.

Of course for there to be basis for critique there has to be potential agreement (as we’re arguing about a term which we’ve defined contrarily there isn’t one readily available). If you accept that the preferences of all ought to be considered without bias, then you would be forced to concur with the utilitarian system, outlined above.

“Except that you haven't yet produced any evidence of this, or a system to back up this bald assertion.

Your appeal is now to ignore/avoid preferences and appeal to "that which most preferable overall", but how will you determine this? Preferable to whom and measured how?”
Evidence of what? How would one create a system to “back up” the statement that that which best fulfils the preferences of all persons who have preferences, is that which is most preferable.

In what sense am I ignoring or avoiding preferences? It is clear that “that which is most preferable overall” is not reducible to “preferences” in the sense that you’ve defined “what the majority prefer” or preferences as defined by a “quick vote.” Clearly if some small children “prefer” to stay up late, get drunk and not do their schoolwork, and even if they hold a vote demonstrating their consensus on this preference, it is clear that their actual net preferences are not being fulfilled by following this course of action.

“Most preferable overall” means taking account of all agents who prefer, without bias, towards persons or preferences. This doesn’t necessitate a system, as with the most basic matter of deciding which actions will fulfil our preferences, we have to determine this based on available knowledge.

“If I put on my teenager hat for a moment: "Well, duh!". Right, that's got that out of the way, so what on earth are you talking about? How will I know when I've found the "greater good" and how will I tell it from a "lesser good" in real, concrete terms? Will everyone else agree with this definition?

Let's go back to classical utilitarianism for a moment. Are you advocating act utilitarianism (Bentham), or rule utilitarianism (Mill)? At times you've veered towards eudaimonism since you've talked about hapoiness as the greatest good a few times. I'm just trying to get a feel for where you're going.”
The fact that the assertion is absolutely obvious is hardly a weakness.
Of course one can’t know absolutely what will bring the greatest good, defined as the greatest fulfilment of preferences for all persons who hold preferences; in the absence of total knowledge of all consequences of all potential actions it is therefore impossible to know absolutely what the greatest fulfilment of preferences would be, or how that could be brought about. Nevertheless one obviously has a responsibility to act in a way likely to bring about better consequences, in real, concrete terms. You ‘tell,’ namely postulate based on your current knowledge, through your observation and theorisation about your fellow preferring agents.

Act utilitarianism is the best formulation, as its clearest, but essentially there’s no distinction between the two, logically carried out. Rule utilitarianism would provide identical results to act utilitarianism as the only rule that could rationally be formulated would be act in all cases so as to maximise good. Likewise, the formulation of utilitarianism as maximising happiness over suffering is identical to preference utilitarianism if formulated correctly.

“You'd feel right at home with Derrida. ”
No, I’m sure I wouldn’t, despite his hospitality.
In any case, what I’m discussing is absolutely concrete: things are preferred (one can suffer or benefit), assuming persons other than myself can also suffer or benefit, and without any basis for privileging my own preferences over their own, it is clearly more preferable that preferences are satisfied to the best extent possible, and that persons act so as to maximise benefit with as little suffering as possible. That’s not mere platitude.

“So how will you objectively establish this weighting? After all, it's central to your thesis.”
There is an objective difference between the preferentiality of action, otherwise any action or consequence would be absolutely as good as all others. That one cannot absolutely establish this weighting is true, for we lack absolute knowledge of the consequences of potential action- but this does not diminish the necessity of acting with the knowledge that we have, similarly we don’t have absolute knowledge, that would prove the viability of the thesis that some things are preferable to others. Neither of us can absolutely advance an argument that disproves moral scepticism. Despite the absence of absolute, self-proving knowledge, it is still clearly preferable that less suffering occur than more; if you absolutely deny this then there exists nothing more to be advanced against you. All that can be done is try to convince persons that, persons suffer and that it would be preferable that this not occur, thus one ought to act to bring this around.

“It's also not true - it isn't "logically identical" at all.”
It is. Treat others as you would like to be treated clearly leads inevitably to utilitarianism. If you “love your neighbour as yourself” it is clear that you ought not to treat them, as if they were you, namely “I want a new polka dot shirt, therefore you too must have such a shirt!” Rather, you must treat the preferences of your “neighbour” as carrying equal weighting as your own, in themselves- thus being identical to utilitarianism.

“So Fred West was acting morally? He wanted to kill people and he thought that on the balance of probabilities he'd be happier if he did. He also considered that his happiness outweighed the needs of the others to live. QED.”
If some-one sincerely believes that they’re acting in the most moral way that they can then clearly the are, person’s morality, in themselves must be judged on their intention, not the success of their action, because clearly a good person is one who wishes to act correctly, not a person who’s actions are lucky enough to bring good consequences. If I bake you a nice cake to thank you for your debating, I am clearly not responsible if you have a nut allergy, or a chronic fear of cake. Conversely if try to poison you, but mistakenly slip walnuts (your favourite!) into the cake, rather than poisonous peanuts, I am clearly not a good person for doing so. Likewise if some complete madman thinks that killing every-one is a good plan, it makes no difference to the moral system itself. If some-one believes, in opposition to you, that the “rules of the game” are that “murder is very good because God said so,” it reflects the individual not the ethical reality.
“He obviously did, unless you think he was psychotically deranged. People usually act for what they see as the greater good, it's just that their view of what that is, will usually be tinged by selfishness. So Mao's vision of the greater good (i.e. power and wealth for him and China) allowed him to ride over the peasants' vision of the greater good (i.e. not starving).”
To be honest I think he doubtless was mad, but as I stated before this is a discussion for psychologists or historians, not ethicists. It is irrelevant if persons incorrectly discern what ethics (good) is, it is irrelevant if they define ethics correctly but incorrectly determine what would actually be preferable, it is irrelevant if they correctly determine what would be preferable but mistakenly discern what actions would bring about these preferences. All that is important is the acknowledgement that suffering is less preferable than less suffering, without privileging the avoidance of your own preference over others.

“I'd argue that indifference is the default state and that it's an absense of something, rather than an object in itself. If we're simply unaware that cheap jeans are bought by the suffering of others, then are we morally culpable? We're happy (in your terms) so there's clearly a good, but is it a moral good? Kant argues against happiness as a greater good, since he believed that happiness needed to be earned.”
Absence or object, is irrelevant, indifference is only pertinent to this discussion insofar as we both said that it was needed for this situation to occur.

Whether one is morally culpable is unimportant. What is important in deciding upon which action ought to occur is solely which action will bring about less actual suffering. If one is unaware of the suffering caused by an action, clearly the person acting unawares cannot be considered culpable, but culpability is irrelevant. It is good that persons are happy rather than that they suffer, per se, ‘good’ cannot be ascribed to happiness in itself in any other sense. What can be stated is whether a choice between actions is ‘good’ insofar that some will bring about more good than other, or whether the happiness of the jean-wearers is good, in the sense that the fulfilment of their preferences, providing their happiness, results in the greatest good overall, in this instance it doesn’t because their happiness necessitates a greater loss of happiness for those enslaved to provide it.
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jmj
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#827
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#827
Hi, I'm jmj and I'm very new to this forum but I LOVE Philosophy so I hope you'll accept the request I put in earlier to join this forum- how exactly do I know whether I'm accepted or rejected? Thanks
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wanderer
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#828
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#828
(Original post by jmj)
Hi, I'm jmj and I'm very new to this forum but I LOVE Philosophy so I hope you'll accept the request I put in earlier to join this forum- how exactly do I know whether I'm accepted or rejected? Thanks
You won't get rejected, we're very welcoming. Although you may find it take a while to get an acceptance, Ema's not around so much at the moment. Doesn't make any difference really - feel free to join in!
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Calvin
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#829
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#829
(though don't interrupt, their very intense at the moment I think )
Though chances are both are regretting all the talk they've commited themselves too by now and are just waiting for an excuse to stop.
What sort of philosophy are you into/have you done JMJ?
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wanderer
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#830
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#830
(Original post by Calvin)
(though don't interrupt, their very intense at the moment I think )
Though chances are both are regretting all the talk they've commited themselves too by now and are just waiting for an excuse to stop.
What sort of philosophy are you into/have you done JMJ?
I get really, really bored with ethics. It brings out the worst of the 'pointless argument between two entrenched positions' type of philosophy debate.
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TCovenant
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#831
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#831
(Original post by wanderer)
I get really, really bored with ethics. It brings out the worst of the 'pointless argument between two entrenched positions' type of philosophy debate.
Strange, to my view it is the most important thing possible. It may bring entrenched positions, but perhaps because it is so ultimately important?
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monty mike
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#832
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#832
(Original post by TCovenant)
Strange, to my view it is the most important thing possible. It may bring entrenched positions, but perhaps because it is so ultimately important?
Perhaps, but do the arguments ever really conclude? Often they are left open, both teams tired but unswayed in their views. I suppose it's a little entertainment if you enjoy the topic and hold strong opinions.

But then isn't this the case with most philosophical dispute? :rolleyes:
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TCovenant
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#833
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#833
(Original post by monty mike)
Perhaps, but do the arguments ever really conclude? Often they are left open, both teams tired but unswayed in their views. I suppose it's a little entertainment if you enjoy the topic and hold strong opinions.

But then isn't this the case with most philosophical dispute? :rolleyes:
You would expect people not to change their views easily when they're held very strongly, as is typical in ethics. Arguments about idealism, epistemology or some such might shift very easily in discussion, but only, probably, because most people discussing them casually don't have strongly held or lengthily-considered views. Ultimately I think such questions are more intractable and certainly much less fruitful than ethical discussion.
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jmj
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(Original post by Calvin)
(though don't interrupt, their very intense at the moment I think )
Though chances are both are regretting all the talk they've commited themselves too by now and are just waiting for an excuse to stop.
What sort of philosophy are you into/have you done JMJ?
Sorry, I didn't mean to interupt and thank you for letting me join! Um, the Philosophy I have done is Philosophy of Religion as part of my RS A Level- unfortuantely my school doesn't have Philosophy A Level as a seperate subject, but I really loved doing Philosophy of Religion and that first got me into the subject.

As for what I enjoy, anything really, although I'm probably ignorant about a lot of philosophy as I've only done religious (and I did ethical philosophy too) philosophy.

I'm hoping to do Philosophy for a year next year at uni- as at Lancaster which is where I want to go you get to do three subjects in the first year- and I've read Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintainence, which I think is an amazing philosophy book. Has anybody else read it?
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rahmara
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#835
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#835
ive just come across this question

"does anyone know how william james' 5 observations of the characteristics of religous experiences forms an argument?"

we havent really learnt william james in detial, and exams just round the corner

what are the 5 observations?

is it something to do with unconsciousness, mysticism and pragmatism?
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jmj
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#836
Um no sorry which is quite bad cos I'm doing Religious Experience too! I haven't even learned about pragmatism... which exam board are you with?
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Calvin
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#837
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You're doing William James at A-level? Yeek.

(Original post by TCovenant)
(Original post by Wanderer)
I get really, really bored with ethics. It brings out the worst of the 'pointless argument between two entrenched positions' type of philosophy debate.
Strange, to my view it is the most important thing possible. It may bring entrenched positions, but perhaps because it is so ultimately important?
Maybe that's the difference. I think having a systematic theory of morality is the least important thing, so I just can't engage in discussion on it fully. I mean, its important to know what is right and wrong in a situation, but I just can't bing myself to believe that there is some underlying basis to our conscious moral evaluations which represents some ethical theory like Utilitarianism, or even God's commandments. I find some things moral, somethings immoral, you disagree with me, its no big deal.
The only time it becomes important is say when you are legislating about abortion for example, but then no ethical theory is ever going to satisfy everybody anyway, you'll still have abortionist and anti-abortionist, or pro-euthanasia Vs anti-euthanasia debate, just at the ethical theory level.

Essentially, ethical disagreements seem the most incommensurable type. You could easily agree on every rational point, and yet still disagree on the conclusion just because you come with different moral views. The same is probably true on all philosophical discussions, but in general the approach there is mora about discussing an issue, and less with forceful debate. In ethics that's rare I find, usually because people hold such strong feelings about ethical issues, calm sympathetic discussion is much less common.

So just generally Ethical discussions seem much less urgent, and much less open to sympathetic discussion
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wanderer
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#838
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(Original post by Calvin)
You're doing William James at A-level? Yeek.
Only his ideas on religious experience. Rahmara, the characteristics as far as I can remember are: noetic quality (passes on otherwise unattainable knowledge), ineffability (the experience cannot be adequately described through language), fixed duration (that may not be the correct name, but thats what it is), and passivity (the person undergoing the experience has no control over it). I'm pretty sure there are only four - there are 5 classifications of religious experience given by Richard Swinburne, were you thinking of those?

(Original post by Calvin)
Maybe that's the difference. I think having a systematic theory of morality is the least important thing, so I just can't engage in discussion on it fully. I mean, its important to know what is right and wrong in a situation, but I just can't bing myself to believe that there is some underlying basis to our conscious moral evaluations which represents some ethical theory like Utilitarianism, or even God's commandments. I find some things moral, somethings immoral, you disagree with me, its no big deal.
The only time it becomes important is say when you are legislating about abortion for example, but then no ethical theory is ever going to satisfy everybody anyway, you'll still have abortionist and anti-abortionist, or pro-euthanasia Vs anti-euthanasia debate, just at the ethical theory level.

Essentially, ethical disagreements seem the most incommensurable type. You could easily agree on every rational point, and yet still disagree on the conclusion just because you come with different moral views. The same is probably true on all philosophical discussions, but in general the approach there is mora about discussing an issue, and less with forceful debate. In ethics that's rare I find, usually because people hold such strong feelings about ethical issues, calm sympathetic discussion is much less common.

So just generally Ethical discussions seem much less urgent, and much less open to sympathetic discussion
I agree pretty much word for word. Ethics in practice I consider to be very important, probably due to how I was brought up (in combination with my genes, of course ) but I don't think any kind of supposedly rational theory or system has much to do with it.
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grumballcake
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(Original post by TCovenant)
They are preferred by the people who hold the preference, by definition. It doesn’t matter that different persons prefer different things, and thus that preferring ‘any specific thing’ is not universal. What is universal is that people prefer that which they prefer, which is sufficient.
[...]
a benefit is defined by net preferences, namely the preferences of all those affected,
[...]
What is important in deciding upon which action ought to occur is solely which action will bring about less actual suffering.
Now here's the problem. You accept that the preferences can only be valued by the preferrer and that everybody has their own preference system. Yet you seem to have an abstract valuation of suffering, which from your other comments is simply a negative preference. So how will you evaluate the amount of suffering? You can't compute the net benefit unless you have a quantitative measure of the positive and negative quantities.

Bentham understood this, as did other utilitarians. That's why he came up with his calculus - so that decisions could be made upon objective criteria. What you're proposing is a subjective measure between incommensurable systems. It's doomed from the outset.
you cause harm (denying preferences) by fulfilling your own, and in harming the other person for pleasure you will bring greater harm to yourself
Non sequitur. You're assuming that no-one actually enjoys torturing others, or that there's some other measurement of benefit outside the preferences. In other words, you're trying to have your cake and eat it. You can argue that torture harms the other person (since it violates their preferences) but you can't simultaneously argue that it harms the torturer except by appealing to a different definition of harm.
This isn’t a mix with situation ethics, though in my view all coherent ethical systems are reducible to utilitarianism and situation ethics (correctly interpreted) is perfectly coherent.
Frankly, that's nonsense. Theism is perfectly coherent but is not reducible in that fashion.
If you accept that the preferences of all ought to be considered without bias, then you would be forced to concur with the utilitarian system, outlined above.
I don't and I wouldn't. There's no point trying to bludgeon me into agreement, or claiming that your system is not only perfect, but that everyone agrees with it really. I ignore preferences on a regular basis, as do you. I'd prefer you to radically criticise your own position ad to understand the glaring weaknesses in it. You'd prefer me to believe that your system actually replaces my own. I suspect that neither of us considers those preferences to override our own.
How would one create a system to “back up” the statement that that which best fulfils the preferences of all persons who have preferences, is that which is most preferable.
Bentham and Mill both made a stab at it; why won't you? Is it that you're too keen to keep vague and woolly statements in lieu of real thought? The system of utilitarianism is hard work and anyone who starts on the endeavour pretty soon discovers that vague platitudes are useless in the face of real-world decisions.

It's blindingly obvious that we want to get the situation where everybody wins. Yet what if they can't? Again, it's simplistic to say "take the course of least harm". That's not news as every system faces the same constraints. So we face that decision in medical triage, or allocating bonuses within a company. Just saying "do the best you can" is a waste of breath. We need a concrete system in place that allows us to make such decisions on an impartial, objective basis. That's because we westerners believe that objectivity achieves an ethical goal of fairness, but that's not a given in many cultures. You want such a system since you want to be "taking account of all agents who prefer, without bias" although you don't say why bias is ethically wrong.
Of course one can’t know absolutely what will bring the greatest good, defined as the greatest fulfilment of preferences for all persons who hold preferences;
You haven't even started to say how you'll get or weigh those preferences. Until you do, you're just banging an empty soup can.
Act utilitarianism is the best formulation, as its clearest, but essentially there’s no distinction between the two, logically carried out. Rule utilitarianism would provide identical results to act utilitarianism as the only rule that could rationally be formulated would be act in all cases so as to maximise good. Likewise, the formulation of utilitarianism as maximising happiness over suffering is identical to preference utilitarianism if formulated correctly.
This isn't an exam, so please don't try to blind me with essay waffle. I can look up and critique any of the flavours of utilitarianism, thanks. If there were really no difference, people wouldn't bother to reformulate them. Don't assume that thinkers like Mill etc were fools. They at least understood that the theory had to have a practical application and that, as proposed by Bentham, it had major flaws.

I'm rapidly coming to the conclusion that you haven't actually read much about utilitarianism beyond the most superficial coverage. Have you read Bentham's "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation" for example? I mean the whole book by the way, not just the extracts in A-level textbooks.
If some-one sincerely believes that they’re acting in the most moral way that they can then clearly the are, person’s morality, in themselves must be judged on their intention, not the success of their action,
Oh dear, I think we're about to part company most dramatically. That's probably the most naive thing I've seen for a while. So convicted paedophiles, rapists and mass murderers are all excused as long as they meant it for the best? That surely can't be what you mean.
if some complete madman thinks that killing every-one is a good plan,
What makes him mad? He simply has preferences which are different from yours.
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rahmara
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#840
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(Original post by jmj)
Um no sorry which is quite bad cos I'm doing Religious Experience too! I haven't even learned about pragmatism... which exam board are you with?
OCR's the exam board



nearly finished revising the ethics part
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