Philosophy Unit 1 and Unit 2 AQA

Hi everyone :smile:

I have my first unit 1 philosophy AS level exam tomorrow, I'm with AQA
I reckon I've revised enough for it but if anyone has any essay plans for physchological/ physical continuity through time it would be much appreciated to compare mine.
I also have my unit 2 free will and determinisn one on Tuesday, not sure what major topics to cover, so any help?
Thanks :smile:

Reply 1

Lauren M

I hope this helps

PHYSICAL CONTINUITY

1) Having the same body makes you the same person

Strength 1: Very intuitive. In order to tell whether you are the same person, I look at your body. If it looks very similar to how it looked yesterday, I conclude you are the same person. If it looks very different, I might doubt your identity.

Objection 1: An obvious objection to this theory is that actually I don't have any of the same physical features now as when I was a baby.
Reply 1: This objection misses the point of physical continuity. Of course you change qualitatively, but you remain numerically the same person.

Objection 2: Theseus' Ship: But over the period of about 7 years a human replaces all of its cells, so there is not one single atom in my body now that was in my body when I was born.
Reply 2: This objection again misses the point of physical continuity. Think of a river.
The water in the Thames is constantly changing, it does not have any of the water atoms in it now as 10 years ago, but it is the same river.
What is needed for physical continuity is not one thing to stay exactly the same throughout all time, but that the elements don't all change drastically and at the same time, rather they change one by one, gradually, so there is always some overlap between old and new elements. This is continuity.

Objection 3: Teletransportation: But then if this continuous line is broken, then I am not the same person. But some would say that in the case of teletransportation (where my body is reassembled on another planet) I still would be the same person, even though bodily continuity is broken.

Objection 4: Bodily continuity is not sufficient for personal identity: I can be lying comatose in a bed. My body is the same, but I am not the same person, since I have none of the psychological characteristics that makes me me. In Locke's terms, I am the same human, but not the same person. Same could be said for amnesia cases. If I forget everything about my past life and start a new one with a new identity, job, friends, etc. then I am just not the same person, even though I have the same body.

Objection 5: Bodily continuity is not necessary for personal identity: I can lose limbs and have plastic surgery and still be the same person, we can imagine cases where I obtain a completely new body and yet remain the same person. (e.g. Freaky Friday, Avatar), so it doesn't seem right to say that you need the same body to be the same person.

2) Having the same brain makes you the same person

Strength: This is an improvement on bodily continuity, as I can clearly lose all sorts of bits of my body without affecting my personal identity, but it seems my brain is pretty essential to my being the same person. Brain damage can cause me to become a different person, quite literally; I can turn from a hardened criminal into a saint if you hit me hard enough in just the right spot on my brain.

However, Brain theory suffers from many of the same objections as bodily continuity. Objections 3, 4, and 5 apply equally.

Objection: Having the same brain is not necessary or sufficient for personal identity: It really doesn't seem to be the brain that matters, but rather the information our brains carry and process (our memories, personality, mind, etc). And in a scenario where all that was downloaded from your brain onto a disk and then that disk inserted into someone else's brain, you would be where your memories are not where your brain was!

Objection: Having the same brain is not necessary for personal identity: We can imagine aliens that don't have brains that are persons. It is not logically impossible. So their personal identity cannot lie in having the same brain.

Reply 2

ellierichardson93

Thanks thats brilliant, I'm using alot of them arguments
also, do you understand Butler's circular criticism, for Locke's memory theory? You might not be including it so I'm not sure?

Reply 3

Lauren M

No sorry I haven't been taught that.

Reply 4

KatieY :)

Butler's circular criticism? Isn't that the one where it's claimed that Locke's memory argument is circular because it presupposes personal identity rather than preserves it (what links your memories together is you, rather than your memories making you 'you' and preserving your personal identity) or am getting it confused with someone's else's criticism?

Reply 5

ellierichardson93

Yeahhh thats the right one!!! I didnt use it though because the questions were so random! Barely anything i revised came up, it was the biggest let down! How did you find the exam?