cgj300399
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Hi guys , not sure if theres any philosophy teachers/tutors on here - but thought it would be worth a crack asking if anyone would mind giving me some feedback on my 25 marker structure
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cgj300399
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How should propositional knowledge be defined?

Propositional knowledge cannot not be defined as justified true belief (JTB) due to a plethora of fragility remaining ; conditions not being individually necessary, its lack of coherency as exposed by Gettier, and most significantly the fact that propositional knowledge cannot be defined because propositional knowledge lacks real essence -as evident by the failure to define propositional knowledge post-JTB as a result of propositional knowledge lacking real essence despite being in cognitive contact with reality.

Firstly, incoherency with propositional knowledge’s definition as JTB is called into question by the argument of whether the conditions are individually necessary, as one can question how coherent the definition of propositional knowledge is, when one is able to achieve knowledge without belief, because although it seems credible that p can only be known if you believe that p – the fact that propositional knowledge can be achieved without belief in the case of Clara knowing the directions to San Jose despite not believing that she knows the way indicates that the conditions to JTB, and thus propositional knowledge are not individually necessary, as JT can be used to define propositional knowledge. Additionally, one can question how coherent the definition of propositional knowledge is necessary the justification condition is, when one is able to achieve knowledge without justification, because although it seems credible that s can only know p if s is justified in doing so – the fact that knowledge can be achieved without justification in the case of ‘John the calendar man’ being able to know everyone’s birthday based on empiricism alone indicates that the conditions to JTB knowledge, and thus propositional knowledge are not individually necessary, as TB can be used to define propositional knowledge. But, the fact that JT and TB, as well as JTB can be claimed to substantiate propositional knowledge shows evidential incoherency within the definition of propositional knowledge because it is logically impossible for knowledge to have 3 distinct definitions that contradict one another. Therefore, in the instance of JTB’s definition of propositional knowledge, it fails to define propositional knowledge as its conditions are not individually necessary, and thus propositional knowledge’s definition is incoherent.

Secondly, incoherency with propositional knowledge’s definition as JTB is called into question by the argument of whether the conditions are jointly-sufficient, as one can question how coherent the definition of propositional knowledge is, when one is able to achieve false-propositional knowledge by JTB– the fact that knowledge can be falsely achieved by JTB in Gettier’s case of ‘Smith and Jones’ as a result of Smith’s belief being true by luck, and being unjustly-justified , thus intrinsically contradicts Plato’s purpose for JTB as a definition of knowledge, because according to Plato, knowledge is acquired by reason not luck. However, one can argue that Propositional knowledge can still be defined as a result of Infallibism’s ability to counteract the ‘Smith and Jones’ example due to the fact that if the justification condition was strengthened by required certainty ; Gettier’s example would crumble, as Smith knowledge would be contingently true, not necessarily true because one can logically doubt that Jones via Smith’s methodology , will get the job. But the fact that infallibism can lead to scepticism about the existence of knowledge that goes against our intuition such as the fact that the sun will rise tomato – allows me to evaluate that infallibism is not a coherent definition of propositional knowledge and thus is no stronger than JTB, despite its ability to counteract the Gettier case. Therefore, in the instance of JTBs and Infallibism’s definition of propositional knowledge, both fail to define knowledge as JTB’s conditions are not jointly sufficient, and infallibism leads to scepticism of propositional knowledge that I intuitively know is common sense, and thus propositional knowledge’s definition is incoherent.

Thirdly, incoherency with propositional knowledge’s definition as JTB is called into question by the argument of whether propositional knowledge can even be defined, as one can question how coherent the definition of propositional knowledge is, when it is not even able to achieve a real definition due to it not forming a natural kind, whereas water does at it is tautologically H20 – the fact that propositional knowledge lacks a real definition indicates that such present definitions for propositional knowledge (JTB, infallibism, no false lemmas, reliabilism and virtue epistemology) lack coherency for one to grant propositional knowledge a real definition. However, Zagzebski argues that propositional knowledge can still be defined as a result of making sure that a definition of propositional knowledge avoids circularity, negativity, obscurity and ad hoc. But this relies on a real definition to be available to test, and thus is circumstantial, and in fact indirectly ratifies my judgement that propositional knowledge cannot be defined because current proposed definitions fail to not commit a fallacy of Zagzebski ‘do not do’s’. Therefore, in the instance of JTB, infallibism, no false lemmas, reliabilsm and virtue epistemology – all commit at least one fallacy on Zagzebski do not do’s, and as a result fail to offer a real definition for propositional knowledge, and thus propositional knowledge cannot be defined.

In conclusion, propositional knowledge cannot be defined due to a plethora of fragility remaining via the unavailability of a real definition before and after Gettier that is coherent, but also the fact that via Ockham razor, perhaps propositional knowledge can never be defined due to it lacking real essence, like a dandelion failing to be defined as a plant or a weed.
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(Original post by cgj300399)
How should propositional knowledge be defined?

Propositional knowledge cannot not be defined as justified true belief (JTB) due to a plethora of fragility remaining ; conditions not being individually necessary, its lack of coherency as exposed by Gettier, and most significantly the fact that propositional knowledge cannot be defined because propositional knowledge lacks real essence -as evident by the failure to define propositional knowledge post-JTB as a result of propositional knowledge lacking real essence despite being in cognitive contact with reality.

Firstly, incoherency with propositional knowledge’s definition as JTB is called into question by the argument of whether the conditions are individually necessary, as one can question how coherent the definition of propositional knowledge is, when one is able to achieve knowledge without belief, because although it seems credible that p can only be known if you believe that p – the fact that propositional knowledge can be achieved without belief in the case of Clara knowing the directions to San Jose despite not believing that she knows the way indicates that the conditions to JTB, and thus propositional knowledge are not individually necessary, as JT can be used to define propositional knowledge. Additionally, one can question how coherent the definition of propositional knowledge is necessary the justification condition is, when one is able to achieve knowledge without justification, because although it seems credible that s can only know p if s is justified in doing so – the fact that knowledge can be achieved without justification in the case of ‘John the calendar man’ being able to know everyone’s birthday based on empiricism alone indicates that the conditions to JTB knowledge, and thus propositional knowledge are not individually necessary, as TB can be used to define propositional knowledge. But, the fact that JT and TB, as well as JTB can be claimed to substantiate propositional knowledge shows evidential incoherency within the definition of propositional knowledge because it is logically impossible for knowledge to have 3 distinct definitions that contradict one another. Therefore, in the instance of JTB’s definition of propositional knowledge, it fails to define propositional knowledge as its conditions are not individually necessary, and thus propositional knowledge’s definition is incoherent.

Secondly, incoherency with propositional knowledge’s definition as JTB is called into question by the argument of whether the conditions are jointly-sufficient, as one can question how coherent the definition of propositional knowledge is, when one is able to achieve false-propositional knowledge by JTB– the fact that knowledge can be falsely achieved by JTB in Gettier’s case of ‘Smith and Jones’ as a result of Smith’s belief being true by luck, and being unjustly-justified , thus intrinsically contradicts Plato’s purpose for JTB as a definition of knowledge, because according to Plato, knowledge is acquired by reason not luck. However, one can argue that Propositional knowledge can still be defined as a result of Infallibism’s ability to counteract the ‘Smith and Jones’ example due to the fact that if the justification condition was strengthened by required certainty ; Gettier’s example would crumble, as Smith knowledge would be contingently true, not necessarily true because one can logically doubt that Jones via Smith’s methodology , will get the job. But the fact that infallibism can lead to scepticism about the existence of knowledge that goes against our intuition such as the fact that the sun will rise tomato – allows me to evaluate that infallibism is not a coherent definition of propositional knowledge and thus is no stronger than JTB, despite its ability to counteract the Gettier case. Therefore, in the instance of JTBs and Infallibism’s definition of propositional knowledge, both fail to define knowledge as JTB’s conditions are not jointly sufficient, and infallibism leads to scepticism of propositional knowledge that I intuitively know is common sense, and thus propositional knowledge’s definition is incoherent.

Thirdly, incoherency with propositional knowledge’s definition as JTB is called into question by the argument of whether propositional knowledge can even be defined, as one can question how coherent the definition of propositional knowledge is, when it is not even able to achieve a real definition due to it not forming a natural kind, whereas water does at it is tautologically H20 – the fact that propositional knowledge lacks a real definition indicates that such present definitions for propositional knowledge (JTB, infallibism, no false lemmas, reliabilism and virtue epistemology) lack coherency for one to grant propositional knowledge a real definition. However, Zagzebski argues that propositional knowledge can still be defined as a result of making sure that a definition of propositional knowledge avoids circularity, negativity, obscurity and ad hoc. But this relies on a real definition to be available to test, and thus is circumstantial, and in fact indirectly ratifies my judgement that propositional knowledge cannot be defined because current proposed definitions fail to not commit a fallacy of Zagzebski ‘do not do’s’. Therefore, in the instance of JTB, infallibism, no false lemmas, reliabilsm and virtue epistemology – all commit at least one fallacy on Zagzebski do not do’s, and as a result fail to offer a real definition for propositional knowledge, and thus propositional knowledge cannot be defined.

In conclusion, propositional knowledge cannot be defined due to a plethora of fragility remaining via the unavailability of a real definition before and after Gettier that is coherent, but also the fact that via Ockham razor, perhaps propositional knowledge can never be defined due to it lacking real essence, like a dandelion failing to be defined as a plant or a weed.
Why don’t you ask your teachers to mark your work?
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cgj300399
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some schools are less equipped - no fault to them at all - the subject is discontinuing after this year; 9 students took it last year , 1 pass
teachers are nice enough tho, just would like a second opinion if possible
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(Original post by cgj300399)
some schools are less equipped - no fault to them at all - the subject is discontinuing after this year; 9 students took it last year , 1 pass
teachers are nice enough tho, just would like a second opinion if possible
You’re school is dropping it or AQA Ian dropping it? You can find philosophy examiners/tutors online? But you would have to pay.
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cgj300399
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school - my bad , didn't make it clear
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A giant chicken
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Right well the knowledge is good however:

We are taught that the structure should look like this:

Introduction: within this you include a brief overview of the theory in question and what you will argue throughout the essay (your view)

Outline theory/argument: this is only a very small paragraph where you explain any necessary definitions (in terms of JTB, assuming that you would have outline the basic theory in the intro, you may want to define what a necessary and sufficient mean with an example)

Paragraphs: these should have:
Strength/ weakness of theory
Counterpoint
Evaluation (relating each judgment to the question)
You repeat this 4 times

Conclusion: summarise what you have discussed and give overall judgment (this should be the same as the one you gave in your intro)


- this is what I have been taught but I'm not sure if there are other ways of doing it
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cgj300399
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thanks! thinking about it - seems silly to not outline the topic in question before criticising it
(Original post by A giant chicken)
Right well the knowledge is good however:

We are taught that the structure should look like this:

Introduction: within this you include a brief overview of the theory in question and what you will argue throughout the essay (your view)

Outline theory/argument: this is only a very small paragraph where you explain any necessary definitions (in terms of JTB, assuming that you would have outline the basic theory in the intro, you may want to define what a necessary and sufficient mean with an example)

Paragraphs: these should have:
Strength/ weakness of theory
Counterpoint
Evaluation (relating each judgment to the question)
You repeat this 4 times

Conclusion: summarise what you have discussed and give overall judgment (this should be the same as the one you gave in your intro)


- this is what I have been taught but I'm not sure if there are other ways of doing it
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A giant chicken
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Indeed although I do find that the outline can often take a while, so try and be mindful in the exam to keep it brief but detailed. Also glad I could help
(Original post by cgj300399)
thanks! thinking about it - seems silly to not outline the topic in question before criticising it
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(Original post by A giant chicken)
Right well the knowledge is good however:

We are taught that the structure should look like this:

Introduction: within this you include a brief overview of the theory in question and what you will argue throughout the essay (your view)

Outline theory/argument: this is only a very small paragraph where you explain any necessary definitions (in terms of JTB, assuming that you would have outline the basic theory in the intro, you may want to define what a necessary and sufficient mean with an example)

Paragraphs: these should have:
Strength/ weakness of theory
Counterpoint
Evaluation (relating each judgment to the question)
You repeat this 4 times

Conclusion: summarise what you have discussed and give overall judgment (this should be the same as the one you gave in your intro)


- this is what I have been taught but I'm not sure if there are other ways of doing it
That looks excellent!
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