Burmah Oil Co.Ltd. v the Lord Advocate -

FisHee

what is the principle for this case???

Reply 1

muncrun

Isn't that case just an example of retrospective law making?

Reply 2

MissAmy

Yeah.. regarding the War Damages Act 1965

Reply 3

supervin

Look it up in a Constitutional Law textbook.

Reply 4

Khalsa1846

hi,
could you guys more knowledgeable than I and for non-law students please explain what happened in this case and what it points out PLEEEAAASE?
thanks,
Mandeep
p.s. im just genuinely intrigued.

Reply 5

Mark_KK

Some property got trashed by the British army during a war.

British courts awarded compensation.

Parliament changed the law to prevent further claims of a similair nature.

Nuff said :biggrin:

(don't put that in an assesment!)

Reply 6

Russell

Fishee,

The best way to decide the ratio of any case is to read the actual report. You might have facilities to do this through Westlaw or Nexus Lexus.

However I can briefly summarise the case (from Lexus)

CATCHWORDS:
Crown -- Prerogative -- War prerogative -- Compensation -- Legal right to compensation -- Exception for battle damage -- Oil installations of appellants destroyed to deny use to advancing enemy -- Long term strategy not battle damage -- Whether actions barred owing to being outside statutory limitation period -- Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61), s. 1.

HEADNOTE:
On Jan. 19, 1942, the Japanese armies invaded Burma, and on Feb. 3, 1942, the G.O.C. Burma issued instructions to the effect that oil installations which were the property of the appellants and were situated near Rangoon, should, if and when necessary, be destroyed. The destruction was in order to deny to the enemy industrial installations that would otherwise be of use ot the enemy. On Feb. 22, the Japanese won a victory over British forces at the Sittang river, and on Mar. 6, orders for evacuation and destruction of installations in the neighbourhood of Rangoon were issued. These orders were carried out on Mar. 7, and Rangoon was occupied by the enemy on Mar. 8. Other installations were destroyed between that date and Apr. 19. It was not disputed that the destruction was lawful; it was assumed that it was carried out in the exercise of the royal prerogative, and it was admitted that the military situation at the time rendered the destruction expedient for the defence of His Majesty's other territories. In actions brought in Scotland by the appellants they claimed to be entitled, as against the Crown, to compensation from public funds to make good the damage sustained by them as result of the destruction. On appeal from an order sustaining please against relevancy, and dismissing the actions before trial, the Crown cross-appealed that the actions were incompetent and should be dismissed by virtue of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893.

Held: (i) (VISCOUNT RADCLIFFE and LORD HODSON dissenting) there was a legal right to compensation (though the measure of compensations was not necessarily the full cost reinstatement (see p. 362, letter D, p. 394, letter H, and p. 395, letter B, post)) in respect of the destruction of the oil installations, which right justified the actions proceeding and existed for the following reasons --

(a) if, in the exercise by the Sovereign of the royal prerogative in relation to war, the subject was deprived of property for the benefit of the state, the subject was entitled to compensation at the public expense, unless the case fell within an exception to this general rule (see p. 360, letter F, p. 358, letter H, p. 391, letter A, and p. 398, letter D, post).

Re Petition of Right ([1915] 3 K.B. 649) and dictum of LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON in The Zamora ([1916] 2 A.C. 100) not followed.

United States v. Caltex (Phillipines) Inc. ((1952), 344 U.S. Rep. 149) distinguished.

A.-G. v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel ([1920] All E.R. Rep. 80) considered.

(b) there was an exception to the general rule stated at (a) above for battle damage (viz., damage done in battle or for the necessities of battle), but this exception did not extend to destruction which was a part of a deliberate long-term strategy (such as economic warfare) and which was not also so requisite for the purposes of battle operations that it would have been done in any event for those purposes (see p. 360, letter G, p. 394, letters F and G, p. 395, letter B, and p. 398, letter G, post).

© on the facts the destruction of the installations with which the present case was concerned did not fall within the exception for battle damage (see p. 362, letter A, p. 395, letter B, and p. 399, letter F, post).

(ii) the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, did not assist the Crown (see p. 362, letter E, p. 376, letter E, p. 381, letter G, p. 395, letters A and B, and p. 400, letter D, post).

Appeal allowed on (i) (b) above.

NOTES:
Both VISCOUNT RADCLIFFE and LORD HODSON took the view that there was no legally enforceable general right at common law to compensation for damage or destruction done in the exercise of the royal prerogative in relation to war (see p. 371, letter G, and p. 379, letter I to p. 380, letter A; cf. p. 386, letter D, post), but LORD RADCLIFFE would except acts done in exercise of the prerogative power which customarily would be recognised to amount to purchases, the fair price, rather than compensation, then becoming something that was due (see p. 375, letter F, post). It was generally accepted for the purposes of the present decision, that there would be no distinction if the appellant's property had been taken over or confiscated rather than having been damaged or destroyed; the Crown did not argue in favour of such a distinction (see, e.g., p. 381, letter A, post).