Feedback on Contract Law Problem Based Question

Can anyone please provide me with feedback on these question:
Question no. 1:
A:
The given question mainly deals with consideration and third party rights in contract law. The advice will be given to Simon who was not part of a contract but want to enforce. The key legal issues are whether Simon can enforce the contract under common law on the basis of ‘consideration must move from the promisee’, or under Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
The first issue is whether Simon who is not a party to contract can enforce it under common law. For a contract to be valid there must be consideration provided in it. The classic definition of consideration was given in the case of Currie v Misa. Lush J defined consideration as exchange of something value between the parties, which can be benefit gained by one party and detriment suffered by other. The maxim ‘consideration must move from the promisee’ means that only the party who has provided consideration for the promise can enforce the contract. This traditional rule was confirmed in the case of Tweddle v Atkinson where the court held that only the party that has provided consideration can enforce the contract. In Simon’s case, he was not a party to contract and has provided no consideration. The contract was between Carmel and the florist Roses. The consideration was provided by Carmel as she pays 1000 to send a bouquet of flowers every day to Simon’s house. So, under common law principle ‘consideration must move from the promisee’, and in the light of Tweddle v Atkinson it can be argued that Simon cannot enforce the contract.
The second issue is whether Simon can enforce the contract under statutory provision. The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 introduced significant provisions which allows a third party to enforce the contract. Section 1(1)(b) allows someone who is not part of the contract to enforce a terms if the contract was made for their benefit, unless it appears that the parties did not intend it be enforceable by third party (s.(2)). In the given scenario, although Simon is not a contracting party, the contract was specifically made for his benefit. Carmel clearly said that the flowers should be delivered at Simon’s house which further shows that the contract was solely made for his benefit. It can be argued by Roses that they did not intend it to be enforceable by a third party, but since the contract was intended for Simon’s benefit and there is no clear indication that Simon cannot enforce the contract, he can argue that he can enforce the contract on the basis of s.1(1)(b). So, most likely s.1(1)(b) will apply and Simon can enforce the contract.
In conclusion, it can be argued that Simon cannot enforce the contract under common law ‘consideration must move from the promisee’, but he might be able to enforce the contract under s.1(1)(b) of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
B:
In English law, for a contract to be valid there must be consideration provided in it. The classic definition of consideration was given in the case of Currie v Misa. Lush J defined consideration as exchange of something value between the parties, which can be benefit gained by one party and detriment suffered by other. There are many principles that governs the doctrine of consideration. One of the principles is that ‘consideration must be sufficient, but not need to be adequate’. It means that consideration must have some value in the eyes of law, but it does not need to equal and fair.
This principle was upheld in many cases. In the case of Chappell v Nestle, Nestle said that anyone can purchase gramophone records for 1 shilling and 6 pence if they bring in three chocolate wrappers. Chappell argued that the chocolate wrappers does not constitute a valid consideration. The House of Lords held that consideration must be sufficient but need not to be adequate, meaning that it must have some value in the eyes of law but does not need to be fair. This principle was also upheld in the case of Thomas v Thomas where the court held that paying one pound per annum to live in a house for the rest of life constitutes a valid consideration. These cases clearly upheld the principle that ‘consideration must be sufficient, but need not to be adequate’. Even trivial items like chocolate wrappers can constitute a valid consideration.
In conclusion, English law only requires consideration to have some value in the eyes of law. It does not need to be equal or fair.
Question no. 2:
The question concerns the area of contract law, particularly the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Advice will be given regarding the legal relationship between Rania and Imran, who is paying half rent after suffering financial difficulties. The main legal issue in this question is whether Imran can rely on promissory estoppel to prevent Rania from going back on her words and demanding full rent as he is still in financial difficulties.
The general rule is that promise without consideration is not enforceable. However, where there is no consideration provided, the doctrine of promissory estoppel as developed in the case of High Tress v Central London Property Trust may apply to prevent a party from going back on their promise if certain conditions are met. Promissory estoppel applies where: (1) there is a clear and unambiguous promise or representation by the promisor, (2) the promisee acted in reliance of the promise, and (3) it would be inequitable for the promisor to revert back. The first issue is whether Rania made a promise to Imran. Here, Rania clearly told Imran that he could pay half the rent until conditions get better. Rania words are clear and unambiguous which can be seem as promise to temporarily reduce the rent (High Tress v Central London Property Trust). Secondly, we will see that whether Imran relied on the promise. As per the given facts, Imran continued living in the property by paying half the rent which can be seen as reliance on the promise (El Nasr Case). The third requirement is that it would be inequitable for the promisor to go back on his promise. Since Imran is still in financial difficulties as his mother is still unemployed it would be unjust and unfair for Rania to go back on his promise. As the requirement for promissory estoppel are satisfied, it seems like Imran can rely on promissory estoppel to prevent Rania from demanding full rent.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is ‘a shield not a sword’ which means that it can only be use as a defence and cannot suspend legal rights completely (Combe v Combe). Once circumstances improve Rania may be able to resume full rent with a reasonable notice.
In conclusion, it seems like Imran can rely on promissory estoppel to prevent Rania from demanding full rent. However, once the financial condition of Imran gets better Rania may be able to enforce full rent.
Question no. 3:
The question in hand deals with consideration in contract law. Advice will be given to Ruth (R) who is a metal worker, on whether he can enforce the promises made with four separate parties. The main legal issue is whether R can enforce the promise of extra payment on the basis of existing contractual duty. The main issue in part 2 is that whether R can demand the proper price after agreeing it to done on a lower price. The key legal issue in part 3 is related to the enforceability of promise on the basis of past considerations. Finally, the main legal issue in part 4 is that whether Lord Bulldog is required to pay 2000, even though the work on cost 200.
Part 1:
The issue here is whether Vicar (V) is legally bound to pay the extra 5000 that R has demanded after discovering that there are voids in the bells. The general principle is performance of an existing contractual duty is not a good consideration for a new promise (Stilk v Myrick). However, there are some exception to this rule. In the case of Williams v Roffey Bros, the court established the doctrine of ‘practical benefit’. The court held that the performance of an existing contractual duty can amount to a valid consideration if the promisor has received a practical benefit from it. Here, R discovered voids in the bells. As the voids are previously undiscovered, V gained a practical benefit by the repairing of these voids. Has these voids been discovered earlier V have to pay money to someone else for their repair. Moreover, V also held a fund raiser which further suggest that he gained a practical benefit from it. In the case of Hanson v Royden, the court held that if a party does more than they are contractually obligated to do, it can amount to a good consideration. The work of repairing the voids in the bells was also beyond the scope of the original contract which can be considered as a good consideration. In the case of Hartley v Ponsonby, it was held that if a party performs an existing contractual duty under a significant change in circumstances, it can amount to good consideration. Here, R can also argue that the voids in the bells significantly changed the circumstances of the work that has been agreed upon. So, in the light of these cases it seems like that the promise of V to pay extra 5000 is enforceable as he received a practical benefit from it, R did more than she is contractually obliged to do and there was also a significant change in the circumstances of the work.
Part 2:
The issue here is whether R can demand more than the agreed amount from the Dog Rescue Kennel (K). The general rule is that past considerations are not good considerations. The application of this rule can be seen in the cases of Roscorla v Thomas and Re McArdle, where the courts held that past consideration are not good consideration and so, the promise is not enforceable. Here, R agreed to carry out work at the cost of materials which is only 50. R agrees to do the work willingly and there is also no evidence that he want beyond his contractual duty. R has not provided a new consideration to enforce the proper amount she is demanding. So, most likely R will not be able to claim the proper amount on the basis that past considerations are not good considerations.
Part 3:
The key issue here is whether Lady Godiva (G) is promise to pay R an extra 500 is enforceable. The general rule is that past considerations are not good considerations, meaning that a promise made after the contract has been completed is not enforceable. The application of this rule can be seen in the cases of Roscorla v Thomas and Re McArdle, where the courts held that past consideration are not good consideration and so, the promise is not enforceable. Here, R agrees to make new gates for 5000. The contract only included making new gates and did not include adding family crest to the gates. R decision of adding family crest was also voluntary as she like her and it was not done on the request of G (Lampleigh v Brathwait). R can argue that it was understood that the additional work of adding the family crest is to be compensated (Re Casey’s Patent Case). However, G can argue that she paid the agreed amount of 5000 before making the new promise, which means that the contract was already concluded and the additional service was not meant to be compensated. So, it seems like R cannot claim 500 which G has promised to pay her.
Part 4:
The key issue here is whether Lord Bulldog (B) is legally bound to pay 2000, despite the work only being worth 200. Consideration is something of value exchanged between the parties. The classic definition of consideration was given in the case of Currie v Misa. Lush J defined consideration as exchange of something value between the parties, which can be benefit gained by one party and detriment suffered by other. For a contract to be valid there must be consideration in it. Here, B agrees to pay R 2000 in return of her repairing the cages can be seen as valid consideration. The value of things exchanged does not need to fair or equivalent. In the case of Chappell v Nestle, the court held that consideration must be sufficient but does not need to be adequate. It means that consideration that is provided must have some value in the eyes of the law, however, it does not need to be fair or equal. In the given facts, the work that R needs to be done is only worth 200, but she charged 2000. Despite the price being too high, it can still count as a valid consideration because the law does not require it to be equal and fair. Moreover, B also agrees to pay 2000. So, it seems like that there is a valid consideration and R can claim the agreed amount of 2000.
In conclusion, it looks like R will be able to claim amount from V and B, but will not be able to claim amount from K and G.

Can anyone please provide me with feedback on these question:
Question no. 1:
A:
The given question mainly deals with consideration and third party rights in contract law. The advice will be given to Simon who was not part of a contract but want to enforce. The key legal issues are whether Simon can enforce the contract under common law on the basis of ‘consideration must move from the promisee’, or under Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
The first issue is whether Simon who is not a party to contract can enforce it under common law. For a contract to be valid there must be consideration provided in it. The classic definition of consideration was given in the case of Currie v Misa. Lush J defined consideration as exchange of something value between the parties, which can be benefit gained by one party and detriment suffered by other. The maxim ‘consideration must move from the promisee’ means that only the party who has provided consideration for the promise can enforce the contract. This traditional rule was confirmed in the case of Tweddle v Atkinson where the court held that only the party that has provided consideration can enforce the contract. In Simon’s case, he was not a party to contract and has provided no consideration. The contract was between Carmel and the florist Roses. The consideration was provided by Carmel as she pays 1000 to send a bouquet of flowers every day to Simon’s house. So, under common law principle ‘consideration must move from the promisee’, and in the light of Tweddle v Atkinson it can be argued that Simon cannot enforce the contract.
The second issue is whether Simon can enforce the contract under statutory provision. The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 introduced significant provisions which allows a third party to enforce the contract. Section 1(1)(b) allows someone who is not part of the contract to enforce a terms if the contract was made for their benefit, unless it appears that the parties did not intend it be enforceable by third party (s.(2)). In the given scenario, although Simon is not a contracting party, the contract was specifically made for his benefit. Carmel clearly said that the flowers should be delivered at Simon’s house which further shows that the contract was solely made for his benefit. It can be argued by Roses that they did not intend it to be enforceable by a third party, but since the contract was intended for Simon’s benefit and there is no clear indication that Simon cannot enforce the contract, he can argue that he can enforce the contract on the basis of s.1(1)(b). So, most likely s.1(1)(b) will apply and Simon can enforce the contract.
In conclusion, it can be argued that Simon cannot enforce the contract under common law ‘consideration must move from the promisee’, but he might be able to enforce the contract under s.1(1)(b) of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
B:
In English law, for a contract to be valid there must be consideration provided in it. The classic definition of consideration was given in the case of Currie v Misa. Lush J defined consideration as exchange of something value between the parties, which can be benefit gained by one party and detriment suffered by other. There are many principles that governs the doctrine of consideration. One of the principles is that ‘consideration must be sufficient, but not need to be adequate’. It means that consideration must have some value in the eyes of law, but it does not need to equal and fair.
This principle was upheld in many cases. In the case of Chappell v Nestle, Nestle said that anyone can purchase gramophone records for 1 shilling and 6 pence if they bring in three chocolate wrappers. Chappell argued that the chocolate wrappers does not constitute a valid consideration. The House of Lords held that consideration must be sufficient but need not to be adequate, meaning that it must have some value in the eyes of law but does not need to be fair. This principle was also upheld in the case of Thomas v Thomas where the court held that paying one pound per annum to live in a house for the rest of life constitutes a valid consideration. These cases clearly upheld the principle that ‘consideration must be sufficient, but need not to be adequate’. Even trivial items like chocolate wrappers can constitute a valid consideration.
In conclusion, English law only requires consideration to have some value in the eyes of law. It does not need to be equal or fair.
Question no. 2:
The question concerns the area of contract law, particularly the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Advice will be given regarding the legal relationship between Rania and Imran, who is paying half rent after suffering financial difficulties. The main legal issue in this question is whether Imran can rely on promissory estoppel to prevent Rania from going back on her words and demanding full rent as he is still in financial difficulties.
The general rule is that promise without consideration is not enforceable. However, where there is no consideration provided, the doctrine of promissory estoppel as developed in the case of High Tress v Central London Property Trust may apply to prevent a party from going back on their promise if certain conditions are met. Promissory estoppel applies where: (1) there is a clear and unambiguous promise or representation by the promisor, (2) the promisee acted in reliance of the promise, and (3) it would be inequitable for the promisor to revert back. The first issue is whether Rania made a promise to Imran. Here, Rania clearly told Imran that he could pay half the rent until conditions get better. Rania words are clear and unambiguous which can be seem as promise to temporarily reduce the rent (High Tress v Central London Property Trust). Secondly, we will see that whether Imran relied on the promise. As per the given facts, Imran continued living in the property by paying half the rent which can be seen as reliance on the promise (El Nasr Case). The third requirement is that it would be inequitable for the promisor to go back on his promise. Since Imran is still in financial difficulties as his mother is still unemployed it would be unjust and unfair for Rania to go back on his promise. As the requirement for promissory estoppel are satisfied, it seems like Imran can rely on promissory estoppel to prevent Rania from demanding full rent.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is ‘a shield not a sword’ which means that it can only be use as a defence and cannot suspend legal rights completely (Combe v Combe). Once circumstances improve Rania may be able to resume full rent with a reasonable notice.
In conclusion, it seems like Imran can rely on promissory estoppel to prevent Rania from demanding full rent. However, once the financial condition of Imran gets better Rania may be able to enforce full rent.
Question no. 3:
The question in hand deals with consideration in contract law. Advice will be given to Ruth (R) who is a metal worker, on whether he can enforce the promises made with four separate parties. The main legal issue is whether R can enforce the promise of extra payment on the basis of existing contractual duty. The main issue in part 2 is that whether R can demand the proper price after agreeing it to done on a lower price. The key legal issue in part 3 is related to the enforceability of promise on the basis of past considerations. Finally, the main legal issue in part 4 is that whether Lord Bulldog is required to pay 2000, even though the work on cost 200.
Part 1:
The issue here is whether Vicar (V) is legally bound to pay the extra 5000 that R has demanded after discovering that there are voids in the bells. The general principle is performance of an existing contractual duty is not a good consideration for a new promise (Stilk v Myrick). However, there are some exception to this rule. In the case of Williams v Roffey Bros, the court established the doctrine of ‘practical benefit’. The court held that the performance of an existing contractual duty can amount to a valid consideration if the promisor has received a practical benefit from it. Here, R discovered voids in the bells. As the voids are previously undiscovered, V gained a practical benefit by the repairing of these voids. Has these voids been discovered earlier V have to pay money to someone else for their repair. Moreover, V also held a fund raiser which further suggest that he gained a practical benefit from it. In the case of Hanson v Royden, the court held that if a party does more than they are contractually obligated to do, it can amount to a good consideration. The work of repairing the voids in the bells was also beyond the scope of the original contract which can be considered as a good consideration. In the case of Hartley v Ponsonby, it was held that if a party performs an existing contractual duty under a significant change in circumstances, it can amount to good consideration. Here, R can also argue that the voids in the bells significantly changed the circumstances of the work that has been agreed upon. So, in the light of these cases it seems like that the promise of V to pay extra 5000 is enforceable as he received a practical benefit from it, R did more than she is contractually obliged to do and there was also a significant change in the circumstances of the work.
Part 2:
The issue here is whether R can demand more than the agreed amount from the Dog Rescue Kennel (K). The general rule is that past considerations are not good considerations. The application of this rule can be seen in the cases of Roscorla v Thomas and Re McArdle, where the courts held that past consideration are not good consideration and so, the promise is not enforceable. Here, R agreed to carry out work at the cost of materials which is only 50. R agrees to do the work willingly and there is also no evidence that he want beyond his contractual duty. R has not provided a new consideration to enforce the proper amount she is demanding. So, most likely R will not be able to claim the proper amount on the basis that past considerations are not good considerations.
Part 3:
The key issue here is whether Lady Godiva (G) is promise to pay R an extra 500 is enforceable. The general rule is that past considerations are not good considerations, meaning that a promise made after the contract has been completed is not enforceable. The application of this rule can be seen in the cases of Roscorla v Thomas and Re McArdle, where the courts held that past consideration are not good consideration and so, the promise is not enforceable. Here, R agrees to make new gates for 5000. The contract only included making new gates and did not include adding family crest to the gates. R decision of adding family crest was also voluntary as she like her and it was not done on the request of G (Lampleigh v Brathwait). R can argue that it was understood that the additional work of adding the family crest is to be compensated (Re Casey’s Patent Case). However, G can argue that she paid the agreed amount of 5000 before making the new promise, which means that the contract was already concluded and the additional service was not meant to be compensated. So, it seems like R cannot claim 500 which G has promised to pay her.
Part 4:
The key issue here is whether Lord Bulldog (B) is legally bound to pay 2000, despite the work only being worth 200. Consideration is something of value exchanged between the parties. The classic definition of consideration was given in the case of Currie v Misa. Lush J defined consideration as exchange of something value between the parties, which can be benefit gained by one party and detriment suffered by other. For a contract to be valid there must be consideration in it. Here, B agrees to pay R 2000 in return of her repairing the cages can be seen as valid consideration. The value of things exchanged does not need to fair or equivalent. In the case of Chappell v Nestle, the court held that consideration must be sufficient but does not need to be adequate. It means that consideration that is provided must have some value in the eyes of the law, however, it does not need to be fair or equal. In the given facts, the work that R needs to be done is only worth 200, but she charged 2000. Despite the price being too high, it can still count as a valid consideration because the law does not require it to be equal and fair. Moreover, B also agrees to pay 2000. So, it seems like that there is a valid consideration and R can claim the agreed amount of 2000.
In conclusion, it looks like R will be able to claim amount from V and B, but will not be able to claim amount from K and G.