I assure you all I've read the cases, but I don't have time to read them again and I'm having a dispute with someone over the following issue:
How is the ruling in B that a deception as to the HIV status of D will not vitiate consent reconcilable with the ruling in Assange that failure to heed a condition of V that she will only have sex if a condom is used will vitiate consent?
My friend thinks that they are reconcilable on the basis that in Assange the condition was explicit, but that seems to me an odd ground of distinction. I thought the finding in B was because, notwithstanding that the particular aspect of the act, i.e. the risk of disease, wasn't consented to, the nature of the act was consented to, such that there could be no complaint of rape.
Is it simply a judgment that protection goes more towards the nature of the act that risk of disease?
Thanks in advance.