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stackelberg

Hi could you please help me with this problem? been trying for hours, seems so confusing

Suppose that two ﬁrms, a “leader” (L) and a “follower” (F), compete in a Stackelberg fashion: the leader chooses their quantity before the follower. Suppose that the leader has constant marginal costs equal to cL = 5 while the follower has constant marginal costs cF. The inverse demand function is given by p = 10−Q, where Q = qL + qF.
(a) Solve for the (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium quantities of the two ﬁrms

(b) With reference to your answer to part (a) of this question, for what levels of cF do we have q∗ F > q∗ L in equilibrium? Discuss