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Are there any good pro natal arguments?

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Is "innate personality" hereditary? And since when was this linked to anti-natalism?
Original post by jamesbarry17
If anti-natalism and radical eco-friendliness is linked to innate personality, and all of those people stop reproducing, then in a few generations there will only be us pro-natalists left, and you wouldn't want that, would you? :wink:
Original post by Obolinda
Is "innate personality" hereditary? And since when was this linked to anti-natalism?

I think all innate things are hereditary. Anti-natalism is probably linked to characteristics such as caring. Btw, I updated the post you quoted, have a look.
But I presume a natalist gave birth to an anti-natalist?

I do not agree. My anti-natalism is founded on the asymmetry between assigning value to the presence and absence of pleasure and suffering. As well as the environment(including other animals). The life I already have is perfectly fulfilling.
Original post by jamesbarry17
I think all innate things are hereditary. Anti-natalism is probably linked to characteristics such as caring. Btw, I updated the post you quoted, have a look.
Original post by Bio 7
I still see no good reasons to have a child. Pretty much all reasons are either pointless or selfish.


I agree. But we do a lot of selfish things as humans so I certainly can't complain.
Original post by Obolinda
But I presume a natalist gave birth to an anti-natalist?

I do not agree. My anti-natalism is founded on the asymmetry between assigning value to the presence and absence of pleasure and suffering. As well as the environment(including other animals). The life I already have is perfectly fulfilling.

Could you explain the bold? I don't understand what you mean. And if your life is fulfilling then why not have children and try to make their lives fulfilling? Is two fulfilled lives not better than one?
1. the presence of pain is bad;
2. the presence of pleasure is good;
3. the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone;
4. the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation
Original post by jamesbarry17
Could you explain the bold? I don't understand what you mean. And if your life is fulfilling then why not have children and try to make their lives fulfilling? Is two fulfilled lives not better than one?
Original post by Obolinda
1. the presence of pain is bad;
2. the presence of pleasure is good;
3. the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone;
4. the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation

How is the absence of pain good, if goodness = pleasure? And surely pain is no worse than a lack of existence? So existence (life) with 1% pleasure and 99% pain is still 1% pleasure more than nothing, regardless of how much pain there is. You don't agree?
1. The absence of pain can still be good while good being pleasure as well.
2. No, pain is worse than lack of existence. It is better that unnecessary pleasure is foregone than that unnecessary suffering is created.
3. Yes, it is. the absence of pain is good and absence of pleasure is neutral as nobody's being deprived of it. No sane person would take up 23 hours of pain for 1 hour of the most immense pleasure. How futile.
Original post by jamesbarry17
How is the absence of pain good, if goodness = pleasure? And surely pain is no worse than a lack of existence? So existence (life) with 1% pleasure and 99% pain is still 1% pleasure more than nothing, regardless of how much pain there is. You don't agree?
Original post by Obolinda
1. The absence of pain can still be good while good being pleasure as well.
2. No, pain is worse than lack of existence. It is better that unnecessary pleasure is foregone than that unnecessary suffering is created.
3. Yes, it is. the absence of pain is good and absence of pleasure is neutral as nobody's being deprived of it. No sane person would take up 23 hours of pain for 1 hour of the most immense pleasure. How futile.

Well I fundamentally disagree with all three points, so we can agree to disagree.

I can't get my head around the assertion that 'absence of pain/absence of pleasure' argument. How can the absence of pain contain the value of goodness, when by definition an absence of something means a lack of its existence? How can something (goodness) exist in what is by definition nothing (absence of pain)?
Ok. I give positive attributes to the absence of pain. Most people think somewhat positively of its absence.
Original post by jamesbarry17
Well I fundamentally disagree with all three points, so we can agree to disagree.

I can't get my head around the assertion that 'absence of pain/absence of pleasure' argument. How can the absence of pain contain the value of goodness, when by definition an absence of something means a lack of its existence? How can something (goodness) exist in what is by definition nothing (absence of pain)?
Original post by Obolinda
Ok. I give positive attributes to the absence of pain. Most people think somewhat positively of its absence.

Yes, they do because an absence of pain usually makes way for pleasure to take its place. Ask yourself this: if there was no possibility of pleasure replacing the void left by the absence of pain, what reason would there be to be happy about pain disappearing? It's like stories I've heard of people leaving school after finishing their A Levels, expecting to be so happy afterwards as they are relieved of the burden they were carrying...and then they end up aimless in the summer, and even become depressed if they feel underwhelmed enough. Pain (A Levels) is inhibited, but no pleasure replaces it, and so one wonders why they were so excited to finish school. (That is, of course, unless you actually have something specific to look forward to in the summer, like a special holiday.)
Ah, this one. I feel perfectly fine in the absence of pain and I don't always necessarily need pleasure to replace it. In this case this is somebody who exists being deprived of pleasure feeling distraught, this can't happen to non existent person.

And none of this would be a justification to impose suffering on somebody. Would it be moral to bully somebody because of the pleasure that may be received later on(being a "stronger" person)?
Original post by jamesbarry17
Yes, they do because an absence of pain usually makes way for pleasure to take its place. Ask yourself this: if there was no possibility of pleasure replacing the void left by the absence of pain, what reason would there be to be happy about pain disappearing? It's like stories I've heard of people leaving school after finishing their A Levels, expecting to be so happy afterwards as they are relieved of the burden they were carrying...and then they end up aimless in the summer, and even become depressed if they feel underwhelmed enough. Pain (A Levels) is inhibited, but no pleasure replaces it, and so one wonders why they were so excited to finish school. (That is, of course, unless you actually have something specific to look forward to in the summer, like a special holiday.)
Original post by Obolinda
Ah, this one. I feel perfectly fine in the absence of pain and I don't always necessarily need pleasure to replace it. In this case this is somebody who exists being deprived of pleasure feeling distraught, this can't happen to non existent person.

And none of this would be a justification to impose suffering on somebody. Would it be moral to bully somebody because of the pleasure that may be received later on(being a "stronger" person)?

Again, my point is the philosophical one that I think you would not care about pain being present or not if you knew there was no possibility of it being replaced by pleasure (if we are equating pleasure to goodness), and likewise you would not care for being deprived of pleasure if you knew pain could not replace it. It's similar to my answer to the problem of evil: good and evil are relative and mutually dependent for their existence.

And bullying someone would be absolutely moral if you somehow knew that doing so would bring a greater amount of good to the world across all of time and existence. The only reason we generally regard bullying as immoral is because we have deduced that, on average, bullying brings about more pain than pleasure; though we have no way to absolutely empirically measure that. We just make a very educated guess. But I don't know how this links to the anti-natalism issue.
-Again, all of this is irrelevant as this is about a person that already exists, anti-natalism would mean the person doesn't exist in the first place. I dislike pain so don't want it, regardless of whether or not it's being replaced with pleasure, neutral is fine. I enjoy pleasure, it not being replaced with pain is irrelevant the least I need is the lack of pleasure to "appreciate" pleasure.

-It links to the anti-natalism issue because it's testing the logical consistency of you asserting that it's moral to impose suffering on (innocent) life because of any possible pleasure. The Holocaust has brought lot's of ongoing good for human rights(https://www.ushmm.org/information/exhibitions/online-exhibitions/special-focus/aftermath) but I absolutely condemn the actions that took place in the holocaust(even if it had arguably brought about some ongoing greater good). Again, I must stress: It's better that unnecessary pleasure is forgone than unnecessarily suffering being created.
Original post by jamesbarry17
Again, my point is the philosophical one that I think you would not care about pain being present or not if you knew there was no possibility of it being replaced by pleasure (if we are equating pleasure to goodness), and likewise you would not care for being deprived of pleasure if you knew pain could not replace it. It's similar to my answer to the problem of evil: good and evil are relative and mutually dependent for their existence.

And bullying someone would be absolutely moral if you somehow knew that doing so would bring a greater amount of good to the world across all of time and existence. The only reason we generally regard bullying as immoral is because we have deduced that, on average, bullying brings about more pain than pleasure; though we have no way to absolutely empirically measure that. We just make a very educated guess. But I don't know how this links to the anti-natalism issue.
(edited 4 years ago)
A baby makes a great substitute for a rugby ball in a pinch.
Original post by Obolinda
-Again, all of this is irrelevant as this is about a person that already exists, anti-natalism would mean the person doesn't exist in the first place. I dislike pain so don't want it, regardless of whether or not it's being replaced with pleasure, neutral is fine. I enjoy pleasure, it not being replaced with pain is irrelevant the least I need is the lack of pleasure to "appreciate" pleasure.

-It links to the anti-natalism issue because it's testing the logical consistency of you asserting that it's moral to impose suffering on (innocent) life because of any possible pleasure. The Holocaust has brought lot's of ongoing good for human rights(https://www.ushmm.org/information/exhibitions/online-exhibitions/special-focus/aftermath) but I absolutely condemn the actions that took place in the holocaust(even if it had arguably brought about some ongoing greater good). Again, I must stress: It's better that unnecessary pleasure is forgone than unnecessarily suffering being created.

Okay, so to the idea about existing and not-yet-existing people, I think the only successful way of disputing that is a logical a posteriori argument. My first proposition is that nothing could possibly exist if the amount of evil that has happened on the history of existence was equal to or greater than the amount of good. I find that proposition to be self-evidently true, because it seems only logical that the fundamental nature of good and evil is pro-existence and anti-existence respectively. For example, love is good because it predicates reproduction, which continues existence, whilst smashing down a building is generally a bad thing because it damages human civilisation, indirectly discouraging its existence.

Okay, so whether you would agree with that or not, I accept the proposition that although more good than evil has been done up to this point (if you accept that proposition), it is the case that more evil than good could be done in the future. For example, if you bring a baby into the world who has a genetic disorder and dies at age two, that would be more evil than good, which would be blatantly evidenced in the rapid decline human civilisation would experience if every baby born from now on suffered the same fate.

But you have to admit, in my opinion, that if every baby born from now on were to die at age two, it would be worth bringing them into the world of we were all babies who had the same genetic disorder but died at age one (and could somehow reproduce.) Babies who could live to age two amidst the same level of suffering are better than those who die at one.

So what this means is that I accept the anti-natalist viewpoint if one deduces that human flourishing is going to decline from here on in. This goes back to my original post in this chain, where I said that it makes sense from an evolutionary sense for people with relatively miserable lives to hold an anti-natalist view and not want to bring in a child who, as far as they can tell, is not going to have any better a life than them. If this theory is true, and all other variables were controlled for, then all anti-natalism would become extinct as none of them would reproduce, and all the reproducing natalists would pass on their natalism to their offspring. Over time, as we evolve more and more and our standards become higher and higher, more and more people would lose hope that the future can be better for their children than it was for them, thus adopting an anti-natalist position. Again, of course it doesn't work so simply, but that's my general theory (developed today, not much thought put into it yet) of why/how anti-natalism exists.
That's some long ass paragraph and I'm not sure how this addresses any of my points. It's entirely likely that any of my potential children will have better lives than me, it's the most probable thing, but I don't think it's moral to impose suffering on innocent life regardless of the possible greater overall pleasure that could result from it(see Holocaust example). My life is perfectly fine and I know that my potential children would have amazing lives. My parents gave birth to an anti-natalist so I'm not sure how anti natalism would be eradicated.
Original post by jamesbarry17
Okay, so to the idea about existing and not-yet-existing people, I think the only successful way of disputing that is a logical a posteriori argument. My first proposition is that nothing could possibly exist if the amount of evil that has happened on the history of existence was equal to or greater than the amount of good. I find that proposition to be self-evidently true, because it seems only logical that the fundamental nature of good and evil is pro-existence and anti-existence respectively. For example, love is good because it predicates reproduction, which continues existence, whilst smashing down a building is generally a bad thing because it damages human civilisation, indirectly discouraging its existence.

Okay, so whether you would agree with that or not, I accept the proposition that although more good than evil has been done up to this point (if you accept that proposition), it is the case that more evil than good could be done in the future. For example, if you bring a baby into the world who has a genetic disorder and dies at age two, that would be more evil than good, which would be blatantly evidenced in the rapid decline human civilisation would experience if every baby born from now on suffered the same fate.

But you have to admit, in my opinion, that if every baby born from now on were to die at age two, it would be worth bringing them into the world of we were all babies who had the same genetic disorder but died at age one (and could somehow reproduce.) Babies who could live to age two amidst the same level of suffering are better than those who die at one.

So what this means is that I accept the anti-natalist viewpoint if one deduces that human flourishing is going to decline from here on in. This goes back to my original post in this chain, where I said that it makes sense from an evolutionary sense for people with relatively miserable lives to hold an anti-natalist view and not want to bring in a child who, as far as they can tell, is not going to have any better a life than them. If this theory is true, and all other variables were controlled for, then all anti-natalism would become extinct as none of them would reproduce, and all the reproducing natalists would pass on their natalism to their offspring. Over time, as we evolve more and more and our standards become higher and higher, more and more people would lose hope that the future can be better for their children than it was for them, thus adopting an anti-natalist position. Again, of course it doesn't work so simply, but that's my general theory (developed today, not much thought put into it yet) of why/how anti-natalism exists.
Reply 57
This is absurd, people who were themselves born saying they see no point to themselves. This isn't anything to do with climate change hysteria, is it?
Original post by z-hog
This is absurd, people who were themselves born saying they see no point to themselves. This isn't anything to do with climate change hysteria, is it?

They definitely hold common philosophical and psychological ground, no doubt about that.

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