Was there a viable alternative to appeasement?

Three alternatives were put forward, but were they realistic and would they have succeeded in preventing war as Churchill suggests..?

1. Put forward by members of labour party, pacifist opponents who hoped that moral force through the collective pressure from the League could halt the expansion of the agressive powers

2. [probably the most plausible..] Call from the right for the formation of an assertive military alliance against Germany.

3. Beck [Commander of the German Armed forces] offered the British Gov. the possibility of arresting Hitler if the British PM stood firm against the German dictator.

1. Would this have really worked? - it failed against Japan [Manchuria] and Italy [Abyssinia] why should it succeed now?

2. Russia [perhaps the only ally that really could have prevented German agression since it would leave her encircled] were, according to Chamberlain, not to be trusted. Moreover, the commanders of the Soviet's army had recently been purged and Britain did not think the force of her army would be particularly advantageous & fear of communism

3. Wasn't the peacetime norm for British diplomacy to take the side of resistance groups in other states - should they, in the circumstances, make an acception? - NO... they couldn't bank on this plan being successful..

So do we conclude that there was no viable alternative?... anyone have any suggestions - they would be much appreciated :smile:

Reply 1

FadeToBlackout

roseannafrascona

So do we conclude that there was no viable alternative?... anyone have any suggestions - they would be much appreciated :smile:

Don't forget the political motives as well. Britain until 1937-8 or so was, basically, tortured with the past of the Great War; the collective feeling was "Never Again". Any politician who suggested anything other than Appeasement (such as Churchill) would be branded a warmonger and would be dropped from view- they were a political liability and would have lost votes.

Also, you might want to consider the relative expense of other courses of action. Appeasement was cheap and in a time of economic poverty, the government couldn't really have done anything else; even when the decision was made to re-arm, it didn't really begin properly until after 1938 when economic conditions were better. And, indeed, when rearmament did take place, it was with the cheap options. The RAF, for example, was to gain new squadrons to police the Empire because they were cheaper to support than the Navy.

And, finally, you might wish to consider the fact that appeasement was a tried and tested part of British foreign policy, that had been successfully used over the previous century. Yet this was appeasement from a position of strength; appeasement from aposition of weakness just made Britain look weak, for example after Munich in 1938 when Hitler unashamedly broke the appeasement terms through occupying Czechoslovakia, but nothing was done because Britain was too weak.

Reply 2

Zetetic

It's also worth remembering that for a surprisingly long period of time there was notable British sympathy for Hitler's actions, and the possibility of alliance (particularly with a Monarch who is posthumously vilified for his pro-Nazi leanings) would have been far preferable in the mid 1930s to another Great War, as FTB has pointed out.

To oversimplify, when appeasement began, War was not an option. Once Hitler's meteoric rearmament process was underway, we had to bide our time in order to even consider war. To be honest, I think if there should be a historical emphasis on the preamble to WWII (which I'm not sure there should be), it should be on the fact that we actually *did* declare War, rather than seeking some sort of alliance.

With hindsight it's all too easy to leap up and down for accusing the British for being overly naive, but the fact is that historians are as good at speculative history as they are at predicting the future.

Reply 3

liamb

Yes, tough Appeasement.

This basically what Lord Salisbury used against America in 1894. Essentially, we don't want a war, but if you persist the war that follows will produce only a pyrric victory at best. So you would be better off talking than fighting. If you reject talks we will go to war.

Also, in the aftermath of the Boer War when the UK realised 'splendid isolation' would no longer work, Britain gradually built up alliances (i.e. with Japan in 1902)
and understandings (the Entente with France in 1904) so it would be more powerful politically - and hence able to use diplomacy in international crises to make war seem less attractive and banish the idea that if war came it would be small and local. (Hitler believed in 1939 that war in Poland would be just that).

Britain's relucance to put together any (let alone a credible) framework of alliances and understandings seriously undermined its position in the 1930's. It also allowed France's Little Entente to fall apart. This really ignored the cardinal rule of British diplomacy since 1690 - namely join any alliance/grouping that would prevent the most powerful state in Europe from aggressively pursuing hegamony.

Another problem was that Chamberlain failed to call a European (or even Global with the US) conference on a possible revision of Versailles. Had this been done, Hitler would have been forced into a one-time agreement that would have left him isolated if violated it. A parallel exists with either the Congress of Berlin (1878) or Algericas (1906) where all the great powers and some minor ones were called together to sort out a definative solution to war threatening situations. Chamberlain made no serious attempt to engage either the Soviets or the Americans in his diplomacy. Previous PMs (Disraeli, Balfour) did even though they viewed France, Russia and Germany with extreme distaste at times. Peace and a working solution were more important to them.

None of the above asks for fanastic changes as in many 'what-if' histories. It simply required a little more robustness, clearly defined long term aims and the putting aside of personal prejudices. A good PM should be able to do that.
Chamberlain chose not to. (Nor did Baldwin or MacDonald or Lord North [1775]).

Reply 4

Zetetic

Unfortunately, the Americans were still bent upon 'splendid isolation,' and a revision of the treaty of Versailles was most unlikely to get past the French, especially with the idealistic views of the Americans out of the equation. If Hitler himself had been at the discussion table, I'm tempted to suppose that proceedings would have been even worse. The German economy was geared for war. Schact and Goring had both been adamant that unless the Germans covered ground, regained industry, and did so quickly, the foundation upon which the Nazi's 'economic miracle' (which to this day baffles historical economists) was founded would give way.

I'm not sure that Chamberlain had many options. It's odd, but I feel that he's a man who needs defending - he could hardly have expected to rise to power with war top of his political agenda, and once the political boulder of the appeasement policy had been set in motion, conferences and similarly time-wasting tactics became the only viable solution that would maintain public support; the fear of war cannot be overstressed. It seems very unlikely that the Americans would have been willing to reingage in militaristic European politics after the Abyssinian disaster and horrific shortcomings of the LON.

Reply 5

roseannafrascona

Whilst it is true that in March 1939 Britain was still arguably underprepared for war and, of course, the memories of the first world war had not been forgotten, I have difficulty finding reasons why Britain felt prepared to go to war 6 months later, over Poland. Many of the arguments against going to war over the invasion of Moravia, Bohemia & Prague in March do not seem to alter when we analyse the situation in September: geographical positioning was still awkward, public opinion largely had been outraged after the attack on Prague and in terms of the economy/ military issues, surely whatever was achieved in terms of bettering these circumstances would have been less that Czechoslovakia, as a force against the Nazi's, could have provided?

At this late stage [March 1939] surely war was inevitable anyway...

As for the argument that the gov. had not decided about an alliance with Russia in March, I find this unconvincing - originally the rejected Stalin's request entierly and then sent an envoy by slow boat who, since he had no real power, had to refer back to London constantly! - I think Britain had already decided about the Soviet Union [well, Chamberlain had at least, after all she was not invited to Munich etc] so essentially waiting 6 months just meant that they lost the force of Czechoslovakia & the Nazi-Soviet Pact was made, clearly strengtherning Hitler's position.

Could it just have been that there was no respectable way to back out of the Polish agreement? [But that Britain didn't actually expect it to lead to war] whilst there HAD been a way to back out of Munich [since Hitler forced the Slovakians to declare themselves an independent state?] - Britain wanted to retain some amount to status and security, if they had not acted in September, any chance of this would have been lost..?

It seems to me that they DID loose respect/ status/ force of Czechoslovakia and also gave the Nazi's & Soviet's a chance to make their 'non-agression Pact'

March or September... which was more advantageous? [in March was Chamberlain still clinging to the possibility of peace?]

Reply 6

roseannafrascona

Oh, and thaaaanks for all the other suggestions :smile:

Reply 7

Zetetic

War probably was inevitable by March, but it was still undesirable - any time for clandestine preparation would presumably have been advantageous. Certainly the government did not wish to raise the guaranteed public consternation and alarm until the latest possible date. Having said that, Chamberlain's cabinet would also have been bearing in mind the necessity to prepare the public as efficiently and wholly as possible - It's tentative, but if war had been declared any earlier, a significantly prolonged 'Phony War' may have been problematic.

Additionally, it was only after Germany disobeyed both French and British ultimatums that the government realised that their bargaining chips were worthless - if there were no means by which appeasement could delay Hitler's advance, a declaration of war doubled as a last ditch attempt to sway German body politic without actual conflict.

Reply 8

Jackathon

Well, if they didnt try and appease him and they did storm in guns blazing. A new Hitler would emerge, and instead of using the war guilt clause and the fall of the weimar repulic, he/she would've used Britian arresting Hitler as another reason for the war.

Appeasement, wasn't really optional, but, how far they appeased him was. They let him get away with too much.