On this Day in History

16 December
1942: Operation Little Saturn is launched. Leading the pathetic relief operation, Manstein begins to worry about his left flank.

Despite Soviet incompetence like unnecessarily diverting 2nd Guards to block a pathetic relief operation, using too many troops against starving 6th Army, coordination issues with the armies for Little Saturn, 5th Tank Army attacking piecemeal (harming themselves), poor training, poor coordination, the Soviets still managed to encircle over half of Italian 8th Army.

Why do you think you're a better strategist than every WWII general, out of interest?

Well first of all we have our strong hindsight while those generals don't.

Second now we know that the Soviets put too many troops in Stalingrad after the encirclement. We also know the precarious supply situation of the Germans from around late-September. By October the Germans had placed boatloads of their horses from 6th Army to Rostov, preventing 6th Army from moving. That plus various supply issues that forced rationing even before the encirclement meant that it was over for 6th from October 14.

The Oct 14 attack was merely a last gasp that put 6th Army even further into the Soviet trap (which was actually decent).

No wonder why the Germans were caught quite unprepared when Uranus came. Even if the Germans knew, they were simply too exhausted to do anything from mid-October.

And yet you misuse said hindsight spectacularly with every counter factual...

Not sure why you're using this argument of your dozens, the more amusing being that the Germans were both an exceptionally powerful war machine whilst simultaneously being incompetent and easily beatable..

Case in point, counter factuals are ridiculous as is being an arm chair historian. Not least in that wiki/youtube are not sources any academic would countenance..

First of all, counterfactuals are actually useful to see what might've happened had something changed, which is far from 'ridiculous'.

Anyway, some of my points, about Stalingrad, concerning Soviet mistakes (as well as what could've been done to avoid them):
1. Lack of coordination and training during Kotluban Offensives
For instance, lack of communication, poor training, like attacking prematurely, attacking piecemeal etc.
OTL, Wietersheim's 14th Panzer Corp barely avoided destruction when it was relieved on 2 Sep 1942.
ATL, with more competent Soviets (for instance better commanders, slightly earlier emphasis on radios, communication), Wietersheim's Corp would be destroyed, which would leave 6th Army not able to cross the Don. They might even be forced back to the Chir.

Additionally, the Germans were quite overstretched even before reaching the city. They were insanely overstretched by late-September, with logistics issues.
By late-September, the Germans were of course exhausted, it took half a month to launch a last-gasp offensive.
The final nail in the coffin was October 14. After the attack the Germans simply were too tired to do anything.

But to be fair, despite various Soviet incompetences, the Kotluban Offensives did divert 6th Army units.

2. Zhukov attacking Germans first on October 14
This allowed the Germans to get deeper into Stalingrad than indeed the case. Had Zhukov decided to defend instead, the Germans would be more exhausted.

3. Units not in position
I've heard that during the October 14 offensive, a unit wasn't placed in the right spot, which meant the encirclement of other units and the further deterioration of the front. Had the order been given a bit in advance this could've been avoided.

4. Confusion and lack of control during Uranus execution
I know it's a bit nitpicky, but if the Soviets had planned slightly earlier like mid-September, after realising that Kotluban offensives won't encircle 6th Army.
Confusion and lack of control caused the Soviet 4th and 13th Mechanized Corps to stumble as they began to exploit the breakthroughs achieved by the opening offensive, at least according to Beevor.

5. (not that related) Incompetence during Battle of Rzhev summer 1942
"Soviet commanders did not have the latitude (or sometimes the imagination) to develop flexible tactics and often rigidly executed orders from above, even if it meant attacking head on across the same ground for days or even weeks at a time." (Gerasimova 2013, p. 101: Quoted conversation between Stalin and Antonov)
"The continued Russian tank attacks were in danger of swamping the defence, but Soviet infantry tactics remained crude with dense masses of men rushing forward, shouting 'Hurrah'." (Gerasimova 2013, p. 100)
Referring to this battle: (Gorbachevsky 2009, p. 139: Replacements had been brought up in rail cars, unloaded and sent into the attack the same day)
This means that there was boatloads of Soviet incompetence, like inflexible tactics.

Despite this glaring incompetence like suicidal attacks, the Soviets almost managed to cut the Rzhev-Vyazma railroad. Had the Kalinin Front attacked better, reducing incompetence and concentrating on Rzhev, it's quite possible that the Soviets could've encircled at least 6 German divisions.
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Rzhev,_summer_1942#/media/File:Battle_of_Rzhev_-_6-9_August_1942_-_Western_Front_continues_advance.jpg)

"Von Vietinghoff, acting 9th Army commander, had already committed what reserves he had against the Kalinin Front's attack and had virtually nothing on hand to stop the new Soviet advance except Army schools, teenage helpers and a few flak guns, which he positioned at strategic points. These were not going to stop Soviet tanks for very long; German defences were wide open until the arrival of the reinforcement divisions"
9th Army was on the brink of collapse.

20th December
1812: "Grimm's Fairy Tales" or "Children's and Household Tales" by Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm is first published.