Anyone help with an intro for negligence e.g breach of duty , psychiatric harm and cases please
Essentially , if you want to know where to look:
Duty of care under Caparo v Dickman per Lord Bridge, requiring a relationship of proximity , foreseeable harm and that it is FJR to impose liability.
Per Lord Wilberforce in McLoughlin v O'Brien the usual Donoghue test does not apply because of the worry about floodgates (which Lord Bridge thought to be exaggerated) - need proximity of time, space, perception and relationship.
This was then developed in Alcock v CC per Lord Oliver , requiring that a primary victim be 'mediately or immediately' involved, including rescuers and unwitting agents of misfortune (see e.g. Dooley v Cammell). This was then adapted in White v CC such that the individual must be in the 'foreseeable zone' of danger, with Lord Hoffmann specifically rejecting rescuers for being too uncertain (although see McFarlane v Caledonia), and unwitting agents suggested also to be removed.
It then seems that being in the zone is not enough - need reasonable fear by C, which is also not enough (Hegarty v Caledonia), but also need D to have reasonably foreseen C would fear the situation. However, some cases suggest C need not fear for themselves at all (e.g. Young v Charles Church) and that being in the zone is enough.
You then have secondary victims, per Alcock, which requires proximity of time and space (extending both temporally and spatially forward: McLoughlin), proximity of perception (with your own unaided senses: White, and can be out of sight: Hambrook v Stokes Bros) and proximity of relationship (with rebuttable relationships being between spouses and parents and children, as settled in Alcock, but cases such as McCarthy v Chief Constable show other relationships can be established, in that case between two half-brothers).
Finally, the case of employers, where per Lady Hale in Hatton v Sutherland, it is sufficient that there was foreseeability of psychiatric injury, although stress is insufficient and both the CoA and the HoL were unanimous that no profession in particular is more likely to result in psychiatric injury or such injury to be 'more foreseeable'. Examples of breaching this duty once it is owed is not offering counselling, although offering counselling is not a panacea (Daw v Intel) and it should be noted that in most cases, the fact that an employee will try and hide their struggles protects the employer (Pratley v Surrey CC).
There have also, additionally, been cases which remove cases that would usually fail under the primary/secondary victim test and allow them to succeed under the employee heading, or by finding an assumption of responsibility. For example, Melville v Home Office must be based largely on the principle that the employer failed to give counselling, rather than the suicide itself being seen as causal. Additionally, the courts were creative in Butchart v Home Office in finding the relationship between a prisoner and the prison itself to be akin to an employee relationship, allowing a claim, and in the case of W v Essex CC it is better to perceive it as a claim for the public authority's breach of duty rather than in the primary/secondary victim framework.
BREACH OF DUTY
The normal test is Blyth v Birmingham Water Works, based on whether or not the reasonable person would have behaved the same way, but the courts take various things into account.
In regard to the characteristics that can be attributed to this 'reasonable person', it seems clear that their experience is irrelevant (Nettleship v Weston), as is sickness (Barnett v Kensington), unless the illness was unknown (Weetabix v Manfield) and unless the 'experience' is their age and (perhaps) their gender (Mullin v Richards). It also seems clear that the courts determine the reasonable person based on the nature of the task (Wells v Cooper) and that if they are a professional professing a certain standard, they will be held to this standard (Maynard v West Midlands).
Likelihood of harm --> Bolton v Stone suggested an individual would not seek to minimise the smallest of harm, but Wagon Mound suggested it is all a question of degree.
Gravity of harm --> Paris v Stepney BC suggested that the fact that a partially sighted employee might lose both eyes meant that precautions should have been taken to stop that happening, but likelihood is that now such precautions would be required regardless of the employee's number of eyes (Lunney and Oliphant).
Context --> Consider if it is for social utility (Tomlinson v Congleton; s.1 Compensation Act 2006), if it was an emergency situation (Adams v Lancashire; Baker v TE Hopkins) and if it took place in the context of a game, where specific injuries might be consented to (Blake v Galloway; R v Barnes; Condon v Basi)
Cost of precautions --> Lord Reid in Bolton thought such considerations were inappropriate to consider, but Latimer v AEC suggested they may be pertinent if the cost of precautions would be astronomical compared to the harm that might be caused. However, Palmer v CC suggested this is unlikely to ever be a justification.
You also need to consider specific standards that the defendant might be held to. For example;
Doctors --> Bolam v Friern, with the Bolitho gloss
Employers --> Morton v William Dixon per Lord Dunedin, although no longer strictly followed
Industry standards --> Not usually followed exactly (Tesco v Pollard) and not relevant if a standard *almost* applied (Chipchase v British Titan)
Other professions --> Suggestion that Bolam could apply outside of doctors (Gold v Haringey)
Advise Sarah, Rashid and Diana of any claims they may have and againstwhom.