Sure, it tastes nice, but that is by no means a moral argument. If one accepts:
p1: Morality should be based upon an equality of the interests of all being (in an attempt to reduce suffering).
p2: The non-human animals consumed by humans (except maybe oysters) have sentience, and by extension interests (ie not to feel pain and a desire to continue living).
c1: Eating meat, at least within this framework, is immoral as if one does not respect the interests of animals they are not respecting their right to an equality of interests.
Some might object to p2, for surely most non-human animals aren't, for the most part, aware of their fate and thus do not really suffer if they are killed quickly. To this I would ask whether, with the same reasoning, it is permissible to kill a human in a coma or brain-dead state, or even asleep, for they also would not have the additional suffering of anticipating their fate. Some might then argue the human life is more valuable than the animal's life, for we are more intelligent. Here, however, is a dilemma, for if the metric we use to judge the moral worth of an entity is its intelligence, why doesn't that then extend to human relations? For example, would Albert Einstein thus have a moral justification for enslaving and ultimately killing me or you because he likes the taste of our skin when barbecued, just because we are both less intelligent than him? If no, then intelligence, and all other arbitrary distinctions like race, gender and sexuality are not a suitable criteria for judging the moral worth of a being. This extends to species, for as aforementioned, they have a capacity for suffering and an interest not to suffer.
Some might then make the irrational claim humans are "intrinsically" more valuable than animals whether based upon some religious justification or out of being a speciest; both of which I am not interested in.