With respect, I don't think you've demonstrated this "lack of oversight". We have an appeals system that has the possibility of appeals all the way up to the Supreme Court, and parliament having the final say if they disagree with any judgment of the Supreme Court.
Common law only exists in the gaps between statutory law, and the latter displaces and overrides the former. These gaps are usually areas where parliament simply does not have the time or inclination to come up with a new or different set of rules to the existing ones.
In theory? It does in practice. Primary legislation will override any other form of lawmaking. Parliament is sovereign, it can choose to do anything it likes with the courts.
Instead of having parliament passively wait for the 20-30 dubiously-shortlisted judgments to arrive, so they can overrule the ones they don't like, wouldn't it be better for parliament to actively and precisely legislate in the first place, meaning the courts would not have to create common law innovations or novel constructions on statutory language?
This all leaves aside the total and utter impracticability of your proposal. Deciding how to identify the precedent, what that encompasses, whether it attaches to a particular ratio, what that ratio is in each case, would require a case analysis (by further jurors above the supreme court, to prepare for parliament). That case analysis/summary would necessarily mean going beyond the ordinary meaning of the words of the judgment, and could result in parliament voting for/against something that isn't reflective of the actual judgment.
It would also create considerable injustice to retrospectively reverse appellate court judgments, litigants would have to wait a year for money they desperately need, or risk having to pay it back to the previously unsuccessful party. It would also be an absolute nightmare in terms of calculating and apportioning responsibility for legal costs between the parties, and would require further costs hearings after the parliamentary reversal, and consequently more litigation.
It would hugely increase uncertainty, in addition to the issues I mentioned above, lower courts may be hesitant to apply any appellate court judgement until a year had elapsed, lest they be reversed. If they do proceed and apply a particular case, and then parliament overturns it, then that judgment would be overturned too.
With respect, the proposal is a fantasy and really doesn't survive the cold light of day when looked at by someone who's even passingly familiar with the legal profession. To do all that for something that's not actually a problem in the first place? It sounds a bit like, "Something must be done. This is something, therefore it should be done".
As a law student, I see very little of what you're claiming. Can you please provide examples. I simply do not think there is evidence for the claim that there changes to the common law that parliament would like to enact but cannot because...?
The lack of public support if immaterial.
First, that lack usually arises from complete ignorance of even the existence of the subjects being adjudicated. Do you think that the disengagement of the public on a questions like the proper construction of CPR 36.1.4(6)(a), or the limits of the application of
ex turpi causa non oritur actio has any actual bearing on the validity and appropriateness of a judgment on the subject?
To offer or withhold support, the public would actually have to understand the issues in question. Most people don't have the time, let alone the inclination, to do so. That's why we have a judiciary and a representative democracy, that's what we pay judges to do. If a judgement is made plainly contrary to law, that will be resolved on appeal.
Secondly, the law is not supposed to be a popularity contest, and it is strange that you are asserting judges should rule according to public opinion. My view is that they should rule according to law.
I don't see that as being a problem. I much prefer this system to the American system of elected judges and political appointments to the judiciary.
I get the feeling that you perceive judges just make things up as they go along; a kind of insoucient exercise of personal whim. In fact, when you get to the level of the High Court and the appelllate courts, the cases are usually highly technical and the factual and legal matrices used by judges are fairly standardised.
For example, take a look at the case below. Do you think an average member of the public would be able to get their head around it? Would they even have the inclination?
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/23.htmlPeople become High Court judges because they have the intellectual capacity to deal with reams and reams of complex detail, the vast majority of people simply do not.
I would also again request that you provide some examples of outrageous judgments? I feel that you may be able to develop and refine your argument somewhat if you had some examples.
It is right and proper that people cannot influence the courts except through parliament. Judges are hired to be impartial arbiters of the law, otherwise you as well just turn it into X-Factor justice and have phone votes on the outcome of Supreme Court cases.
By conceding that intervention will usually only occur where there is sufficient political will, are you not conceding that there is necessarily a link between public opinion and the law as the courts practice it?
All I can see here is that you have a quibble about the way parliament intervenes in the common law (though I have seen no case examples), and consequently have proposed a system that would cause utter chaos in the court system for almost no actual gain. Surely there is a better way to proceed? Perhaps investing in more education about the law for the general public
So you are proposing substantial tax increases for a significant number of lower-income people? That hardly seems fair.