A deal with Hitler: Was Churchill wrong?

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Zebedee

Hitler only came to power in 1933, 3 years isn't so long to start "becoming freindly".

It is when you understand why it happened, and when you note that in 1934, Italian troops were poised for a showdown with Germany, over Austria. You're reading history backwards.

I'll think you'll find both Italy and Japan were on the winning side of the first world war. For example the South Tyrol is now part of Italy. So no, thats not what they had in common!

Who said the losers have to be the only ones to get a bad deal? Any scholar of the World Wars will know the sense of aggrievement felt by the Italians and Japanese over the eventual settlement. They felt that their reward did not justify their relative sacrifices during the war.

What they did have in common was all three were lead by nationalist dictators.

And you are reading too much into that. They didn't decide to gang up on the civlised world simply because they had opposing ideologies.Remember, until 1936, Hitler was actively courting Britain, so ideological differences could not have been the big deal you suppose.

Yes, i would say the Soviet Union was an exceptional aside. We were not in alliance with them at the beginning of the war. They still saw us as supporters of rhe russian whites, capitalists. Monarchists and all that jazz. The reason the Soviet Union joined the allies is because of the Nazi invasion of russia, thats it. It was an alliance against a common foe. Which also explains why it took only a matter of months from the end of ww2 in europe for the previous great 3 allies to become enemies - i.e the start of the cold war (which existed due to the ideological divide).

The Cold War grew out of the same fears that caused the First and Second World Wars: not primarily ideology, but a fear of a military power able to throw her weight unchecked, around Europe. You can't say Russia was exceptional just because that would back your argument. Russia and the democracies were allies because both were threatened by Germany and Japan, not by Fascism. It was not an ideological fight.

Reply 41

Alasdair

Zebedee

I'll think you'll find both Italy and Japan were on the winning side of the first world war. For example the South Tyrol is now part of Italy. So no, thats not what they had in common!

Yes, but they also felt that they got a lot less from Versailles than they wanted. the Italians wouldn't really be contented unless they got Tyrol, Istria, and most of the Dalmatian coast, and the Japanese felt they didn't gain as much as the other allies from the Versailles treaty. So all three countries felt bitter about Versailles/St. Germain/Trianon, etc, etc - the Germans because they got bitchslapped, the Italians and the Nips because they didn't get to do enough of the bitchslapping.

Reply 42

Alasdair

Giliwoo

Russia and the democracies were allies because both were threatened by Germany and Japan, not by Fascism. It was not an ideological fight.

Those two statements aren't mutually inconclusive. Yes, the Russians and the Western Allies made war together because they were both threatened by the Nazi's. But the Brits and the Americans made War against Germany because if they didn't, they'd suffer under the rule of a totalitarian dictatorship. Then the Germans attacked Russia and they were more than happy to take whatever they could get by way of allies - not to mention the need to keep Russia in the war lest she gang up with the Germans against the Western Allies.

Reply 43

Giliwoo

Hi, Alasdair. I acknowledge your points, but I cannot agree that the World War was "a fight against Fascism". It gives it a crusading moral dimension that I think is misleading when we consider the causes of the war. Hitler's eastern war was certainly ideologically driven, but it Britain didn't think "Fascism must be stopped" when she resolved to fight; rather, it was a case of "Hitler cannot be trusted", and there was increasing urgency in light of this, to reassert the verdict of the first War before it was no longer possible.

Reply 44

Arminius

Giliwoo, can i ask you to tell me why ww2 was fought? i want a detailed explanation because i have given mine. I will answer some points from your last post in a bit.

Reply 45

Giliwoo

If you expect me to sit here typing the kind of essay that the subject deserves, then I'm afraid I can't comply. Ihave neither the time nor the will. Here is an essay I prepared earlier

In 1938, after five years in power, incremental (substantial after 1935) rearmament and of course, with a head start from Weimar policy, Hitler was in a position to be more assertive in his foreign policy. It would seem fair to observe without need for veering into protracted dispute, that during 1938, Nazi ideology was at the heart of foreign policy. But such observations must not lightly be made. For, if we regard ‘nationalist’ to refer to post-Versailles, Weimar policy concerned chiefly with the revision of Versailles, and ‘Nazi’ foreign policy to carry stronger ideological import, with conquest as its end, then an overlap is observed between the two. Suspicion of Russia and dissatisfaction with the eastern borders were common to both, but the ‘nationalist’ was informed more by strategic imperatives rather than the racial and ideological ones of Nazi policy. It is well known that Hitler’s foreign policy doctrines were defined almost entirely by their racial edge: lebensraum or “living space” for the German people, Teutonic domination of Europe at the expense of “inferior” peoples, and an irrational hatred of Jews, Slavs and Bolshevism all (supposedly) most manifest in Russia. It was a fundamental axiom of Nazi ideology that such claims could justifiably – and preferably – be obtained through conquest.

The year 1938 was one of much activity for Hitler. He opened the year with a salvo aimed at his detractors. Fritsch was removed from the general staff and Blomberg as head of the Ministry of War, the resignation of 14 senior generals was requested (and obtained) others were reassigned and new ambassadors were appointed to the key chanceries of Europe (such as Rome and Vienna) and Tokyo in the East. In so doing he made clear his intention to dominate foreign policy henceforward. Only a month afterwards, Hitler pulled of one of his greatest foreign policy coups with the Austrian Anschluss. It was a long held aspiration of both Austrian and German nationalists of all political complexions and was thus not exclusively ‘Nazi’ though union with Austria was very much in line with Hitler’s personal fantasies of a Europe dominated by pan-Teutonic bloc. But, as warned above, we must not assume long term ideological intent as being the efficient engine of this policy. Anschluss occurred under the mutually assisted conditions of willingness and readiness in Austria, as well as a weakened political opposition from the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg, not to mention favourable noises from Italy’s Mussolini. As such, political and prevailing ideological (not specifically ‘Nazi&#8217 :wink:

winds gave speed to the union of Austria and Germany.

The Austrian crisis caused alarm but nothing like the Czech crisis that was to follow. Hitler’s contempt for the Czechs and Slavs was central to his racial ideology, mentioned frequently in his conversations, and writings (not least Mein Kampf). The Hossbach memorandum of 1937 suggests active intent in the events that unfolded in September of 1938. However, while the memorandum spells out clearly his long term intentions, it was fortuitous that the opportunity presented itself in 1938. After appearing to give way under duress, Hitler’s urgency became more determined, asserting his in pique, his desire for “Czechoslovakia to disappear from the map.” Once more caution is counselled to those who would take such declarations at face value, and perceive them as being the chief determinants of policy. For, although a conference resulted from it, Hitler did not manage to wipe Czechoslovakia of the map, obtaining only the Sudetenland and its majority (though minority in relation to its parent state) German population. It was a popular move with the German minority. Once more, this move has claim to both nationalist and ‘Nazi’ inspiration. Nationalist in that it was decidedly irredentist, uniting a peripheral German population with their ancient progenitor; Nazi in that this was done at the expense of a sovereign state. It was not revision. It was conquest without war, which, was a cause of frustration to Hitler smarting from being once more robbed out of his war. The boldness of this event was to encourage greater gambles. As though a morsel of Czechoslovakia’s body were not enough, the whole would be demanded a short year later.

Germany’s foreign policy in 1938 achieved two things that distinguished it from the more “reasonably” nationalist foreign policy of Weimar. First, it unilaterally challenged what was left of the treaty of Versailles, but it was in response to a very old but ostensibly legitimate claim. This was also at first glance, the case with the Sudetenland, but it would be disingenuous to accord it the same grounds of “ancient legitimacy” that Anschluss had. Czechoslovakia was a sovereign state, and whether it was home to a minority German population or not, these were not reasonable grounds to dismember the body of a sovereign state. It was conquest by another name and a silent, dark augury for the bold moves to come the following year.

That is the German side on the eve of war. Even here we see that ideology was not the only factor involved.

As for the Allies, particularly Britain, one word can explain why she went to war with Germany: Versailles. The Treaty posed a problem to Britain and France. How could they bind what was naturally the most powerful nation on the continent, with artificial fetters (an inherently difficult aim, compounded for want of means)? After the First World War, there was no occupation of Germany - a mistake in some people's books. How do you enforce a peace remotely then? You can't, except through sanctions and goodwill. Goodwill was there until Hitler came to power. Sanctions posed a problem because, as A.J.P Taylor so eloquently put it, "the allies threatend to choke Germany and Germany threatened to die". A powerless Germany was no use to anybody, and a powerful one was to be avoided at all costs. The purpose of Versailles was to neutralise Germany as a military power, and to protect France (recent victim of two episodes of German aggression) and Belgium (the latter for Britain's security). The means by which this was to be achieved, was by integrating Germany into an international mechanism of peacekeeping - the League of Nations - and keeping her military in check. By 1935, both objectives were clearly no longer achievable. Hitler had ejected Germany from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference (interestingly, after the latter occurred, Britain, France and Italy denounced Germany's militarism), had started to openly flout the armament limitations of Versailles, and more or less repudiated the Treaty. Britain tried to buy her off. Naval Agreements and good words. Germany agreed, but, as ever, wanted more. France could do little but watch. By 1938, it had become clear that Versailles was dead. But the allies were faced withthe age old problem of how to enforce a peace, without recourse to military action. By 1939, when Germany had shown herself incapable of honouring even test agreements, it became clear that she would have to be stopped. This is a very, very brief run down of the European side.

With Japan and the US it was competition for resources and influence in the Pacific. The US cutting off credit to Japan, denying her of much needed oil. Japan responded with a plan to consolidate her Pacific presence before the US could intervene. They decided to eliminate the US's Pacific Fleet (particularly the carriers) and steal a march on the Americans, hoping unrealistically that by the time the US turned round to see who had kicked her in the arse, Japan would be too powerful in the Pacific to be worth fighting.

Reply 46

Arminius

Well i actually read that i can't quite see the relevence to the issue at hand, why did britain not want to ally with germany? In your view?

I think we diddn't because we did not want to submit to fascism and the rule of tyrants. What other reason is there?

Reply 47

Giliwoo

Zebedee

Read everything I said about Versailles. The stuff below the Italics. That is "why ww2 was fought", as you asked. The reason I posted that stuff about Nazi Policy was to show why Britain was so suspicious of Hitler, and, more importantly, why you should beware of looking at European foreign relations at this time, with ideological assumptions.