Mr AnononomousHow you can call Russia a 'non-entity' is astounding. They were pivotal in the series of events. No Russia, no war. It's like calling Germany a non-entity in the Second World War. Their military strength has nothing to do with their actions.
The word 'legitimate' is subjective and I would argue there is no such thing. But let's take what you say for sake of argument, in which case, how is Russia's case anymore 'legitimate' than Austria's, Germany's, France's, Britain's etc? Surely Russia mobilising first is cause enough for 'legitimising' an appropriate response from the Germans?
Germany was no different in it's imperialist ambitions than any other major European power. She wanted her share aswell, more than a sausage factory in Tanganyika. Woodrow Wilson also 'opined' a 14 point plan and a League of Nations, but didn't sign up to it.
To be honest, the population of Europe seemed to have an appetite and zest for war, fuelled by nationalism. There was no major political force that spoke out against war and consequently, the politicians' foreign policy stance had to be seen as tough and aggressive, unwilling to back down. This would have reflected badly in diplomatic communications as nations were unwilling to compromise. The situation might well be akin to Europe pre 1815 and the Vienna treaty. The other reasoning behind the population’s support for war at the time was, especially in countries with Empires (France and Britain) was that it was seen that the model of fighting would be like those colonial victories experienced against lesser opponents. The slogan “back before Christmas” consequently added confidence and support for a ‘jolly good war against the ‘bosch’. As for Britain, it was impossible for her to remain neutral as diplomatic agreements with France (such as the entete de cordiale) meant she had to support her if her colonial agreements were to mean anything. France could also not be allowed to fall in Britain’s eyes as the use of her ports accounted for much trade and could thus not be allowed to fall into German hands.
You're using a statement like 'true' in a historical argument? No, they were decisions based on the information at the time. There is no 'truth' to the matter.
Germany, had earlier pledged on the 5th of July 1914 to give Austria its unconditional support for whatever action she wished to undertake. Russia similarly offered the same to protect Serbian sovereignty. However, unlike the Bosnian crisis of 1908, Russia did not back down this time. A series of delays and misunderstandings in diplomatic communications between Russia and Germany (known as the ‘Willy and Nicky correspondence’ and the poor reliability of the system meant crucial telegrams were not received on either side or were delayed by hours, sometimes even days. This panicked the Russians into ordering a partial mobilisation of the reserves on the 16th of July. German intelligence got wind of military movements in Russia and reported back to the German Ministry of War. Germany sent an urgent telegram to the Russians asking them to back down and stop mobilising. The telegram made the Russians even more suspicious and thus prompted them to fully mobilise on the 30th. The Germans, alarmed by this responded in kind on the 31st and declared war against Russia on 1st August 1914.
It was unfortunate that events took place during the month of July - a holiday month when politicians and diplomats were away from their desks. By the time the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had been issued on 23 July - and after a cooling-off period had been allowed by the Austro-Hungarians, who remained anxious to avoid a general conflagration - both the French Prime Minister, Rene Viviani, and President, Raymond Poincare, were away from France on a diplomatic mission to Russia. There, at St. Petersburg, they reaffirmed their support for the Tsar, Nicholas II, in his backing of Serbia.
The Germans only had one war plan should the event arise - the ‘Schliefen plan’. This revolved around mobilising troops as quickly as possible making a pre-emptive strike against an potential enemy before they could fully mobilise before a prolonged conflict could ensue. As a result, once mobilisation had started the Germans (or anyone for that matter) could not back down, as to do so would be loosing a crucial advantage over the enemy. The whole war by timetable would be lost and give time for the enemy to catch up with its mobilisation.
Military theorists of the time generally held that seizing the offensive was extremely important. This theory encouraged all of belligerents to strike first in order to gain the advantage. The window for diplomacy was shortened by this attitude. Most planners wanted to begin mobilization as quickly as possible to avoid being caught on the defensive. Some analysts have argued that mobilisation schedules were so rigid that once it was begun, they could not be cancelled without massive disruption of the country and military disorganisation. Thus, diplomatic overtures conducted after the mobilizations had begun were ignored.
As a Brit, I doubt you would. There was also no indication that Britain would get involved at all. Germany had no clue as to her colonial agreements with France and what they actually meant. For all they knew, Britain could just sit by in splendid isolation, leaving the business to sort itself out. The British Government, and its Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, attempted to mediate throughout July, reserving at all times its right to remain aloof from the dispute. It was only as the war began that the British position solidified into support for, ostensibly, Belgium. Hence the oft-levelled criticism that had Britain come out clearly on the side of Belgium and France earlier in July, war would have been avoided: Germany would have effectively instructed Austria-Hungary to settle with Serbia, especially given the latter's willingness to co-operate with Austria-Hungary.
The entente cordiale was not an alliance, let's get this straight. There was no obligation to defend one another. It was an utterly separate gentleman's agreement over their respective Empires. France did however have a SECRET military alliance with Russians years before hand.
I don't quite know what you're thinking here, or if you know how power-politics works, but you can only say with the benefit of hindsight that this would have led to the conclusive disaster. What Austria saw was an opportunity which they took. Yes they were vigorous, but it was their own back yard.
Germany probably didn't care about Serbia per-say, it was a minor player of insiginificance which was a security threat to the stability of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Franz's assassination merely gave a pretext to what had been an Austrian problem for years and to finally act upon it.
Doubtful. The Moroccan crises was designed to embarass the Old Empires and to test the strength of the entente. Nothing more. If anything, Germany saw the entente as an aggressive move by Britain and France, shifting the balance of power. It's called sabre rattling and a common facet of international politics. The Germans weren't looking for war, just a piece of the pie.
I fail to see how.