Invitation to Treat / Offer question

Hi All,

Was wondering if people thought the following would be an offer or an invitation to treat?

Hand written note
Posted specifically to a individual
with the following statement

"Figs for sale. 100kg of freshly picked figs. $10 for each kilogram. Ready on the 20th march 2008 and delivered on the same day in the afternoon."

On it's own I would say it is an invitation to treat - like an advertisement. However as it is only addressed to one person in handwriting could it be seen as an offer? Even though the amount of fruit has been settled upon. Would I be right to say that it is dependant upon the promisor's intent of the note?

Any sources of case law would be much appreciated.

Regards
Dwib

Reply 1

x__Indigo_x

on first glance i would argue that it is an offer but if this is an exam/essay i would argue how it could be seen as both using relevant case law ie .Gibson V Manchester city council- an offer is a statement which objectively indicates that the offeror is prepared to contract on specifed terms.

Patridge v crittenden - advertisements are normally invitations to treat [here it is hand written to indv though so argue that if it was a public adv may fail]

i searched lexis and couldnt find any cases to do with handwritten notes though.

sorry i cant help any more im busy with law work myself :frown:

Trusts

Reply 2

x__Indigo_x

found this under revision notes
Invitations to treat
Goods Displayed on Shelves
Pharmaceutical Society of GB –v- Boots Cash Chemists [1953]
Pharmacy and Poisons Act 1933 – chemist to be present at point of sale. Point of sale was cash desk, displaying of product was invitation only.
Freedom of contract preserved – shops can refuse sale
Goods Displayed in Shop Window
Fisher –v- Bell [1961]
Offensive Weapons Act 1959 – sale of prohibited weapons. Failed as display was not sale, rather invitation to treat.
Advertisements
Partridge –v- Crittenden [1968]
Protection of Birds Act 1954 – “Bramblefinch cocks and hens 25s each” not an offer.
Lack of objectivity
Gibson –v- Manchester City Council [1979]
G invited to buy house. M invited application on “may be prepared to sell” basis. Not an offer.
Mere statement of price
Harvey –v- Facey [1893]
Sale of Penn. H: “telegram lowest price”. F: “lowest acceptable £900”. Not an offer, merely statement.
Lots at Auction
Harris –v- Nickerson [1873]
Furniture listed in catalogue, H hoped to buy. Items withdrawn. Advertising was invitation to treat, acceptance only at fall of hammer.
British Car Auctions –v- Wright [1972]
Prosecution for selling unroadworthy car. No offer to sell at auction. Failed.

Not Invitation to Treat
Unilateral Offer
Carlill –c- Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893]
Promise to pay £100 for unsuccessful usage in advert was an offer that could be accepted by anyone.
Statement of Price where offer is intended
Biggs –v- Boyd Gibbins [1971]
B: “for a quick sale I will accept £26,000”. BG accepts and B affirms. There is an offer.
Competitive tendering
Spencer –v- Harding [1870]
Invitation to submit tenders is not an offer to sell to highest bidder.
BUT: Harvela Investments –v- Royal Trust of Canada [1986]
Advert stipulated sale to highest bidder. Lowest bidder stated $2,100,000 or £101,000 in excess of any other. H sued successfully. Wording ensured offer could only be accepted by H.
Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club –v- Blackpool BC [1990]
Council put up airport pleasure flight usage for competitive tender. Stated not bound by any bid. Tender time closed early. RR Helicopters won. Council discovered mistake and re-run but legal threat from RRH. Court acknowledged implied undertaking to operate by the set rules.
Auctions without reserve
Warlow -v- Harrison [1859]
Collateral contract created between the highest bona fide bidder and the auctioneer himself when the auctioneer refuses sale.
Barry –v- Davies [2000]
Auction without reserve withdrawn, thus auctioneer refused sale to claimant (2 x £200). Then sold privately for £750 each. Existence of collateral contract - £27,600 damages.

Offer
Must be communicated to the offeree
Taylor –v- Laird [1856]
T gave up captaincy and worked as member of crew, wages claim failed, owner had no knowledge.
Inland Revenue Commissioners –v- Fry [2001]
F owed £113,000; F sends £10,000 cheque “in full and final settlement to be accepted when banked”. IRC procedure to bank before correspondence. Court held unilateral offer could be accepted but IRC had no knowledge, hence ignorant and thus no acceptance.
Can be made to the whole world
Carlill –v- Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893]
Must be certain
Guthing –v- Lynn [1831]
£5 more “if horse is lucky” is too vague.
Can be withdrawn at any time before acceptance
Routledge –v- Grant [1828]
G offered house for sale for 6 weeks. Withdrew early, legitimate as no acceptance had occurred.
Withdrawal must be communicated
Byrne –v- Tienhoven [1880]
VT: 1st October offered sale in writing, 8th October withdrew. B: 11th October accepted by telegram, 15th October confirmed in writing. 20th October received VTs withdrawal. Invalid.
Communication can be by reliable third party
Dickinson –v- Dodds [1876]
B notified Di that Do had withdrawn offer to sell houses. B was a mutual acquaintance, therefore notification valid.
Unilateral offer cannot be withdrawn during performance of the offeree
Errington –v- Errington & Woods [1952]
Father mortgages house in own name. Promised son and daughter in law it would be theirs after mortgage paid off. Father’s promise could not be withdrawn so long as mortgage paid off.

Reply 3

x__Indigo_x

http://www.thestudentroom.co.uk/showthread.php?t=540006 discussion on inv to treat here too

Reply 4

Rami Samara

Primarily, goods on display in a shop window are traditionally considered to be mere "invitations to treat", or otherwise, in terms of seriousness, somewhat below a full offer (Pharmaceutical Society of GB v Boots, Fisher v Bell).

Should a conflict subsequently emerge from this situation, the store may well have a defense in that there appears to be little to indicate that their signage indicates a full offer exists at this stage.

Nevertheless, the statement "Absolutely first come, first served" may instead be dragged in as a rebuttal (with reference to the famous "Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball"). Indeed the information given (price, sale, "absolutely" is hard to justify as mere "puff"). Should a court be persuaded that the claims and wording are sufficiently strong so that a reasonable person might consider that they WOULD indeed receive a TV upon payment of 50p, then a full legal offer may be considered to have been made by the advert.

In this case, it appears as if the fellow waiting outside might well attempt to make that case, and cite his own actions in waiting, having cash with him, and so on as evidence, in the event of a dispute.

Did the manager indicate that the deal would have a certain longevity, or that it would only be valid for a certain period (from Monday 9:00 am, etc.), and so on ? Surely he might counter with the defense that in actuality the terms are lacking in specifics in this case. If not so, and then we enter into the question of clarity of terms, but that is a different matter entirely.

Daulia v Four Millbank Nominees, and Errington v Errington & Woods provide authority regarding the binding of the offeror once the offeree has started performance. Of course, a defense here would be straightforward: unlike in Errington (where a significant history of payments were proven) no payments were accepted of William, and unlike Daulia (where terms had already been negotiated, and a verbal unilateral offer made) the offer/ITT as it stands seems somewhat thin. Indeed, both cases already pre-suppose that an offer has definitely been made, which as discussed is far from clear in this case that we have her.

In any case, the signage was taken down prior to William actually entering the store, paying money or any other such action that was actually. William, in this case before us now, would then have to prove that actually waiting outside a shop was somehow an implicit (presumably) part of any offer.

Furthermore in any defense, it is possible that the manager might also wish to call upon the authority of Harris v Nickerson, where a plaintiff attempted to pursure a claim of breach of contract after travelling a great distance in order to attend an auction (cancelled at the last minute). In that case, auction catalogues where deemed indeed to be mere ITT, and the fact that the plaintiff was put to inconvenience was considered immaterial to the matter.

I might imagine that William would have to overcome that paritcular objection in any pursuit of action. After all, nobody TOLD him to camp outside the shop.